liftKElIY 

LiSRARY 

UNIVERilTY   Of 
CALIPORMIA 


HARVARD  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 


I.  The  English  Patents  of  Monopoly.  ByWU- 
liam  H.  Price.    8vo. 

II.  The  Lodging  House  Problem  in  Boston. 
By  Albert  B.  Wolfe.    8vo. 

III.  The  Stannaries:  A  Study  of  the  English 
Tin  Miner.    By  George  R.  Lewis.    8vo. 

IV.  Railroad  Reorganization.  By  Stuart  Dag- 
gett.   8vo. 

V.  Wool-Growing  and  the  Tariff.  By  Chester 
W.  Wright.    8vo. 

VI.  Public  Ownership  of  Telephones  on  the 
Contment  of  Europe.  By  Arthur  N.  Hol- 
combe.    8vo. 

VII.  The  History  of  the  British  Post  Office. 
By  J,  C.  Hemmeon.    8vo. 

Vni.  The  Cotton  Manufacturing  Industry  of 
the  United  States.  By  M.  T.  Copeland. 
8vo. 

IX.  The  History  of  the  Grain  Trade  in  France. 
By  Abbott  Payson  Usher.    8vo. 

X.  Corporate  Promotions  and  Reorganiza- 
tions. By  A.  S.  Dewing.  8vo. 

XL  The  Anthracite  Coal  Combination  in  the 
United  States.    By  Eliot  Jones.    8vo. 

XIL  Some  Aspects  of  the  Tariff  Question.  By 
F.  W.  Taussig.    8vo. 

Xm.  The  Evolution  of  the  English  Corn 
Market  from  the  Twelfth  to  the  Eighteenth 
Century.  By  N.  S.  B.  Gras.  8vo. 


XIV.  Social  Adaptation:  A  Study  in  the 
Development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Adapta- 
tion as  a  Theory  of  Social  Progress.  By 
L.  M.  Bristol.    8vo. 

XV.  The  Financial  History  of  Boston,  from 
May  1, 1822,  to  January  31,  igog.  By  C.  P. 
Huse.    8vo. 

XVI.  Essays  in  the  Earlier  History  of  Amer- 
ican Corporations.  By  J.  S.  Davis.  8vo. 
3  volumes. 

XVn.  The  State  Tax  Commission.  By  ILL. 
Lutz.    8vo. 

XVIII.  The  Early  English  Customs  System. 
By  N.  S.  B.  Gras.    8vo. 

XIX.  Trade  and  Navigation  between  Spain 
and  the  Indies  in  the  time  of  the  Hapsburgs. 
By  C.  H.  Haring.    8vo. 

XX.  The  Italian  Emigration  of  Our  Times. 
By  R.  F.  Foerster.     8vo. 

XXI.  The  Mesta:  A  Study  in  Spanish  Eco- 
nomic History,  1 273-1836.  By  Julius 
Klein.    8vo. 

XXII.  Argentine  International  Trade  imder 
Inconvertible  Paper  Money:  1 880-1 900. 
By  J.  H.  Williams.    8vo. 

XXIII.  The  Organization  of  the  Boot  and 
Shoe  Industry  in  Massachusetts  before  1875. 
By  Blanche  E.  Hazard.     8vo. 


HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
CAMBRIDGE,  MASS.,  U.S.A. 


HARVARD  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 

PUBLISHED   UNDER  THE  DIRECTION  OF 
THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ECONOMICS 

VOL.  XIV 


SOCIAL  ADAPTATION 

A  STUDY  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE 

DOCTRINE  OF  ADAPTATION  AS  A  THEORY 

OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS 


BY 

LUCIUS  MOODY  BRISTOL,  Ph.D. 

ASSISTAKT  PROFESSOR  OF  SOCIOLOGY  IN 
WEST  VIRGINIA  UNrVERSITY 


WITH  A  PREFACE  BY 

THOMAS  NIXON  CARVER 


AWARDED  THE  DAVID  A.  WELLS  PRIZE  FOR 
THE  YEAR  1914-15.  AND  PUBLISHED  FROM 
THE  INCOME  OF  THE  DAVID  A.  WELLS  FUND 


CAMBRIDGE 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

Oxford  University  Press 

1921 


COPYRIGHT,  19  IS 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

First  Impression,  January,  1916 
Second  Impression,  December,  1919 
Third  Impression,  July,  192 1 


HM  IOC 


TO  MY  WIFE 


00155 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface ix 


PART  I 
Introduction 3 

CHAPTER  I 

AuGUSTE  CoMTE.     Comtc's  Positive  Philosophy  a  Prolegomenon  to 

Sociology 12 

CHAPTER  n 
Herbert  Spencer.    Cosmic  Evolution .      29 

CHAPTER  in 
Sociological  Methodology: 

L.  A.  J.  Qu^telet.    The  Statistical  Method 43 

Paul  Von  Lilienfeld.    The  Analogical  Method 47 

Guillaume  De  Greef.    Classification  as  a  Method  of  Sociological 

Knowledge 49 

PART  II 
PASSIVE  PHYSICAL  AND  PHYSIO-SOCIAL  ADAPTATION 

CHAPTER  IV 
Biological  Evolution: 

Jean  Baptiste  de  Lamarck.    Use-Inheritance 56 

Charies  Darwin.    Natural  Selection 58 

August  Weismann.    Continuity  of  the  Germ-Plasm 68 

Hugo  de  Vries.    Mutations 70 

Johann  Gregor  Mendel.    Independent  Unit  Characters  .     ...  71 

CHAPTER  V 

Neo-Darwtnian  Sociologists: 

Friedrich  Nietzsche.    Evolution  of  the  Super-Man 80 

Benjamin  Kidd.    Religion  and  Social  Progress 85 

Galton  and  Pearson.    National  Eugenics 92 

Vacher  de  Lapouge.    Societal  Selections 99 

V  ♦ 


VI  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Environmental  School  of  Sociologists: 

Karl  Marx.    Economic  Determinism 103 

Henry  Thomas  Buckle.    Intellect  and  Environment 105 

Ratzel  —  Semple.    Anthropo-Geography iii 

William  Z.  Ripley.    Race  and  Environment 1x5 

PART  III 

PASSIVE  SPIRITUAL  ADAPTATION 

CHAPTER  VII 

Development  of  the  Concept  of  Society  as  an  Organism: 

Albert  Schaffle.    The  Social  Organism 123 

J.  S.  Mackenzie.    An  Idealistic  Interpretation  of  Social  Progress  128 

Gustav  Le  Bon.    The  Psychology  of  Peoples 133 

Emile  Durkheim.    Social  Reahsm 138 

Further  Development  of  the  Organic  Concept 145 

CHAPTER  Vm 

The  Anthropological  Sociologists: 

William  G.  Sumner.    Folkways 152 

Franz  Boas.    Opportunity  and  Race  Progress 155 

Westermarck,  Hobhouse,  Thomas 159 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Historical  Sociologists: 

Ludwig  Gumplowicz.    Progress  by  Inter-Group  Conflict  ....  162 

Gustav  Ratzenhofer.    Interests 170 

Walter  Bagehot.    Discussion  and  Animated  Moderation  ....  177 

CHAPTER  X 

SoaoLOGiSTS    Emphasizing    One    All-Important    Formula    or 
Principle: 

Adam  Smith.    Fellow-Feeling  v.  Self-interest 182 

Gabriel  Tarde.    Imitation 185 

James  Mark  Baldwin.    The  Dialectic  of  Growth 192 

Henry  Drummond.    Struggle  for  the  Life  of  Others 199 

Franklin  H.  Giddings.    Consciousness  of  Kind 201 

CHAPTER  XI 

Transition  from  Passive  to  Active  Adaptation: 

The  Problem  and  Attempts  at  Solution 208 

The  Sociological  Significance  of  the  Free- Will  Controversy  ...  213 

John  Fiske.    The  Prolongation  of  Infancy 214 


CONTENTS  VU 

PART  IV 
ACTIVE  MATERIAL  ADAPTATION 

CHAPTER  XII 

Invention  and  Production: 

Lester  Frank  Ward.    Material  as  the  Basis  of  Spiritual  Achieve- 
ment       221 

Simon  N.  Patten.     Pain-Pleasure-Creative  Economy 236 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Invention  and  Production  (continued) : 

Thomas  Nixon  Carver.    The  Super-Group 245 

PART  V 
ACTIVE  SPIRITUAL  ADAPTATION 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Active  Social  Adaptation: 

Jacques  Novicow.     Social  Progress  by  Cultural  Attraction  and 

Expansion 268 

CHAPTER  XV 

Active  Social  Adaptation  (continued): 

Thomas  Carlyle.    The  Role  of  the  Great  Man 283 

William  James.    The  Energies  of  Men 286 

Edward  Alsworth  Ross.    The  Psychology  of  Social  Control .    .    .  291 

CHAPTER  XVI 

Idealization  and  Religion: 

According  to  Comte 299 

According  to  Ross 301 

According  to  Baldwin 304 

CHAPTER  XVII 

SUMIIARY  AND  CONCLUSION 313 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 333 

INDEX 343 


PREFACE 

The  doctrine  of  biological  evolution  did  not  originate  with 
Darwin  or  with  any  other  modern  scientist.  It  is  as  old  as  human 
speculation.  Darwin's  supreme  contribution  was  his  positive 
proof  that  the  method  of  evolution  was  the  method  of  natural 
selection,  of  trial  and  rejection,  of  extermination  and  survival. 
Since  his  day  biological  evolution  has  meant  a  definite  process 
capable  of  being  studied  in  detail,  tested  and  verified.  Before 
his  time  it  was  only  a  generalization,  a  guess  as  to  how  things 
might  very  well  have  been,  without  any  definite  proof  that  they 
were  actually  so. 

The  concept  of  social  evolution  has  gone  through,  or  is  going 
through,  a  similar  course  of  development.  This  concept  also  is 
as  old  as  human  speculation.  It  has  generally  been,  however, 
only  a  vague  speculation,  a  guess  as  to  how  things  socially  might 
conceivably  have  come  about,  a  vague  idea  of  an  unfolding 
process.  A  little  more  definiteness  has  come  into  the  theory  by 
the  attempt  to  trace  the  successive  stages  of  evolution.  A 
treatise  on  this  subject,  however,  is  rather  a  book  of  social  genesis 
than  a  book  on  social  evolution.  Until  some  one  is  able  to 
point  out  the  factors  and  forces  which  bring  about  social  evolu- 
tion, to  show  the  method  and  the  process,  it  will  not  have  become 
a  scientific  concept. 

In  fact,  Comte's  three  stages  of  mental  development  are  beauti- 
fully illustrated  in  the  development  of  the  concept  of  social  evolu- 
tion. The  theological  stage  is  represented  by  the  doctrine  of  a 
divine  providence  moulding  himian  history  and  leading  mankind 
along  by  a  preordained  path.  The  metaphysical  stage  is  repre- 
sented by  most  current  theories  of  social  evolution  which  only 
point  out  that  society,  like  a  biological  organism,  grows,  and  that 
its  growth  presumably  is  the  result  of  some  impersonal  force  or 
principle,  rather  than  the  personal  interference  of  a  supernatural 
being. 


X  PREFACE 

The  world  was  prepared  to  believe  much  more  easily  in  Dar- 
win's theory  of  biological  evolution  than  it  is  today  prepared  to 
believe  in  a  similarly  definite  doctrine  of  social  evolution.  It  is 
true  that  Darwin's  theory  ran  counter  to  certain  traditional 
theological  beliefs  of  that  day.  The  real  concept  of  social  evolu- 
tion will  run  counter  to  much  deeper  currents  of  belief  and  tradi- 
tion that  still  persist  in  the  world  in  this  twentieth  century.  It 
will  necessitate  a  complete  reorganization  of  our  theories  of 
morals,  and  of  most  of  the  ideals  of  the  cultured  classes.  When 
it  is  stated,  for  example,  by  a  great  biological  evolutionist,  that 
nature  is  non-moral,  or  that  one  is  not  able  to  discern  a  moral 
order  of  the  universe,  the  issue  is  pretty  squarely  drawn  and  the 
fundamental  conflict  of  ideas  is  very  clearly  presented.  It  liter- 
ally means  that  the  person  who  makes  such  a  remark  is  not  yet 
prepared  to  apply  the  method  of  evolution  to  morals,  social  ideals 
and  rehgious  concepts. 

The  method  of  evolution  is  not  simply  a  recognition  that  things 
go  through  certain  processes  of  development.  Many  people 
imagine  themselves  to  be  moral  evolutionists  when  they  admit 
that  moral  ideals  change  and  develop.  They  are  not  real  evolu- 
tionists until  they  are  wilHng  to  recognize  that  the  processes  of 
natural  selection,  of  trial  and  rejection,  of  extermination  and 
survival  apply  to  moral  principles  and  social  ideals  as  well  as  to 
biological  forms.  To  say  that  nature  is  non-moral  is  merely  to 
say  that  one  is  not  able  to  see  that  nature  recognizes  what  one 
has  been  taught  to  believe  to  be  moral.  To  say  that  one  cannot 
discern  a  moral  order  of  the  universe,  is  merely  to  say  that  one 
cannot  perceive  that  the  order  of  the  universe  harmonizes  with 
what  one  has  believed  to  be  moral.  Until  one  is  prepared  to  face 
about  and  say  that  nature  is  moral  and  that  if  it  does  not  har- 
monize with  what  we  have  previously  believed  to  be  moral,  that 
is  a  demonstration  that  our  ideas  of  morality  have  been  wrong, 
or  that  if  he  cannot  discern  a  harmony  between  the  order  of  the 
universe  and  his  system  of  morals,  that  is  a  demonstration  that 
his  system  of  morals  is  wrong,  he  is  not  a  true  evolutionist.  In 
other  words,  one  must  admit  that  whatever  the  order  of  the 
universe  is,  that  is  the  moral  order.    This  will  prepare  him  for 


PREFACE  XI 

the  application  of  natural  selection  to  moral  codes  and  social 
ideals.  That  moral  code  which  works  best,  which  fits  the  people 
who  follow  it  to  survive  by  making  them  strong  and  efficient  is 
per  se  the  best  moral  code.  Whether  we  like  it  or  not,  such 
people  will  rule  the  earth  and  crowd  out  of  existence  other  people 
who  follow  different  codes  which  make  for  less  efficiency.  As  the 
present  writer  has  said  elsewhere,  one  might  as  well  say  that  he 
is  unable  to  perceive  a  hygienic  order  of  the  universe  merely 
because  what  he  has  believed  to  be  hygienic  practice  does  not 
secure  him  good  health,  or  that  he  does  not  discover  a  harmony 
between  the  order  of  the  universe  and  his  supposedly  hygienic 
practices.  If  morality  is  social  hygiene,  then  we  must  apply  the 
same  test  to  our  moral  practices  and  beliefs  that  we  are  compelled 
to  apply  to  our  hygienic  practices  and  behefs.  If  our  hygienic 
beliefs  do  not  seem  to  work  in  matters  of  health,  we  will,  if  we 
are  wise,  change  our  beliefs,  rather  than  try  to  change  the  uni- 
verse. Similarly,  if  our  moral  practices  and  beliefs  do  not  seem 
to  work,  we  must  change  our  moral  practices  and  beliefs  rather 
than  try  to  change  the  universe. 

It  will  require  a  much  greater  mental  revolution  to  adjust  our- 
selves to  this  new  doctrine  of  social  evolution  than  it  ever  took 
to  adjust  ourselves  to  a  biological  doctrine  of  evolution.  The 
beliefs  that  were  involved  then  were  only  traditional  beliefs 
regarding  the  Creation.  These  beliefs  were  never  very  deep- 
seated,  and  a  single  generation  was  sufficient  to  bring  about  the 
discarding  of  the  old  and  the  adoption  of  the  new;  but  our 
fundamental  notions  of  right  and  wrong  are  very  much  older 
than  the  Biblical  story  of  the  Creation,  and  very  much  more 
deep-seated.  To  have  to  give  up,  for  example,  a  cherished  belief 
regarding  democracy,  or  socialism,  or  individualism,  or  culture, 
or  gentlemanly  conduct,  or  as  to  what  constitutes  virtue,  in  order 
to  square  ourselves  with  the  facts  of  the  universe,  will  involve 
such  a  mental  struggle  that  very  few  can  be  expected  to  come 
through  it  very  successfully  in  any  single  generation.  Neverthe- 
less, the  process  is  going  on.  They  will  rule  the  world  who  are 
best  fitted  to  rule  the  world  by  virtue  of  their  strength  and  effi- 
ciency, not  by  virtue  of  the  assumed  beauty  or  persuasive  power  o£ 


xli  PREFACE 

their  ideals.  They  who  are  unfitted  will  perish  as  certainly  as  did 
the  dinosaur  or  the  mastodon,  regardless  of  their  apparent  bigness 
or  assumed  attractiveness.  It  will  be  well  with  any  people  which 
undergoes  this  mental  revolution  early,  and  begins  first  to  study 
how  it  may  adjust  itself,  its  moral  practices,  its  social  ideals, 
to  the  hard  conditions  of  universal  law.  To  do  so  is  to  prove 
itself  to  be  the  superior  race  or  chosen  people.  To  refuse  to  do 
so  is  to  elect  extermination  rather  than  survival,  death  rather 
than  life. 

Dr.  Bristol  has  done  a  notable  service  in  tracing  the  develop- 
ment of  this  concept  of  social  evolution  or  progress.  From  the 
formidable  Hst  of  authorities  quoted,  and  the  volume  of  his  quo- 
tations and  citations,  it  is  apparent  that  this  topic  has  received 
large  attention  from  students  of  social  life.  This  laborious  com- 
pilation together  with  Dr.  Bristol's  keen  analysis  and  criticism 
will  go  far  toward  making  clear  a  subject  which  has  hitherto 
been  obscure. 

T.  N.  Carver. 


PART  I 


INTRODUCTION 

The  Meaning  of  Progress.  —  Progress  is  a  word  frequently  used 
though  not  always  with  critical  precision.  The  nineteenth  cen- 
tury was  an  era  of  marvelous  increase  in  the  production  of  wealth, 
in  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  intensively  and  extensively,  in 
methods  of  social  reform  and  in  agencies  for  the  betterment  of 
unfortunate  man.  But  is  this  the  essence  of  social  progress  ? 
Ask  the  meditative  Brahman  or  the  static  celestial!  Is  movement 
always  forward  movement  ?  Is  mere  increase  a  sign  of  pros- 
perity ?  Dr.  Watkinson  ^  speaks  aptly  of  the  fallacy  of  bigness. 
The  boulder  is  vastly  bigger  than  the  diamond.  Enlargement  of 
the  hiunan  body  is  often  a  sign  of  disease.  Many  feel  that 
Carlyle  did  well  to  inveigh  against  the  gospel  of  Mammonism 
and  ridicule  the  theory  of  the  leisure  class  of  his  day;  that  John 
Ruskin's  prophetic  voice  rang  true  when  he  summoned  econo- 
mists to  a  different  evaluation  of  wealth  than  that  of  mere  inter- 
changeable goods. 

Increase  of  knowledge  is  not  always  advantageous  either  to  the 
individual  or  to  society.  Walter  Bagehot  in  praising  the  virtues 
of  stupidity  says  that  nations,  just  as  individuals,  may  be  too 
clever  to  be  practical  and  not  dull  enough  to  be  free.  "  Knowledge 
puffeth  up,"  —  sometimes  to  a  man^s  eternal  damnation.  A 
strong  prejudice  against  college  education  for  the  yoimg  man  of 
only  average  ability  prevails  among  a  certain  class  of  men  of 
affairs  and  it  is  true  that  there  are  many  whose  superior  education 
has  unfitted  them,  apparently,  to  adapt  themselves  to  life  condi- 
tions. Nor  do  all  agree  that  it  is  a  sure  sign  of  progress  that  our 
enlarged  sympathy  has  built  almshouses,  asylums  and  orphanages 
to  prolong  the  lives  of  the  weak  and  unfortunate  and  apparently 
thwart  nature's  plan  of  eliminating  the  unfit  in  the  struggle  for 
existence. 

*  The  great  Wesleyan  preacher  in  his  book  The  Education  of  the  Heart. 

3 


4  INTRODUCTION 

"  Each  of  us,"  says  Ross,  "  considers  a  change  progressive 
when  it  advances  society  toward  his  ideal.  But  one  man's  ideal 
is  freedom,  while  another's  is  order;  one  man  borrows  from  biol- 
ogy the  criterion  of  differentiation,  while  another  imports  from 
psychology  the  idea  of  harmony;  one  man's  touchstone  is  the 
happiness  of  the  many,  while  another's  is  the  perfecting  of  the 
superior  few.  It  is,  therefore,  hopeless  as  yet  to  look  for  a  test  of 
progress  that  shall  be  objective  and  vaHd  for  all.  Since  change  is 
a  matter  of  observation,  whereas  progress  is  a  matter  of  judgment 
involving  the  application  of  a  subjective  standard,  those  who 
desire  to  see  sociology  a  true  science  are  justified  in  insisting  that 
social  dynamics  deal  with  the  factors  and  manner,  not  of  social 
progress  merely,  but  of  social  change."  ^  This  is  very  true  for 
sociology  as  a  science  which  deals  with  facts  and  laws,  but  sociol- 
ogy is  also  a  philosophy  which  evaluates.  Social  science  observes 
and  systematizes  social  phenomena  and  their  relations;  but  social 
philosophy  seeks  to  understand  these  phenomena  not  merely  in 
their  relations  of  co-existence  and  sequence  but  as  a  system,  —  a 
causal  order. 

It  is  nearly  a  hundred  years  since  Augusta  Comte  gave  the 
world  his  Positive  Philosophy  as  a  theory  of  social  progress,  first  as 
lectures,  later  in  pubHshed  form.  Since  then  many  have  followed 
in  his  footsteps  and  many  more,  without  pretending  to  think 
social  phenomena  as  a  whole,  have  contributed  to  social  science 
by  the  discovery  and  formulation  of  social  laws. 

In  the  history  of  social  science  and  social  philosophy,  if  I 
observe  correctly,  one  word,  or  the  principle  of  which  it  is  the 
symbol,  stands  out  with  ever  increasing  prominence,  —  that  of 
adaptation.  It  is  the  main  purpose  of  this  book  to  trace  the 
development  of  this  doctrine  as  a  theory  of  social  progress. 

The  Value  of  Social  Philosophy, — Our  discussion  will  lead  us  to 
consider  such  questions  concerning  the  social  group,  large  and 
small,  as  have  ever  perplexed  thoughtful  souls  concerning  their 
own  existence,  whence,  how,  whither,  and  why  ?  ^  But  as  con- 
sideration of  such  ultimate  questions  is  tabooed  by  so  many  in 

1  Foundations  of  Sociology,  p.  i86. 

2  cf.  Ward,  Applied  Sociology,  p.  3. 


INTRODUCTION  J 

this  hyper-utilitarian  age  and  nation,  such  an  investigation  may 
call  for  justification. 

One  such  justification  has  been  mentioned  in  that  we  persist  in 
using  the  term  progress  despite  the  fact  that  we  are  warned  that  it 
has  no  common  meaning.  We  hear  the  query  raised  from  time  to 
time  as  to  whether  the  world  is  growing  better  or  worse.  We 
Americans  are  proverbially  boastful  of  our  superiority  as  a  nation, 
and  concerning  the  progress  we  have  made  since  the  venture  of 
'76.  But  all  such  queries  and  all  such  boasting  is  vain  unless  we 
have  a  common  standard.^ 

Such  a  study,  then,  should  aid  in  clear  and  consistent  thinking 
and  that  is  always  desirable.  To  think  logically  on  this  subject, 
may,  perchance,  help  us  to  clear  thinking  concerning  matters 
pertaining  to  bread  and  butter. 

Again,  this  is  an  age  of  social  Utopias  and  of  all  sorts  of  schemes 
looking  toward  social  amelioration.  Every  state  legislature  is 
trying  to  usher  in  the  millennium  by  force  of  statutes,  for  the  most 
part  making  sorry  work  of  its  task.  The  yellow  press  and 
maroon  magazine  as  well  as  high-grade  periodicals  fill  columns 
with  plans  for  social  reconstruction.  Writers  in  educational 
journals  as  well  as  in  the  penny  press  are  criticizing  our  present 
educational  system  and  trying  to  formulate  a  "  get-culture- 
quick  "  device  to  correspond  to  the  "  get-rich-quick  "  schemes 
that  have  been  so  fruitful,  —  to  their  promoters,  —  during  the 
past  quarter  century. 

The  one  supreme  need  of  this  hour  is  sanity  and  scientifically 
worked  out  policies  of  social  amelioration,  and  one  requisite  is  an 
attempt  to  "  see  life  steadily  and  see  it  whole,"  to  climb  some 
height  from  whose  summit  the  complexities  and  confusions  and 
contradictions  of  life  may,  perchance,  seem  to  form  one  co-ordinate 
whole,  in  which  disharmonies  enter  into  the  production  of  a 
higher  harmony.  If  the  view  does  not  thus  yield  harmony,  it 
does  at  least  yield  perspective  and  a  degree  of  imity  not  possible 
in  the  view  that  we  get  from  a  study  of  mere  details.  Such  an 
outlook  on  life  should  yield  an  inner  consistency,  purpose  and 
power  not  to  be  obtained  by  partial  views.  It  may  be,  indeed, 
*  Cf.  Fiske,  Cosmic  EvoMion,  ii,  pp.  193  £E. 


6  INTRODUCTION 

that  our  philosophy  will  be  pessimistic,  but  even  so  it  will  enter 
the  lists  to  contend  with  those  of  different  cast,  and  the  attain- 
ment of  truth,  if  this  is  a  rational  universe,  must  be  the  ultimate 
outcome,  and  with  truth,  increased  well-being.  A  second  justi- 
fication for  such  an  investigation  is  thus  to  provide  a  critique  of 
current  social  theories  and  of  schemes  for  social  regeneration. 

Social  philosophy  has  a  third  function.  Advance  in  science  is 
dependent  very  largely  on  the  possession  of  a  scientific  imagina- 
tion, —  the  power  to  jump  at  conclusions  which  become  working 
hypotheses  to  be  verified,  repudiated  or  corrected  in  the  light  of 
inductive  study.  The  western  world  is  interested  today  as  never 
before  in  the  increase  of  human  well-being.  But  social  ameliora- 
tion is  as  truly  a  science  as  physics  or  geology  though  infinitely 
more  complex.  Sane  advance  in  this  science  must  be  guided  by 
sane  philosophy.  The  latter  will  furnish  the  background  for  the 
formulation  of  laws  and  methods  of  social  advance  and  these 
should  prove  far  more  workable  than  unsophisticated  guesses. 

Spencer  in  his  Study  of  Sociology  says  that  if  you  give  a  man 
who  does  not  understand  metal  work  a  sheet  of  metal  with  a  dint 
in  it  and  ask  him  to  flatten  it  out,  he  will  take  a  hammer  and 
knock  the  dint  flat  only  to  find  that  it  has  appeared  elsewhere. 
He  tries  to  flatten  these  other  dints  but  with  like  result.^  Thus  it 
is  with  much  social  legislation  not  based  on  the  laws  of  social 
change. 

A  final  Justification  is  analogous  to  Comte's  praise  of  the  crude 
behefs  of  primitive  times.  As  those  common  behefs  in  spirits 
that  animated  and  controlled  the  phenomena  of  nature  provided 
a  unity  of  thought  as  the  necessary  background  for  unity  of 
action,  so  a  generally  accepted  theory  of  social  progress  would 
provide  an  educational  aim  that  could  be  put  into  practice;  a 
common  principle  of  legislation  that  would  make  enforcement 
easy;  a  common  goal  of  endeavor  which  might  make  possible  a 
social  reconstruction  in  the  interest  both  of  the  group  as  a  whole 
and  of  the  constituent  members. 

Comte  claimed  this  virtue  for  his  system  but  the  vagaries  of 
his  Polity  did  much  to  retard  the  spread  of  his  theory.    Since 

*  Quoted  by  Hobhouse,  Social  Evolution  and  Political  Theory,  p.  5. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

his  day  great  advance  has  been  made  and  the  leaders  of  thought 
and  life  in  the  western  world  are  coming  to  agreement  as  never 
before  on  fundamental  principles  of  life  and  progress. 

During  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  evolution 
was  the  open  sesame  to  the  interpretation  of  all  phases  of  life,  but 
this  term  has  proven  too  vague.  More  and  more  that  general 
concept  is  being  analyzed,  narrowed,  defined.  Its  place,  as  we 
shall  see,  is  being  usurped  by  the  more  definite  concept  of  adap- 
tation, which  has  already  obtained  a  foremost  place  in  educational 
philosophy,  even  in  that  narrower  and  more  conservative  sphere 
of  education  which  is  concerned  primarily  with  the  religious  phase 
of  life,  and  is  invading,  too,  the  domain  of  political  science.  A 
second  purpose  of  this  thesis,  then,  will  be  to  indicate  the  utility 
of  this  concept  of  adaptation  in  interpreting  various  phases  of 
social  endeavor. 

Method. — Our  subject  naturally  calls  for  an  analysis  of  systems 
of  social  philosophy  with  the  one  special  aim  of  showing  the  con- 
tribution of  each  to  this  doctrine  of  adaptation.  It  will  be  in  our 
province,  also,  to  investigate  the  writings  of  others  outside  the 
sphere  of  sociology  proper  who  have  contributed  to  the  develop- 
ment of  this  doctrine.  We  shall  not  attempt,  however,  to  trace 
this  development  back  in  its  several  root  forms  to  early  ages. 
Such  a  task  would  be  too  great  and  of  too  little  value.  Indeed 
this  field  has  been  cultivated  already  to  a  considerable  extent. 
Professor  Osborn  has  traced  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of 
adaptation  as  a  theory  of  biological  evolution  back  to  the  early 
Greek  physicists,  especially  to  Empedocles,^  and  Professor 
Flint's  Philosophy  of  History  contains  abundant  material  for  the 
study  of  the  use  of  this  concept  among  early  social  philosophers. 
Modern  sociology  is  generally  conceded  to  take  its  rise  from 
Auguste  Comte,  so  our  investigation  may  well  begin  with  him, 
although  reference  will  be  made  to  some  who  lived  in  an  earlier 
age. 

Several  methods  of  procedure  are  open  to  us.  The  subject 
suggests  a  historical  method,  but  inasmuch  as  the  period  covered 
is  less  than  a  century  such  a  method  presents  many  difficulties. 
*  From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin, 


8  INTRODUCTION 

Two  other  methods  are  suggested  in  Professor  Carver's  Sociol- 
ogy and  Social  Progress,  In  the  Introduction  he  analyzes 
adaptation  as  passive  and  active  material  and  passive  and 
active  social.  We  might,  then,  trace  the  development  of  each 
form  of  adaptation  from  Comte  to  the  present.  The  difficulty 
here  is  that  several  authors  have  made  contributions  bearing  on 
each  of  these  four  divisions,  and  such  a  method  would  make 
impossible  the  study  of  the  social  theory  of  an  author  as  a  whole. 
A  third  method  might  follow  the  outline  in  the  book  referred  to, 
and  discuss  the  development  of  the  doctrine  from  the  side  of 
biology,  economics,  psychology  and  the  social  sciences  including 
religion.  But  our  chief  interest  is  to  study  social  theories  rather 
than  the  writings  of  economists  and  social  scientists  except  as 
they  bear  directly  on  the  subject  in  hand,  and  here,  again,  as  in 
the  previous  case,  some  authors  have  contributed  along  several 
diifferent  lines. 

It  seems  best,  therefore,  to  discuss  the  social  theories  of  the 
writers  who  have  been  most  influential  in  the  development  of  this 
doctrine  of  adaptation  or  whose  contributions  are  most  important 
in  a  constructive  social  philosophy  built  around  this  concept,  and 
in  an  order  which  shall  be,  so  far  as  possible,  both  historical  and 
logical.  In  the  treatment  of  some  writers  attention  will  be  given 
only  to  their  specific  contribution  to  our  subject  while  in  the  case 
of  others  a  brief  outline  of  their  general  social  philosophy  will  be 
necessary  as  a  background  for  a  due  appreciation  of  that  contri- 
bution. The  work  as  a  whole  will  thus  furnish  an  approach  to  a 
constructive  social  philosophy  by  a  review  of  the  systems  of  many 
writers  not  only  in  English  but  also  in  German  and  French. 

Definition  of  Terms, — Adaptation  may  be  considered  as  a  state 
or  as  a  process.^  By  the  former  is  meant  such  relationship  be- 
tween an  organism,  species,  social  group  or  institution  as  is 
favorable  to  existence  and  growth;  by  the  latter  is  meant  the 
process  by  which  such  a  unity  becomes  and  continues  in  favorable 
relation  to  its  environment.  There  are  two  general  classes  of 
environment,  physical  or  material,  and  spiritual,  including  social, 
and  two  general  classes  of  adaptation,  passive  and  active.  By 
1  Cf.  Haeckel,  The  Last  Link,  pp.  84,  117  f. 


INTRODUCTION 


passive  adaptation  as  a  process  is  meant  the  non-purposeful 
modification  of  an  organism,  species,  social  group  or  institution 
to  suit  it  to  its  environment.  If  we  differentiate  the  process 
further,  as  above,  passive  physical  adaptation  will  comprise  the 
process  of  biological  evolution  including  permanent  somatic 
differences  in  ethnic  groups  whereas  passive  spiritual  adaptation 
will  comprise  the  evolution  of  all  psychic  factors  in  the  individual 
and  race,  and  the  expression  of  these  in  language,  mores,  laws  and 
social  institutions  (so  far  as  the  process  is  non-purposeful).  It 
thus  comprises  nearly  the  whole  process  of  education,  including 
moral  and  religious,  and  much  of  social  control.  By  active 
adaptation  is  meant  the  purposeful  modification  of  any  organic 
or  quasi-organic  unity  to  suit  it  to  its  environment  or  the  purpose- 
ful modification  of  the  environment  to  make  it  favorable  to  the 
unity.  If  we  differentiate  further,  active  material  adaptation 
will  include  the  process  of  industrial  development  while  active 
spiritual  adaptation  will  comprise  the  purposeful  adjustment  of 
the  individual  to  his  spiritual  environment,  social,  ideal  and 
transcendental,  the  work  of  true  teachers  and  social  reformers  and 
purposeful  social  control. 

*  Of  course  there  are  no  hard  and  fast  lines  between  these  divi- 
sions, but  the  above  classification  will  prove  useful  in  the  general 
discussion  of  the  subject  and  may  be  represented  by  the  following 
scheme:  — 


Kind  of  Environment 


Mode  of 
Adaptation 


Passive 


Active 


Physical  or  Material 

'  Biological  evolution  including 
relatively  permanent  differ- 
ences in  somatic  characteris- 
tics of  individuals  in  different 
races,  and  development  of 
brain  and  nervous  system  in- 

.  eluding  instincts. 


Industrial  development. 


Spiritual  (including  Social) 
Evolution  of  psychic  and  social  fac- 
tors   and    of    their    expression    in 
language,  mores,  laws  and  other 
social  institutions. 
Process    of    education    (including 
moral  and  religious). 
Genetic  social  control. 

Telic  adjustment  of  the  individual 

to  his  spiritual  (including  social) 

environment. 

Work  of  true  teachers  and  moral 

reformers. 

Telic  social  control. 


lO  INTRODUCTION 

The  complexity  of  the  task  of  social  philosophy  and  of  the 
social  problems  to  be  solved  by  the  theory  of  adaptation  is  illus- 
trated by  the  following  diagram:  — 


Let  S,  S',  and  S*  represent  three  social  groups  in  three  different  environments,  E,  E',  and  E* 
respectively.  Let  P,  P',  and  P",  represent  political  parties,  C,  C'  and  C  church  organizations 
and  F,  F'  and  F*  family  groups,  the  individuals  in  each  case  being  represented  by  I,  V  and  F. 
Sociology  has  as  its  scope  to  describe  and  if  possible  explain  the  following:  (i)  the  physical 
and  psychical  differences  that  characterize  the  individuals  of  the  three  groups  as  determined 
by  use  of  the  normal  frequency  curve;  (2)  the  socio-psychical  differences  between  the  groups 
considered  as  unities;  (3)  the  reciprocal  relations  between  each  group  and  its  physical  en- 
vironment, i.  e.,  between  S  and  E,  S'  and  E',  S"  and  E";  (4)  the  reciprocal  relations  between 
each  group  and  its  constituent  social  organizations,  i.  e.,  between  S  and  P,  C  and  F,  S'  and  P', 
C  and  F'  and  S"  and  P*,  C  and  F";  (s)  the  reciprocal  relations  between  each  group  and  its 
constituent  members,  i.  e,,  between  S  and  I,  S'  and  I',  S"  and  F;  (6)  the  reciprocal  relations 
between  the  organizations  in  each  society,  i.  e.,  between  P  and  C,  C  and  F,  P  and  F,  etc.;  (7) 
the  reciprocal  relations  between  each  organization  and  its  constituent  members,  i.  e.,  between 
P  and  I,  C  and  I,  and  F  and  I,  etc.  But  each  group  has  its  super-organic  environment,  that  is, 
S  is  in  relation  with  S'  and  S",  etc.  This  complicates  the  problem  further  as  follows:  Each 
social  organization  is  in  reciprocal  relations  with  similar  organizations  in  each  of  the  other 
groups,  each  individual  in  one  group  is  subject  to  influences  from  any  individual  in  another 
group,  and,  indeed,  one  group  as  a  unit  may  conceivably  be  modified  by  an  individual  from 
another  group.  This  complication,  however,  is  even  less  important  than  one  arising  from  the 
fact  that  the  intra-group  organizations  overlap,  as  indicated  by  the  intersecting  circles,  so  an 
individual  may  belong  to  two  or  more  organizations.  At  times  there  is  conflict  of  interests 
between  the  individual  and  the  organization  to  which  he  belongs  or  between  the  organizations 
as  unities. 

Social  philosophy  as  before  suggested  has  as  its  task  to  see  the 
whole  social  process  as  a  unity,  if  possible,  and  out  of  the  chaos  of 


INTRODUCTION  II 

these  inter-relations  and  conflict  of  interests  find  an  underlying 
harmony.  It  must  not  only  interpret  the  past,  but  in  the  light  of 
this  forecast  the  future,  and  if  possible  point  the  way  of  larger  life 
to  every  thinking  individual  and  purposeful  group,  —  the  way  of 
more  complete  adaptation  both  passive  and  active. 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  thus  to  show  how  the  doctrine  of 
adaptation  is  coming  more  and  more  to  be  considered  as  the  key 
to  social  philosophy  and  its  manifold  problems,  and  how  this 
doctrine  has  evolved  until  at  present  it  is  being  applied  to  the 
process  by  which  man  and  social  groups,  by  taking  thought, 
transform  their  material  and  spiritual  environment,  and  to  the 
process  by  which  they  become  conformed  into  more  or  less  agree- 
ment with  their  ideals  and  with  the  World  All  or  God. 


CHAPTER  I 

AUGUSTE  COMTE  (i  798-1857) 

Comte's  Positive  Philosophy  a  Prolegomenon  to 
Sociology  ^ 

Short  as  is  our  life,  and  feeble  as  is  our  reason  we  cannot  emancipate  ourselves 
from  the  influence  of  our  environment.  Even  the  wildest  dreamers  reflect  in  their 
dreams  the  contemporary  social  state.  —  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  11. 

AuGUSTE  CoMTE  in  his  life  and  philosophy  is  a  striking  confirma- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  relativity  expressed  in  the  above  quotation, 
—  a  doctrine  which  forms  such  an  important  part  of  his  teaching 
and  one  which  is  closely  related  to  the  doctrine  of  adaptation. 
His  relation  to  his  age,  to  his  race,  to  his  generation,  to  his  local 
environment  may  be  discerned  with  a  good  deal  of  clearness,  and 
hereditary  traits  and  the  experiences  of  his  personal  life  are  re- 
flected in  his  system  of  philosophy  and  in  the  theory  of  social 
reconstruction  elaborated  in  his  Polity,^ 

1  Owing  to  the  controversy  among  the  students  of  Comte  as  to  the  imity  of 
his  writings,  our  analysis  will  be  confined  almost  entirely  to  the  Cours  with  quota- 
tions from  the  well-known  English  summary  by  Miss  Martineau.  The  Cours 
was  the  making  of  Comte's  reputation  and  on  it  is  based  almost  exclusively  his 
influence  on  sociology.  His  romantic  love  experience  with  Clotilda  de  Vaux  had 
a  profoimd  effect  on  his  life  and  thought,  and  ever  after  that  the  "  heart "  was 
given  a  place  of  pre-eminence  over  the  intellect.  The  Polity  adds  little  else  essential 
to  social  philosophy  except  the  exposition  of  idealism  and  religion  which  we  will 
discuss  in  a  later  chapter.     See  Flint,  Philosophy  of  History,  pp.  259  f . 

For  the  influence  of  Clotilda  de  Vaux  see  Systime,  Preface;  also  A  General  View 
(Bridges),  pp.  242  f. 

*  "  Comte  was  the  son  of  a  revolutionary  epoch,  —  a  time  full  of  jarring  opposi- 
tions, full  of  imsolved  problems.  For  this  reason,  he  who  attempts  at  any  time  to 
penetrate  deeper  into  the  peculiarity  of  his  doctrines  and  of  his  personality  that 
he  may  make  real  to  himself  the  things  which  the  great  world  taught  Comte  to  know 
in  later  life,  should  never  forget  under  what  conditions  and  imder  the  influence 
of  what  teachers  the  youth  grew  to  manhood.  He  must  know  the  pictures  that 
met  his  gaze,  the  words  that  filled  his  ears,  the  problems  that  pressed  ceaselessly 
upon  his  mind."  Waentig,  A.  Comte  und  seine  Bedeutungfiir  die  Entmckelung  der 
Socialwissenschaft,  p.  43;  cf.,  however,  ibid.,  p.  207,  where  Waentig  claims  that 
Comte's  philosophy  was  essentially  "  unfrench." 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  fj 

A  Frenchman  of  the  south,  warm-blooded,  impulsive,  senti- 
mental yet  withal  practical;  drilled  in  early  youth  under  the 
educational  ideal  of  his  day  with  special  emphasis  on  mathematics 
and  logic;  taught  to  seek  in  all  things  system  and  imity;  breath- 
ing from  earliest  years  the  spirit  of  revolt  from  all  external 
authority;  so  influenced  by  his  social  environment  and  especially 
by  one  master  that  his  rebellious  nature  found  expression  at 
fourteen  years  of  age  by  turning  from  the  catholic-royahstic 
principles  of  his  parents  to  become  a  free- thinking  republican; 
steeping  his  yoimg  precocious  mind  in  the  French  philosophical 
writings  of  the  eighteenth  century  which  were  grossly  material- 
istic, together  with  the  writings  of  Hume  and  the  English  econo- 
mists; conscious  of  the  failure  of  Rousseau  and  his  followers  to 
regenerate  society,  and  of  the  failure,  too,  of  the  retrogressive 
theory  of  de  Maistre  and  the  sentimental  schemes  of  Owen, 
LeBlanc,  Fourier  and  Saint-Simon,  Comte  saw  at  last  the  possi- 
bilities of  the  scientific  method  applied  to  social  phenomena  and 
wrought  out  that  system  of  social  philosophy  which  in  broad 
outline  stands  as  the  foundation  of  the  prevailing  theories  of 
social  progress  today.^ 

It  has  been  said  that  all  the  elements  in  the  Positive  Philosophy 
may  be  found  in  earHer  systems.^  Comte  devotes  one  whole 
chapter  to  a  review  and  criticism  of  the  methods  and  conclusions 
of  some  of  his  most  illustrious  predecessors  in  the  field  of  social 
philosophy  including  Aristotle,  Montesquieu,  Condorcet  and 
Adam  Smith  whom  he  praises  as  an  exception  to  the  economists 
for  whom  otherwise  he  has  little  use.^  He  omits  all  mention  of 
Saint-Simon,  however,  doubtless  owing  to  his  pique  against  the 
one  whom  he  recognized  as  master  till  their  break  in  1834, 
although  he  was  indebted  to  Saint-Simon  more  than  to  any  one 
else  not  only  for  his  enthusiasm  for  social  regeneration  but  also  for 
some  of  the  most  important  principles  of  his  Positive  Philosophy.^ 

^  Cf .  L€vy-Bruhl,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy  in  France,  pp.  394-396.  Waen- 
tig,  op.  cit.,  pp.  221  ff.,  387  fE.     Mill,  Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  52. 

2  For  catalogue  of  sources  of  Comte's  philosophy,  see  Defoumey,  La  Sociologie 
Positive,  pp.  352  ff. 

'  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  61  f. 

*  For  an  able  discussion  of  the  controversy  as  to  the  dependence  of  Comte  on 


14  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Comte  was  not  so  much  an  original  thinker  as  a  system  builder, 
but  so  well  did  he  do  his  task  that  social  philosophy  since  his  day 
has  done  little  more  than  to  fill  in  his  outline  and  correct  and  sup- 
plement his  method.  Thus  the  Positive  Philosophy  may  not  in- 
aptly be  termed  a  prolegomenon  to  sociology,  and  the  more  so 
as  the  conscious  aim  of  his  work  was  introductory  rather  than 
exhaustive  or  even  technically  scientific.^ 

A  brief  survey  of  his  social  philosophy  is  necessary  for  an  appre- 
ciation of  his  place  as  the  founder  of  the  new  science  and  of  his 
contribution  to  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social 
progress. 

Of  first  importance  is  Comte's  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  a 
social  philosophy  as  the  basis  of  social  reorganization.^  This  was 
the  natural  outcome  of  the  reaction  of  such  a  character  on  such  an 
age.  It  was  a  period,  as  he  well  observed,  of  intellectual,  moral 
and  social  anarchy,^  and  he  felt  that  these  were  vitally  related 
and  that  for  social  adjustment  and  moral  vigor  there  must  be 

Saint-Simon,  see  Barth,  Philosophie  der  Geschichte  als  Sociologie,  pp.  56,  57.  He 
mentions  the  following  contributions  of  Saint-Simon  to  social  philosophy,  most  of 
which  were  made  use  of  by  Comte:  (i)  Politics  is  a  positive  science,  i.  e.,  a  science 
depending  on  observations  as  positive  as  those  of  physics.  (2)  The  total  condition 
of  society  and  not  merely  the  constitution  of  the  state  is  its  object.  (3)  The 
process  of  the  development  of  the  human  mind  follows  a  fixed  direction  parallel  with 
the  philosophy  of  life,  —  from  theology  through  metaphysics  more  and  more  to 
positive  science,  and  in  practical  life  from  militarism  to  industrialism.  [Though 
this  thought  is  found  in  Turgot,  Whittaker,  Comte  and  Mill,  p.  14,  claims  it  was  an 
independent  discovery  on  the  part  of  Comte.]  (4)  Each  philosophical  system  is 
bound  up  with  a  political  system  which  is  grounded  upon  it,  at  every  stage  of  the 
process  of  this  spiritual  development.  But  besides  this  every  political  system 
rests  also  on  a  certain  arrangement  (Ordnung)  of  property  rights  and  method  of 
production  which  results  in  a  definite  class  formation.  (5)  He  gives  for  the  first 
time  a  sketch  of  the  history  of  this  class  formation  in  which  he  confines  himself  to 
France  with  side  glances  to  England.  (6)  He  desires  thus  to  raise  history  from 
literature  to  science.  "  Ahnost  every  one  of  these  items,"  says  Barth,  "  became  a 
suggestion  to  new  thoughts  and  investigations  for  Saint-Simon's  scholar,  A.  Comte, 
who  endeavored  to  build  up  the  science  proposed  by  Saint-Simon,  and  to  carry  out 
to  complete  unity  what  flitted  before  the  mind  of  the  other  in  merest  outline."  The 
last  part  of  (4)  and  (5)  which  were  fundamental  with  Saint-Simon  were  almost 
ignored  by  Comte.     Cf.  also,  Ferras,  Etude  sur  la  Philosophie,  pp.  313  fif. 

1  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  ch.  II. 

2  Ibid.,  i,  pp.  14,  16;  ii,  pp.  31,  41  ff.,  165,  489-522.     A  General  View,  ch.  II. 
'  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  9,  30,  31. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  1 5 

unity  of  thought  and  conviction.  His  philosophical  training 
made  acceptable  the  suggestion  of  a  scientific  interpretation  of 
social  phenomena  such  as  had  already  been  attempted  by 
Montesquieu,  Condorcet  and  Saint-Simon.  It  remained  for  him 
to  work  out  a  complete  system  in  outline  which  he  felt  sure  would 
be  so  convincing  as  to  win  speedy  and  wide-spread  acceptance 
and  make  social  regeneration  possible.^  The  fact  that  the  scien- 
tific method  had  reached  the  domain  of  social  phenomena  was 
proof  to  him  that  it  offered  the  only  possible  workable  basis  for 
practical  politics.^  He  could  not  but  admire  the  organization  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  church  and  the  power  it  possessed  ^  but  he 
could  not  agree  with  de  Maistre  that  it  had  potency  for  social 
reform  because  it  stood  for  a  theological  interpretation  of  life, 
i.  e.,  a  belief  in  personality  as  the  mainspring  of  action  rather 
than  natural  laws.  He  could  not  agree  any  better,  however, 
with  the  social  philosophers  of  his  day  who  following  Rousseau 
beheved  in  a  "return  to  nature"  which  seemed  to  him  a  denial 
of  social  evolution.  The  metaphysicians  had  performed  their 
task  by  destroying  the  faith  of  the  people  in  the  teachings  of 
theology,  but  with  this  had  come  a  destruction  of  moral  authority 
and  a  decay  in  personal  and  social  life  which  Comte  would  bring 
back.  "  The  object  of  all  my  labor,"  he  wrote  in  1825,  "  has 
been  to  re-establish  in  society  something  spiritual  that  is 
capable  of  counterbalancing  the  influence  of  the  ignoble  ma- 
terialism in  which  we  are  at  present  submerged."  *  Catholicism 
stood  for  order  but  was  incapable  of  inspiring  progress.  The 
destruction  of  Catholicism  seemed  necessary  for  progress  but 
such  a  movement  had  led  to  anarchy.  Comte 's  task  was  to 
synthesize  order  and  progress  and  thus  destroy  the  condition  of 
anarchy  in  morals  and  politics  which  reigned  in  his  day,  and  his 
method  was  by  an  appeal  to  science. 

Comte's  belief  that  the  intellect  always  and  of  necessity  led  in 
social  progress  was  further  reason  for  his  emphasis  on  the  need  of 
a  thorough-going  social  philosophy  as  the  basis  for  social  recon- 

1  By  the  time  he  wrote  the  Polity  he  had  experienced  disappointment. 

'  Positive  Philosophy y  ii,  p.  14. 

'  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  261  ff.;  L6vy-Bruhl,  op.  cit.,  p.  363. 

*  L6vy-Briihl,  op.  cit.,  p.  361. 


1 6  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

struction.^  In  his  earlier  investigations  he  seems  to  have  sought 
a  principle  of  unity  in  social  phenomena  as  all-comprehensive  as 
the  law  of  gravitation  in  physics  2  but  he  failed  and  later  repu- 
diated the  idea  insisting  only  on  unity  of  thought,^  unity  of  feel- 
ing,^ unity  of  purpose  ^  and  unity  of  method.^ 

Comte's  philosophy  of  history  of  which  he  makes  large  use  as  a 
support  to  his  social  philosophy  is  based  primarily  on  the  law  of 
the  three  stages/  but  in  a  lesser  degree  on  the  phenomenalism 
of  Hume  and  some  of  the  French  materiaHsts,  on  Pascal's  fiction 
of  all  humanity  from  earliest  times  to  the  present  conceived  as  a 
living,  learning  personality,^  on  Condorcet's  device  of  consider- 
ing all  nations  and  peoples  as  forming  one  society,^  and  onHobbes' 
conception  of  humanity  as  a  gigantic  organism.^^  It  is  thus 
largely  deductive,  logical  and  abstract  rather  than  inductive  and 
scientific,  although  Comte  advocates  the  scientific  methods  of 
observation,  experiment  and  comparison  supplemented  by  the 
historic,  with  the  expression  of  hope  of  large  future  contributions 
from  biology.^^  He  combines  the  deductive  and  inductive 
methods  most  ingeniously  yet  not  in  a  way  to  satisfy  the  de- 
mands of  science  today.  Indeed  he  is  accused  by  Barth  of  dis- 
torting facts  to  fit  his  theory.^^ 

The  law  of  the  three  stages,  suggested  by  Turgot  and  Saint- 
Simon,  becomes  fundamental  with  Comte.  He  makes  use  of  it  to 
prove  that  the  time  is  ripe  for  a  reorganization  of  society  based  on 
science;    that  this  science  of  social  phenomena  which  he  calls 

1  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  ch.  I;  ii,  pp.  51,  157  f.,  495-497.  Barth,  op.  cit.,  p.  26; 
A  General  View,  pp.  23,  79  f.;  cf.,  however,  his  emphasis  on  "  heart  "  and  "  love  " 
in  his  Polity. 

2  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  pp.  3,  16;  cf.  L^vy-Briihl,  op.  cit.,  pp.  378,  379. 
'  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  504,  511,  521.  ^  A  General  View,  p.  13. 
"  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  498,  521;  ^  General  View,  p.  26. 

•  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  17. 

7  Ihid.,  i,  ch.  I;  ii,  pp.  158  £f.     Cf.  Flint,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  267  f. 

»  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  54,  95;  A  General  View,  p.  372.  This  figure  was 
used  by  Perrault,  Fontennelle,  Abb6  de  St.  Pierre,  as  well  as  by  Saint-Simon  and 
Littr6-Flint,  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  History,  pp.  213  f. 

»  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  58,  83.  "  Ibid.,  ii,  p.  509. 

"  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  96  fif. 

"  Barth,  op.  cit.,  p.  26;  cf.  Mill,  op.  cit.,  p.  60;  Mackintosh,  From  Comte  to 
Benjamin  Kidd,  p.  41. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  I7 

social  physics  or  sociology,  forms  the  climax  of  all  the  sciences 
which  he  arranges  in  a  hierarchy  based  on  filiation/  increasing 
complexity ,2  decreasing  perfection  in  the  sense  of  quantitative 
exactitude,^  and  on  the  order  of  development  of  the  sciences  to 
that  condition  which  might  be  termed  positive.  This  classifica- 
tion, repudiated  by  Spencer,  has  been  adopted  with  some  modi- 
fications and  explanations  by  Mill,  Ward,^  Giddings,  De  Greef  and 
many  others. 

This  law  of  the  three  stages  was  incorporated  into  Mill's 
logical  doctrine  as  the  "inverse  deductive  method." ^  It  assumes 
that  the  general  human  mind  has  developed  the  same  as  the 
individual  mind.  Experience  showed  Comte  that  the  child  is 
imaginative  with  a  personal-causal  explanation  of  phenomena 
whereas  the  adult,  at  least  the  one  schooled  in  the  scientific 
method,  interprets  phenomena  by  reference  to  natural  laws.' 
The  period  of  youth  had  been  with  Comte  a  transition  period,  a 
period  of  storm  and  stress,  of  intellectual  and  moral  anarchy  and 
this  he  saw  was  characteristic  of  youth.  Comte  found  stages  of 
civilization  that  corresponded  to  these  periods;  primitive 
societies  imaginative  with  a  personal  explanation  of  phenomena, 
the  five  nations  of  western  Europe  in  the  centuries  just  preceding 
his  time  corresponding  to  the  anarchic  stage  of  youth,  and  the  era 
dawning  with  its  emphasis  on  law  like  unto  the  mature  mind  of 
cultured  man.^  He  shows  also  that  each  science  in  its  develop- 
ment has  passed  through  these  stages. 

One  other  item  is  worthy  of  consideration  before  passing  to  the 
discussion  of  his  specific  social  doctrines,  —  his  conception  of  law. 
In  this  he  seems  to  have  followed  Hume.  Not  only  does  he  repu- 
diate the  effort  to  discover  the  final  cause  of  change,  but  it  would 
seem  that  he  fails  to  recognize,  also,  efi&cient  cause  in  the  system 
itself.  He  seeks  only  laws  of  similitude  and  succession  among 
phenomena.^     The  former  make  possible  his  scheme  of  logical 

^  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  28;  cf.  Ward,  Pure  Sociology ,  ch.  V. 

2  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  ch.  II.  *  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  65  f. 

'  Ihid.,  i,  pp.  29,  223.  ^  Whittaker,  Comte  and  Mill,  p.  23. 

^  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  3. 

7  Ibid.,  ii,  chs.  VII-XI.    Levy-Briihl,  op.  cit.,  p.  364. 

*  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  pp.  5,  12,  217,  221,  225  f.,  515. 


1 8  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

classification  and  the  latter  forms  the  basis  of  his  "  explana- 
tions ";  but,  as  Mill  has  justly  remarked,  "  There  are  two  kinds 
of  uniformities,  the  one  conditional  [as  the  succession  of  day  and 
night],  the  other  conditional  on  the  first  [as  the  dependence  of 
this  succession  on  the  revolution  of  the  earth];  laws  of  causation, 
and  other  successions  dependent  on  those  laws."  ^ 

Comte  repudiates  all  hypotheses  not  capable  of  verification 
such  as  those  of  luminiferous  ether  and  chemical  affinities  as 
being  metaphysical,^  yet  he  does  not  always  keep  clear  of  such 
assumptions,  as  when  he  assumes  a  "  tendency  to  development " 
in  man,^  and  when  he  admits  that  his  biological  classification  is 
purely  subjective,  i.  e.,  is  logical  rather  than  genetic.  This  last 
point  is  of  such  importance  as  to  warrant  the  giving  of  a  few 
quotations  in  its  support.  In  discussing  biological  evolution  he 
justifies  the  use  of  scientific  fictions  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the 
evolutionary  process.  "  The  process,"  he  says,  "  would  be  to 
intercalate  among  different  known  organisms,  certain  purely 
fictitious  organisms,  so  imagined  as  to  facilitate  their  compari- 
son, by  rendering  the  biological  series  more  homogeneous  and 
continuous:  and  it  might  be  that  several  might  hereafter  meet 
with  more  or  less  of  a  reafization  among  organisms  hitherto  unex- 
plored." *  "  In  forming  the  animal  series,  it  (our  encyclopedia) 
—  [i.  e.,  of  positivism]  —  takes  as  its  continual  guide  the  true 
object  of  that  formation,  —  a  logical  rather  than  a  scientific  object. 
As  we  only  study  the  animals  to  gain  a  sounder  knowledge  of  man 
by  tracing  through  them  his  connections  with  plants,  we  are  fully 
authorized  to  exclude  from  our  hierarchy  all  the  species  which 
disturb  it."  He  goes  on  to  show  that  the  same  method  is  justifi- 
able in  social  evolution;  i.  e.,  the  creation  of  certain  races  and 
introduction  of  them  into  the  logical  series  to  make  it  complete.^ 

That  his  synthesis  is  consciously  and  purposely  subjective  and 
logical  rather  than  objective  is  proven  by  these  words:  "  Not 
merely  is  it  true,  that  no  organic  existence  ever  sprung  from 

»  Mill,  op.  cit.y  p.  58.  '  Ihid.y  ii,  pp.  83,  88.    Cf.  ii,  p.  147- 

*  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  pp.  225  f.,  301.       *  Ihid.y  i,  p.  389. 
'  The  Catechism  of  Positivism,  pp.  222,  224.    Cf.  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  520, 
521;  also  A  General  View,  pp.  34  f.,  369. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  1 9 

inorganic  nature;  but  further,  no  species  of  any  kind  can  spring 
from  a  different  kind,  either  inferior  or  superior.  The  limits  of 
the  exception  to  this  rule  are  very  narrow,  and  are  as  yet  but  little 
known.  There  is  then  a  really  impassible  gulf  between  the  worlds 
of  life  and  of  matter,  and,  even  though  less  broad,  between  dif- 
ferent forms  of  vitality.  This  view  strengthens  our  position 
that  any  simply  objective  synthesis  is  impossible.  But  it  in  no 
way  impairs  the  subjective  synthesis,  in  every  case  the  result  of  a 
very  gradual  ascent  towards  the  type  of  man."  This  subjective 
synthesis,  then,  as  we  have  noted  above,  is  merely  a  logical  classi- 
fication according  to  a  pre-determined  plan,  although  based  on 
scientific  observation,  and  does  not  necessarily  represent  a  his- 
torical order  of  development,  much  less  a  real  causal  order. 
Comt6  does  not  always  hold  to  the  above  distinction,  to  be  sure, 
and  in  places  seems  to  hold  that  the  subjective  order  represents 
the  objective.^ 

Comte  considers  that  society  is  an  organism  but  further  that  it 
is  the  reality  whereas  the  mere  individual  is  an  abstraction.* 
His  doctrine  of  society  is  developed  under  the  two-fold  aspect  of 
static  and  dynamic,  the  former  corresponding  to  order,  the  latter 
to  progress.  By  static  he  seems  to  mean  a  cross-section  of  social 
evolution  showing  the  "  consensus,"  "  interconnections,"  "  con- 
currence," "  harmony,"  "  co-operation  "  of  the  parts  under  the 
laws  of  co-existence.^  By  dynamic  he  means  the  same  phe- 
nomena viewed  as  a  process  of  development  imder  the  laws  of 
antecedents  and  consequents.  The  one  is  a  sort  of  social  anat- 
omy, the  other  a  sort  of  social  physiology.* 

Comte's  conception  of  all  humanity  as  a  developing  organism 
is,  as  we  have  noted,  a  logical  fiction,  yet  with  sufficient  basis  in 
fact  to  form  a  suggestive  working  hypothesis.  It  corresponds  to 
the  figure  used  by  Hildebrand,^  of  nations  in  relays  carrjdng 
forward  the  torch  of  progress;  but  Comte  seems  to  consider  also 

^  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  520,  521.     Cf.  Barth,  op.  cit.,  pp.  25-27. 

2  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  363;  ii,  pp.  508-509;  A  General  View,  p.  370.  The 
general  mind  is  regarded  as  prior  to  the  individual  mind,  and  the  latter  can  be 
understood  only  by  reference  to  the  former. 

'  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  74-84.  *  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  84-89. 

^  German  Thought,  Lecture  I. 


20  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

that  specific  groups  form  "  societies  "  characterized  by  a  certain 
community  of  thought  and  life.  This  conception,  developed  by 
Spencer,  Le  Bon,  Durkheim  and  others,  approaches  much  more 
nearly  to  concrete  reality.^ 

Comte's  law  of  the  three  periods,  together  with  his  fiction  of 
all  humanity  as  a  developing  organism,  is  the  basis  of  his  doctrine 
of  relativism  which  is,  perhaps,  his  most  important  contribution 
to  social  philosophy .2  By  relativism  he  has  in  mind  not  only  the 
relativity  of  knowledge  emphasized  by  Spencer,  but  even  more 
the  relativity  of  social  phenomena  to  the  stage  of  development  of 
the  organism.^  That  is,  there  is  no  absolutely  right  form  of 
government,  or  reHgion,  or  set  of  moral  principles,  —  or  at  least 
not  until  developed  by  positivism.^  A  certain  form  is  appropriate 
to  society  in  the  theological  stage,  another  when  it  has  reached  the 
metaphysical  and  still  another  when  all  life  is  interpreted  and 
organized  in  accordance  with  science. 

The  dynamic  study  of  society  gives  rise  to  the  problem  of  prog- 
ress.^ The  one  phrase  used  most  by  our  author,  especially  in 
the  Polity  is  the  development  of  order, ^  though  he  also  uses  that  of 
increasing  differentiation  and  integration,^  a  growing  preponder- 
ance of  cultural  over  organic  phases  of  life,^  and  an  enlargement 
of  man's  powers  over  the  forces  of  nature.^  In  particular,  we 
have  as  proof  of  material  progress  the  factihat  though  there  has 
been  great  increase  in  population  there  has  been,  also,  an  increase 
in  the  satisfaction  of  wants.^^  Intellectual  development  is  shown 
by  an  increase  in  the  aptitude  for  mental  combinations  and 
abstract  thinking.^^  Moral  progress  is  marked  by  the  develop- 
ment of  the  social  faculties  and  by  the  expression  of  these  in  in- 
dustrial co-operation  and  efforts  toward  social  amelioration.^^ 

1  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  132,  491  ff. 

2  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  77,  92  ff.    Cf.  Small,  General  Sociology^  pp.  68  fif. 
'  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  517  f. 

^  Ibid.,  ii,  pp.  14-16.     Cf.  Mill,  op.  cit.,  pp.  177  fif. 

*  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  84-89;  Mill,  p.  100;  A  General  View,  p.  117. 
«  Ihid.,  p.  1 16.  '  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  120;  ii,  p.  140. 

*  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  89,  129, 150  fif. 

»  Ihid.,  i,  p.  361;  ii,  pp.  88,  118  f.,  129,  150,  259. 

10  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  88  f.  "  See  above,  note  8. 

"  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  131  f.,  288,  554  fif. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  21 

The  impelling  factor  in  progress  according  to  our  author  is  the 
affectional  nature  or  heart  including  the  appetites,  passions  and 
sentiments  ^  or  about  what  Ward  ^  means  by  desires  and  Ratzen- 
hofer  ^  and  Small  ^  by  interests;  the  guiding  factor,  however,  is 
the  intellect  going  through  the  three  stages  of  development  both 
in  the  individual  and  in  civilization  as  a  whole.  Although  there 
is  in  the  individual  and  society  a  tendency  to  development, 
there  are  certain  accelerating  factors  such  as  ennui,  duration  of 
Hfe  and  increase  of  population.^  Race  and  climate  are  factors  to 
be  reckoned  with  and  also,  within  narrow  limits,  poUtical  action.^ 
A  consideration  of  the  last  gives  occasion  for  the  exposition  of  his 
doctrine  of  poHtical  opportunism,  an  exceedingly  suggestive  and 
valuable  contribution  to  poHtical  economy.  This  is  a  corollary 
of  his  general  theories  of  social  evolution  and  relativism,  and 
signifies  merely  that  society  cannot  be  radically  changed  by 
legislation  which  is  the  expression  of  the  will  of  an  individ- 
ual or  of  collective  individuals.  Comte  holds  that  the  aim  of 
legislation  should  be  rather  to  accelerate  the  general  movement  of 
evolution.  All  laws  to  be  effective  must  be  in  harmony  with  the 
social  Hfe  and  traditions  of  the  people. 

After  this  brief  survey  we  are  prepared  to  consider  Comte's 
contribution  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  as 
a  theory  of  social  progress.  To  be  sure  Comte  did  not  use  the 
phrase  or  analyze  the  doctrine  as  have  later  writers  but  we  find 
with  him  the  kernel  which  has  come  to  such  rich  fruitage  since. 

Passive  Physical  Adaptation. — Before  Comte's  time  Montes- 
quieu, Lamarck  and  others  had  emphasized  the  influence  of  the 
material  environment  on  the  organism  and  on  society.  Comte, 
though  not  going  so  far  as  some,  yet  recognized  this  factor.^ 
"  It  is  plain  that  society,  as  well  as  individual  beings,"  he  says, 
"  is  affected  by  the  circumstances  of  the  earth's  daily  rotation  and 

^  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  8$,  128-130,  156,  257;  Catechism,  p.  234.  In  the 
Polity  heart  equals  sympathy  plus  energy.     Cf.  A  General  View,  pp.  119  f. 

2  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  loi  f.  •*  General  Sociology,  chs.  XXXI,  XXXII. 

3  Infra,  ch.  IX.  ^  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  152  flf. 

^  Ihid.,  ii,  pp.  90-92.  Public  opinion  is  given  prominence  in  the  Polity.  Cf, 
A  General  View,  ch.  III. 

"^  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  57,  116  f. 


22  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

annual  movement;  and  by  the  states  of  heat,  moisture  and 
electricity  in  the  surrounding  medium;  and  by  the  chemical  con- 
ditions of  the  atmosphere,  the  waters,  the  soil,  etc.  I  need  only 
observe  that  the  effect  of  these  influences  is  even  more  marked  in 
sociology  than  in  biology,  not  only  because  the  organism  is  more 
complex,  and  its  phenomena  of  a  higher  order,  but  because  the 
social  organism  is  regarded  as  susceptible  of  infinite  duration,  so 
as  to  render  sensible  many  gradual  modifications  which  would  be 
disguised  from  our  notice  by  the  brevity  of  individual  life."^ 
Comte,  as  we  have  noted,  did  not  accept  Lamarck's  theory  of  the 
development  of  species  as  a  result  of  the  response  of  the  organism 
to  environmental  influences,  and  in  social  evolution  he  believed 
that  inherent  race  quaKties  and  the  general  forces  behind  the 
evolutionary  process  were  vastly  more  potent.^ 

Active  Material  Adaptation.  —  Man's  ability  to  control  the 
forces  of  nature  in  the  interest  of  his  well-being  is  with  Comte  one 
of  the  chief  tests  of  progress.^  "  All  human  progress,"  he  says, 
"political,  moral  or  intellectual,  is  inseparable  from  material 
progression,  in  virtue  of  the  close  interconnection  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  characterizes  the  natural  course  of  social  phenomena. 
Now,  it  is  clear  that  the  action  of  man  upon  nature  depends 
chiefly  on  his  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  inorganic  phenomena, 
though  biological  phenomena  must  also  find  a  place  in  it."  * 

Passive  Spiritual  Adaptation, — Comte's  whole  doctrine  of  rela- 
tivity is  but  another  way  of  expressing  this  principle.  He  holds 
that  the  genius  is  an  age-product;  ^  that  the  preponderating 
opinions  of  the  people  determine  morals  and  politics;  ^  and  he 
goes  so  far  as  to  say  that "  the  happiness  of  every  man  depends  on 
the  harmony  between  the  development  of  his  various  faculties  and 
the  entire  system  of  the  circumstances  which  govern  his  life  "; 
i.  e.,  on  both  material  and  spiritual  adaptation.^ 

Comte  might  almost  be  termed  a  social  realist  in  his  insistence 
that  the  individual  apart  from  society  is  a  mere  abstraction 
whereas  humanity,  or  again  the  general  human  mind  is  real. 

1  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  ii6.  *  Ihid.,  ii,  p.  ii8. 

2  Ibid.,  ii,  pp.  92  f.  ^  Ihid.,  ii,  p.  92. 

'  Ihid.,  i,  pp.  223,  363,  393;  ii,  pp.  57,  118.       ^  Ibid.,  i,  p.  14;  ii,  pp.  30,  165. 
'  Ibid.,  ii,  p.  87.     Cf .  Caird,  The  Social  Philosophy  and  Religion  of  Comte,  p.  25. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  23 

He  thus  approaches  the  theory  of  many  modern  sociologists  who 
hold  that  society  is  a  psychological  organism.  This  fact  of 
psychical  unity,  according  to  Comte,  distinguishes  sociology  from 
biology  which  makes  the  individual  organism  the  unit  of  investi- 
gation. After  setting  forth  this  contrast  he  says:  "  The  evolu- 
tion of  the  individual  mind  can  disclose  no  essential  law:  and  it 
can  afford  neither  indications  nor  verifications  of  any  value 
unless  brought  imder  the  methods  of  observation  taught  by  the 
evolution  of  the  human  mind  in  general."  * 

This  doctrine  furnishes  the  key  to  this  theory  of  education: 
"  The  sociological  theory  requires  that  the  education  of  the  in- 
dividual should  be  a  reproduction,  rapid  but  accurate,  of  that  of 
the  race.  In  his  brief  career,  he  must  pass  through  the  three 
stages  which  an  aggregate  of  nations  has  wrought  out  with  infi- 
nite comparative  slowness;  and  if  any  material  part  of  the  ex- 
perience is  evaded,  his  training  will  be  abortive."  2  Comte  thus 
reaches  deductively  a  theory  of  recapitulation  very  much  like 
that  of  some  modern  psychologists  and  pedagogues  which  they 
claim  to  have  reached  by  inductive  methods.  The  individual 
mind  is  real  then,  and  able  to  perform  its  functions,  according  to 
our  author,  only  as  it  partakes  of  the  general  mind,  or  is  produced 
and  moulded  by  it,  —  and  this  is  a  form  of  passive  spiritual 
adaptation. 

Another  point  emphasized  by  Comte,  bearing  on  this  doctrine, 
is  his  theory  of  the  family  as  a  training  school  for  social  adjust- 
ment.^ 

Active  Spiritual  Adaptation. — Reacting  as  Comte  did  upon  the 
methods  of  social  reconstruction  of  his  day,  we  might  have  ex- 
pected that  he  would  have  gone  to  the  other  extreme  as  did 
Spencer  and  Gumplowicz,  but  instead  we  find  a  compromise,  — 
a  recognition  of  natural  law  but  also  a  law  possible  of  modifica- 
tion by  himian  intelligence  and  effort.  "  Though  modifications 
from  all  causes,"  he  says,  "  are  greater  in  the  case  of  political 
than  of  simpler  phenomena,  still  they  can  never  be  more  than 
modifications:  that  is,  they  will  always  be  in  subjection  to  those 

^  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  509.  ^  Jbid.,  ii,  p.  510. 

'  Ibid.,  ii,  p.  133. 


24  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

fundamental  laws,  whether  statical  or  dynamical,  which  regu- 
late the  harmony  of  the  social  elements,  and  the  filiation  of  their 
successive  variations.  There  is  no  disturbing  influence,  exterior 
or  hiunan,  which  can  make  incompatible  elements  co-exist  in  the 
political  system,  nor  change  in  any  way  the  natural  laws  of  the 
development  of  humanity.  What  then  are  the  modifications  of 
which  the  social  organism  and  social  Hfe  are  susceptible,  if  noth- 
ing can  alter  the  laws  either  of  harmony  or  of  succession  ?  The 
answer  is  that  modifications  act  upon  the  intensity  and  second- 
ary operation  of  phenomena,  but  without  affecting  their  nature  or 
their  filiation.  In  the  intellectual  order  of  phenomena,  for  in- 
stance, there  is  no  accidental  influence,  nor  any  individual 
superiority,  which  can  transfer  to  one  person  the  discoveries 
reserved  for  a  subsequent  age,  in  the  natural  course  of  the  human 
mind;  nor  can  there  be  a  reverse  case  of  postponement."  ^  This 
gives  rise  to  his  theory  of  opportuneness  which,  though  carried  too 
far,  contains  a  truth  that  needs  to  be  re-emphasized  in  these  days 
of  legislative  radicalism. 

Comte's  theory  of  social  control  is  tersely  expressed  in  these 
words:  "  It  is  the  social  function  of  mind  to  struggle  perpetually, 
in  its  own  way,  to  modify  the  necessary  rule  of  material  power,  by 
subjecting  it  more  and  more  to  respect  for  the  moral  laws  of 
universal  harmony,  from  which  all  practical  activity,  public  and 
private,  is  apt  to  revolt,  for  want  of  loftiness  of  view  and  gener- 
osity of  sentiment.  Regarded  in  this  way,  legitimate  social 
supremacy  belongs  neither  to  force  nor  to  reason,  but  to  morality, 
governing  alike  the  actions  of  the  one  and  the  counsels  of  the 
other.  .  .  .  This  spiritual  authority  will  be  naturally  kept 
within  bounds  by  the  very  nature  of  its  functions,  which  will  be 
those  of  education,  and  the  consultative  influence  which  results 
from  it  in  active  life;  and  again,  by  the  conditions  imposed  on 
their  exercise,  and  the  continuous  resistance  which  must  be 
encountered,  —  the  authority  itself  being  founded  on  free  assent, 
within  the  limits  necessary  to  guard  against  abuse.  .  .  .  The 
disposition  to  seek  in  political  institutions  the  solution  of  all 
difficulties  whatever  is  a  disastrous  tendency  of  our  time.''^ 
1  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  90-92.  2  j^id.,  ii,  p.  471. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  2$ 

Thus  government  is  to  rest  on  the  free  consent  of  the  governed 
and  be  a  spontaneous  expression  of  social  demands  based  on  moral 
considerations  which  place  the  good  of  all  above  that  of  the 
individual. 

There  is  to  be  a  separation  of  spiritual  and  temporal  authority 
yet  the  two  are  expected  to  work  in  harmony.  The  spiritual 
authority  will  be  supreme  in  matters  of  education  but  consulta- 
tive in  what  concerns  action,  while  the  temporal  authority  will  be 
supreme  in  matters  of  action  with  consultative  power  in  matters 
of  education.  Comte's  educational  ideal  is  modern  with  emphasis 
on  the  studies  that  make  for  active  adaptation,  i.  e.,  power  over 
the  forces  of  nature  and  such  development  of  the  moral  instincts 
as  shall  make  for  social  well-being.  "  The  direct  effect  of  a 
imiversal  education  is  to  place  every  one  in  the  situation  best 
adapted  to  his  abilities,  whatever  his  birth  may  have  been.''  ^ 

Comte  recognizes  the  historic  value  of  religion  as  a  factor  in 
social  progress,  holding  that,  though  an  illusion,  it  is  indispens- 
able to  active  adaptation.^  He  values  also  its  function  in  social 
organization  and  its  place  in  providing  a  permanent  speculative 
class.  "  It  is  a  radical  property  of  the  theological  philosophy  to  be 
the  sole  support  of  man's  moral  courage,  as  well  as  the  awakener 
and  director  of  his  intellectual  activity.  .  .  .  Feeble  as  are  the 
intellectual  organs,  relatively  considered,  the  attractive  moral 
perspective  of  an  unboimded  power  of  modifying  the  universe,  by 
the  aid  of  supernatural  protectors,  must  have  been  most  impor- 
tant in  exciting  mental  action.  In  our  advanced  state  of  scientific 
progress,  we  can  conceive  of  the  perpetual  pursuit  of  knowledge 
for  the  sake  of  the  satisfaction  of  intellectual  activity,  joined  to 
the  tranquil  pleasure  which  arises  from  the  discovery  of  truth; 
yet  it  is  doubtful  whether  such  natural  stimulus  as  this  would 
always  suffice  without  collateral  instigations  of  glory,  of  ambition, 
or  of  love  and  stronger  passions,  except  in  the  case  of  a  very  few 
lofty  minds.  ...  In  the  working  out  of  such  speculation,  the 
mental  activity  can  be  sustained  by  nothing  short  of  the  fictions 
of  the  theological  philosophy  about  the  supremacy  of  man  and 

*  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  485.     Cf.  A  General  View,  pp.  91,  189,  192-194. 
2  Positive  Philosophy,  i,  p.  4. 


26  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

his  unbounded  empire  over  external  nature."  ^  This  evaluation  oi 
the  idealizing  function  of  the  mind  is  elaborated  in  the  Systeme 
and  in  the  Subjective  Synthesis,  and  as  made  concrete  in  the 
sacerdotal  order  of  positivism  appears  to  most  people  grotesque, 
yet  it  contains  an  element  of  truth.  Whether  an  illusion  or  not, 
religion  is  a  power  in  life  that  makes  for  individual  and  social 
success,  and  using  Comte's  pragmatic  test  the  very  fact  that  it 
works  gives  us  good  reason  for  believing  that  it  is  not  a  mere 
fiction  of  the  mind.^ 

There  was  to  be  a  social  hierarchy  under  positivism  yet  based 
not  on  force,  or  privilege,  but  on  ability  with  equal  opportunity 
to  each.  This,  he  grants,  would  result  in  inequality  in  wealth, 
but "  the  positive  philosophy  will  show  that  it  is  of  small  impor- 
tance to  popular  interests  in  what  hands  capital  is  deposited,  if  its 
employment  is  duly  useful  to  society  at  large;  and  that  condition 
depends  much  more  on  moral  than  on  poHtical  methods.  No 
jealous  legal  provision  against  the  selfish  use  of  wealth,  and  no 
mischievous  intervention,  paralyzing  social  activity  by  pohtical 
prohibition,  can  be  nearly  so  effectual  as  general  reprobation, 
grounded  on  an  ascertained  principle  under  the  reign  of  positive 
morality."  ^  Thus  social  control,  according  to  our  author,  is  a 
potent  factor  in  social  progress,  but  to  be  effective  it  must  be 
based  on  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  social  development,  and  be 
inspired  by  a  desire  to  enhance  the  well-being  of  humanity  at 
large. 

It  is  commonly  stated  that  the  two  leading  teachings  of  the 
Positive  Philosophy  are  the  law  of  the  three  stages  and  the 
hierarchy  of  the  sciences,  but  most  fundamental  of  all  is  Comte's 
conception  of  all  humanity  forming  a  living,  growing  entity  or 
"  general  mind."  The  doctrine  as  developed  may  be  stated  as 
follows:  (i)  Society  is  an  organism,  (2)  with  a  structure  in  which 
all  parts  are  co-ordinated,  each  adapted  to  the  whole  and  to  its 
function,  (3)  each  stage  in  the  process  of  development  growing  out 
of  the  past,  growing  into  the  future  and  adapted  to  its  environ- 

1  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  164,  165.    Cf.  A  General  View,  pp.  364  fiE. 

2  Cf.  Carver,  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  p.  89. 
*  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  486. 


AUGUSTE  COMTE  2/ 

ment  both  material  and  social.  (4)  In  this  evolutionary  process 
the  intellect  leads,  furnishes  the  pattern  and  makes  possible 
material  achievement  and  social  telesis,  and  finally,  (5)  the  heart, 
including  the  desires  and  emotions,  is  the  impelling  force.^  The 
first  is  essential  to  his  ethics  of  altruism  and  his  religion  of 
humanity  for  he  had  discarded  all  supernatural  sanctions  and 
needed  something  to  take  their  place.  The  second  supplies  the 
key  to  his  static  sociology  with  its  doctrine  of  consensus.  The 
third  furnishes  his  theories  of  social  continuity,  social  prophecy 
and  relativism.  The  fourth  issues  in  his  law  of  the  three 
periods  as  the  interpreter  of  the  historic  process,  in  his  teaching 
concerning  active  material  and  social  adaptation  with  the  corol- 
lary of  political  opportunism.  The  fifth  supplies  the  dynamic  of 
social  progress,  of  his  altruistic  ethics  and  of  his  positive  polity 
based  on  love  and  on  his  rehgion  of  humanity. 

This  fiction  of  a  general  mind,  however,  not  only  does  not  corre- 
spond to  reality,  but  it  partially  closed  the  eyes  of  Comte  to  two 
great  realms  of  sociological  investigation:  first,  to  the  actual 
state  of  disorder  and  mal-adaptation,  attention  to  which  has  led 
to  the  modern  studies  in  social  pathology  and  social  control, 
and  second,  to  the  processes,  forces  and  methods  of  social  evolu- 
tion which  are  now  being  studied  inductively  as  well  as  those  of 
biological  evolution. 

His  assumption  of  an  impulse  to  orderly  development,^ 
very  like  the  preformation  theory  of  early  biologists,  is  highly 
metaphysical  and  so  unwarranted  from  his  theory.^  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  a  general  human  mind  that  has  developed  from 
primitive  to  modern  times.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  the  phenomenon 
of  so-called  social  heredity  or  the  transmission  of  acquired  knowl- 
edge and  experience  from  generation  to  generation  through 
imitation,  tradition,  custom  and  education.  There  is,  too,  the 
fact  of  similarity  of  individual  mental  processes  in  all  ages,  so  far 
as  we  know,  and  similarity  in  the  laws  of  psychic  interaction  so 
that,  as  Ross  points  out,  "  those  social  phenomena  which  lie 

^  In  the  Polity  evaluated  above  the  intellect. 
*  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  pp.  75-85. 
'  Cf.  Ward,  Pure  Sociology,  p.  381. 


28  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

nearest  the  subjective  focus  will  exhibit  in  their  transformations 
a  certain  logic  and  regularity,"  ^  but  there  is  the  other  focus  in 
social  evolution,  the  objective.  "  Environments,"  Ross  con- 
tinues, "  impose  modes  of  existence  extremely  unlike,  and 
therefore  in  differently  situated  social  groups  those  social  phe- 
nomena lying  nearest  the  objective  focus  will  undergo  not 
parallel  but  divergent  evolution."  The  discovery  and  working 
out  of  these  problems  was  reserved  for  later  sociologists  under  the 
inspiration  of  Darwin's  painstaking  labors  in  biological  evolution. 

Comte  might  have  made  more  progress  along  these  lines  in  his 
later  years,  aided  by  advance  not  only  in  biological  but  in  mental 
and  historical  science  had  it  not  been  that  he  was  obsessed  by  the 
logical  fiction  of  his  early  treatise,  was  busied  with  the  elabora- 
tion of  his  positive  poKty  and  moreover,  was  led  astray  by  his 
theory  of  "  cerebral  hygiene  "  which  closed  his  mind  to  the 
scientific  truths  discovered  in  the  later  years  of  his  life. 

In  spite,  however,  of  these  short-comings,  so  great  has  been  his 
contribution  to  social  science  and  social  philosophy  that  a  modern 
authority  says:  "  The  broad  and  general  lines  on  which  he 
sketched  the  outlines  of  social  science  have  formed  the  basis  of  all 
attempts  since.  Much  of  his  filhng  in  was  crude,  but  some  was  of 
permanent  value.  He  indicated  correctly  the  true  nature  and 
scope  of  the  science  and  the  proper  method  of  investigation  to  be 
followed.'*  2 

Sociological  organicists  may  well  claim  Comte  as  their  master, 
so  too,  the  biological  and  the  classifying  schools.  In  basing  social 
evolution  on  the  development  of  mind  he  is  in  line  with  genetic 
psychologists.  In  suggesting  the  importance  of  material  achieve- 
ment as  the  basis  of  cultural,  he  was  a  forerunner  of  Ward,  Carver 
and  others;  in  his  emphasis  on  desires  as  the  impelling  forces  to 
progress  his  position  was  very  much  like  that  of  Ratzenhofer 
and  Small;  in  his  doctrine  of  social  telesis  and  political  opportun- 
ism, he  pointed  the  way  to  rational  social  control  as  generally 
accepted  today  by  social  scientists.  Comte's  Positive  Philos- 
ophy may  thus  not  inaptly  be  denominated  a  Prolegomenon 
to  Sociology. 

^  Foundations  of  Sociology,  p.  62.  ^  F.  Spencer  Baldwin,  Class  Lectures, 


CHAPTER  II 

HERBERT  SPENCER  (1820-1903) 

Cosmic  Evolution 

As  the  naturalistic  philosophy  of  eighteenth-century  France  and 
the  social  enthusiasm  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  were 
strangely  fused  in  the  life  and  social  philosophy  of  Angus  te  Comte, 
so  the  England  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Adam  Smith,  Lyell, 
Watts,  and  Shaftesbury,  —  the  England  at  once  scientific,  in- 
dustrial, moral  and  religious,  found  expression  in  the  life  and 
Synthetic  Philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer.  To  appreciate  his 
theories  of  evolution  and  adaptation  one  needs  to  understand  the 
imfolding  of  his  life  and  thought  and  this  is  revealed  in  his  pub- 
lished autobiography  and  letters  with  a  frankness  and  keenness 
of  self-analysis  that  is  illuminating. 

The  son  of  an  English  school-master,  of  a  line  of  non-conform- 
ist ancestors,  breathing  from  earhest  days  the  atmosphere  of 
intellectual  and  religious  freedom  and  himself  taught  to  question, 
to  observe,  and  to  reason,  Spencer  grew  up  through  boyhood  a 
student  of  nature,  a  questioner,  a  seeker  after  causes  in  a  law- 
abiding  order. 

An  only  child,  left  much  to  the  companionship  of  his  own 
thoughts,  he  became  a  dreamer.  Allowed  to  have  his  own  way, 
and  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  developing  his  social  nature 
normally  through  play  with  other  children,  when  in  youth  he  did 
mingle  with  others,  he  found  the  problem  of  social  adjustment  a 
severe  task,  and  out  of  this  experience  was  born  his  theory  of 
moral  compromise,  —  of  rational  adjustment  between  egoism  and 
altruism.  He  refused  the  opportunity  of  a  university  career  and 
turned  to  engineering  where  for  several  years  he  struggled  along, 
dividing  his  time  between  drawing,  field-work,  inventing,  study, 
and  writing. 


30  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

The  reading  of  Lyell's  Principles  of  Geology  when  twenty  years 
of  age  marked  a  crisis  in  Spencer^s  life,  for  it  turned  his  attention 
to  the  theory  of  evolution  as  against  creationism  as  a  method  of 
explaining  the  origin  of  species.  Lyell's  attempt  to  refute 
Lamarck,  however,  made  him  a  believer  in  Lamarck's  hypothesis. 

Professor  Royce  thus  summarizes  the  development  of  Spencer's 
thought  as  revealed  in  his  autobiography:  — 

First,  came  a  love  for  tracing  the  causes  of  things,  a  love  which  early  led  to 
the  notion  that  nature  permitted  no  miracles,  that  all  processes  of  nature 
are  unbroken  and  continuous,  and  that  all  which  is  beyond  the  realm  of  dis- 
coverable law  is  altogether  unknowable.  Second,  came  an  assurance  that, 
even  as  he  himself  was  of  an  independent  spirit,  so  no  man's  liberty  ought  to 
be  hindered,  so  long  as  such  a  man  did  not  interfere  with  his  neighbor's 
liberty.  Third  came,  slowly  growing  in  his  mind,  the  assurance  that  the 
"  development  theory  "  must  account  for  living  things,  by  means  of  a  natural 
process,  just  as  causation  in  general  was  needed  to  account  for  every  other 
natural  event  and  product.  Next  came  the  notion  that,  in  particular,  the 
life  of  the  mind  must  be  understood  as  a  development,  determined  by  natural 
causes,  and  connected  with  the  development  of  all  the  phenomena  of  Kfe. 
Finally  came  the  conviction  that  a  full  and  coherent  theory  of  nature,  in 
which  the  organic  and  inorganic  worlds  were  united  by  the  working  of  uni- 
versal laws,  not  only  would  explain,  so  far  as  that  was  possible,  the  growth  of 
things,  but  also  would  furnish  a  systematic  and  complete  foundation  for  his 
own  never  changing  individualistic  ethics,  and  for  his  sturdy,  old-fashioned 
British  liberalism.  In  this  way,  the  main  work  of  Spencer's  life  came  to  be 
an  effort  to  bring  into  synthesis  an  organic  theory  of  the  unity  of  the  evolu- 
tionary process,  with  a  doctrine  regarding  the  freedom  and  the  rights  of  the 
individual  which  had  come  down  to  him  from  an  age  when  evolution  and  the 
organic  unity  of  things  had  indeed  interested  Enghshmen  but  little.  This 
particular  synthesis  of  organic  evolution  with  individual  independence  re- 
mains one  of  the  most  paradoxical,  and  consequently  most  instructive,  fea- 
tures of  Spencer's  teaching.^ 

Turning  to  a  consideration  of  the  teachings  of  Spencer  which 
bear  directly  on  our  subject  we  find  the  following:  — 

I.  Society  an  Organism.  —  Spencer's  method  in  this  discussion 
is  analogical.  He  mentions  four  similarities  and  four  dissimilari- 
ties between  society  and  a  biological  organism.  The  former  are 
continuous  growth,  increasing  complexity,  increasing  dependence  of 
parts,  and  possible  independent  life  of  organism  and  member.  The 
four  dissimilarities  are  lack  of  specific  external  form  in  the  case  of 
society,  units  discreet  and  dispersed  instead  of  continuous,  w<7- 

*  Herbert  Spencer,  pp.  63-64. 


HERBERT  SPENCER  3 1 

bility  of  parts  and  separate  centers  of  feeling.^  He  concludes, 
however,  that  the  similarities  are  so  much  more  striking  than  the 
dissimilarities  that  the  use  of  the  analogy  is  legitimate.  This 
theory  is  not  essential  to  Spencer^s  system  as  it  was  to  Comte's, 
and  in  reply  to  criticism  he  holds  that  the  only  analogy  alleged  is 
community  in  the  fundamental  principles  of  organization.  "  I 
have  used  the  analogies  elaborated  but  as  a  scaffolding  to  help  in 
building  up  a  coherent  body  of  analogical  inductions.  Let  us  take 
away  the  scaffolding:  the  inductions  will  stand  by  themselves." ^ 
Society,  then,  according  to  our  author  is  a  quasi-biological 
organism. 

Spencer  is  more  definite  in  his  concept  of  the  content  of  that 
society  which  is  like  an  organism  than  is  Comte,  yet  does  not  face 
the  question  squarely  as  have  some  later  sociologists.  His 
thought  is  most  clearly  expressed  where  he  says:  "  It  is  the  per- 
manence of  the  relations  among  component  parts  which  con- 
stitutes the  individuality  of  a  whole  as  distinguished  from  the 
individuality  of  its  parts  ";  and  again  where  he  defines  society  as 
an  entity,  "  because,  though  formed  of  discrete  units,  a  certain 
concreteness  in  the  aggregate  of  them  is  implied  by  the  general 
persistence  of  the  arrangement  among  them  throughout  the 
territory  occupied." '  This  seems  to  imply  a  sovereign  group, 
and  corresponds  roughly  to  a  biological  species.  He  uses  the 
term  with  the  same  meaning  also  in  Part  III  where  he  contrasts 
the  diverse  interests  of  the  species,  of  the  parents  and  of  the 
offspring.* 

2.  Social  Evolution  interpreted  in  Terms  of  Cosmic  Evolution.  — 
Spencer,  as  Comte,  divides  sociology  into  social  statics  and  social 
dynamics  but  with  difference  in  meaning.  With  the  latter  statics 
had  to  do  with  relations  of  co-existence  and  dynamics  with  rela- 
tions of  sequence,  corresponding  roughly  to  social  anatomy  and 
social  physiology.  With  the  former  static  is  defined  in  the  me- 
chanical terms  of  equilibrium  of  forces  and  dynamic  in  those  of 
dis-equilibrium. 

^  Sociology,  i,  pt.  2,  ch.  II;  also  Illusirations  of  Universal  Progress,  chapter  on 
"  The  Social  Organism."    For  Ward's  criticism,  see  Am.  Journ.  Soc,  vii,  pp.  493  £F. 
2  Sociology,  i,  p.  592. 
'  Ibid.,  i,  pp.  447,  448,  *  Ibid.,  pp.  603  f.,  esp.  p.  610. 


32  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Spencer's  theory  of  social  progress,  though  nowhere  elaborated, 
is  brought  out  in  his  summary  of  the  application  of  the  general 
laws  of  evolution  to  the  social  process. 

The  many  facts  contemplated  unite  in  proving  that  social  evolution  forms 
a  part  of  evolution  at  large.  Like  evolving  aggregates  in  general,  societies 
show  integration,  both  by  simple  increase  of  mass  and  by  coalescence  and 
recoalescence  of  masses.  The  change  from  homogeneity  to  heterogeneity  is 
multitudinously  exemplified;  up  from  the  single  tribe,  ahke  in  all  its  parts, 
to  the  civiHzed  nation,  full  of  structural  and  functional  unlikeness.  With 
progressing  integration  and  heterogeneity  goes  increasing  coherence.  We  see 
the  wandering  group  dispersing,  dividing,  held  together  by  no  bonds;  the 
tribe  with  parts  made  more  coherent  by  subordination  to  a  dominant  man; 
the  cluster  of  tribes  united  in  a  political  plexus  under  a  chief  with  sub-chiefs; 
and  so  on  up  to  the  civilized  nation,  consoUdated  enough  to  hold  together  for 
a  thousand  years  or  more.  Simultaneously  comes  increasing  definiteness. 
Social  organization  is  at  first  vague;  advance  brings  settled  arrangements 
which  grow  slowly  more  precise;  customs  pass  into  laws  which,  while  gaining 
fixity,  also  become  more  specific  in  their  appHcations  to  varieties  of  actions; 
and  all  institutions,  at  first  confusedly  intermingled,  slowly  separate,  at  the 
same  time  that  each  within  itself  marks  off  more  distinctly  its  component 
structures.  Thus  in  all  respects  is  fulfilled  the  formula  of  evolution.  There 
is  progress  towards  greater  size,  coherence,  multiformity,  and  definiteness.^ 

The  sociological  unit,  corresponding  to  the  cell  in  biological 
evolution,  is  primitive  man  with  certain  quaHties,  physical, 
emotional  and  intellectual;  ^  yet  other  unities  are  given  promi- 
nence as  the  primitive  horde,^  later  the  family,^  and  finally  the 
sovereign  group  or  nation.^ 

Men  thus  endowed  form  the  internal  or  intrinsic  factors  in  the 
social  process  but  this  process  is  determined  by  the  extrinsic 
factors,  chmate,  surface,  flora,  fauna  and  their  interaction  ^  and 
by  the  super-organic  environment  of  each  group,  made  up  of 
other  groups.^ 

Very  little  attention  is  given  by  our  author  to  an  analysis  of  the 
social  process,^  his  chief  purpose  being  to  show  that  it  corre- 
sponds to  evolution  in  general  so  is  considered  to  be  almost 

1  Sociology,  i,  pp.  596,  597. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  9,  also  p.  437.    Cf.  Earth's  criticism,  op.  cit.,  p.  100. 
2  Sociology,  pp.  464  f.,  550.     Cf.  Laws  of  Univ.  Prog.,  p.  399. 

*  Sociology,  pp.  437,  711.  ^  Ihid.,  i,  p.  9,  ch.  III. 
^  Ihid.,  p.  603;  ii,  pp.  569  f.                  '  Ihid.,  p.  12. 

*  Cf.  Social  Statics,  pp.  77  ff.,  Sociology,  iii,  p.  609. 


HERBERT  SPENCER  33 

entirely  a  process  of  unconscious,  gradual  adjustment  by  means 
of  such  phenomena  as  increase  of  population  together  with 
economic  pressure,  conflict  of  groups,  psychic  interaction  be- 
tween individuals  and  the  group  and  such  super-organic  products 
as  tools,  language,  knowledge,  laws,  and  works  of  art.^  Social 
evolution  further  results  from  the  inheritance  of  acquired  adapta- 
tions both  biological  and  sociological  ^  and  by  the  natural  selec- 
tion.3  That  group  will  survive,  grow  and  ultimately  "  possess  I  l-^^' 
the  land  "  that  has  the  best  family  system,  the  most  efficient  |  "^ 
methods  of  production  and  distribution  and  the  best  government,  l 

Spencer  recognizes  only  two  distinct  stages  of  social  progress, 
the  military  and  industrial.  Compulsory  co-operation  is  character- 
istic of  the  former,  voluntary  co-operation  of  the  latter.  Under 
mihtarism  we  have  social  progress  by  multiplication  of  homogene- 
ous units,  grouping  and  compound  grouping  with  ever  increasing 
efficiency  of  organization  and  division  of  labor.'*  Under  indus- 
trialism little  corporate  activity  is  required^  hence  a  less  compli- 
cated and  centralized  poHtical  organization.^  The  contrast  is 
well  expressed  thus:  "  In  a  society  organized  for  militant  action, 
the  individuality  of  each  member  has  to  be  so  subordinated  in 
life,  liberty  and  property,  that  he  is  largely  or  completely  owned 
by  the  state.  .  .  .  Under  the  industrial  regime  the  citizen's  in- 
dividuality, instead  of  being  sacrificed  by  the  society,  has  to  be 
defended  by  the  society.  Defence  of  his  individuahty  becomes 
the  society's  essential  duty."  ^ 

When,  according  to  Spencer,  with  the  abolition  of  inter-group    ' 
conffict  "  there  remains  only  the  industrial  struggle  for  existence,    . 
the  final  survival  and  spread  must  be  on  the  part  of  those  societies 
which  produce  the  largest  number  of  the  best  individuals,  — 
individuals  best  adapted  for  life  in  the  industrial  state." ^ 

With  simplification  and  decentralization  of  government,  how- 
ever, comes  an  increase  of  industrial  organization,  yet  not  at  the 
expense  of  individual  freedom  as  in  the  former  case.^    Industrial- 

^  Sociology,  i,  pp.  11  ff.  2  Jhid.,  p.  549. 

'  Ihid.,  p.  652;  ii,  pp.  601,  268,  569  f.,  610;  iii,  pp.  581  f. 

*  Ibid.,  i,  pp.  466  fif.;  ii,  pp.  568  ff.  '  Ibid.,  p.  607. 

*  Ibid.,  ii,  pp.  606  f.  8  ihid.^  ii,  p.  610. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  612.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  613,  632. 


34  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

ism,  moreover,  leads  to  a  breaking  down  of  national  barriers  and 
the  development  of  world-federations.^  It  also  leads  to  a  de- 
crease of  individual  bitterness  and  revengefulness,  hence  of  anti- 
social acts.2 

Along  with  the  change  from  militarism  to  industrialism  are 
manifold  sociological  changes  co-ordinated  with  it.  In  Spencer^s 
discussion  of  the  evolution  of  social  institutions  he  shows  not  only 
how  the  changes  are  brought  about  in  harmony  with  the  general 
laws  of  evolution  which  he  has  formulated,  but  also  how  in  each 
case  the  structure,  functions  and  changes  are  correlated  with  the 
movement  from  militarism  to  industrialism.  The  six  institu- 
tions whose  evolution  is  thus  described  are  the  domestic,  cere- 
monial, political,  ecclesiastical,  professional  and  industrial. 

3.  Tests  of  Progress,  —  Our  author,  as  we  have  noted,  makes 
increasing  complexity  the  general  test  of  progress.  More 
specifically,  the  test  of  individual  well-being  is  measured  by 
length  of  Ufe  multiplied  by  breadth,  this  latter  made  up  of  "  the 
aggregate  of  thought,  feeling  and  action";^  the  test  of  industrial 
progress  is  increase  of  division  of  labor,  and  also  increase  of 
interdependence;*  the  test  of  intellectual  progress  is  the  ever 
increasing  power  of  complex  mental  operations;^  the  test  of 
moral  development  is  increasing  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  the 
ends  including  both  self -maintenance  and  race-maintenance.® 
For  the  individual  this  last  test  includes  increase  of  well-being  ^ 
which  calls  for  progressive  adjustment  to  an  ever  increasing 
complexity  of  social  relations  ^  and  also  such  activity  as  furthers 
the  well-being  and  adjustment  of  fellow-men.^  The  test  of  social 
progress  is  increase  of  complexity  in  social  life  and  institutions 
and  in  social  interdependence.^^    The  test  of  religious  progress  is 

1  Sociology,  pp.  615  ff.  2  ijjici.^  p.  636. 

'  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  14. 

*  Illustrations  of  Universal  Progress,  p.  404;  Sociology,  iii,  p.  410. 
^  Ibid.,  i,  ch.  VII;  Principles  of  Psychology,  sections  484-493. 

*  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  17. 
7  Ibid.,  pp.  37,  49  f. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  20,  21,  87;  Sociology,  iii,  pp.  608  ff. 
'  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  27. 

1**  Illustrations  of  Universal  Progress,  pp.  2,  403;  Sociology,  i,  pt.  2,  ch.  IV;  also 
p.  597;  iii,  p.  410. 


HERBERT  SPENCER  35 

increasing  complexity  in  religious  institutions  and  functions  but 
with  a  simplification  of  doctrine  until  it  consists  merely  in  belief 
in  and  adoration  of  the  infinite  but  unknowable  source  of  all.^ 
The  test  of  political  progress  is  for  a  time  increasing  differentiation 
and  integration  but  ultimately  decentralization  in  the  interest  of 
individual  liberty  and  well-being,  until  it  is  merely  negative- 
regulative.2 

Spencer's  specific  contribution  to  the  doctrine  of  adaptation 
as  a  theory  of  social  progress  began  as  early  as  1843  when  he 
wrote  The  Proper  Sphere  of  Government  and  reached  its  highest 
development  in  Social  Statics  written  in  1861.  His  own  sum- 
mary of  the  principles  as  there  elaborated  is  given  in  his  Auto- 
biography:— 

Everything  was  referred  to  the  unvarying  course  of  causation,  no  less 
uniform  in  the  spheres  of  life  and  mind  than  in  the  sphere  of  inanimate  exist- 
ence. Continuous  adaptation  was  insisted  on  as  holding  of  all  organisms, 
and  of  mental  faculties  as  well  as  bodily.  For  this  adaptation,  the  first  cause 
assigned  was  the  increase  or  decrease  of  structure  consequent  on  increase  or 
decrease  of  function;  and  the  second  cause  assigned  was  the  kiUing  ofiF,  or 
dying  out,  of  individuals  least  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  their  lives. 
The  ideally  moral  state  was  identified  with  complete  adjustment  of  constitu- 
tion to  conditions;  and  the  fundamental  requirement,  alike  ethical  and  polit- 
ical, was  represented  as  being  the  rigorous  maintenance  of  the  conditions  to 
harmonious  social  co-operation;  with  the  certainty  that  human  nature  will 
gradually  be  moulded  to  fit  them. 

The  dependence  of  institutions  upon  individual  character  was  dwelt  on; 
the  reciprocal  influences  of  the  two  emphasized;  and  the  adjustment  of 
moral  ideas  to  the  social  state  illustrated.  A  physiological  view  of  social 
actions  was  taken;  on  sundry  occasions  the  expression  "social  organism" 
was  used;  the  aggregation  of  citizens  forming  a  nation  was  compared 
with  the  aggregation  of  cells  forming  a  living  body;  the  progress  from  a 
whole  made  up  of  Hke  parts  which  have  but  little  mutual  dependence  to 
a  whole  made  up  of  unlike  parts  which  are  mutually  dependent  in  a  high 
degree,  was  shown  to  be  a  progress  common  to  individual  organisms  and 
social  organisms.  So  that  the  conception  of  progress  subsequently  to  be 
presented  in  a  more  generalized  form,  was  evidently  foreshadowed.' 

We  thus  have  two  principles  of  evolution  or  tests  of  progress: 
that  of  continuous  adjustment  and'  that  of  increasing  differen- 
tiation and  integration,  the  former  taking  into  consideration  the 

1  Sociology,  iii,  ch.  XVI.  2  /jjj.^  \^  pp.  494  ff.^  598  ff.;  ii,  pp.  643  flF. 

'  Autobiography,  ii,  p.  8.    Cf.  Hudson,  Philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer,  pp.  43, 44. 


36  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

relation  between  the  organism  and  its  environment,  the  latter,  the 
structure  and  functions  of  the  organism.  Now  these  two  prin- 
ciples or  tests  are  not  always  in  agreement.  Mention  has  already 
been  made  of  Spencer's  exception  in  the  case  of  government, 
turning  aside  from  his  universal  principle  in  the  interest  of 
individual  well-being,  thus  returning  to  his  principle  of  adaptation. 
The  same  conflict  is  to  be  noted  in  his  discussion  of  the  family. 
He  shows  that  there  has  not  been  any  one  line  of  development 
from  promiscuity  to  monogamy  but  that  the  order  has  depended 
on  economic  conditions,  i.  e.,  on  the  principle  of  adaptation. 
Tlmt  the  individual  and  social  goal  is  adaptation  and  survival 
rather  than  mere  increasing  complexity  (if  indeed  we  are  war- 
ranted in  speaking  of  a  goal  in  a  naturalistic  system)  is  brought 
out  in  this  same  discussion:  "  Family  organizations  of  this  or 
that  kind  have  first  to  be  judged  by  the  degrees  in  which  they 
help  to  preserve  the  social  aggregate  they  occur  in,  for  in  relation 
to  its  component  individuals,  each  social  aggregate  stands  for  the 
species.  Mankind  survives  not  through  arrangements  which 
refer  to  it  as  a  whole,  but  by  survival  of  its  separate  societies, 
each  of  which  struggles  to  maintain  its  existence  in  presence  of 
other  societies.  And  survival  of  the  race,  achieved  through  sur- 
vival of  its  constituent  societies,  being  the  primary  requirement, 
the  domestic  arrangements  most  conducive  to  survival  in  each 
society  must  be  regarded  as  relatively  appropriate."  ^  The 
standard  of  right  thus  expressed  is  not  a  final  test,  however,  but 
such  as  belongs  to  the  pre-perfect  social  state  whereas  under 
complete  industrialism  and  world-federation,  the  standard  of 
right  is  no  longer  group  utility  and  survival  but  "the  liberty 
of  each  limited  only  by  like  liberty  of  others."  The  group 
ethics  of  the  preliminary  stages  is  thus  very  like  that  of  Galton, 
Carver  and  others  whom  we  shall  consider  later. 

Our  author  admits  that  survival  may  necessitate  a  return  to  a 
simpler  form  but  this  he  considers  retrogression,  thus  placing 
increasing  complexity  as  a  higher  test  of  progress  than  adapta- 
tion. He  never  seems  to  have  faced  this  problem  squarely  and 
thought  it  through.  Increasing  differentiation  and  integration  is 
^  Sociology,  i,  p.  6io. 


HERBERT  SPENCER  2f7 

a  formal  or  structural  test  whereas  increasing  adaptation  is  a  life 
test.  This  point  has  weighty  moral  and  religious  implications. 
The  summum  honum  of  individual  and  group  life  should  be  re- 
vealed by  a  study  of  cosmic  and  especially  of  social  evolution,  and 
if  we  are  theists  we  may  believe  that  God's  will  is  there  revealed. 
Now  if  increasing  differentiation  and  integration  is  the  one  all-i 
inclusive  formula  of  life  and  progress,  every  individual  should 
seek  to  hasten  this  process  in  his  own  life,  so,  too,  should  each 
group,  though  it  lead  to  destruction.  To  theists,  this  would  be 
God's  will.  If,  on  the  contrary,  progressive  adaptation  is  the  law 
of  life,  every  individual  should  seek  to  further  the  process  in  his: 
own  Hfe,  so,  too,  should  every  group,  though  it  call  for  a  return  to 
a  simpler  form,  —  which  Spencer  terms  retrogression.  In  this  case  \ 
retrogression  would  mean  progression  for  it  would  mean  increased 
adaptation  to  a  change  in  the  environment  requiring  such  simpli- 
fication for  survival.  Whether  or  not  such  simplification  is 
possible  for  a  group  is  a  mooted  question  but  it  certainly  is  pos- 
sible for  an  individual. 

In  his  Principles  of  Ethics  adaptation  again  comes  to  the  front  \ 
as  the  test  of  the  good.  Moral  conduct  is  there  defined  in  two  ' 
ways:  as  "  acts  adjusted  to  ends  "  and  as  "  the  adjustment  of 
acts  to  ends."  Spencer  does  not  seem  to  have  appreciated  the 
significance  of  the  difference  in  these  two  statements  but  they 
may  be  interpreted  very  differently,  the  first  signifying  merely 
passive  adaptation,  the  second,  active  adaptation,  because  the 
process  issues  from  intelligent  purpose.  With  him  the  distinction 
is  merely  between  emphasis  on  the  formed  body  of  acts  or  on  the 
form  alone.^ 

Spencer  does  give  some  place  to  purpose,  to  be  sure,  in  his  dis-  ! 
cussion  of  conduct,  but  nowhere  does  he  bring  out  the  contrast 
between  conduct  that  happens  to  he  adjusted  and  conduct  that  is  '■. 
purposely  adjusted.  This  is  shown  by  the  following  quotations: 
"  We  are  able  to  furnish  no  other  test  of  perfection  than  that  of 
complete  power  in  all  the  organs  to  fulfil  their  respective  func- 
tions." ^  "  The  perfection  of  man  considered  as  an  agent  means  the 
being  constituted  for  effecting  complete  adjustment  of  acts  to 
*  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  4.  *  Ibid.,  p.  36. 


38  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

ends  of  every  kind."  ^  "  Given  its  environment  and  its  structure, 
and  there  is,  for  each  kind  of  creature  a  set  of  actions  adapted  to 
their  kinds,  amounts,  and  combinations,  to  secure  the  highest 
conservation  its  nature  permits. '^  ^  ^n  conduct,  that  is,  fits  into 
one  scheme  of  things  and  only  one  line  of  action  can  be  fitting 
hence  good.  The  total  pressure  of  heredity,  of  material  and  social 
environment  tends  to  force  a  man  into  this  line  of  conduct.  The 
normal  man  reacts  approximately  in  the  fitting  way  hence  is  good; 
the  abnormal  man  fails  to  react  properly,  that  is,  fittingly,  hence 
may  be  pronounced  bad.^  We  have  thus  a  doctrine  of  rela- 
tivity similar  to  that  of  Comte  with  this  difference:  with  the 
latter  ethics  is  relative  until  made  absolute  under  the  positive 
regime  while  with  the  former  there  can  be  no  absolute  system 
until  the  ideal  state  of  social  equilibrium  is  reached,  —  a  state 
made  up  of  ideal  men  each  perfectly  adapted  to  the  whole. ^ 

With  Spencer,  as  we  noted  in  our  introduction,  adaptation  is  a 
five-fold  process:  that  of  the  individual  to  his  material^  and 
social  environment  and  that  of  the  group  to  the  well-being  of  its 
members,  to  its  material  environment  and  to  other  societies,  i.  e., 
to  its  super-organic  environment. 

Spencer's  failure  to  emphasize  active  adaptation  or  "telesis'' 
was  due  to  several  causes:  — 

1  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  37.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  152. 

3  Cf.  Mackintosh's  interpretation  of  Spencer:  "The  morally  good  society  is  the 
t3^ically  human  society;  the  morally  good  individual,  so  far  as  he  is  good,  is 
qualified  for  membership  in  that  society,"  op.  cit.,  p.  109.  Cf .  Social  Statics,  pp.  77  f. 

^  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  83. 

^  In  Spencer's  Education  published  as  early  as  i860  we  have  his  only  important 
contribution  to  the  doctrine  of  active  material  adaptation  (though  the  phrase  is  not 
used),  where,  along  with  emphasis  on  the  knowledge  that  insures  health,  stability  of 
the  family,  maintenance  of  wholesome  social  relations  and  the  satisfaction  of  the 
tastes  and  feelings,  stress  is  placed  on  the  knowledge  that  gives  power  over  nature  so 
that  with  increased  productivity  will  come  the  material  essentials  for  "  complete 
living."  Yet  even  in  this  treatise  which  has  been  one  of  the  most  potent  factors  in 
the  modem  movement  for  an  education  which  fits  for  success  in  life,  the  main 
emphasis  is  on  passive  adaptation  as  shown  in  his  discussion  of  "  pimishment,"  in 
his  insistence  that  education  is  to  fit  the  child  for  the  world  as  he  finds  it  rather  than 
for  an  ideal  social  order,  and  in  his  repeated  use  of  the  dictum  "  follow  nature  " 
without  making  clear  that  nature  includes  man  and  social  groups  with  power  to 
react  on  it  purposefully  in  the  interest  of  the  largest  possible  individual  and  social 
life. 


HERBERT  SPENCER  39 

1.  His  whole  system  is  formal,  abstract  and  logical.  Bergson 
characterizes  his  evolution  theory  as  false  because  it  "  consists  in 
cutting  up  present  reality  already  evolved,  into  little  bits  no  less 
evolved,  and  then  recomposing  it  with  these  fragments,  thus 
positing  in  advance  everything  that  is  to  be  explained."  ^  Pro- 
fessor Bowne  delighted  to  speak  of  his  method  of  confusing  logical 
classification  with  genetic  order,  as  the  "  fallacy  of  the  universal."  ^ 

2.  His  explanation  is  essentially  mechanistic.  He  endeavors 
to  interpret  the  complexities  of  psychical  and  social  life  in 
terms  adequate  to  describe  only  movements  of  lifeless  matter. 
Mackintosh  shows  how  inadequate  is  his  theory  to  explain  or- 
ganization, consciousness  and  history,^  and  Sir  Arthur  Thomson, 
while  recognizing  that  Spencer  was  using  mere  S3anbols  to  express 
the  workings  of  the  unknown  reality,  points  out  that  these 
symbols  are  entirely  inadequate  to  represent  the  genesis  of  life 
and  mind.  "No  one  can  doubt,"  he  says,  "  that  development  is 
progressive  differentiation,  but  it  is  rather  a  realization  of  a  com- 
plex inheritance  of  materialized  potentialities  than  a  change  from 
an  incoherent,  indefinite  homogeneity  to  a  coherent,  definite 
heterogeneity."  ^  The  mechanical  laws  of  multiplication  of 
effects,  of  rhythm  ^  and  of  the  tendency  to  equilibrium  are  thus 
entirely  inadequate  to  explain  social  evolution. 

3.  Spencer's  assumption  of  an  inherent  tendency  to  develop- 
ment in  the  cosmos  together  with  his  belief  in  use-inheritance  and 
natural  selection,  render  his  explanation  much  easier  than  is 
really  the  case.  The  first  assumption  is  hyper-scientific,  the 
second  has  been  all  but  disproven  and  the  third  has  been  ques- 
tioned so  seriously  in  its  appHcation  to.  social  progress  that  his 
general  theory  has  been  greatly  weakened. 

4.  His  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  economic  factors  has 
been  accentuated  since;  but  he  failed  to  appreciate  the  distinc- 
tion between  uneconomic  and  economic  competition;  i.  e., 
between  the  competition  that  is  destructive  of  human  energy  and 

*  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  xiii,  xiv.     Cf.  also  pp.  364-391. 

2  Class  Lectures.  '  Op.  cit.,  p.  91. 

*  Herbert  Spencer,  p.  115.     Cf.  also  pp.  103,  140,  211,  212. 

5  For  criticism  of  his  use  of  law  of  rhythm,  see  Schiller,  "Herbert  Spencer," 
Encyclopedia  Brit.,  xiii  ed. 


40  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

diminishes  social  welfare  and  the  competition  that  tends  to  de- 
velop and  encourage  the  multiplication  of  the  most  efficient  men 
and  methods  and  increases  social  welfare.  The  one  should  be 
prevented,  the  other  encouraged  by  social  control.^ 

5.  Spencer  failed  to  appreciate  the  function  of  intelligence  in 
"short  circuiting"  the  normal  processes  of  nature.^  Intelligence 
has  as  one  of  its  chief  functions  the  economizing  of  time  and 
energy.  Man  by  "  art "  abridges  the  slow  process  of  passive 
adjustment. 

6.  Finally  his  failure  to  appreciate  the  fxmctions  of  social  con- 
trol was  due  in  large  measure  to  his  extreme  individualism,  ex- 
pressed in  religion  in  non-conformity  and  free- thought;  in 
economics  by  laissezfaire  doctrines;  in  ethics  by  over-emphasis 
on  egoism;  in  government,  in  his  theory  of  decentralization  and 
"  negative  regulation."  "  Liberty,  equality,  justice  and  fra- 
ternity,"— these  ideals  were  for  him  the  interpreters  of  the  social 
process  in  its  final  stages.  This  point  of  view  led  him  to  see  only 
those  acts  of  ParHament  that  were  over-paternalistic  and  had 
proven  a  failure,  and  blinded  him  to  the  many  successful  meas- 
ures that  had  been  passed.  Despite  these  short-comings,  how- 
ever, his  doctrine  of  passive  adaptation  as  developed  in  Social 
Statics  and  illustrated  in  his  Principles  of  Sociology  stands  as  one 
of  the  great  principles  of  social  progress,  a  process  which  was 
destined  to  be  analyzed  by  more  keenly  analytic  students  in- 
spired by  the  more  strictly  scientific  methods  of  men  like  Darwin. 

1  For  development  of  this  distinction  see  discussion  of  Professor  Carver's 
social  philosophy. 

2  Cf.  however,  note  5,  p.  38. 


CHAPTER  III 
SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY 

Both  Comte  and  Spencer  defined  life  in  terms  of  progressive 
adaptation  between  an  organism  and  its  environment  and  both* 
conceived  society  as  a  quasi-biological  organism,  though  not 
agreeing  in  their  conception  of  society  nor  of  the  process  of  adjust- 
ment. Comte^s  concept  was  a  logical  fiction,  so  also,  to  a  con- 
siderable degree,  the  process  of  social  evolution  as  formulated  by 
him.  Spencer  attempted  to  describe  in  mechanical  terms  the 
historical  process  by  which  society,  considered  for  the  most  part 
as  a  sovereign  group,  is  progressively  adapted  to  its  environment 
so  also  that  of  the  various  social  institutions;  but  most  of  his 
time  was  devoted  to  a  study  of  origins  and  his  method,  the  logical 
classification  of  concepts,  failed  to  give  him  genetic  order,  and  led 
him  to  neglect  the  study  of  social  forces.  Comte  was  in  advance  / 
of  Spencer  in  emphasizing  the  power  of  mind  over  matter  thus] 
making  place  for  active  adaptation. 

From  Comte  and  Spencer  the  development  of  theories  of  social 
progress,  of  methods  of  sociological  investigation,  and  as  a  result 
of  these,  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  as  the  key 
to  social  philosophy,  was  along  several  different  lines.     Some 
pushed  further  than  these  two  the  method  of  classification  as  a 
means  of  attaining  knowledge  of  the  social  structure  and  process 
such  as  Littre,  De  Roberty,  De  Greef,  Lacombe  and  A.  Wagner,  f 
Some  used  the  same  analogical  method  as  they  and  elaborated  the 
concept  of  society  as  a  quasi-biological  organism,  chief  among 
whom  were  Lilienfeld  and  Schaffle.     Others  making  use  of  the 
neo-Darwinian  formula,   as    Nietzsche,   Kidd,   and    Lapouge,  j 
endeavored  to  explain  social  progress  in  terms  of  struggle  and 
survival.      Others  interpreted  society  as  a  quasi-psychological 
organism  as  Le  Bon,  MacKenzie,  Fairbanks,  Ely,  Giddings  and  | 
Baldwin.     Others,  still,  sought  to  analyze  and  evaluate  social 


42  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

forces,  some  of  whom,  following  the  lead  of  Quetelet,  made  use  of 
the  statistical  method,  as  Buckle,  Galton,  and  Pearson,  while 
others,  imder  the  inspiration  of  Darwin,  turned  to  an  inductive 
study  of  social  facts  and  forces  as  Ratzenhofer,  Gumplowicz  and 
the  modern  school  of  social  scientists  such  as  Le  Play,  Booth, 
Rountree  and  the  eugenicists,  —  represented  in  England  by 
Galton  and  Pearson  and  in  America  by  Davenport,  —  and  a 
final  group  have  endeavored  to  explain  social  progress  in  terms  of 
some  one  law  or  principle  as  Tarde  and  Giddings. 

As  method  is  so  important  in  any  department  of  investigation, 
especially  in  one  that  is  new,  and  inasmuch  as  an  appreciation  of 
the  method  used  by  an  author  often  furnishes  a  valid  means  of 
criticizing  his  conclusions,  it  may  be  well  to  devote  some  place 
to  a  brief  discussion  of  sociological  methodology  in  general  and  of 
some  methods  as  illustrated  by  specific  writers  in  this  field  whose 
contribution  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation 
has  been  indirect  rather  than  direct. 

When  Comte  and  Spencer  wrote,  the  deductive  method  reigned 
almost  supreme  in  social  science,  and  though  they  prided  them- 
selves on  breaking  away  from  the  methods  of  the  past,  they  were 
still,  to  a  considerable  extent,  fettered  by  their  training.  Mal- 
thus,  Quetelet,  and  a  few  others,  indeed,  had  turned  their  atten- 
tion seriously  to  a  scientific  study  of  social  phenomena  but  their 
followers  were  few. 

Comte  turned  his  attention  to  this  subject  holding  that  the 
same  inductive  methods  in  vogue  in  biology  were,  with  some 
modification,  applicable  in  sociology,  viz.,  observation,  experi- 
ment, and  comparison,  with  the  promise  of  a  fourth  method  to 
be  derived  from  biology,  —  since  fulfilled  in  the  so-called  genetic 
method.^  Under  experiment,  Comte  mentions  only  a  study  of 
pathological  conditions,  but  despite  MilFs  teaching  concerning 
the  inapplicability  of  this  method  in  social  investigations,^  we 
have  come  to  realize  the  possibility  of  arranging  social  conditions 
and  forces  by  forethought  much  as  does  the  worker  in  the  physical 
or  chemical  laboratory,  although  as  the  phenomena  are  so  much 
more  complex,  and  the  time  required  to  try  out  the  experiment  is 

*  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  ch.  II.  '  Logic,  ch.  VII. 


SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY  43 

SO  great,  the  process  is  difficult  and  the  results  more  or  less  un- 
certain. Under  the  comparative  method,  according  to  Comte, 
we  have  comparison  between  society  and  animal  groups,  between 
co-existing  states  of  society  and  between  consecutive  stages  in 
social  growth.  A  combination  of  this  last  and  of  the  method 
derived  from  biology  has  given  rise  to  the  historical  method,^ 
where  the  purpose  is  not  merely  to  deduce  general  laws  from 
specific  historical  events  but  to  discover  the  "  filiation  "  in  suc- 
cessive events.  Two  other  forms  of  the  inductive  method  have 
come  to  have  increasing  vogue  since  Comte's  time,  the  statistical 
method  and  what  might  well  be  termed  the  "  inverse  historical " 
method,  i.  e.,  the  analysis  of  current  events  with  the  purpose  of 
finding  a  clue  to  the  interpretation  of  the  past.^ 

In  this  chapter  we  will  consider  Quetelet  because  of  his  develop- 
ment of  the  statistical  method  and  his  use  of  it  in  studying  social 
phenomena,  Lilienfeld  as  representative  of  the  analogical  school 
and  De  Greef  as  representative  of  those  whose  social  philosophy  is 
based  largely  on  the  method  of  logical  classification,  and  in  the 
following  chapter  consider  Darwin  and  his  successors  as  repre- 
sentatives of  the  inductive  method. 

Lambert  A.  J.  Quetelet  (i  796-1 874) 
The  Statistical  Method 

Such  a  large  place  has  the  statistical  method  ^  played  in  all  the 
social  sciences  during  the  past  half  century  that  some  place  needs 
to  be  given  it,  and  especially  to  its  use  in  connection  with  the 
doctrine  of  adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social  progress,  for  it  is  an 
instrument  of  first  importance  in  diagnosing  social  pathology  or 
mal-adaptation,  as  it  is  also  in  measuring  social  growth  and 
adaptation. 

According  to  Quetelet,  statistics,  as  a  science,  dates  back  no 
longer  than  1820,^  but  M.  Block  shows  that  in  its  essential  fes^ 

*  Logic,  ch.  X. 

*  Carver,  Sociology  and  Social  Progress,  p.  64. 
^  King,  Elements  of  Statistical  Methods,  ch.  I. 

*  M.  Block,  Trait6  de  Statistique,  p.  48;  Hankins,  "Quetelet,"  Columbia  Unit 
Studies,  xxxi,  pp.  37 ff. 


44  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

tures  this  method  was  taught  by  Courning  in  the  University  of 
Hehnstadt  in  1660,  and  that  a  course  in  statistics  was  offered  at 
Jena  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.^  Although  as  a 
science  it  is  of  recent  date,  enumerations  of  population  and  cal- 
culations concerning  other  social  phenomena  antedate  the  birth  of 
Christ  more  than  2000  years.^  The  word  law  was  first  used  in 
statistics  by  Sussmilch  in  1775  to  express  regularity  in  the  recur- 
rence of  social  phenomena;^  but  some  statisticians  have  confused 
this  with  natural  law.  M.  Block  distinguishes  the  two  as  follows : 
"  One  indicates  certainty,  the  other,  probability.  ...  In 
natural  laws  we  are  able  to  follow  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  We  see  (as  far  as  our  knowledge  or  experience  permits) 
all  the  factors  in  action,  we  know  in  advance  that  the  cause  will 
produce  the  effect.  ...  In  statistics  the  relations  of  cause  and 
effect  are  less  visible,  often  we  can  determine  only  correlations 
(coincidences)  from  the  post  hoc  rather  than  from  the  propter  hoc, 
for  now  the  cause  remains  unknown." 

f  Quetelet  is  generally  recognized  as  the  first  name  in  the  his- 
tory and  development  of  modern  statistical  science.^  His  con- 
tribution is  stated  by  Hankins  to  be  four-fold:  (i)  perfection  of 
plans  for  census  taking;  (2)  criticism  of  sources;  (3)  arrangement 
of  materials;  and  (4)  progress  toward  uniformity  and  compar- 
ability of  data.^  He  was  the  leading  spirit  in  the  formation  of  the 
Bureau  of  Statistics  in  Belgium  and  in  the  organization  of  the 
Royal  Statistical  Society  of  London.  Through  his  influence 
various  nations  were  led  to  co-operate  in  using  a  standard 
system  of  enumeration. 

Quetelet  was  a  contemporary  of  A.  Comte  and  seems  to  have 
influenced  him  to  some  extent  though  Comte  finally  repudiated 
the  statistical  method.  His  influence  on  Buckle,  however,  was 
profound  and  the  statistical  method,  made  popular  among 
scientists  by  his  writings,  has  been  foimd  of  great  value  by 
modern  sociologists. 

i  Guided  by  the  scientific  thought  of  his  day  as  represented  by 
Lyell,  Agassiz,  Gray  and  Hooker,  Quetelet  considered  each  species 

*  Op.  cit.j  p.  5.  •  Ibid.,  p.  115.  ^  Ibid. J  p.  41. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  I.  *  Hankins,  p.  36. 


SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY  45 

to  be  immutable.  The  normal  frequency  curve  applied  to  each  / 
species  revealed  the  type  nature  was  aiming  to  produce.  Varia- 
tions from  the  norm  were  considered  to  be  due  to  accidental 
causes.^  This  law  he  considered  to  be  of  universal  application, 
and  it  furnished  him  the  background  for  his  doctrine  of  the 
"  average  man  "  which  was  one  of  his  great  original  contributions 
to  anthropology,  although  we  find  a  similar  conception  in  the 
writings  of  Father  Buffier.^  The  qualities  of  this  typical  man, 
moral  and  mental  as  well  as  physical,  were  obtained  in  the  same 
way.  He  had  not  only  a  certain  height,  weight,  complexion, 
color  of  hair  and  eyes,  but  a  certain  intellectual  acuteness,  tem- 
perament, sensitiveness,  —  in  other  words  a  *^  character,"  which 
represented  reaction  power  to  physical  and  social  stimuli.  Under 
certain  conditions  this  typical  man  would  react  in  such  a  way 
that  society  would  denominate  the  action  crime  or  again,  suicide, 
and  he  considered  that  the  social  conditions  were  on  the  whole  so 
uniform  as  to  produce  regularity  in  such  phenomena.  He  made  j 
no  place  for  progress  in  either  physical  or  intellectual  capacity,  I 
but  only  in  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  and  power  over  nature,  j 

Quetelet  applied  the  same  method  to  the  study  of  society  that 
he  had  to  the  study  of  the  "  average  man."  He  is  vague  in  his 
definition  of  society  but  considers  it  as  a  "  body  "  in  a  sense 
almost  as  crude  as  in  the  use  of  the  term  by  Hobbes.  The  nation-? 
type,  in  his  thought,  was  made  up  of  physical,  intellectual  and 
moral  factors.  He  recognized  a  complexity  here,  however,  which 
had  no  analogy  in  man,  for  he  showed  that  in  stature,  for  example, 
sections  of  a  people  differed,  as  city  and  country  dwellers,  and  also 
that  there  were  various  sectional  types. 

The  statistical  method,  especially  as  applied  to  moral  phe- 
nomena, seems  to  some  to  eliminate  arbitrary  will;  not  so,  how- 
ever, with  Quetelet  who  emphasized  its  importance  in  individual 
life,^  but  showed  that  the  free  will  manifested  itself  in  activities 
which  were  a  part  of  the  law-abiding  order  and  that  considering  a 
group  as  a  whole  this  element  of  arbitrariness  did  not  appear  as 

^  Du  Systeme  Social,  pp.  257  f. 

2  Quoted  and  adopted  by  A.  Smith,  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  p.  318. 

*  Du  Systeme  Social,  p.  96. 


46  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

such.  Indeed  he  went  so  far  as  to  hold  that  "  les  phenomenes 
sociaux,  influences  par  le  libra  arbitrare  de  Thomme,  procedent, 
d'annee  en  annee,  avec  plus  de  regularite  que  les  phenomenes 
purement  influences  par  des  causes  materielles  et  fortuites."  ^ 

The  fallacies  in  Quetelet's  argument  are  all  ascribable  to  two 
sources,  first,  his  belief  in  the  stability  of  types,  and  second,  his  too 
rigid  application  of  the  organic  analogy  to  a  social  group.  Never- 
theless, he  shares  with  Comte,  Spencer,  and  Darwin  the  honor 
of  being  pillars  in  the  building  of  the  new  social  science. 

The  statistical  method,  of  utmost  value  when  used  with  scien- 
tific insight,  has  been  misused  more  than  has  any  other,  for  its 
fallacies  are  less  easily  observed  by  the  uninitiated.  As  has  been 
frequently  pointed  out  this  method  gives  us  at  best  only  correla- 
tions and  conditions,  not  causes;  and  too  often  the  phenomena 
compared  are  not  sufficiently  alike  to  warrant  the  conclusions 
drawn  from  the  comparison.  The  results  obtained  by  this 
method  are  valid  only  in  proportion  as  all  other  things  are  equal 
save  in  the  one  point  of  comparison,  and  this  is  difficult  to  obtain 
in  social  phenomena. 

The  advent  of  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  marks  a  new  epoch  in 
sociological  methodology  and  since  his  day  the  pure  deductive 
reasoning  of  the  mediaeval  philosophers  has  constantly  waned, 
so  too,  of  late,  the  endeavor  to  ground  social  philosophy  on  a 
classification  of  social  phenomena  or  formulate  its  principles  by 
analogy.  Observation,  comparison,  compilation  of  statistics, 
correct  interpretation  of  the  data,  experiment,  —  these  are 
emphasized  with  increasing  vigor,  with  a  proper  use,  to  be  sure, 
of  deduction,  classification,  and  analogy. 

Before  passing  to  a  consideration  of  Darwin  and  his  successors 
as  representatives  of  the  inductive  method  and  as  furnishing  the 
biological  background  for  the  theory  of  adaptation,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  consider  the  importance  of  the  material  environment 
in  biological  evolution  and  the  contributions  of  Lamarck. 

1  Du  Systeme  Socialy  p.  97. 


SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY  47 

Paul  Von  Lilienfeld  (1829-1903) 
The  Analogical  Method    *^— .^,, 

Lilienfeld  is  perhaps  the  best  representative  of  the  analogical 
school,  for  though  Schaffle  has  made  large  use  of  the  organic 
analogy  it  is  not  essential  to  his  system  as  proven  by  the  fact  that 
in  his  Sociology  he  dispensed  with  the  concept  entirely,  and 
his  whole  temperament  and  method,  together  with  his  emphasis 
on  the  psychical  factors  in  society  and  social  progress,  give  war- 
rant for  placing  him  in  another  class. 

Lilienfeld  may  well  be  termed  a  social  realist  for  he  insists  ( 
"dass  diese  oder  jene  Gesellschaftsgruppe,  dieser  oder  jener  Staat 
wirkliche,  lebendige  Organismen,  gleich  alien  iibrigen  Organismen 
in  der  Nature,  sind,  die  sich  im  Raum  und  in  der  Zeit  nicht  nur 
ideell,  sondern  reell  entwickeln  und  wahrnehmen  lassen."  ^ 

Many  likenesses  between  society  and  a  biological  organism  are 
enumerated,  the  individuals  in  the  former  corresponding  to  the 
cells  in  the  latter,^  the  political,  juridical  and  industrial  institu- 
tions corresponding  to  the  central  nervous  system  while  the  inter- 
cellular substance  in  the  body  has  its  analogue  in  such  social 
achievements  as  works  of  art,  written  laws  and  ideas,  by  means  of 
which  society  projects  itself  in  concrete  form.^ 

While  holding  that  there  is  no  break  in  the  cosmic  process,  yet 
he  shows  how  the  forces  working  in  organic  life  differ  from  those 
in  the  inorganic  realm,  becoming  ever  more  active,  complex,  and 
differentiated,  culminating  in  freedom  and  purposeful  action.* 
He  mentions  five  ways  in  which  the  former  shows  its  superiority  ; 
to  the  latter:  (i)  in  the  organic  cycle  of  growth  and  decay  activi- 
ties are  never  repeated;  (2)  an  organism  has  an  inner  unity  of 
life;  (3)  there  is  a  correlation  of  materials  and  forces  working 
toward  an  end;  (4)  there  is  a  struggle  to  come  to  completion  and, 
(5)  there  is  a  storing  up  and  transmission  of  surplus  energy.^ 
Li  the  first  and  last  items  he  has  made  real  contributions  to  social 

^  Gedanken  iiher  die  Socialwissenschaft  der  Zukunftj  i,  p.  27.  Cf.  Pathologic 
Sociale,  Preface. 

^  Gedanken,  ii,  pp.  viii  f.  *  Gedanken,  i,  pp.  56,  57. 

'  Pathologie  Sociale,  pp.  95  fif.  ^  Ihid.,  pp.  57  f. 


48  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

philosophy,  especially  in  the  last.  He  shows  how  this  is  especially 
characteristic  of  developed  personaHty  and  how,  in  this  respect,  a 
society  is  not  like  a  low  form  of  organic  life  but  like  the  highest. 
This  process  he  terms  social  capitalization.  ^  Society  is  further 
like  a  personality  in  that  it  has  consciousness,  reason  and  will.^ 

Another  important  contribution  for  our  purpose  is  his  distinc- 
tion between  a  normal  and  diseased  organism.  This  concept  he 
applies  by  analogy  to  society  and  develops  especially  in  his  La 
Pathologie  Sociale.  Disease  may  affect  society  in  any  one  of  the 
three  departments,  —  industry,  justice,  or  politics,  —  and  these 
social  maladies  correspond  to  three  forms  of  nervous  disease, 
that  of  industry  to  insanity,  that  of  justice  to  delirium,  that  of 
poHtics  to  paralysis.^  This  last,  however,  can  hardly  be  called  a 
contribution  to  science  of  any  kind.  Ross  scores  Lilienfeld 
severely  for  such  flimsy  analogical  reasoning.^ 

The  discussion  of  social  pathology  leads  our  author  to  the 
question  of  social  therapeutics  which  in  places  is  equally  fanciful 
and  unscientific.  In  bringing  out  this  phase  of  group  life  he 
introduces  a  note  which  finds  little  place  in  the  systems  of  Comte 
or  Spencer.  We  have  now  the  concept  of  social  mal-adaptation 
and  the  problem  of  adjustment. 

Another  analogy  used  by  Lilienfeld  which  has  had  large  use 
since,  especially  by  pedagogical  writers,  is  his  bio-social  law  of 
recapitulation  taken  over  from  Haeckel,  according  to  which  the 
individual  person  recapitulates,  in  his  development,  the  culture- 
periods  of  racial  history.^ 

The  analogical  method  has  been  used  too  frequently  as  a  device 
to  exploit  some  pet  theory  without  painstaking  endeavor  to  dis- 
cover the  forces  at  work  in  the  process  and  formulate  the  laws  of 
their  operation.  This  has  been  true  to  a  considerable  extent  as 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  note  later,  with  much  of  the  reasoning 
of  the  biological  school  of  sociologists  who  are  apt  to  assume 

1  Gedanken,  pp.  55  f.  '  Barth,  op.  cit.,  pp.  103-105. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  61.  *  Foundations  of  Sociology,  p.  48. 

^  Gedanken^  i,  pp.  245  ff .  "  Die  Stadien  der  menschlichen  embryonalen  Entwicke- 
lung  eines  jeden  Individuums  entsprechen  der  progressiven  socialen  Entwickelung 
des  ganzen  Menschengeschlechts  in  seiner  stufenweisen  Ausbildimg  in  Verlaufe  der 
ganzen  Geschichte  der  Menschheit  "  {ihid.,  p.  247). 


SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY  49 

that  a  law  that  prevails,  or  is  thought  to  prevail,  in  biological 
evolution,  prevails  in  like  manner  in  the  evolution  of  a  social 
group  or  civilization  taken  as  a  whole.     The  fact  would  seem  to 
be  rather  that  each  phase  of  development  has  its  characteristic  | 
marks  and  can  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of  an  inductive 
study  of  the  elements  that  make  up  its  own  life.    Moreover,  while ' 
a  knowledge  of  higher  phases  of  development  can  be  applied  with  ', 
a  good  degree  of  certainty  to  lower  phases,  the  reverse  is  true  / 
only  within  limits  which  need  to  be  carefully  defined. 


GUILLAUME   De   GrEEF    (1842-  ) 

Classification  as  a  Method  of  Sociological  Knowledge 

De  Greef  accepts  Comte's  hierarchy  of  the  sciences,  but  greatly 
extends  it  to  include  the  social  sciences.*  In  addition  to  Spencer's 
principle  of  classification,  —  increasing  complexity  and  de- 
pendence of  parts,  —  he  adds  that  of  volitional  activity  or 
contractuaHsm,  which  he  holds  to  be  "  the  distinguishing  char- 
acteristic of  society,  both  from  the  structural  and  the  functional 
point  of  view,"  and  defines  as  "  their  superior  and  special  mode  of 
adaptation  and  life."  ^ 

De  Greef  arranges  the  social  elements  in  a  hierarchy  based  on 
decreasing  generality  beginning  with  the  economic  and  including 
in  order,  the  industrial,  genetic,  artistic,  scientific,  moral,  juridi- 
cal, and  political.  Not  only  does  this  scale  stand  for  the  order  of 
generality,  but  also  represents  their  related  order  of  influence  on 
social  progress  and  on  each  other.  That  is,  the  economic  factor 
has  great  influence  on  social  progress  as  a  whole  and  on  the  politi- 
cal factor  in  particular,  whereas  the  political  factor  has  little 
influence  on  social  progress  and  little  on  economic  conditions.^ 

^  Am.  Journ.  Soc,  vii;  Introduction  d  la  Sociologie,  Preface. 

2  Am.  Journ.  Soc,  viii,  p.  497.     Cf.  Barth,  op.  cit.,  p.  69. 

'  This  is  a  good  example  of  the  artificialities  into  which  some  are  led.  Such  a 
harmonious  cross-classification  does  not  represent  concrete  life  conditions.  The 
fact  is  that  government  has  more  influence  on  the  economic  factor  than  it  has 
on  the  religious,  moral,  or  juridical,  and,  in  fact,  as  Sumner  has  pointed  out,  the 
moral  is  most  often  changed  by  legislation  that  has  aimed  to  bring  about  certain 
industrial  changes.     Cf.  Barth,  ihid.y  p.  81;  Small,  General  Sociology ^  pp.  68  fif. 


so  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

The  above  hierarchy,  too,  according  to  our  author,  is  based  on 
increasing  contractualism;  i.  e.,  in  politics  we  have  the  highest 
degree  of  voluntary  action,  in  economics,  the  least.  De  Greef 
thus  made  advance  on  the  logical  classification  of  Comte  but 
made  the  mistake  of  thinking  this  represented  the  real  objective 
order.i 

Spencer,  as  we  have  seen,  connects  social  with  biological  evolu- 
tion without  emphasizing  any  marked  difference.  With  him 
social  development  is  a  part  of  the  whole  cosmic  process  which  is 
a  mechanical  system  and  so  affords  no  opportunity  (or  practi- 
cally none)  for  rational  control.  While  De  Greef 's  position  is  in 
many  respects  the  same,^  yet  his  differentiating  factor  of  volitional 
activity  or  contractualism,  though  perhaps  merely  logical,  is  yet 
important,  for  De  Greef  believed  it  represented  some  real  objec- 
tive distinction.  It  is  closely  related  to  Ward's  concept  of  telesis 
and  in  proportion  as  his  classification  does  represent  reality  it 
reveals  degrees  of  active  adaptation.  But  the  same  criticism 
applies  here  as  in  the  case  of  Comte:  a  logical  hierarchy  is  of  no 
value  for  social  science  unless  it  represents  objective  distinctions 
and  relations;  but  with  neither  of  these  writers  are  we  made  sure 
that  this  is  the  case,'  and  with  De  Greef  we  are  very  sure  that  it  is 
positively  false  in  some  respects.  As  there  are  different  degrees 
of  adaptation,*  or  better,  of  mal-adaptation,  the  important  thing 

1  Op.  cit.,  i,  p.  159.  Barth  holds  that  logical  classification  may  represent  the 
temporal  evolution  of  an  object  as  a  biological  organism,  but  that  it  does  not 
represent  necessarily  the  evolution  of  a  science  or  of  a  social  institution.  He 
shows  that  as  propagation  co-exists  with  struggle  for  existence,  so  love  is  as  early 
as  economic  endeavor,  and  that  the  industrialism  of  primitive  people  is  no  more 
general  than  their  religious  thoughts  and  acts,  op.  cit.,  p.  87. 

2  Ibid.,  i,  p.  140. 

*  On  this  point  Small  justly  remarks:  "  His  claim  with  reference  to  the  hier- 
archial  order  of  phenomena  so  arranged  must  stand  or  fall  as  a  result  of  specific 
investigation  of  the  activities  and  sub-activities  distinguished  in  the  schedule." 
General  Sociology,  p.  72.     Cf.  Barth,  pp.  2>?>  f. 

^  "  There  is  a  wide  interval  between  the  highest  and  lowest  degrees  of  complete- 
ness of  living  that  are  compatible  with  maintenance  of  life.  Hence  the  wicked 
flourish.  Vice  is  but  slowly  eliminated  because  mankind  has  so  many  other 
qualities,  besides  the  bad  ones,  which  enable  it  to  subsist  and  achieve  progress  in 
spite  of  them,  that  natural  selection, —  which  always  works  through  death, —  can- 
not cx)me  into  play."     John  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  98. 


SOCIOLOGICAL  METHODOLOGY  5 1 

to  know  is  the  cause  of  the  mal-adaptation  and  the  best  way  to 
secure  adjustment,  and  for  this  De  Greef's  logical  scheme  would 
not  seem  to  be  of  much  service. 

De  Greef  makes  advance  over  both  Comte  and  Spencer,  also, 
in  that  he  gives  clearer  content  to  the  concept  of  society,  holding 
that  humanity  is  a  social  organism  only  at  best  potentially,  and 
that  the  true  social  aggregates  are  the  androgynous  couple,  the 
family,  tribe,  etc.,^  moreover  that  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the 
social  organism  is  a  certain  felt  "  togetherness  "  whether  it  be 
merely  automatic  and  reflexive  or  thought  out.^ 

1  Op.  cii.,  p  71.  2  Qp^  cU.,  p.  131. 


PART  II 

PASSIVE  PHYSICAL  AND  PHYSIO- 
SOCIAL  ADAPTATION 


CHAPTER  IV 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION 


Having  surveyed  in  outline  the  social  theories  of  Comte  and 
Spencer  with  special  reference  to  their  bearing  on  the  doctrine  of 
adaptation,  and  having  reviewed  the  various  methods  in  use  in 
social  science  and  social  philosophy  and  considered  their  bearing 
on  our  subject,  pointing  out  some  of  the  dangers  lurking  in  the 
use  of  the  classifying,  analogical  and  statistical  methods,  our  next 
problem  is  to  study  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adapta- 
tion by  those  who  have  endeavored  to  explain  evolution  in  terms 
of  the  influence  of  the  environment  on  the  organism  or  social 
group. 

The  environment  may  afifect  the  organism  in  three  different 
ways:  (i)  by  direct  action,  producing  molecular,  chemical  or 
functional  changes  as  in  pigmentation  and  acclimatization; 
(2)  by  affording  favorable  opportunity  for  growth  and  functional 
variation,  or  the  reverse,  as  in  change  of  habitat  resulting  in 
increase  or  decrease  of  food,  or  (3)  by  furnishing  conditions  favor- 
able to  struggle  and  selection. 

The  first  view,  advocated  by  Buff  on  and  Erasmus  Darwin,^  was 
eclipsed  for  a  long  time  under  the  influence  of  the  theory  of  nat- 
ural selection  but  has  been  upheld  firmly  by  Viet,  Scott  Elliott, 
W.  H.  DaU  and  others,  and  still  more  recently  by  the  advocates  of 
the  theory  of  geographical  isolation  as  the  most  important  factor 
in  species  formation.^ 

The  direct  influence  of  environment  on  the  organism  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  words  of  Dall  though  in  somewhat  exaggerated 
terms:  "  The  environment  stands  in  a  relation  to  the  individual 
such  as  the  hammer  and  anvil  bear  to  the  blacksmith's  hot  iron. 
The  organism  suffers  during  its  entire  existence  a  continuous 

1  Packard,  Lamarck,  pp.  203,  218. 

2  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  ch.  IX. 

S5 


56  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

series  of  mechanical  impacts,  none  the  less  real  because  invisible, 
or  disguised  by  the  fact  that  some  of  them  are  precipitated  by 
voluntary  effort  of  the  individual  itself."  ^ 

The  influence  on  the  organism  of  such  environmental  forces  as 
food  and  climate  has  never  been  seriously  questioned.  The 
mooted  points  are  such  as  these:  (i)  the  inheritance  in  any 
degree  of  characters  thus  acquired,  and  if  so,  the  method;  (2)  the 
presence  and  potency  in  the  organism  of  a  vital,  directive  force; 
(3)  the  character  of  the  variations  whether  continuous  or  dis- 
continuous; and  (4)  the  process  by  which  variations  come  to 
have  such  quaHtative  difference  as  to  give  rise  to  new  species. 
The  most  vital  point  in  the  controversy  today,  especially  among 
the  followers  of  Weismann,  is  as  to  whether  or  not  any  environ- 
mental influence  can  affect  heredity,  working  either  through  the 
blood  or  through  the  central  nervous  system,  and  if  so,  what  such 
influences  are  and  how  the  effect  is  produced. 

In  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  in  theories  of 
biological  evolution,  ^yq  names  stand  out  with  such  prominence 
as  to  demand  special  consideration:  Lamarck,  Charles  Darwin, 
Weismann,  De  Vries  and  Mendel. 

Jean  Baptiste  de  Lamarck  (i 744-1829) 

Use-Inheritance 

Pemberton  in  his  Path  of  Evolution  thus  characterizes  the  work 
of  Lamarck :  — 

He  rendered  to  mankind  the  eminent  service  of  arousing  attention  to  the 
probability  that  all  change  in  the  organic  as  well  as  in  the  inorganic  world, 
was  the  result  of  law  and  not  miraculous  interposition.  His  theories  of 
the  origin  of  species  were,  that  the  organs  of  the  body  were  modified  by  the 
desires  and  will  of  the  individual  in  response  to  external  condition.  The 
changes  thus  induced  would  be  transmitted  to  their  offspring,  subject, 
moreover,  to  hke  changes  from  new  conditions  so  that,  if  illimitable  time  was 
granted,  it  would  account  for  the  formation  of  the  highest  order  of  animals 
from  the  lowest  organisms.  In  accordance  with  this  doctrine  he  held  that 
man  himself  was  derived  from  the  species  next  below  him,  the  anthropoid 
apes.2 

1  Pemberton,  Path  of  Evolution,  p.  294. 

»  Op.  cit.,  p.  294. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  57 

The  four  laws  of  organic  evolution  as  formulated  by  Lamarck 
in  his  latest  work  are  as  follows:  — 

First  law:  Life,  by  its  proper  forces,  continually  tends  to  increase  the 
volume  of  every  body  which  possesses  it,  and  to  increase  the  size  of  its  parts, 
up  to  a  limit  which  it  brings  about. 

Second  law:  The  production  of  a  new  organ  in  an  animal  body  results 
from  the  supervention  of  a  new  want  (besoin)  which  continues  to  make  itself 
felt,  and  of  a  new  movement  which  this  want  gives  rise  to  and  maintains. 

Third  law:  The  development  of  organs  and  their  power  of  action  are  con- 
stantly in  ratio  to  the  employment  of  these  organs. 

Fourth  law:  Everything  which  has  been  acquired,  impressed  upon,  or 
changed  in  the  organization  of  individuals,  during  the  course  of  their  life  is 
preserved  by  generation  and  transmitted  to  the  new  individuals  which  have 
descended  from  those  which  have  undergone  these  changes.^ 

These  four  laws  may  be  summarized  briefly  into  these  two 
principles:  (i)  the  active  response  of  an  organism  by  way  of 
variation  to  a  felt  need  of  adjustment  to  its  environment,  and 
(2)  use  and  disuse  inheritance.  The  first  issues  easily  into  the 
theory  of  an  active  life-principle  or  "  bathmic  force  ''  as  formu- 
lated by  Nageli,  Ratzenhofer  and  Ward,  while  the  second  has  been 
the  chief  point  of  contention  among  biologists  since  Weismann's 
experiments  on  mice. 

After  pointing  out  the  fimction  of  instinct  in  the  lower  orders 
Lamarck  differentiates  the  higher  in  a  way  to  lay  the  biological 
foundation  of  the  concept  of  active  adaptation.  "  It  is  not  the 
same  in  animals  which,  besides  a  nervous  system,  have  a  brain, 
and  which  make  comparisons,  judgments,  thoughts,  etc.  These 
same  animals  control  more  or  less  their  power  of  action  according 
to  the  degree  of  perfection  of  their  brain;  and  although  they  are 
strongly  subjected  to  the  results  of  their  habits,  which  have  modi- 

1  Packard,  Lamarck,  p.  346.  "Every  want  felt  produces  an  emotion  in  the 
inner  feeling  of  the  individual  which  experiences  it;  and  from  this  emotion  of  the 
feeling  in  question  arises  the  force  which  gives  origin  to  the  movement  of  the  parts 
which  are  placed  in  activity.  .  .  .  Thus,  in  the  animals  which  possess  the  power 
of  acting,  —  the  force  productive  of  movements  and  actions,  —  the  inner  feeling, 
which  on  each  occasion  originates  this  force,  being  excited  by  some  need,  places  in 
action  the  power  of  force  in  question;  excites  the  movement  of  displacement  in  the 
subtile  fluid  of  the  nerves  which  the  ancients  called  the  animal  spirits;  directs 
this  fluid  toward  that  of  its  organs  which  any  want  impels  to  action;  finally,  makes 
this  same  fluid  flow  back  into  its  habitual  reservoirs  when  the  needs  no  longer 
require  the  organ  to  act."  — Ibid.,  p.  330. 


58  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

fied  their  structure,  they  enjoy  more  or  less  freedom  of  the  will, 
can  choose,  and  can  vary  their  acts,  or  at  least  some  of  them.''  ^ 
That  is,  if  man's  mode  of  existence  calls  for  stronger  muscles  in 
any  part  of  his  body,  he  can,  by  taking  thought,  exercise  and  thus 
develop  those  parts.  In  this  sense  the  organism  is  modified  by  a 
consciousness  of  need  and  an  act  of  will,  although  the  process  of 
adaptation  is  in  strict  accordance  with  law. 

Charles  Darwin  (i 809-1 882) 
Natural  Selection 

Charles  Darwin  was  born  at  Shrewsbury,  England,  of  an  an- 
cestry that  by  "  nature  "  or  "  nurture  "  had  much  to  do  with  his 
future  life-work.  His  grandfather,  Erasmus,  in  his  Zoonomia 
published  in  1794,  had  laid  down  ten  principles  bearing  on  evolu- 
tion, many  of  which  became  famous  later  through  Lamarck  and 
Charles  Darwin,  though  they  were  worked  out  independently  by 
the  former  and  to  a  considerable  extent  by  the  latter.^  His 
father  Robert  was  a  most  acute  observer  of  nature.  From  him 
came  caution  and  conservatism.  It  is  significant,  too,  that  his 
cousin  was  the  Francis  Galton  who  was  the  founder  of  the  science 
of  eugenics. 

In  formal  education  Darwin  was  not  a  success.  Turning  aside 
from  medicine  which  he  studied  at  Edinburgh,  and  from  the- 
ology which  he  studied  at  Cambridge,  he  closed  his  academic 
studies  with  his  chief  asset  the  scientific  inspiration  which  he 
received  from  the  botanist  Professor  Henslow,  and  the  geologist. 
Professor  Sedgwick.  The  two  books  to  which  he  was  most 
indebted  were  Lyell's  Principles  of  Geology  and  Malthus  on 
Population,  —  the  two  books  which  profoundly  influenced 
Spencer  also.  The  most  potent  factor  in  Darwin's  education, 
apart  from  the  influence  of  these  teachers,  was  the  experience  he 
had  as  naturalist  on  the  "Beagle"  which  made  a  tour  of  the 
world  for  scientific  purposes  in  1831-36. 

With  broken  health,  his  great  work.  The  Origin  of  Species,  was 
published  in  1859  after  twenty-one  years  of  labor  to  demonstrate 
^  Packard,  Lamarck j  p.  331.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  230  f. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  59 

the  truth  of  the  hypothesis  with  which  he  began; ^  and  it  was 
given  the  world  then  only  because  A.  R.  Wallace  had  come  to 
similar  conclusions  working  independently,  though  for  a  much 
shorter  time. 

Darwin  started  with  the  general  theory  of  evolution  based  on  a 
recognition  of  the  influence  of  heredity  and  environment,  with 
Malthus'  doctrine  of  "  teeming  nature  ''  and  struggle  for  exist- 
ence; with  Lamarck's  law  of  transmission  of  acqmred  characters; 
and  with  the  observed  facts  of  variation  and  improvement  under 
domestication.  His  problem  was:  "  Can  nature,  with  long 
enough  time,  do  what  man  in  a  short  time  is  able  to  accomplish  by 
use  of  reason  and  choice  ?  "  The  hypothesis  of  natural  selection 
with  the  correlative  doctrine  of  sexual  selection  was  the  outcome 
of  his  thought  and  years  of  most  painstaking  observation. 

There  are  five  links  in  the  chain  of  this  theory  of  the  origin  of 
species:  (i)  prodigality  of  nature;  (2)  struggle  for  existence; 
(3)  variation;  (4)  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  (5)  heredity .^ 
Other  factors  recognized  but  not  emphasized  by  Darwin,  such  as 
"  geographical  isolation  "  have  since  come  into  prominence  and 
one,  transmission  of  acquired  characters,  taken  over  from 
Lamarck,  has  been  questioned  with  ever  increasing  unanimity 
since  Weismann's  experiments. 

Prodigality  of  Nature  and  Struggle  for  Existence. — These  two 
links  are  so  interrelated  as  to  call  for  consideration  together,  as 
was  done  by  Darwin.  "  A  struggle  for  existence,"  he  says, 
"  inevitably  follows  from  the  high  rate  at  which  all  organic  beings 
tend  to  increase."  ^  The  term  *'  struggle  for  existence  "  is  used  in  a 
large  and  metaphorical  sense,  as  Darwin  takes  pains  to  explain, 
and  includes  "  dependence  of  one  being  on  another,  and  .  .  .  not 
only  the  life  of  the  individual,  but  success  in  leaving  progeny."  * 
This  doctrine  is  that  of  "  Malthus  applied  with  manifold  force  to 
the  whole  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms;  for  in  this  case  there 
can  be  no  artificial  increase  of  food,  and  no  prudential  restraint 
upon  marriage.  .  .  .  There  is  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  every 

^  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  pp.  17  ff. 

2  Conn,  The  Method  of  Evolution,  pp.  19,  20.     Wallace,  Darwinism,  ch.  I. 

'  Origin  of  Species,  London,  1872,  p.  50. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  50. 


6o  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

organic  being  naturally  increases  at  so  high  a  rate  that,  if  not 
destroyed,  the  earth  would  soon  be  covered  by  the  progeny  of  a 
single  pair."  Darwin  gives  many  instances  of  the  prodigality  of 
nature  and  these  have  been  supplemented  by  contributions  from 
more  recent  exponents  of  "  natural  selection."  ^ 

He  considers  various  checks  to  the  increase  of  members  of  a 
species  including  enemies,  lack  of  food  supply  and  climate  and 
shows  the  complex  relations  of  all  animals  and  plants  to  each 
other  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  concluding  that  "  battle 
within  battle  must  be  continually  recurring  with  varying  suc- 
cess." 2 

This  prodigality  and  struggle  for  existence,  according  to  the 
author  under  consideration,  is  just  the  condition  most  favorable 
for  progress  by  means  of  natural  selection,  for  in  this  struggle 
those  individuals  which  by  slight  favorable  variations  are  best 
adapted  to  the  conditions  of  life  will  survive  whereas  the  least 
adapted  will  perish.  As  to  the  working  of  natural  selection, 
Darwin  says:  "  Let  the  endless  number  of  slight  variations  and 
individual  differences  occurring  in  our  domestic  productions,  and, 
in  a  lesser  degree,  in  those  under  nature,  be  borne  in  mind;  as 
well  as  the  strength  of  the  hereditary  tendency.  .  .  .  Can  it 
then  be  thought  improbable,  seeing  that  variations  useful  to  man 
have  undoubtedly  occurred,  that  variations  useful  in  some  way 
to  each  being  in  the  great  and  complex  battle  of  Hfe,  should  occur 
in  the  course  of  many  successive  generations  ?  If  such  do  occur, 
can  we  doubt  (remembering  how  many  more  individuals  are  born 
than  can  possibly  survive)  that  individuals  having  any  advantage, 
however  slight,  over  others,  would  have  the  best  chance  of  surviv- 
ing and  of  procreating  their  kind  ?  On  the  other  hand,  we  may 
feel  sure  that  any  variation  in  the  least  degree  injurious  would  be 
rigidly  destroyed."  He  goes  on  to  say  that  "  variations  neither 
useful  nor  injurious  would  not  be  affected  by  natural  selection, 
and  would  be  left  either  a  fluctuating  element  ...  or  would 
ultimately  become  fixed,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  organism  and 
the  nature  of  the  conditions."  ^ 

1  Wallace,  op.  ciL,  pp.  25  f.;  Conn,  op.  ciL,  pp.  52  ff.;  Morgan,  Evolution  and 
Adaptation,  p.  iii. 

*  Origin  of  Species,  p.  57.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  62,  63. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  6 1 

Darwin  further  grants  that  multitudes  of  eggs  and  organisms 
are  destroyed  by  accidental  causes  in  which  case  the  quality  of  the 
stock  would  not  be  affected.^ 

Variation  and  Survival.  —  The  theory  of  natural  selection  was 
suggested  and  built  up  to  a  considerable  extent  on  principles  long 
observed  in  artificial  breeding.  The  fact  of  considerable  variation 
in  each  new  generation  had  been  observed  for  thousands  of  years, 
and  use  made  of  the  principle  of  "  selection  "  to  secure  desirable 
traits.  Darwin  accepted  the  well-known  facts  of  variation  with- 
out attempting  to  explain  their  efficient  cause  or  causes.  He 
recognized  two  kinds,  the  indefinite  and  the  definite. 

The  direct  action  of  changed  conditions  leads  to  definite  or  indefinite 
results.  In  the  latter  case,  the  organism  seems  to  become  plastic,  and  we 
have  much  fluctuating  variability.  In  the  former  case  the  nature  of  the 
organism  is  such  that  it  yields  readily,  when  subjected  to  certain  conditions, 
and  all,  or  neariy  all,  the  individuals  become  modified  in  the  same  way. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  decide  how  far  changed  conditions,  such  as  of  climate, 
food,  etc.,  have  acted  in  a  definite  manner.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
in  the  course  of  time  the  effects  have  been  greater  than  can  be  proved  by 
clear  evidence.  .  .  .  When  a  variation  is  of  the  slightest  use  to  any  being, 
we  cannot  tell  how  much  to  attribute  to  the  accumulative  action  of  natural 
selection,  and  how  much  to  the  definite  action  of  the  conditions  of  life.^ 

In  response  to  an  objection  that  a  single  variation  would  soon  be 
swamped,  our  author  admits  the  force  of  the  point  and  suggests 
an  explanation  that  is  very  close  to  the  theory  of  "  organic 
selection "  formulated  later  by  Lloyd  Morgan,  Osborn  and 
Baldwin.  "  It  should  not  ...  be  overlooked,"  he  says,  "  that 
certain  rather  strongly  marked  variations,  which  no  one  would 
rank  as  mere  individual  differences,  frequently  recur  owing  to  a 
similar  organization  being  similarly  acted  on,  —  of  which  fact 
numerous  instances  could  be  given  with  our  domestic  productions. 
In  such  cases,  if  the  varying  individual  did  not  actually  transmit 
to  its  offspring  its  newly  acquired  character,  it  would  undoubtedly 
transmit  to  them,  as  long  as  the  existing  conditions  remained  the 
same,  a  still  stronger  tendency  to  vary  in  the  same  manner." ' 
T.  H.  Morgan  thinks  this  and  what  immediately  follows  invali- 
dates  much   that   had   been   claimed   previously   for  natural 

*  Origin  of  Species,  p.  68.         '  Ibid.,  p.  io6.     Cf.  p.  170.  '  Ibid.,  p.  72. 


62  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

selection,  for  Darwin  continues:  "There  can  also  be  little 
doubt  that  the  tendency  to  vary  in  the  same  manner  has 
often  been  so  strong  that  all  the  individuals  of  the  same  species 
have  been  similarly  modified  without  the  aid  of  any  form  of 
selection." 

As  to  conditions  favorable  for  the  production  of  new  forms 
through  natural  selection,  Darwin  mentions  a  large  and  diverse 
area,  numbers  of  individuals  in  the  species,  intercrossing  (espe- 
cially among  hermaphrodites)  and  isolation.^  Diversification 
of  structure  is  considered  an  adaptive  quality  under  some  cir- 
cumstances and  is  discussed  at  length,^  and  origin  of  species  is 
accounted  for  as  the  cumulative  result  of  ever  increasing  diversi- 
fications which  in  time  become  fixed. ^ 

In  considering  the  degree  to  which  organization  tends  to 
advance,  Darwin  discusses  the  question  of  standards  of  judging 
advancement  and  accepts  that  of  Von  Baer,  namely,  "  the 
amount  of  differentiation  of  the  parts  of  the  same  organic  being, 
(in  the  adult  state,  Darwin  adds)  .  .  .  and  their  specialization 
for  different  functions  ...  or  the  completeness  of  the  division 
of  physiological  labor."  ^ 

Not  only  does  natural  selection  lead  to  the  origin  of  new 
species,  but  also  to  the  extinction  of  intermediate  forms.  ^  "  Use 
and  disuse  of  organs  "  is  linked  with  natural  selection,  so  also 
"acclimatization,"  "correlated  variation,"  and  "compensation 
and  economy  of  growth  ";  ^  then  follows  a  frank  discussion  of  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  accepting  his  theory.  "  Some  of  them," 
he  says,  "  are  so  serious  that  to  this  day  I  can  hardly  reflect  on 
them  without  being  in  some  degree  staggered."  ^ 

*  Origin  of  Species,  pp.  8i  £f.  This  last  element,  first  stressed  by  Wagner,  was 
given  great  prominence  by  Romanes  and  more  recently  by  David  Starr  Jordan.  "  In 
the  principle  of  isolation,"  says  Romanes,  "we  have  a  principle  so  fundamental  and 
so  universal,  that  even  the  great  principle  of  natural  selection  lies  less  deep,  and 
pervades  a  region  of  smaller  extent.  Equalled  only  in  its  importance  by  the  two 
basal  principles  of  heredity  and  variation,  this  principle  of  isolation  constitutes 
the  third  pillar  of  a  tripod  on  which  is  reared  the  whole  superstructure  of  organic 
evolution."  —  Darwin  and  after  Danvin,  ii,  p.  2. 

2  Origin  of  Species,  pp.  86  ff.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  59,  93,  134  f. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  90  flf.  «  Ibid.,  ch.  V. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  97.  '  Ibid.,  p.  133. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  63 

The  first  difficulty  is  concerning  "  the  absence  or  rarity  of 
transitional  varieties,"  and  his  answer  is:  "  As  natural  selection 
acts  solely  by  the  preservation  of  profitable  modifications,  each 
new  form  will  tend  in  a  fully-stocked  country  to  take  the  place  of, 
and  finally  to  exterminate,  its  own  less  improved  parent-form  and 
other  less  favored  forms  with  which  it  comes  into  competition."  ^ 
In  discussing  the  difficulty  of  explaining  neuter  insects,  Darwin 
formulates  the  doctrine  of  selection  on  the  basis  of  utility  to  the 
species  rather  than  to  the  individual.^ 

In  reply  to  criticism  by  Mr.  Mivart,  Darwin  takes  issue  with  all 
who  beUeve  in  mutations,  appealing  as  usual  to  experience  under 
domestication.^ 

Instincts  are  discussed  at  length  and  their  origin  explained  in 
the  same  way  as  other  useful  characters,  —  by  natural  selection.* 

We  find  further  contributions  to  our  doctrine  of  adaptation  in 
Darwin's  Descent  of  Man  though  here  he  was  preceded  by  other 
writers.  In  this  work  we  are  shown  how  the  various  mental 
qualities  so  highly  developed  in  man  have  descended  or  "  as- 
cended "  from  rudiments  to  be  found  in  the  lower  orders.* 
Emotion,  imitation,  attention,  memory,  imagination,  reason, 
the  use  of  tools,  even  language  are  thus  evolved.  All  of  these,  — 
with  many  others  such  as  self-consciousness,  individuality, 
abstraction,  general  ideas,  sense  of  beauty,  rehgion,  —  are  the 

*  Origin  of  Species,  p.  134.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  230  f. 

'  Ihid.,  pp.  202  f.  Recent  experiments  by  De  Vries,  Bateson  and  others,  how- 
ever, indicate  to  their  satisfaction  that  nature  does  take  leaps,  "  Natura  facit 
saltum."     Cf.  Walter,  Genetics,  chs.  IV,  VII,  and  VIII. 

*  Ihid.,  ch.  VIII.  Professor  T.  H.  Morgan  takes  issue  with  his  conclusions 
concerning  the  development  of  such  instincts  as  that  of  slave-holding  among  certain 
species  of  ants.  "  We  must  not  forget,"  says  Professor  Morgan,  "  that  it  is  not 
enough  to  show  that  a  particular  habit  might  be  useful  to  a  species,  but  it  should 
also  be  shown  that  it  is  of  sufficient  importance,  at  every  stage  of  its  evolution, 
to  give  a  decisive  advantage  in  the  *  struggle  for  existence.'  For  unless  a  life  and 
death  struggle  takes  place  between  the  different  colonies,  natural  selection  is 
powerless  to  bring  about  its  supposed  results.  And  who  will  be  bold  enough  to 
affirm  that  the  presence  of  slaves  in  a  nest  will  give  victory  to  that  colony  in  com- 
petition with  its  neighbors  ?  Has  the  history  of  mankind  taught  us  that  slave- 
making  countries  have  exterminated  countries  without  slaves  ?  "  His  conclusion 
is  that  the  instinct  was  a  mutation  and  that  the  species  practising  it  survived 
because  it  was  not  so  disuseful  as  to  lead  to  extermination. 

^  Articulate  language,  however,  is  peculiar  to  man.     Descent  of  Man,  p.  52. 


64  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

outcome  of  the  process  of  natural  selection.  In  this  discussion 
Darwin  pays  tribute  to  Herbert  Spencer  and  agrees  with  his 
doctrine  of  use-inheritance  taken  from  Lamarck.  Man's 
development,  he  holds,  is  in  every  case  homologous  with  that  of 
the  lower  orders.^ 

In  discussing  the  rate  of  increase  in  population  our  author  fol- 
lows Mai  thus  rather  than  Spencer,  holding  that  "  there  is  reason 
to  suspect  .  .  .  that  the  reproductive  power  is  actually  less  in 
barbarous  than  in  civilized  races."  ^  Mai  thus  is  criticized  for  not 
giving  sufficient  emphasis  to  infanticide  as  a  check  among 
primitive  people. 

Passive  adaptation  which  gave  man  the  prehensile  thumb, 
erect  posture  and  added  brain  capacity,  is  shown  to  have  been  the 
one  supreme  factor  in  making  possible  those  later  differentiations 
which  are  the  crowning  glory  of  the  human  race.^ 

In  conclusion,  he  says:  — 

As  all  animals  tend  to  multiply  beyond  their  means  of  subsistence,  so  it 
must  have  been  with  the  progenitors  of  man  and  this  will  inevitably  have  led 
to  a  struggle  for  existence  and  to  natural  selection.  This  latter  process  will 
have  been  greatly  aided  by  the  inherited  effects  of  the  increased  use  of  parts; 
these  two  processes  incessantly  reacting  on  each  other.  It  appears,  also,  as 
we  shaU  hereafter  see,  that  various  unimportant  characters  have  been 
acquired  by  man  through  sexual  selection.  An  unexplained  residuum  of 
change,  perhaps  a  large  one,  must  be  left  to  the  assumed  uniform  action  of 
those  unknown  agencies  which  occasionally  induce  strongly-marked  and 
abrupt  deviations  of  structure  in  our  domestic  productions. 

With  strictly  social  animals,  natural  selection  sometimes  acts  indirectly 
on  the  individual,  through  the  preservation  of  variations  which  are  beneficial 
only  to  the  community.  A  community,  including  a  large  number  of  well- 
endowed  individuals,  increases  in  number  and  is  victorious  over  other  and 
less  well-endowed  communities;  although  each  separate  member  may  gain 
no  advantage  over  the  other  members  of  the  same  community.* 

In  Chapter  V  of  the  Descent  of  Man  we  find  developed  the 
doctrine  phrased  in  this  paper  as  active  material  adaptation. 
Following  Wallace  our  author  shows  how  important  was  the 

^  Ch.  IV.  It  is  noteworthy  that  both  Wallace  and  Weismann  differed  from 
Darwin  as  to  the  explanation  of  the  evolution  of  mental  and  moral  faculties  by 
natural  selection.     Wallace,  Darwinism,  p.  461. 

2  Descent  of  Man,  p.  127. 

»  Ihid.,  ch.  IV.  *  Ihid.,  p.  149. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  65 

change  in  the  evolutionary  process  when  natural  selection  turned 
from  the  development  of  the  organism  to  the  development  of 
intellectual  power,  "  for  man  is  enabled  through  his  mental 
faculties  *  to  keep  with  an  unchanged  body  in  harmony  with  the 
changed  universe.'''  He  invents  weapons,  tools,  and  various 
stratagems,  by  which  he  procures  food  and  defends  himself. 
When  he  migrates  into  a  colder  climate  he  uses  clothes,  builds 
sheds,  and  makes  fires.^  What  a  contrast  this  to  that  of  the  lower 
animals,  who  "  must  have  their  bodily  structure  modified  in  order 
to  survive  under  greatly  changed  conditions." 

The  development  of  intelligence  and  sagacity  in  earliest  times 
enabled  the  tribes  whose  members  were  best  endowed  to  supplant 
the  other  tribes,  even  as  today  in  various  parts  of  the  world.^ 
With  the  development  of  men  in  society,  progress  became  more 
rapid  through  imitation,  reason  and  experience.'  Likewise  were 
developed  sympathy,  fideHty,  courage  and  obedience  to  authority. 
"  A  tribe  possessing  the  above  qualities  in  a  high  degree  would 
spread  and  be  victorious  over  the  other  tribes;  but  in  the  course 
of  time  it  would,  judging  from  all  past  history,  be  in  its  turn 
overcome  by  some  other  and  still  more  highly-endowed  tribe. 
Thus  the  social  and  moral  qualities  would  tend  slowly  to  advance 
and  be  diffused  throughout  the  world."* 

From  experience  the  value  of  co-operation  was  learned,  habits 
formed  and  sympathy  developed,  which  after  many  generations 
became  fastened  upon  the  organism  as  an  instinct.^  Thus,  too, 
originated  other  social  virtues  such  as  the  praise  and  blame  of 
fellow-men,  love  of  approbation  and  dread  of  infamy,  and  remorse 
at  the  consciousness  of  failure  in  the  performance  of  duty.  Later 
the  self-regarding  virtues  developed,  such  as  temperance,  chastity, 
etc.,  based  on  experience  of  the  results  of  conduct.^ 

As  Darwin's  argument  concerning  the  working  of  the  law  of 
natural  selection  among  civilized  nations  is  built  so  largely  on  the 
labors  of  such  investigators  as  W.  R.  Greg  and  Francis  Galton, 
we  will  pass  over  the  subject  for  the  present  and  turn  to  another 

^  Descent  of  Man,  p.  152.  ■*  Ibid.,  p.  156. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  154.  5  Ibid.,  p.  157. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  155.  8  Ibid.,  p.  158. 


66  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

line  of  argument  which  will  not  be  duplicated  in  a  later  part  of 
this  discussion. 

Concerning  the  causes  which  lead  to  the  extinction  of  races  of 
man,  we  are  told  that  "unfavorable  physical  conditions  appear  to 
have  had  but  little  effect/'  but  that  "  extinction  follows  chiefly 
from  the  competition  of  tribe  with  tribe,  and  race  with  race  "; 
also,  that  "  when  civilized  nations  come  into  contact  with  bar- 
barous, the  struggle  is  short,  except  where  a  deadly  climate  gives 
aid  to  the  native  race."  Among  the  specific  causes  for  this  ex- 
termination, new  diseases  and  vices  are  mentioned  as  being  among 
the  most  potent.^ 

Next  to  natural  selection,  the  doctrine  of  sexual  selection  is 
the  great  original  contribution  of  Darwin,  although  in  a  sense  it 
may  be  considered  but  a  modification  of  the  former.  The  prob- 
lem is  to  account  for  the  development  of  secondary  sexual  dif- 
ferences, among  other  things  for  the  fact  that  in  most  species  of 
birds  the  males  are  more  conspicuously  beautiful  than  the 
females.  In  contrast  to  natural  selection  which  has  to  do  with 
the  results  of  a  life  and  death  struggle  for  existence,  sexual 
selection  has  to  do  merely  with  the  process  and  results  of  mating 
whereby  certain  qualities  are  selected  and  transmitted.  The 
more  vigorous  males  or  those  better  weaponed,  secure  possession 
of  the  desired  females  leaving  the  weaker  males  to  mate  with  the 
females  that  are  left  over.  The  supposition  is  that  the  more 
vigorous  pairs  will  leave  the  most  numerous  offspring.  Or, 
again,  the  females  are  supposed  to  exercise  choice  and  select  the 
more  brilliant  or  active  males,  with  the  same  result.^  Such  selec- 
tion is  most  easily  secured  when  the  males  largely  exceed  the 
females  in  nmnber,  otherwise  resort  is  made  to  the  hypothesis 
that  the  more  vigorous  are  ready  to  mate  first  either  physiologi- 
cally, or  by  virtue  of  reaching  first  the  breeding  place,  and  so 
rear  a  more  numerous  progeny.^ 

^  Descent  of  Man,  pp.  229  f.  2  /jj^.^  chg.  VIII  and  XIII. 

^  Professor  T.  H.  Morgan  has  formulated  twenty  objections  to  this  doctrine, 
among  others  that  "  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  more  precocious  females  would 
rear  a  larger  number  of  offspring  than  the  more  normal  females,  or  even  those  that 
breed  somewhat  later."  Evolution  and  Adaptation,  ch.  VI;  cf.  Kellogg,  op.  cit., 
p.  118. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  67 

It  is  noteworthy  in  this  connection  that  Darwin  and  Wallace 
had  diametrically  opposite  theories  as  to  the  cause  of  the  more 
brilliant  plumage  of  male  birds.  "According  to  Darwin,  the 
gayness  of  male  birds  is  due  to  selection  on  the  part  of  the 
females;  according  to  Wallace,  the  soberness  of  female  birds  is 
due  to  natural  selection,  which  has  eHminated  those  which  per- 
sisted to  the  death  in  being  gay/'  ^ 

Heredity.  The  fifth  and  last  link  to  be  considered  does  not 
yield  to  Darwin  added  fame.  A  follower  of  Lamarck  in  the  belief 
that  acquired  characters  were  inherited,  he  was  led  to  make  use  of 
this  refuge  when  hard  pressed  by  his  opponents.  His  construc- 
tive theory,  that  of  pangenesis,  —  given  to  the  world  against 
the  advice  of  Huxley,  ^  —  was  so  completely  disproved  by  Weis- 
mann  as  to  receive  scant  reference  today,  though  here,  too,  he  was 
a  prophet  and  the  hope  expressed  to  Sir  Joseph  Hooker  has  been 
fulfilled:  "  I  feel  sure  that  if  pangenesis  is  stillborn  it  will,  thank 
God,  at  some  future  time  reappear,  begotten  by  some  other  father 
and  christened  by  some  other  name."  '  Cytology  has  taken  up 
his  task  and  some  who  have  received  his  mantle  are  striving 
earnestly  to  discover  the  secret  hidden  from  his,  and  up  to  the 
present,  from  all  human  eyes,  —  the  mystery  of  heredity.  De 
Vries  has  made  some  use  of  Darwin's  hypothesis  in  his  theory  of 
"  intracellular  pangenesis,"  so  too  Weismann  in  his  theory  of 
"  determinants,"  but  laboratory  experiments  have  not  as  yet 
added  conviction  to  assumption. 

The  transmission  of  acquired  characters  in  the  sense  used  by 
Lamarck,  Spencer  and  Darwin  has  been  all  but  disproven, 
though  as  we  shall  see  later  there  is  proof  of  the  influence  of 
ontogenetic  variations  on  the  offspring,  and  some  ground  for 
believing  that  habit  and  environment  may  furnish  conditions 
favorable  for  modification  of  the  germ  plasm. 

In  concluding  our  discussion  of  Darwin  and  the  bearing  of  his 
theory  of  natural  selection  on  the  problem  of  this  study,  first  place 
must  be  given  to  the  new  spirit  infused  into  biological  and  social 
science  by  the  publication  of  his  Origin  of  Species.      With 

*  The  Evolution  of  Sex,  Geddes  and  Thomson,  p.  10;  Wallace,  Darwinism,  pp. 
274  f.     Cf  Morgan,  cited  above  pp.  213  fif. 

2  Cf.  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  p.  93.  '  Ibid.,  p.  94, 


68  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

good  reason  has  he  been  called  the  liberator  of  the  human  mind 
and  spirit.  Patient,  long-continued  investigation  to  discover  the 
cause  and  laws  of  variation  is  now  the  sine  qua  non  of  success  in 
every  science.  His  catholic  spirit,  generous  appreciation  of  the 
discoveries  of  others  together  with  a  humble  estimate  of  his  own 
merit  form  a  rare  combination  in  one  who  is  generally  estimated 
as  the  most  influential  thinker  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
five  links  in  his  chain  of  causes  leading  to  the  origin  of  species 
stand  today,  though  some  have  been  interpreted  differently,  and 
causes  minimized  by  him  have  been  raised  to  rank  with  that  of  his 
great  theory.  Especially  is  this  true  concerning  the  factor  of 
geographical  isolation. 

The  fittest  to  survive,  in  Darwin's  thought,  are  those  best 
adapted  to  their  environment.  Spontaneous  variations  of  use  in 
the  struggle  for  existence  have  been  preserved  and  transmitted  by 
heredity  while  variations  disuseful  have  been  eliminated.  Not 
only  is  adaptation  emphasized  by  him  but  adaptability,  that  is, 
power  in  the  organism  to  adapt  itself  to  a  changing  environment. 
We  have  brought  to  our  attention  also  the  fact  that  the  variations 
need  not  always  be  useful  to  the  individual  providing  they  are 
useful  to  the  species  in  its  contest  with  other  species.  Connection 
is  made  between  passive  and  active  adaptation  and  the  principle 
of  struggle  and  survival  applied  to  the  development  of  the  higher 
human  faculties  and  the  evolution  of  races.  Natural  selection 
is  supplemented  by  sexual  selection  to  account  for  secondary 
sexual  differences. 

We  must  pass  now  to  the  contributions  of  some  other  biologists 
who  have  supplemented  and  corrected  the  work  of  their  master. 

August  Weismann  (1834-       ) 
Continuity  of  the  Germ  Plasm 

August  Weismann  the  "  Sage  of  Freiburg  ''  is  especially  worthy 
of  consideration  in  our  discussion  as  his  investigations  and  teach- 
ings mark  a  turning-point  in  biological  and  to  a  certain  extent  in 
sociological  theory,  for  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection  was 
somewhat  on  the  wane  when  he  began  to  write  but  with  him  it 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  69 

has  taken  on  new  life  and  in  his  earlier  writings  and  with  most  of 

his  disciples  it  has  become  the  "  Allmacht  "  in  the  explanation  of 

the  formation  of  new  species. 

Weismann's  contributions  to  biology  are  thus  summarized  by 

Kellogg: 

His  careful  investigation  and  illumination  of  the  vexed  question  of  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  his  definite  exposition  of  that  point  of 
view  which  distinguishes  sharply  in  the  individual  between  the  germ-plasm 
(that  particular  protoplasm  in  the  body  from  which  the  germ-cells,  eventu- 
ally new  individuals,  arise)  and  the  soma-plasm  (that  which  develops  into, 
or  gives  rise  to,  the  rest  of  the  body),  his  development  of  the  interesting  and 
suggestive  combinations  of  fact  and  theory  designated  by  the  phrase  names 
"  continuity  of  the  germ-plasm  "  and  "  immortality  of  the  Infusoria,"  — 
these  products  of  his  investigating  and  philosophizing  mind  prove  him  one 
of  the  ablest  of  modern  biological  scholars.^ 

Of  almost  equal  importance  with  the  above  for  sociology  is  his 
emphasis  on  the  species  as  the  unit  in  the  struggle  for  existence, 
for  from  this  point  of  view  sympathy,  mutual  aid  and  all  forms  of 
co-operation  that  make  for  group  strength  are  seen  to  be  of  adap- 
tive value. 

Weismann's  theory  of  "  germinal  selection  ''  is  also  worthy  of 
note  for  although  not  widely  accepted  today  we  find  in  it  an 
application  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  to  the  determinants  — 
the  theoretical  sub-divisions  of  the  germ-cell.  Weismann  holds 
that  these  determinants  compete  for  the  possession  of  food  and 
that  the  successful  dominate  in  the  organism  that  is  to  be.^ 

Weismann's  influence  on  social  theory  will  be  noted  in  succeed- 
ing chapters;  here  it  will  suffice  to  bring  out  his  teaching  con- 
cerning the  continuity  of  the  germ-plasm  for  the  wide-spread 
acceptance  of  this  has  led  to  the  corresponding  disbelief  in  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters  as  taught  by  Lamarck  and 
Spencer,  and  has  been  a  most  potent  factor  in  the  modern  eugenics 
movement.    Weismann's  statement  of  the  theory  is  as  follows: 

Heredity  depends  upon  the  fact  that  a  small  portion  of  the  effective  sub- 
stance of  the  germ,  the  germ-plasm,  remains  unchanged  during  the  develop- 
ment of  the  ovum  into  an  organism,  and  this  part  of  the  germ-plasm  serves 
as  a  foundation  from  which  the  germ-ceUs  of  the  new  organism  are  produced. 
There  is  therefore  continuity  of  the  germ-plasm  from  one  generation  to 

1  Darwinism  To-day,  p.  188. 

2  For  explanation  of  germinal  selection,  see  Kellogg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  195  f. 


70  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

another.  One  might  represent  the  germ-plasm  by  the  metaphor  of  a  long 
creeping  root-stock  from  which  plants  arise  at  intervals,  these  latter  repre- 
senting the  individuals  of  successive  generations.^ 

Heredity  being  thus  explained,  variation  is  held  to  be  due  to  the 
union  of  diverse  sex  cells  ^  and  possibly  to  katabolic  influences 
from  the  environment  that  somehow  affect  the  germ-plasm.^ 

Hugo  De  Vries  (1848-       ) 
Mutations 

Three  quotations  at  the  very  beginning  of  De  Vries'  Species 
and  Varieties  are  suggestive  of  the  relation  between  his  work 
and  that  of  Lamarck  and  Darwin.  "  The  origin  of  species  is  a 
natural  phenomenon/'  Lamarck;  "  The  origin  of  species  is  an 
object  of  inquiry,"  Darwin;  "The  origin  of  species  is  an  object  of 
experimental  investigation,"  —  this  is  the  thesis  of  De  Vries,  and 
to  his  observations  and  experiments,  according  to  Sir  Arthur 
Thomson,  the  world  is  indebted  for  the  establishment  upon  a 
solid  basis  of  the  theory  of  evolution  by  mutation. 

A  further  relation  between  this  theory  and  that  of  Darwin  is 
brought  out  in  the  closing  words  of  the  book  referred  to:  "  Mu- 
tation explains  the  arrival  of  the  fittest  but  natural  selection  the 
survival  of  the  fittest."  That  is,  De  Vries  does  not  deny  the 
potency  of  natural  selection,  as  some  have  asserted,  but  contends 
that  it  is  insujficient  as  a  theory  of  biological  evolution  for  it 
takes  no  account  of  the  origin  of  change.  His  chief  contention 
with  the  Darwinians  is  that  natural  selection  operates  to  preserve 
adaptive  mutations  rather  than  mere  fluctuations.^  The  theory 
in  question  is  thus  explained  by  Thomson: 

The  general  idea  is  that  novel  characters  may  suddenly  appear,  as  it  were, 
full-fledged,  with  considerable  perfectness  from  the  moment  of  their  emer- 
gence, and  without  intergrades  linking  them  to  the  parents.    Furthermore. 

1  Essays  upon  Heredity,  p.  266;  of.  pp.  184  f.  For  further  explanation  and  illus- 
tration, see  Walter,  Genetics,  pp.  10-13.  *  Essays  upon  Heredity,  pp.  269  f. 

'  Weismann  laid  aU  stress  on  the  former  but  in  his  later  writings  admitted  the 
latter,  and  recent  experiments  have  demonstrated  the  certainty  of  such  source  of 
variation  though  the  range  seems  very  limited.    See  infra,  pp.  73  f. 

*  Species  and  Varieties,  their  Origin  and  Mutation,  Introduction.  Cf.  Kellogg, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  337  ff. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  7 1 

the  novel  character  of  the  mutant,  if  we  may  use  the  word,  is  independently 
heritable  and  does  not  blend;  it  can  be  grafted  intact  onto  another  stock, 
or  it  can  be  dropped  out  as  such.  Again,  mutations  are  what  may  be  called 
qualitative,  as  contrasted  with  fluctuations  which  are  quantitative.^ 

Having  established  the  principle  of  mutation  or  discontinuous 
variation,  which  Darwin  denied,  De  Vries  raises  several  questions 
which  have  not  as  yet  been  answered:  Is  mutability  a  temporary 
or  permanent  condition  ?  If  temporary  what  is  its  cause  and 
how  is  the  quality  lost  ?  How  may  mutations  be  induced  or 
controlled  ?  ^  By  way  of  answer  he  suggests  several  working 
hypotheses:  Mutability  may  be  a  periodic  phenomenon;  It  may 
be  permanent  in  the  main  line  of  development  with  loss  of  muta- 
bility in  lines  branching  from  the  main  trimk  of  the  genealogic 
tree;  One  primary  mutation  giving  rise  to  one  or  more  unit 
characters,  initiates  a  multitude  of  minor  changes.^  He  thinks 
that  besides  these  periodic  seasons  of  mutation  there  are  stray 
mutations  that  are  potent  also  in  the  evolutionary  process. 

Our  author  discusses  at  length  the  possibilities  and  limitations 
of  artificial  selection,*  shows  how  inconstant  are  races  improved 
thus  and  how  prone  they  are  to  revert  to  the  species-type,^  also 
how  uncertain  is  selection  based  on  visible  qualities,^  holding  that 
the  study  of  pedigree  is  of  first  importance. 

JOHANN  GrEGOR  MeNDEL  (1822-1884) 

Independent  Unit  Characters 

Although  Mendel's  great  work  antedated  both  that  of  Weis- 
mann  and  De  Vries,  it  was  entirely  lost  to  the  scientific  world  for 
nearly  forty  years  and  not  brought  to  Hght  till  1900  when  within 
a  few  months  De  Vries,  Correns  and  Tschermak  working  inde- 
pendently pubHshed  papers  setting  forth  the  substance  of  his 
discoveries. 

1  Darwinism  and  Human  Life,  p.  107.        2  species  and  Varieties,  pp.  690  f. 

'  "  At  the  beginning  of  each  series  of  analogous  mutations  there  must  have  been 
one  greater  and  more  intrinsic  mutation,  which  opened  the  possibility  to  all  its 
successors.  This  was  the  origination  of  the  new  character  itself,  and  it  is  easily 
seen  that  this  incipient  change  is  to  be  considered  as  the  real  one.  AU  others  are 
only  its  visible  expressions,"  ibid.,  p.  703. 

*  Ihid.,  pp.  805  f.  ^  Ihid.,  pp.  770  f.  ^  Ihid.,  pp.  810  £. 


72 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


The  so-called  Mendelian  law,  the  outgrowth  of  years  of  experi- 
ment by  Mendel  in  crossing  garden  peas  of  different  varieties, 
and  verified  since  by  hundreds  of  experiments  on  various  plants 
and  animals  by  many  botanists  and  zoologists,  is  thus  stated  and 
illustrated  by  Professor  Walter:  ^ 

When  parents  that  are  unlike  with  respect  to  any  character  are  crossed, 
the  progeny  of  the  first  generation  will  apparently  be  like  one  of  the  parents 
with  respect  to  the  character  in  question.  The  parent  which  impresses  its 
character  upon  the  offspring  in  this  manner  is  called  the  dominant.  When, 
however,  the  hybrid  offspring  of  this  first  generation  are  in  turn  crossed  with 
each  other,  they  will  produce  a  mixed  progeny,  25  per  cent  of  which  will  be 
like  the  dominant  grandparent,  25  per  cent  like  the  other  grandparent,  and 
50  per  cent  like  the  parents  resembling  the  dominant  grandparent. 


The  law  is  represented  by  the  following  figure  which  shows  tha 
in  monohybrids  the  dominant  character  comes  to  the  surface  in 
the  second  generation  in  three  out  of  four  of  the  offspring,  one 
of  the  three,  however,  being  of  pure  breed,  the  other  two  being 
hybrids. 


D  (Dominant) 


R  (Recessive) 
I 


D(R) 


DD 


2D(R) 


RR 


DD  DD  2D(R)  RR 


RR 


DD  DD  DD  2D(R)  RR  RR 


RR 


There  are  three  principles  involved  in  this  law:  (i)  The  exist- 
ence of  independent  unit  characters ^  (2)  dominance,  in  cases  where 
the  parents  differ  in  a  unit  character,  and  (3)  segregation  of  the 
units  contributed  by  the  respective  parents,  this  segregation  being 
found  among  the  gametes  formed  by  the  offspring.^ 

1  Genetics,  pp.  123  f. 

2  Castle,  Heredity,  p.  38;  cf.  Walter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  144,  145. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  73 

The  knowledge  and  use  of  the  Mendelian  law  by  animal 
breeders  and  horticulturists  during  the  past  few  years  have  shown 
its  great  importance  to  man  in  the  process  of  active  material 
adaptation,  and  its  present  use  in  studies  of  defectiveness  has 
demonstrated  its  value  in  eugenics  which  comes  under  the  division 
of  active  social  adaptation. 

Before  summing  up  the  contributions  of  biology  to  sociology 
and  to  the  subject  of  this  book  in  particular  it  may  not  be  amiss  to 
consider  briefly  the  position  of  biologists  today  on  some  of  the 
fundamental  questions  brought  out  in  our  survey  of  the  theories 
of  Darwin  and  his  successors.  For  this  purpose  the  Centennial 
Addresses  in  Honor  of  Charles  Darwin  before  the  American 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  should  furnish 
impartial  material. 

That  inborn  variation  and  natural  selection  alone  are  suflScient 
was  questioned  by  J.  M.  Coulter  of  the  University  of  Chicago 
from  the  side  of  botany.  David  Starr  Jordan  of  Leland  Stanford 
emphasized  isolation  as  a  factor  of  equal  importance  with  natural 
selection.  E.  B.  Wilson  of  Columbia  showed  that  experiments 
had  proven  the  possibiHty  of  the  transmission  of  ontogenetic 
variations  and  gave  assent  to  the  theory  of  metabolism  through 
chemical  action.  "  Experiment,"  he  said,  "  has  established  the 
fact  that  certain  forms  of  development  are  thus  controlled  by 
substances,  the  '  hormones,'  that  may  be  extracted  from  the 
cells  that  produce  them,  and  upon  injection  into  the  body  call 
forth  their  characteristic  results.  Such  an  eJffect,  for  instance,  is 
the  development  of  the  cock's  comb  in  the  hen  upon  injection  of 
testic-extract  and  its  recession  to  the  characteristic  female  condi- 
tion upon  cessation  of  the  injections."  ^  Professor  Wilson  made 
another  statement  of  great  suggestive  value  in  its  bearing  on  social 
progress:  "  We  must  not  forget  that  some  of  the  most  acute  and 
thoughtful  of  naturalists  have  in  recent  years  expressed  the 
conviction  that  the  ultimate  control  of  development  is  not  to  be 
sought  in  the  physico-chemical  properties  of  the  germ  cells,  but 
in  an  indwelling  *  entelechy '  or  *  elan  de  la  vie,'  a  power  of 

1  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  pp.  io6,  107. 


74  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

unknown  nature,  that  may,  in  the  last  analysis,  be  psychical  in 
nature."  1  Though  not  a  neo-Lamarckian,  Professor  Wilson 
makes  room  for  environmental  influences  to  affect  the  germ 
plasm  and  so  influence  heredity.  "  Though  we  may  not  fully 
understand  the  manner  in  which  the  germ  cells  are  modified, 
there  is  no  inherent  improbabiHty  or  difficulty  in  the  conception 
that  such  modifications  will  produce  blastogenic  variations  or 
mutations  that  are  inherited,  permanently  or  temporarily.  We 
can  readily  understand  that  the  constitutional  effects  of  tempera- 
ture, food,  moisture,  and  similar  general  agencies  of  the  environ- 
ment may  manifest  themselves  in  definite  changes  that  reappear 
in  following  generations  because  the  germ  cells  have  been  directly 
affected  in  the  same  way  as  the  somatic  cells." 

D.  T.  MacDougal  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington 
took  a  position  very  like  that  of  Wilson,  holding  that  "  the 
securest  foundation  is  laid  for  the  conclusion  that  well-defined 
correlations  exist  in  the  plant  by  which  secondary  effects  of  the 
action  of  external  factors,  or  of  morphogenic  or  embryonic 
procedure,  may  be  freely  communicated  from  one  part  of  the 
soma  to  another  and  from  the  egg  to  the  soma."  ^ 

Charles  B.  Davenport  also  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  and 
Secretary  of  the  American  Genetic  Association  championed  the 
cause  of  mutation,  and  Professor  Eigenmann  advocated  "  selec- 
tive adaptations  "  as  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with.  "  Adapta- 
tions," he  says,  "  have  usually  been  looked  upon  as  adjustments 
in  the  organism  to  its  environment.  The  suggestion  has  more 
recently  been  made  that  adapted  environments  and  habits  are 
selected  by  animals  adjusted  to  them.  .  .  .  The  shore-fishes, 
channel-fishes,  etc.,  depending  on  light  to  find  their  food  and 
mates,  moved  out  to  the  Green  River,  where  their  descendents 
Uve  to  the  present  day.  The  fishes  negatively  heliotropic, 
nocturnal,  or  stereotropic,  moved  into  the  holes  dissolved  in  the 
bottom  of  the  river,  followed  its  subterranean  development,  and 
their  descendents  Uve  today  in  the  stream  which  now  flows 
entirely  below  the  valley.  .  .  .  Primarily  blind  fishes  do  not 
have  degenerate  eyes  because  they  live  in  caves,  but  they  live  in 

*  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  p.  109.  *  Ihid.,  p.  120. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  75 

caves  because  their  ancestors  were  adjusted  to  do  without  the  use 
of  eyes."  ^ 

Another  paper  by  H.  F.  Osborn  of  Columbia  is  of  interest 
because  it  re-emphasizes  the  value  of  the  theory  of  variation  by 
"  organic  selection  "  formulated  some  years  ago  by  Baldwin  and 
himself  in  this  country  and  by  Lloyd  Morgan  in  England.  Bald- 
win gives  this  explanation:  "  It  claims  that  it  is  possible  for 
intelHgent  adaptations,  or  any  sort  of  'modification'  made  by  the 
individuals  of  one  generation,  to  set  the  direction  of  subsequent 
evolution,  even  though  there  be  no  direct  inheritance  of  acquired 
characters  from  father  to  son."  ^ 

Osborn,  in  the  paper  cited,  contends  for  law-abiding  rather 
than  fortuitous  variations,^  and  formulates  his  own  theory  as 
follows:  — 

The  life  and  evolution  of  organisms  continually  center  around  the  proc- 
esses which  we  term  heredity,  ontogeny,  environment  and  selection;  these 
have  been  inseparable  and  interacting  from  the  beginning;  a  change  intro- 
duced or  initiated  through  any  one  of  these  factors  causes  a  change  in  all. 
First,  that  while  inseparable  from  the  others,  each  process  may  in  certain 
conditions  become  an  initiative  or  leading  factor;  second,  that  in  complex 
organisms  one  factor  may  at  the  same  time  be  initiative  to  another  group  of 
characters,  the  inseparable  action  bringing  about  a  continuously  harmonious 
result.* 

An  additional  citation  may  well  be  made  from  a  recent  work  by 
Professor  Loeb  of  the  Rockefeller  Institute  because  of  his  recog- 
nized authority.  Professor  Loeb  has  endeavored  to  reduce  all 
life  to  terms  of  the  physical  and  chemical  interaction.^  While 
discrediting  the  theory  formulated  by  Former,  that  the  results  of 
muscular  activity  may  be  inherited  by  their  effect  on  the  central 
nervous  system  and  through  this  on  the  germ  plasm,  he  goes  on  to 
say:  — 

If  we  thus  deny  the  immediate  influence  of  the  central  nervous  system  on 
the  germ,  and  assume  a  chemical  theory  of  heredity,  it  might  still  be  possible 
that  the  central  nervous  system  could  influence  heredity  indirectly,  in  so  far 

1  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  pp.  183,  189. 

2  Story  of  the  Mind,  p.  34.  Cf.  Conn,  Method  of  Evolution^  pp.  306  ff.;  also 
Thomson,  Darwinism  and  Human  Life,  p.  169. 

'  Fifty  Years  of  Darwinism,  p.  225.  *  Ibid.,  p.  238. 

^  Especially  in  his  Mechanistic  Universe. 


76  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

as  it  can  affect  the  chemical  processes  of  the  body.  As  illustrations  of  a 
chemical  effect  of  the  nerves,  the  fact  is  mentioned  that  stimulation  of  the 
nerves  of  certain  glands  produces  a  secretion.  Mathews  has  shown,  however, 
that  in  cases  where  stimulation  of  the  sympathetic  system  produces  a  secre- 
tion, the  glands  contain  muscular  fibres  which  contract  when  stimulated, 
and  in  this  way  press  a  liquid  out  of  the  ducts.  .  .  .  There  are  no  specifi- 
cally trophic  nerves,  but  it  is  possible  that  many  nerves  produce  indirectly 
(for  instance,  through  disturbances  of  the  circulation  and  Kmitation  of  the 
supply  of  oxygen)  such  extensive  chemical  changes  that  morphological 
changes  of  the  tissue  ensue.  If  this  is  really  the  case,  a  possibihty  still  exists 
that  the  central  nervous  system  also  affects  the  sexual  cells  indirectly,  in  so 
far  as  disturbances  of  circulation  and  hence  chemical  changes  are  produced, 
which  may  modify  the  sexual  cells  contained  in  the  testes  and  ovaries  chemi- 
cally. Thus  there  might  be  a  very  remote  chance  that  brain-activity  of  one 
generation  might  lead  to  the  formation  of  chemical  substances  which  affect 
the  sexual  cells.  .  .  .  We  arrive  thus  at  the  conclusion  that  a  transmission 
of  hereditary  characteristics  through  the  egg  is  only  possible  in  the  form  of 
specific  chemical  substances,  and  that  the  central  nervous  system  could  only 
influence  heredity,  if  it  could  bring  about  the  formation  of  special  substances 
in  the  egg  (by  influencing  metabohsm).i 

This  quotation  is  in  harmony  with  the  suggestion  of  Professor 
Wilson  as  to  the  operation  of  "  hormones.''  ^ 

In  the  babel  of  voices  can  we  hear  a  single  clear  word  of  use  in 
the  study  of  social  progress  ?  That  nature  is  prodigal  is  certain 
but  decreasingly  so  as  we  rise  in  the  scale  to  the  higher  species 
where  a  large  proportion  of  the  offspring  reach  maturity.  Varia- 
tion is  the  law  of  life,  —  and  more  universal  than  Darwin 
imagined.^  Struggle  for  existence  is  unquestionable  if  we  accept 
the  term  in  the  large  and  metaphorical  sense  as  used  by  Darwin 
and  more  recently  by  Thomson."*  As  to  the  causes  of  variation, 
however,  the  "  doctors  disagree  "  so  too,  as  to  the  potency  of 

1  Physiology  of  the  Brain,  pp.  208  ff.  ^  /J^.^  p.  ^q. 

3  Cf.  Conn,  Method  of  Evolution,  pp.  108  ff.;  Wallace,  Darwinism,  ch.  III. 

*  Thomson  mentions  three  classes  of  struggle  for  existence:  (i)  struggle  between 
fellows,  (2)  struggle  between  foes,  (3)  struggle  with  fate.  In  the  first,  "  the  struggle 
does  not  need  to  be  direct  to  be  real,  —  the  essential  point  is  that  the  competitors 
seek  after  the  same  desiderata  of  which  there  is  a  limited  supply.  In  the  second, 
it  is  between  individuals  and  between  species,  sometimes  to  the  death.  In  the 
third,  our  sweep  widens  still  further,  and  we  pass  beyond  the  idea  of  competition 
altogether,  to  cases  where  the  struggle  for  existence  is  between  the  living  organism ' 
and  the  inanimate  conditions  of  life, — for  instance,  between  birds  and  the  winter's 
cold,  between  aquatic  animals  and  changes  in  the  water,  between  plants  and 
drought,  between  plants  and  frost  ...  in  a  wide  sense,  between  Life  and  Fate." 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  JJ 

natural  selection  in  the  struggle  between  individuals  where  Dar- 
win laid  chief  emphasis.^ 

There  seems  to  be  a  strong  tendency  now  to  accept  the  theory 
of  mutations  in  the  line  of  inheritable  unit  characters,  to  empha- 
size the  unity  of  the  species  in  the  struggle  for  existence  and  to 
rate  highly  the  importance  of  geographical  isolation  in  the 
formation  of  new  species  and  ethnic  groups.  There  seems  to  be 
a  tendency  in  certain  quarters,  also,  following  the  lead  of  Nageli 
and  Driesch,  to  return  to  the  hyper-scientific  method  of  earUer 
days  and  posit  a  life  principle  or  force  as  the  mainspring  of 
development.  This  is  strongly  opposed,  however,  by  those  who 
hold  that  science  is  weakened  just  in  proportion  as  it  gets  beyond 
the  domain  of  demonstrable  facts,  so  on  the  whole  sociology  can 
claim  little  support  for  this  theory  from  biologists  of  recognized 
authority.^ 

Most  clear  and  certain  of  all,  it  would  seem,  stands  out  above 
the  confusion  of  present  biological  knowledge  and  hypotheses  the 
doctrine  of  adaptation  though  with  differences  of  interpretation 
and  emphasis.  In  proportion  as  the  struggle  is  between  individ- 
uals, either  friends  or  foes,  the  weak  and  otherwise  less  adapted 
tend  to  be  eliminated,  but  in  proportion  as  the  struggle  is  between 
groups  certain  instincts  seem  to  have  been  evolved  which  have  as 
their  specific  function  the  strengthening  of  the  group  in  collective 
activity.  Some  of  these  instincts  seem  to  work  for  the  detriment 
of  the  individual  member  who  does  not  fit  in  with  the  "  group 
sentiment  of  safety  "  ^  or  whose  death  will  in  some  way  be 
advantageous  to  the  group  as  in  the  destruction  of  the  weak,  the 

*  For  a  sane  criticism  of  Darwinism,  see  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  chs.  Ill, 
IV,  V. 

2  Although  this  theory  is  in  general  repudiated  as  extra-scientific  and  tending 
to  turn  scientists  aside  from  their  supreme  task  of  finding  out  the  eflScient  causes 
of  change,  the  vast  realm  of  mystery  that  still  baflBes  biologists  in  their  endeavor 
to  explain  the  process  of  biological  evolution  and  has  led  some  to  posit  a  force  or 
intelligence  as  the  cause  of  these  changes,  gives  a  vantage  groimd  for  social  phi- 
losophers who  are  not  limited,  as  are  scientists,  to  mere  description  in  terms  of  co- 
existence and  sequence,  but  have  as  their  task  to  push  their  investigations  and 
formulations  on  to  an  underlying  or  final  cause  as  have  Ratzenhofer,  Fiske,  and 
Ward.     Cf.  Kellogg,  op.  ciL,  pp.  226  f. 

'  Ward,  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  134,  419. 


78  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

maimed  and  the  "  drones  ";  sometimes,  however,  it  seems  to 
manifest  itself  in  defence  of  the  helpless  and  weak,  thus  providing 
the  biological  background  of  "  mutual  aid  "  in  the  social  behavior 
of  men.i  gut  the  range  of  mal-adaptation  possible  before 
elimination  takes  place  is  often  wide,^  —  and  here  again  the 
decisive  factor  is  the  severity  of  the  struggle  for  existence,  and 
although  adaptation  in  the  strict  use  of  the  term  and  in  every 
particular  may  not  be  necessary  to  the  mere  existence  of  the 
individual  to  the  point  of  reproduction  and  so  to  the  point  neces- 
sary for  the  preservation  of  the  species,  adaptation  in  this  sense 
is  necessary  for  the  largest  possible  life  of  which  any  individual 
or  species  is  capable.  The  pine  tree  of  the  tropics  is  vastly  dif- 
ferent from  the  pine  tree  of  the  cold  regions. 

Permanent  modifications  within  a  species,  as  in  the  forma- 
tion of  new  varieties  seem  to  come:  (i)  as  a  result  of  inter-cross- 
ing; (2)  through  a  great  change  in  the  environment  affecting  a 
certain  portion  of  the  species  eliminating  all  but  those  whose 
variations  from  the  type  prove  best  adapted  to  the  new  conditions 
of  Ufe;  (3)  through  geographical  isolation  resulting  in  inbreeding 
and  the  selective  pressure  of  a  different  combination  of  environ- 
mental conditions,  or  (4)  by  spontaneous  variation  or  mutation 
often  with  the  potency  of  development,  arising  by  a  process  as  yet 
unknown.^  When  the  changes  are  sufficiently  great,  especially 
when  the  reproductive  functions  are  affected  so  as  to  make  the 
individuals  of  the  variety  and  the  parent  species  infertile  when 
crossed,  we  have  a  new  species. 

As  tropisms,  reflexes  and  instincts  are  inborn  characters,  or 
based  on  such,  their  origin  is  to  be  explained  in  accordance  with 
the  above  principles,  and  they  are  to  be  considered  as  on  the 
whole  of  adaptive  value  either  to  the  individual  or  to  the  species.* 
They  may  persist,  however,  as  "  vestiges  "  even  though  disuseful, 
providing  this  disutiHty  is  not  sufficient  to  lead  to  elimination. 

The  human  organism  is  in  direct  descent  from  the  anthropoid 
apes  or  from  the  common  precursor  of  these  and  man,  and  the 

1  Kropotkin,  Mutual  Aid.  ^  Kellogg,  op.  cit.,  p.  227. 

'  For  discussion  of  "  Varieties  "  see  Walter,  Genetics,  pp.  60  £. 
*  Colvin  and  Bagley,  Human  Behavior,  pp.  21-25,  126  ff.;  Miller,  Psychology 
of  Thinking,  pp.  18  f.;  Pannelee,  Science  of  Human  Behavior,  pp.  105  ff. 


BIOLOGICAL  EVOLUTION  79 

existence  of  all  human  qualities  is  to  be  explained,  if  at  all,  on 
the  assumption  that  they  have  been  of  value  on  the  whole  in  the 
struggle  for  existence. 

Some  modern  genetic  psychologists  and  sociologists,  working 
on  the  above  premises,  and  stud3dng  the  behavior  of  animals  and 
infants  to  get  a  clue  to  the  behavior  of  man,  have  formulated  the 
following  conclusions  which  may  well  be  included  with  the 
above :  — 

When  unconscious  reactions  were  not  adequate  to  survival, 
consciousness,  in  some  cases,  seems  to  have  arisen  as  an  adaptive 
response  to  this  need,  and  having  arisen,  developed  rapidly.^ 

Every  organism  tends  to  respond  positively  to  stimuli  that 
are  favorable  and  negatively  to  those  that  are  unfavorable,  and  a 
favorable  reaction  tends  to  be  repeated.  In  this  way  innate 
tendencies  are  modified  and  habits  formed.^ 

In  higher  organisms  endowed  with  feeling,  reactions  that  are 
favorable  to  the  individual  or  species  are  accompanied,  on  the 
whole,  by  pleasurable  sensations,  those  that  are  unfavorable,  by 
painful  sensations.^ 

With  the  development  of  the  human  intellect  giving  man  the 
power  of  selection  among  satisfiers  of  felt  needs  arose  the  possi- 
bility of  a  selection  that  was  detrimental  to  the  organism  and  to 
the  species.* 

With  the  rise  of  conscious,  purposeful  choice,  came  the  power  of 
active  adaptation,  —  i.e.,  the  purposeful  modification  of  the 
individual  or  group  to  make  it  better  adapted  to  life  conditions,  or 
the  purposeful  modification  of  the  life  conditions  to  make  them 
more  favorable  to  the  individual  or  group.^ 

1  Ellwood,  Sociology  in  its  Psychological  Aspects,  p.  98. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  106  f.;  Thomdike,  Original  Nature  of  Man,  ch.  IX. 

*  Pannelee,  op.  cit.,  pp.  232  f.;  Ward,  Pure  Sociology,  p.  130:  "  All  pleasure  is 
mandatory  and  all  pain  is  monitory.  ...  So  long  as  feeling  and  function  are 
adapted  pleasure  means  life  and  health  and  growth  and  multiplication,  while  pain 
points  to  danger,  injury,  waste,  destruction,  death,  and  race  extinction." 

*  Miller,  op.  cit.,  pp.  44  f. 

*  Ellwood,  op.  cit.,  pp.  104  f. 


CHAPTER  V 

NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS 

Having  made  our  approach  through  biological  evolution  espe- 
cially as  interpreted  by  Darwin  and  his  successors,  we  will  take 
up  in  this  chapter  the  contributions  to  our  subject  from  some 
representative  social  philosophers  who  make  use  primarily  of  the 
neo-Darwinian  formula,  and  to  this  extent  of  the  principle  of 
passive  adaptation,  considering  here  Nietzsche,  Kidd,  Galton, 
Pearson  and  Lapouge. 

Friedrich  Nietzsche  (i 844-1 900) 
Evolution  of  the  Super-Man 

Although  Nietzsche  is  not  usually  classed  as  a  sociologist,  his 
writings  have  had  profound  influence  on  modern  social  philosophy, 
especially  as  represented  in  drama,  novel,  magazine  and  news- 
paper. According  to  Mencken  he  reigns  as  king  in  the  German 
universities.^ 

Nietzsche's  philosophy,  according  to  the  same  commentator, 
consists  of  the  following  propositions:  ^  — 

1.  That  the  ever-dominant  and  only  inherent  impulse  in  all 
Hving  beings,  including  man,  is  the  will  to  remain  alive,  —  the  will, 
that  is,  to  attain  power  over  those  forces  which  make  life  dij6&cult 
or  impossible. 

2.  That  all  schemes  of  morality  are  nothing  more  than  efforts 
to  put  into  permanent  codes  the  expedients  found  useful  by  some 
given  race  in  the  course  of  its  successful  endeavors  to  remain 
alive. 

3.  That,  despite  the  universal  tendency  to  give  these  codes 
authority  by  crediting  them  to  some  god,  they  are  essentially 
man-made  and  mutable,  and  so  change,  or  should  change,  as  the 
conditions  of  human  existence  in  the  world  are  modified. 

*  The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche y  p.  vii.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  ix,  x. 

80 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  8 1 

4.  That  the  human  race  should  endeavor  to  make  its  mastery- 
over  its  environment  more  and  more  certain,  and  that  it  is  its 
destiny,  therefore,  to  widen  more  and  more  the  gap  which  now 
separates  it  from  th-e  lower  races  of  animals. 

5.  That  any  code  of  morality  which  retains  its  permanence  and 
authority  after  the  conditions  of  existence  which  gave  rise  to  it 
have  changed,  works  against  this  upward  progress  of  mankind 
toward  greater  and  greater  efficiency. 

6.  That  all  gods  and  religions,  because  they  have  for  their 
main  object  the  protection  of  moral  codes  against  change,  are 
inimical  to  the  life  and  well-being  of  healthy  and  efl&cient  men. 

7.  That  all  the  ideas  which  grow  out  of  such  gods  and  religions 
—  such,  for  example,  as  the  Christian  ideas  of  humility,  of  self- 
sacrifice  and  of  brotherhood,  —  are  enemies  of  life,  too. 

8.  That  human  beings  of  the  ruling,  efficient  class  should  reject 
all  gods  and  religions,  and  with  them  the  morality  at  the  bottom 
of  them  and  the  ideas  which  grow  out  of  them,  and  restore  to  its 
ancient  kingship  that  primal  instinct  which  enables  every  effi- 
cient individual  to  differentiate  between  the  things  which  are 
beneficial  to  him  and  the  things  which  are  harmful. 

This  analysis  would  seem  to  indicate  that  Nietzsche  should  be 
classified  rather  among  those  who  have  contributed  chiefly  to  the 
development  of  the  doctrine  of  active  adaptation,  but  his  phi- 
losophy is  rooted  fundamentally  on  two  assumptions:  The  will 
to  live  as  the  primary  element  in  human  life,  and  the  development, 
by  the  law  of  struggle  and  survival,  of  the  super-man  in  whom  this 
will  to  five  shall  find  the  highest  possible  expression. 

We  shall  concern  ourselves  here  chiefly  with  the  second  of  these 
fundamental  elements. 

One  can  understand  the  evolution  of  Nietzsche's  system  only 
in  the  light  of  his  temperament  and  hfe.  He  was  born  in  1844 
into  the  home  of  a  Lutheran  pastor  of  Rocken.  Bereft  of  his 
father  at  four  years  of  age,  he,  with  two  sisters,  was  brought  up  in 
the  companionship  of  four  pious  women.^  The  idol  of  the  home, 
now  changed  to  Naumburg-on-the-Saale,  "  the  boy  shrank  from 
the  touch  of  the  world's  rough  hand,"  until  he  entered  the  Gym- 
*  The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche,  pp.  10  f . 


82  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

nasium.  Here  he  received  a  mental  and  spiritual  shock  which  to 
one  of  his  temperament  and  early  training  had  much  to  do  with 
the  transformation  of  his  unsophisticated  piety  and  credulity  to 
dionysian  iconoclasm. 

The  influence  of  Ritschl,  the  celebrated  philologist  at  Bonn  and 
Leipsic,  was  very  great  on  the  developing  youth  ^  but  greater  yet 
that  of  the  writings  of  Schopenhauer  which  he  read  in  1865,  but 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection 
with  which  he  became  acquainted  during  his  first  years  at  Bonn.^ 
Schopenhauer  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  doctrine  that  progress 
results  from  struggle  for  existence  and  survival  of  the  fittest  is  thus 
the  very  heart  of  Nietzscheism.^ 

Our  author  arrived  at  manhood  in  the  flush  of  an  intellectual 
period  when  monistic  philosophy  and  the  scientific  method  were 
being  turned  to  a  criticism  of  all  of  life's  conventions  and  values. 
The  cataclysm  in  Nietzsche's  moral  and  religious  ideas  and  beliefs 
made  the  conventional  standards  in  these  departments  of  life 
values  his  special  concern,  and  later  his  special  point  of  attack, 
and  he  became  one  of  the  most  virulent  and  blasphemous  of 
moral  and  religious  critics. 

In  his  attack  on  David  Strauss  in  1873,  he  charges  that  phi- 
losopher and  critic  with  lack  of  courage  in  failing  to  follow  out  the 
Darwinian  formula  to  its  logical  conclusion."*  The  same  argu- 
ment would  apply  to  Darwin  himself,  and  to  Wallace,  Fiske,  Bal- 
four and  Huxley,  as  Dr.  A.  Lilly  points  out,  for  none  of  these  apply 
the  biological  formula  in  all  its  rigidity  to  social  progress,  or  to  the 
development  of  moral  sentiments.  The  consensus  of  opinion 
today,  however,  among  sociologists  is  with  Darwin  rather  than 
with  Nietzsche  and  his  defenders  as  we  shall  point  out  later.  To 
say  that  the  law  of  natural  selection  does  not  apply  rigidly  in 
social  evolution  is  not  to  pit  man  against  the  cosmic  process,  for 
man  with  his  intelligence  and  will  is  a  part  of  that  process,  so 
also  are  society  and  the  social  sentiments.^  The  reasoning  of  the 
Nietzscheans  is  far  from  conclusive.® 

*  The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche,  p.  16.  '  Ihid.,  p.  13. 
'  Cf.  Mencken,  pp.  64  ff.,  loi  f.,  138  f.,  esp.  142  n.        *  Ihid.,  p.  30. 

•*  For  Dnmmiond's  position  as  against  Huxley  see  his  Ascent  of  Man,  ch.  I. 

•  Introduction  to  The  Case  Against  Wagner,  etc.,  cf,  Mencken,  p.  140. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  83 

Nietzsche's  peculiar  reaction  against  the  naturaKstic  ethics  of 
Darwin  and  the  English  utilitarians  is  doubtless  to  be  explained 
also  in  the  light  of  his  temperament,  early  training  and  violent 
reaction  which  carried  him  to  the  extreme  of  conventional 
iconoclasm.  Naturalistic  ethics  made  large  place  for  sympathy, 
sociability  and  self-sacrifice.  Nietzsche,  an  eccentric  egoist,  with 
will  to  power  and  natural  selection  forming  an  idee  fixe j  re-enforced 
by  the  experience  which  came  by  defying,  with  more  or  less 
success,  the  forces  both  physical  and  moral  which  seemed  allied 
against  him,  had  to  find  some  other  explanation  for  the  origin  of 
moral  sentiments  than  that  given  by  the  Darwinians. 

His  approach  was  through  his  specialty,  philology,  and  he  tried 
to  prove  by  the  derivation  of  words  used  to  express  ethical  con- 
cepts that  the  moral  code  of  Christendom  was  a  "  slave  moraHty  " 
imposed  by  the  ruling  classes  for  their  own  advantage.  The  re- 
sume of  the  process  by  which  he  obtained  "  enlightenment "  as 
set  forth  in  A  Genealogy  of  Morals  indicates  the  pressure  of  his  in- 
dividualistic bias.  His  violence  against  traditional  Christianity  is 
likewise  explained.  The  Christianity  with  which  he  was  most 
familiar  was  that  typified  on  the  one  hand  by  the  life  of  Saint 
Francis  of  Assisi  and  on  the  other  that  set  forth  dogmatically  by 
Albrecht  Ritschl  who  was  Professor  of  Systematic  Theology  at 
Bonn  during  his  student  days  there.  The  negation  of  the  will 
to  live  which  found  its  greatest  Christian  example  in  Saint 
Francis  must  necessarily  call  forth  violent  opposition  from  one  of 
Nietzsche's  temperament  and  life  philosophy.^ 

His  study  of  the  genesis  of  moral  ideas  is  unsatisfactory  from 
biological  and  anthropological  viewpoints,  and  seems  strained 
even  from  that  of  philology.  To  try  to  explain  the  herding  in- 
stinct among  men  which  is  so  pronounced  among  certain  species 
of  mammals  as  a  social  institution  produced  by  the  combining  of 
the  many  weak  against  the  few  strong,  is  too  absurd  to  merit 
serious  consideration. ^ 

With  Nietzsche  the  good  is  that  which  advances  the  will  to  live, 
the  bad,  that  which  hinders  it.     But  he  never  gets  beyond  the 

1  A  Genealogy  of  Morals,  Third  Essay,  cf.  Mencken,  p.  143. 

2  A  Genealogy  of  Morals,  p.  17. 


84  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

individual.  Now  granted  that  personal  might  made  right  in 
primitive  times;  that  "  gut "  is  related  to  the  ruling  "  Goths  "; 
that "  schlecht "  is  identical  with  "  schlicht/'  —  simple,  common; 
that  purity  is  merely  ceremonial  and  priestly  in  its  origin,  —  all 
this  does  not  invalidate  the  social  utility  of  conventions  thus 
derived.  Nietzsche  seems  entirely  oblivious  to  that  social 
phenomenon  emphasized  by  Darwin,  Fiske,  Drummond  and  in 
fact  by  practically  all  sociologists,  viz.,  the  prevalence  and  persist- 
ence in  early  times  of  the  inter-group  struggle,  and  the  survival 
of  that  group  which  was  the  most  powerful,  not  only  by  virtue 
of  physical  strength  but  of  organization  based  on  social  qualities 
possessed  by  the  members.  According  to  consistent  Darwinism 
no  Nietzschean  group  could  have  survived  to  transmit  its  theory 
of  life  by  congenital  variation  or  social  heredity,  —  nor  is  it 
probable  that  it  could  today.  It  is  destructive  to  the  family  as 
well  as  to  the  state  and  can  lead  only  to  self-annihilation.  Thus 
it  is  not  social  ethics  that  leads  to  destruction  but  dionysian 
individualism.  A  study  of  the  history  of  Nietzscheans  for  a  few 
generations  would  be  illuminating.  If  all  were  such  woman- 
haters  as  the  founder  there  would  be  no  normal  generation. 

Nietzsche's  chief  contribution  to  the  development  of  the 
doctrine  of  passive  material  adaptation  is  by  virtue  of  the  fal- 
lacies in  his  opposition.  Indeed  he  positively  repudiates  the 
doctrine  as  contrary  to  the  notion  of  functional  activity. 

Laboring  under  this  idiosyncrasy,  "  adaptation,"  that  is  to  say,  a  second- 
rate  activity,  in  fact,  a  mere  reactivity,  is  pushed  into  the  foreground,  and 
indeed,  life  itself  has  even  been  defined  as  "  a  continuous  better  adjustment 
of  internal  relations  to  external  relations  "  (Mr.  Herbert  Spencer).  But  this 
is  to  mistake  the  true  nature  and  function  of  life,  which  is  will  to  power.  It  is 
to  overiook  the  principal  priority  which  the  spontaneous,  aggressive,  trans- 
gressive,  new-interpretative  and  new-directive  forces  possess,  from  the  result 
of  which  "  adaptation  "  follows.  It  is  to  deny  the  sovereign  office  of  the 
highest  functionaries  in  the  organism,  in  which  functionaries  the  will  to  live 
appears  as  an  active  and  formative  principle.  The  readers  will  recall  here 
what  Huxley  objected  to  in  Spencer  —  his  "Administrative  Nihilism." 
But  we  have  to  deal  here  with  much  more  than  mere  "  administration."  ^ 

His  failure  here  is  in  his  inability  to  see  that  adaptation  may 
be  interpreted  to  include  the  very  will  to  life  and  power  for  which 
1  A  Genealogy  of  Morals,  p.  95. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  85 

he  stands,  —  except  in  the  extreme  form  which  characterizes  his 
theory. 

Nietzsche,  like  many  another  critic,  drives  out  a  theory  at  the 
front  door  only  to  let  it  in  at  the  rear.  Self-denial  and  self- 
sacrifice,  the  products  of  slave-morality,  are  to  be  despised,  — 
yet  every  individual,  he  holds,  is  to  deny  himself  the  gratification 
of  certain  impulses  that  he  may  attain  greater  future  life  and 
power.  Likewise  the  aristocracy  of  the  present  generation  are  to 
become  dionysians  in  the  interest  of  the  super-man  of  the  future, 
—  but  Nietzsche  provides  no  sanction  for  such  sacrifice,  save  an 
appeal  to  the  law  of  cosmic  evolution.  Such  a  sacrifice  has  no 
rational  sanction,  however,  according  to  his  theory,  and  all  super- 
rational  sanctions  are  tabooed. 

Nietzsche  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of 
passive  social  adaptation  by  emphasizing  the  relativity  of  ethical 
ideals,  but  this  had  been  done  previously  by  Comte  and  Spencer. 
He  went  to  the  extreme,  however,  in  his  devaluation  of  all  values. 

The  brief  outline  and  few  quotations  given  above  indicate  how 
great  emphasis  our  author  placed  on  the  power  of  individual 
initiative,  thus  paving  the  way  for  a  reaction  against  the  laissez 
faire  tendency  growing  out  of  the  first  application  of  scientific 
methods  to  social  phenomena.  In  this  way  he  has  contributed 
very  greatly  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  active  adapta- 
tion in  all  its  phases. 

The  philosophy  of  Nietzsche  applied  to  the  group  fitted  in 
admirably  with  the  statecraft  of  Bismarck  and  together  they  have 
inspired  the  German  people  to  become  a  dionysian  group;  but 
applied  to  the  state  this  social  theory  loses  its  distinctive  Nietzs- 
chean  quality  and  takes  on  the  character  of  the  social  theories  of 
Kidd,  Pearson,  and  Carver  in  which  some  of  the  very  qualities  so 
bitterly  denounced  by  our  author  come  to  have  supreme  impor- 
tance. 

Benjamin  Kidd  (1858-        ) 
Religion  and  Social  Progress 

Nietzsche  took  as  his  point  of  departure  Schopennauer's  will  to 
live  interpreted  in  terms  of  Darwin's  formula  of  struggle  for 
existence  between  individuals.      Kidd  takes  as  his,  a  belief  in 


86  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

supernatural  religion  and  Weismann's  formula  with  emphasis  on 
the  survival  of  the  species.  The  work  of  the  former  is  largely 
destructive;  that  of  the  latter  apologetic  and  constructive. 

Both  writers  are  hyper-imaginative  and  dogmatic,  presenting 
mere  hypotheses  with  the  certitude  of  well-established  scientific 
facts,  and  reading  into  these  hypotheses  their  own  interpretations. 
Mr.  Kidd^s  air  of  authority  and  use  of  superlatives  tend  to  make 
the  unsophisticated  believe  that  the  ultimate  truth  in  social 
philosophy  has  at  last  been  discovered.  This  characteristic  is 
illustrated  by  the  use,  in  the  first  three  pages  of  his  Social  Evolu- 
tion, of  such  terms  as  "  profoundly,"  "  stupendous,"  "  helpless," 
"  onslaught,"  "  most  remarkable,"  "  most  commanding," 
"pregnant."  His  rigid  application  to  social  progress  of  the 
formula  of  Weismann  is  shown  by  the  following:  — 

Left  to  himself,  this  high  born  creature  [man],  whose  progress  we  seem  to 
take  for  granted,  has  not  the  slightest  innate  tendency  to  make  any  progress 
whatever.  It  may  appear  strange,  but  it  is  strictly  true,  that  if  each  of  us 
were  allowed  by  the  conditions  of  life  to  follow  his  own  inclinations,  the 
average  of  one  generation  would  have  no  tendency  whatever  to  rise  beyond 
the  average  of  the  preceding  one,  but  distinctly  the  reverse.  This  is  not  a 
peculiarity  of  man;  it  has  been  a  law  of  Kfe  from  the  beginning,  and  it  con- 
tinues to  be  a  universal  law  which  we  have  no  power  to  alter.  .  .  .  Progress 
everywhere  from  the  beginning  of  life  has  been  effected  in  the  same  way,  and 
it  is  possible  in  no  other  way.  It  is  the  result  of  selection  and  rejection.  .  .  . 
To  formulate  this  as  the  inevitable  law  of  progress  since  the  beginning  of  life 
has  been  one  of  the  principal  results  of  the  biological  science  of  the  century; 
and  recent  work,  including  the  remarkable  contributions  of  Professor  Weis- 
mann in  Germany,  has  all  tended  to  establish  it  on  foundations  which  are  not 
now  likely  to  be  shaken.^ 

The  above  quotation  shows  not  only  Mr.  Kidd's  dogmatic 
spirit,  but  the  further  fact  that  his  social  theory  is  built  up 
deductively  on  the  teachings  of  Weismann  with  sole  emphasis  on 
natural  selection  as  the  method  of  progress,  degeneration  result- 
ing from  the  cessation  of  this  process  and  by  "  pan-mixia  "  or 
general  breeding. 

Our  author  shows  how  wide-spread  has  been  this  struggle  for 
existence  in  social  evolution  and  how  it  exists  today  not  only 
between  individuals,  but  between  classes,  nations  and  races.    He 

'  Social  Evolution^  p.  36. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  87 

pictures  the  misery  of  the  exploited  classes  in  industrial  centers 
and  seems  to  feel  that  all  this  is  natural  and  necessary,  —  neces- 
sary for  the  good  of  the  social  organism  with  special  emphasis 
on  imborn  generations.^ 

Having  read  the  first  three  chapters  with  emphasis  on  rivalry 
between  individuals  as  a  basis  of  selection,  —  though  he  fails  to 
indicate  how  there  can  be  selection  for  he  admits  that  the  masses 
who  do  not  succeed  leave  the  largest  number  of  offspring,^  —  one 
is  surprised  to  find  later  that  Mr.  Kidd  repudiates  the  commonly 
accepted  belief  among  biological  sociologists  concerning  the 
differential  in  average  mental  capacity  between  primitive  and 
modern  man.^  His  view  seems  to  be  that  with  the  advent  of 
man  natural  selection  turned  to  the  production  of  those  qualities 
of  character  which  make  for  group  efficiency  such  as  energy, 
vigor,'*  virility,  courage,  integrity  ^  and  simple-minded  devotion 
to  conceptions  of  duty,^  but  he  fails  to  show  how  these  qualities 
are  produced.  He  lays  great  stress  on  the  increasing  prevalence 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  equality  of  all  men  and  traces  this  to  "  the 
great  fund  of  altruistic  feeHng  generated  by  the  ethical  system 
upon  which  our  civilization  is  founded,"'  —  but  he  does  not 
furnish  a  shred  of  evidence  that  this  feeling  is  due  to  selection 
rather  than  to  the  increase  of  co-operation,  intercourse  and  educa- 
tion. Indeed  as  to  the  other  qualities  which  he  holds  to  be  of 
supreme  worth  in  the  individuals  of  the  successful  group, — these 
are  the  result  of  a  complex  of  physical  and  social  conditions  and 
by  no  means  solely  the  product  of  selection.  In  other  words, 
there  is  no  more  reason  for  beUeving  that  the  western  nations 
excel  others  in  the  social  and  religious  instincts  than  there  is  for 
belie\dng  that  they  excel  in  average  mental  ability. 

The  struggle  between  groups  results,  as  Kidd  shows,  in  the 
survival  of  the  groups  that  on  the  whole  are  best  adapted  to  the 
conditions  of  life  in  which  they  are  placed,  and  survival  power 
depends  not  only  on  the  social  efficiency  of  the  individual  mem- 
bers, but  on  the  efficiency  of  the  social  organization.^    It  depends 

1  Social  Evolution,  ch.  II.  *  Ibid.,  p,  61. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  278  f.,  372,  384.  •  Ibid.,  p.  349. 
'  Ibid.,  ch.  IX.  '  Ibid.,  p.  182. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  58.  8  Ibid.,  pp.  68  f. 


88  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

primarily,  however,  according  to  our  author,  on  religion,  which 
provides  a  super-rational  sanction  for  the  self-sacrificing  conduct 
which  is  required  of  the  great  majority  of  people  that  their  group 
may  succeed,  and  especially  that  social  progress  may  be  furthered 
to  the  advantage  of  future  generations.  ^  "  The  greatest  good  which 
the  evolutionary  forces,  operating  in  society,  are  working  out,"  he 
says,  "is  the  good  of  the  social  organism  as  a  whole.  The 
greatest  number  in  this  sense  is  comprised  of  the  members  of 
generations  yet  unborn  or  unthought  of,  to  whose  interests  the 
existing  individuals  are  absolutely  indifferent. '^  ^  xhis  he  terms 
the  law  of  projected  efficiency. 

This  law  of  projected  efficiency  is  the  key  to  the  understanding 
of  Kidd's  social  philosophy,  so  must  be  explained.  He  makes  use 
of  this  law  in  the  later  chapters  of  Social  Evolution,  but  it  is 
developed  at  length  in  his  Principles  of  Western  Civilization,  He 
claims  biological  support  for  it  in  Weismann's  essay  on  Duration 
of  Life,  but  so  far  as  I  can  discover  there  is  not  one  word  in  the 
whole  essay  that,  fairly  interpreted,  warrants  the  conclusion  Mr. 
Kidd  draws.  All  Professor  Weismann  claims  is  that  duration  of 
life  in  a  given  species  is  dependent  on  an  internal  principle  deter- 
mined by  utility  to  the  species  in  its  struggle  for  existence,  —  a 
theory  which  has  received  added  confirmation  in  recent  studies 
concerning  Mendelian  characters.  Yet  this  theory  of  projected 
efficiency  is  enunciated  by  Kidd  as  if  it  were  a  demonstrated  fact 
and  we  are  told  that "  Never  before  has  a  principle  of  such  reach 
in  the  social  sciences  emerged  into  view."  In  explanation  of  its 
workings,  he  says:  — 

What  we  are  now  brought  to  see  is  that  the  overwhelming  weight  of 
numbers  as  of  interests,  in  the  evolutionary  process,  is  never  in  the  present. 
It  is  always  in  the  future.  .  .  .  We  are,  in  other  words,  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  fact  that,  in  the  scientific  formula  of  the  life  of  any  existing  type  of 
social  order  destined  to  maintain  its  place  in  the  future,  the  interests  of  these 
existing  individuals,  with  which  we  have  been  so  preoccupied,  possess  no 
meaning,  except  so  far  as  they  are  included  in,  and  are  subordinate  to,  the 
interests  of  a  developing  system  of  social  order,  the  overwhelming  proportion 
of  whose  members  are  still  in  the  future.' 

*  Social  Evolution,  ch.  IV.  '  Ihid.,  p.  312. 

'  Principles  of  Western  Civilization,  p.  4,  of.  p.  65. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  89 

Let  us  examine  the  facts  as  taught  in  biology  and  contrast  them 
with  the  interpretation  given  by  the  author  under  consideration. 
According  to  Darwin  biological  evolution  has  resulted  from  in- 
crease of  numbers  beyond  means  of  subsistence,  struggle  for  exist- 
ence and  the  survival  of  those  best  adapted  to  the  conditions  of 
life.  According  to  Weismann  the  struggle  is  not  so  much  be- 
tween individuals  as  between  species  and  variations  may  con- 
ceivably be  preserved  which  would  prove  disadvantageous  to  the 
individual  if  he  had  to  carry  on  the  struggle  independently,  but 
which  are  advantageous  to  the  group  in  competition  with  nature 
or  with  other  groups.^  Now  under  static  conditions  the  curve 
showing  the  "  norm  "  or  "  type  ''  represents  those  on  the  whole 
best  adapted  for  survival,  but  under  dynamic  conditions,  espe- 
cially in  the  physical  environment,  some  individuals  varying 
from  the  norm  will  have  the  advantage  and  survive,  thus  per- 
manently modifying  the  species.  Shortness  of  life  in  the 
individual,  according  to  Weismann  in  the  essay  quoted,  may  be 
considered  favorable  to  a  species  in  a  dynamic  environment 
calling  for  frequent  modifications  of  the  "  type  "  in  order  that 
the  species  may  persist.  The  species  living  under  such  conditions 
that  evolves  an  inner  principle  which  causes  death  when  the 
individual  has  ceased  to  be  of  service  to  the  group,  has  an  advan- 
tage in  competition  with  other  groups  or  species  where  certain 
individuals  live  on  as  a  burden  to  others.  Brevity  of  life  for  the 
individual,  then,  may  be  of  value  to  the  species,  though  in  general 
brevity  of  life  is  considered  disadvantageous.  Now  "  species  " 
is  a  generic  term  and  includes  past,  present  and  future.  Having 
seen  that  a  variation  may  be  of  advantage  to  the  species  though 
possibly  disadvantageous  to  the  individual,  it  is  but  a  step  to  say 
that  as  the  great  bulk  of  those  who  comprise  the  species  and  who 
are  to  receive  the  benefit  of  this  variation  are  yet  unborn,  there- 
fore the  benefits  of  the  variation  are  "  projected  "  into  the  future. 
We  thus  have  "  projected  efficiency." 

Mr.  Kidd's  chief  error  is  in  conceiving  that  a  quality  can  be  of 
advantage  to  the  species  which  is  not  at  the  same  time  of  advan- 
tage to  the  great  majority  of  individuals  that  compose  it  at  any 

*  Recognized  by  Darwin,  but  not  emphasized. 


90  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

one  time.i  "  Species ''  is  but  a  class  term  and  a  species  can 
survive  only  through  the  survival  of  individuals.  In  a  dynamic 
environment  a  species  cannot  persist  without  modification  and  if 
changes  in  the  type  occur  there  is  no  special  advantage  in  keeping 
the  same  name.  In  the  above  illustration  from  Weismann,  if 
brevity  of  life  in  the  individual  is  advantageous  to  the  species  in 
its  present  struggle,  it  is  advantageous  to  the  individuals  com- 
posing the  species,  for  if  nature  did  not  terminate  Kfe  when  the 
individual  had  ceased  to  be  of  service  to  the  group,  the  group  as 
such  would  have  to  make  way  with  it,  that  is,  if  the  struggle  for 
existence  were  sufficiently  acute,  —  even  as  happens  in  some 
species.  The  same  thing  holds  true  of  man.  Among  some 
primitive  tribes  the  aged  are  cast  off  to  die.  It  would  be  of 
advantage  to  the  individuals  under  such  conditions  if  there  were 
an  inner  principle  which  would  bring  life  to  an  end  as  soon  as 
such  social  disutility  occurred  as  to  lead  to  their  destruction  by 
the  group. 

This  theory  of  projected  efficiency,  calling  for  the  sacrifice  of 
the  vast  majority  of  living  individuals  to  the  good  of  unborn 
generations,  gives  Kidd  the  background  for  his  emphasis  on  the 
need  of  a  super-rational  sanction  which  will  hold  the  members  of  a 
group  to  their  thankless  but  inevitable  task. 

Reason,  which  in  his  conception  is  the  cold  calculating  faculty 
that  enables  one  to  balance  pleasures  and  pains  and  choose  con- 
duct in  the  fine  of  self-interest  cannot  furnish  a  sanction,  for  if 
allowed  full  sway  it  would  lead  to  the  establishment  of  some  kind 
of  socialistic  or  anarchistic  scheme  which  would  mean  present 
gain  though  future  disaster  to  the  race.^  Reason  is  considered 
to  be  diametrically  opposed  to  "  belief "  and  "  ultra-rational." 
There  can  be  no  such  thing,  according  to  our  author,  as  a  reason- 
able rehgion.^     ReHgion  is  not  only  super-rational  but  irrational. 

Mr.  Kidd's  chief  contributions  to  the  development  of  the 
doctrine  of  adaptation  are  (i)  emphasis  on  the  development  by 
inter-group  conflict  of  the  social  and  moral  qualities  which  make 

1  His  illustrations  from  social  evolution,  Social  Evolution,  chs.  VI  and  VII,  have 
no  biological  analogue. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  67  ff.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  107  f. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  9 1 

for  group  strength  thus  affording  a  wholesome  antidote  to 
Nietzsche;  (2)  the  value  he  places  on  religion  as  a  factor  in  group 
survival;  (3)  his  criticism  of  the  over-emphasis  on  the  intellectual 
element  in  social  progress  as  in  the  writings  of  Buckle,  though  here 
he  is  weak  in  failing  to  appreciate  the  value  of  the  intellect  in 
active  social  adaptation;  and  (4)  his  doctrine  of  projected  effi- 
ciency which,  though  untenable  as  formulated  by  him,  is  most 
suggestive  especially  as  a  principle  of  social  control.  As  such  it 
means  merely  that  the  group  that  would  be  immortal  must  use 
forethought  and  see  to  it  that  those  qualities  and  conditions  are 
developed  which  make  for  group  strength  not  only  in  the  present 
but  in  the  distant  future  and  that  those  which  weaken  the  group 
are  eliminated,  —  but  this  is  entirely  foreign  to  the  thought  of 
our  author. 

The  most  serious  objections  to  Eadd's  social  philosophy  are 
(i)  his  use  of  the  deductive  and  analogical  method  almost  ex- 
clusively, rather  than  the  inductive;  (2)  his  loose,  inconsistent 
use  of  biological  formulae  as  applied  to  social  progress;  (3)  his 
hyper-acute  imagination  which  reads  into  biological  theories 
what  was  never  intended  by  the  author;  (4)  his  dogmatic  setting 
forth  of  mere  hypotheses  as  assured  laws;  (5)  his  use  of  the  term 
organism  to  include  the  future,  for  there  can  be  no  organism  apart 
from  organization;  and  (6)  his  conception  of  reason  as  diametri- 
cally opposed  to  faith  on  the  one  hand  and  to  everything  that 
does  not  favor  narrow  self-interest  on  the  other.  This  is  due  to 
his  failure  to  recognize  the  function  of  the  self -regarding  sentiment 
as  it  expands  to  include  ever  wider  circles  of  individuals  with 
whom  self-interest  is  identified.  Just  as  reason  leads  us  to  deny 
ourselves  a  present  for  a  future  enjoyment,  and  one  that  is  sensual 
for  one  that  is  intellectual,  so  it  may  lead  us  to  deny  an  egoistic 
satisfaction  for  one  that  comes  as  a  result  of  success  to  our  family, 
club,  church  or  state.*  Moreover  Kidd  fails  utterly  to  note  the 
function  of  reason  in  mitigating  social  misery.  He  pictures  the 
awful  condition  of  the  poor  in  industrial  centers  and  cites  this  as 
an  example  of  the  sacrifice  required  on  the  part  of  the  toiling 
masses  that  the  group  may  succeed  and  that  social  progress  may 

*  For  the  development  of  this  thought,  see  infra,  chs.  VII,  XV,  and  Conclusion. 


92  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

be  advanced,  —  and  finds  no  rational  sanction  for  such  sacrifice; 
but  the  pity  of  it  all  is  that  religion  is  invoked  to  keep  them  to 
their  hard  lot  when  in  fact  social  welfare  demands  that  their 
condition  be  changed.  It  is  true  that  there  is  no  rational  sanction 
for  the  condition  of  the  millions  of  the  industrially  exploited,  nor 
should  there  be  any  super-rational  sanction. 

Galton  and  Pearson  ^ 
National  Eugenics 

These  two  may  well  be  considered  together  for  they  are  closely 
related  in  point  of  view,  method  and  conclusions,  and  moreover 
have  been  associated  in  their  life  work,  —  the  latter  being  the 
present  director  of  the  Eugenics  Laboratory  at  London,  founded 
by  the  former. 

Sir  Francis  Galton,  cousin  of  Charles  Darwin,  well  versed  both 
in  medicine  and  mathematics,  is  known  chiefly  as  the  author  of 
Hereditary  Genius  and  founder  of  the  modern  science  of  national 
eugenics.  This  new  science  was  thus  defined  by  its  founder  in 
establishing  the  laboratory  in  connection  with  the  University  of 
London:  "  National  eugenics  is  the  study  of  those  agencies  under 
social  control,  which  may  improve  or  impair  the  racial  quafities 
of  future  generations,  either  physically  or  mentally."  ^  This 
definition  is  interpreted  somewhat  differently  by  Professor  Pear- 
son in  Lecture  Series ^  nos.  i  and  vn.  In  the  former  he  says, "  The 
word  eugenic  here  has  the  double  sense  of  the  English  well-bred, 
goodness  of  nature  and  goodness  of  nurture.  Our  science  does 
not  propose  to  confine  its  attention  to  problems  of  inheritance 
only,  but  to  deal  also  with  problems  of  environment  and  nur- 
ture." ^  In  the  pamphlet  published  two  years  later  practically 
all  the  stress  is  placed  on  nature  as  over-against  nurture.  Here 
racial  is  given  most  prominence  and  is  defined  as  follows:  "  We 
understand  by  a  racial  character,  one  which  is  the  product  of 
many  generations  of  selecting,  one  which  passes  from  generation 
to  generation,  and  one  which  is  not  fundamentally  modified  if  a 
child  be  born  to  the  race  in  India,  Canada,  or  Australia.     We  are 

^  Galton,  1822-1911;  Pearson,  1857-. 

*  Laboratory  Lecture  Series,  no.  ix,  p.  2.  '  Ihid.,  no.  i,  p.  10. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  93 

looking,  therefore,  at  the  range  of  qualities  fixed  by  selection  and 
transmitted  by  heredity."  ^ 

In  Hereditary  Genius  Galton  endeavored  to  trace  the  in- 
fluence of  heredity  in  the  transmission  of  high  mental  ability,  but 
succeeded  in  showing  only  a  correlation  without  separating  the 
factors  of  "  nature  "  and  "  nurture  ";  yet  in  his  discussion  of 
Influences  that  A  fed  the  Natural  Ability  of  Nations,  he  assumes 
that  he  has  shown  that  the  qualities  are  hereditary  rather  than 
due  to  environment.  "  I  shall  have  occasion  to  show,''  he  says, 
"  that  certain  influences  retard  the  average  age  of  marriage,  while 
others  hasten  it;  .  .  .  that  an  enormous  effect  upon  the  average 
natural  ability  of  a  race  may  be  produced  by  means  of  those 
influences.  I  shall  argue  that  the  wisest  policy  is  that  which 
results  in  retarding  the  average  age  of  marriage  among  the  weak 
and  in  hastening  it  among  the  vigorous  classes;  whereas,  most 
unhappily  for  us,  the  influence  of  numerous  social  agencies  has 
been  strongly  and  banefuUy  exerted  in  precisely  the  opposite 
direction.''  2  jjg  discusses  not  only  the  effect  of  the  age  of 
marriage,  but  also  of  religious  persecution  and  celibacy  both  of 
the  priesthood  and  of  a  type  of  scholastics,^  and  bases  his  con- 
clusion on  the  innate  differences  between  the  various  classes  in 
English  society  and  their  value  to  the  race-stock.  Now  he  has 
not  proven  that  the  lower  economic  classes  or  those  who  by 
intellectual  tests  stand  lowest  are  innately  inferior  to  the  higher, 
yet  the  whole  value  of  his  argument  rests  on  this  and  on  the 
correlation  between  physical  vigor  and  the  possession  of  those 
quaHties  which  make  for  national  strength.  In  truth,  in  his 
prefatory  chapter  to  the  edition  of  1892  where  he  takes  his  stand 
on  Weismannism,  he  confuses  those  qualities  of  mind  and  char- 
acter which  may  be  purely  psycho-social,  as  in  the  illustration 
given  from  the  French  Huguenots,  and  those  that  pertain  to  the 
germ  plasm.^  The  same  confusion  is  to  be  noted  in  his  discussion 
of  The  Comparative  Worth  of  Different  Races.     He  holds  that  the 

1  Laboratory  Lecture  Series,  no.  vii,  pp.  4  f. 

2  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  339  (italics  ours). 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  343  f.    Yet  he  admits  that  celibacy  is  favorable  to  eminence,  hence  to 
the  production  of  those  utilities  which  make  for  national  strength,  ibid.,  p.  320. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  xxiii. 


94  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

average  ability  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  is  about  two  classes  above 
the  Negro  race,  but  about  an  equal  degree  below  the  ancient 
Athenians.  This  confusion  of  innate  and  acquired  characters  is 
especially  pronounced  in  his  discussion  of  "  types,"  where  there  is 
not  a  shred  of  evidence  adduced  in  support  of  his  contention  that 
it  is  a  matter  of  race-stock  ^  rather  than  of  social  heredity. 
Indeed  here  his  argument  is  largely  analogical. 

Extensive  investigations  have  been  carried  on  during  the  past 
three  years  in  connection  with  the  Eugenics  Laboratory  in  which 
the  endeavor  has  been  made  to  separate  the  influences  of  "  na- 
ture "  and  "  nurture  "  but  they  are  only  to  a  limited  degree 
convincing,  especially  concerning  the  main  thesis  of  both  Galton 
and  Pearson  that  the  majority  of  each  generation  are  the  off- 
spring of  a  small  per  cent  of  those  in  the  preceding  generation 
composing  the  half  of  the  population  inferior  in  natural  ability.^ 

There  is  no  question,  today,  among  students  of  the  subject, 
concerning  the  general  facts  of  heredity,  including  the  inheritance 
of  mental  and  temperamental  traits  although  these  must  be 
reduced  to  terms  of  the  physical.  There  is  great  difference  of 
opinion,  however,  as  to  the  variability  of  the  race-stock  as  a 
whole  or  on  the  average.  In  fact  we  do  not  know  the  unit 
characters  and  the  combination  of  them  which  make  for  individual 
and  social  efficiency,  and  if  we  did,  as  Max  Nordau  has  pointed 
out,  selective  breeding  for  "  points  "  would  probably  result  in 
lack  of  adaptability  to  general  life  conditions  as  is  the  case  with 
thorough-bred  animals.^ 

One  of  the  recent  investigations  at  the  Eugenics  Laboratory 
proves  absolutely  nothing  except  the  difficulty  of  securing  social 
data  of  any  real  value  for  statistical  purposes.  This  investiga- 
tion concerning  The  Influence  of  Defective  Physique  and  Unfavor- 
able Home  Environment  on  the  Intelligence  of  School  Children  by 
Dr.  David  Heron,  concludes  that  on  the  basis  of  the  data  there  is 
"  little  sensible  effect  of  nurture,  environment,  and  physique  on 
intelligence."*     This  finding  is  so  at  variance  with  the  results  of 

^  Hereditary  Genius,  pp.  350  f.     This  discussion  based  on  Darwin's  theory  of 
pangenesis  was  repudiated  in  the  Preface  to  the  1892  edition.     Cf.  p.  xiv. 
*  Lecture  Series,  no.  ii,  esp.  pp.  16  flf. 
'  Sociological  Papers,  ii,  p.  31.  *  Memoirs,  no.  viii,  p.  58. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  95 

medical  inspection  in  schools  both  in  England  and  America  as  to 
be  of  negative  value. 

Other  of  the  studies  are  of  far  greater  value,  as  those  concerning 
the  influence  of  alcohol  on  heredity  ^  but  even  these  are  not  con- 
clusive, except  as  indicating  with  a  good  degree  of  certainty  that 
chronic  alcohoUsm  is  more  or  less  a  symptom  of  germinal  defect.^ 

The  general  conclusion  of  all  the  laboratory  investigations  is  to 
the  effect  that  mental  and  moral  traits,  as  well  as  physical,  includ- 
ing insane  and  tubercular  diathesis,  are  inheritable  in  about  the 
same  ratio,^  and  that  heredity  is  vastly  more  important  than 
environment.^  The  writer  goes  so  far,  even,  as  to  hold  that 
medical  progress,  by  suspending  the  operation  of  natural  selection 
by  prolonging  the  lives  of  those  who  otherwise  would  have  been 
"  selected,"  has  weakened  the  average  quality  of  the  race-stock, ^ 
and  that  this  tendency  can  be  counteracted  only  by  national 
eugenics. 

Mr.  Galton  wrote  his  Hereditary  Genius  from  the  point  of  view 
of  Darwin's  theories  of  natural  selection,  pangenesis  and  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  but  later  accepted  the  teach- 
ings of  Weismann.  Pearson,  in  his  Grammar  of  Science,  makes 
room  for  other  factors  in  race-stock  improvement  besides  natural 
selection,^  but  in  his  more  recent  writings  he,  too,  has  become  a 

*  Memoirs,  nos.  x  and  xiii. 

2  For  sane  criticism  see  Charity  Organization  Review,  September,  1910. 

'  Lecture  Series,  no.  ii,  p.  20.  How  a  moral  trait  can  be  inherited  is  not  made 
clear.  There  is  a  strong  tendency  in  modern  psychology  and  ethics  to  repudiate 
the  old  teaching  concerning  a  *'  moral  sense."  Biology  has  not  yet  revealed  the 
possibility  of  inheriting  anything  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  terms  of  the  physical 
(including  the  nervous  system).  If  there  be  innate  moral  traits  they  must  be  a 
function  of  the  nervous  system.  The  nearest  approach  that  modern  psychology 
can  make  is  in  its  assumption  of  a  gregarious  or  social  instinct,  and  possibly  of  an 
instinct  that  leads  one  to  do  as  others  do.  Recent  studies  of  juvenile  delinquency 
have  failed  to  find  any  specific  inheritance  of  criminal  tendencies,  and  criminal 
psychologists  are  now  questioning  the  existence  of  the  class  of  so-called  "  moral 
delinquents."     Cf.  Healey,  The  Individual  Delinquent. 

^  "  We  find  that  the  effect  of  nurture  is  on  the  average  hardly  one-fifth  to  one- 
tenth  that  of  heredity."  —  Lecture  Series,  no.  vii,  p.  7.  Yet  in  no  case  has  the 
factor  of  heredity  been  kept  entirely  separate  from  early  home  training  except  in 
Galton's  study  of  twins.     Cf.  Ward's  Applied  Sociology. 

^  Lecture  Series,  no.  ix,  p.  19. 

^  Grammar  of  Science,  p.  378.     Cf.  concluding  chapter  of  this  volume. 


96  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Weismannian  and  with  him  emphasizes  the  good  of  the  species 
rather  than  that  of  the  individual.  In  the  former  work,  also,  he 
traces  the  operation  of  the  law  of  evolution  and  selection  through 
the  three  stages  which  he  names  individualism,  socialism  and 
humanism,  but  in  National  Life  from  the  Standpoint  of  Science  and 
in  his  published  lectures  the  emphasis  is  almost  entirely  on  the 
national  group  in  its  competition  with  other  groups. 

The  contributions  of  Galton  and  Pearson  to  our  subject  may  be 
summarized  as  follows:  — 

1.  Passive  Physical  Adaptation.  They  have  endeavored  to 
prove  by  the  biometric  method  that  social  progress  is  largely  by 
natural  selection:  e.  g.,  that  from  60  to  70  per  cent  of  deaths  are 
"  selective  ";  ^  that  12  per  cent  of  one  generation,  and  from  those 
of  inferior  ability,  produce  50  per  cent  of  the  next  generation;  ^ 
that  there  is  correlation  between  physical  stature  and  race  vigor ' 
and  that  urbanization  leads  to  degeneration;  ^  that  "  nature  " 
is  stronger  than  "  nurture  '';  ^  that  alcoholism  is  not  so  much  the 
cause  as  the  symptom  of  degeneration;  ®  that  intermarriage  with 
inferior  races  is  fatal  to  the  higher  race;  ^  that  health  and  vigor  are 
the  best  selective  quaHties  known  at  present  and  that  the  best 
qualities  are  to  a  large  extent  correlated;  ^  but  most  important  of 
all  is  the  emphasis  laid  by  Pearson  on  the  importance  of  inter- 
group  struggle  and  on  the  teaching  that  co-operation  within 
the  group  is  essential  to  make  it  strong  in  competition  with 
other  groups.^ 

2.  Active  Material  Adaptation.  The  chief  contribution  in  this 
department  comes  from  Pearson's  Grammar  of  Science  where  he 
points  out  the  utility  of  scientific  training  not  only  to  increase  the 

^  Lecture  Series,  no.  ii,  p.  22.  ^  /j/j.^  p.  28. 

^  Inquiries  into  Human  Faculties,  p.  22. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  24.  Weakened,  however,  by  the  following:  "  Sickly  looking  and 
puny  residents  in  towns  may  have  a  more  suitable  constitution  for  the  special 
conditions  of  their  lives,  and  may  in  some  sense  be  better  knit  and  do  more  work 
and  live  longer  than  much  haler  men  imported  to  the  same  locality  from  elsewhere." 

^  Cf.  Galton's  studies  of  twins,  Inquiries  into  Human  Faculties,  p.  235. 

^  Memoirs,  nos.  x  and  xiii. 

^  National  Life,  pp.  14  f. 

*  Sociological  Papers,  ii,  p.  50. 

*  National  Life,  pp.  44  f. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  97 

comforts  of  life  but  in  the  interest  of  efficient  citizenship/  and 
from  his  National  Life,  where  he  shows  the  importance  of  educa- 
tion for  adaptability  and  group  success.^ 

3.  Passive  Spiritual  Adaptation.  Gal  ton  points  out  the  in- 
fluence that  customs  and  rehgion  have  had  on  marriage  institu- 
tions and  believes  that  after  a  time  eugenics  may  so  influence 
public  opinion  that  uneugenic  marriages  will  be  tabooed  and  that 
this  new  science  may  yet  receive  the  sanction  of  religion.^  If  this 
stage  should  be  reached  we  would  have  an  example  of  the  opera- 
tion of  passive  spiritual  adaptation.  Pearson  emphasizes  the 
value  of  scientific  training  to  insure  social  stabiHty.^ 

4.  A  dive  Spiritual  A  daptation.  Eugenics  as  defined  by  Gal  ton 
belongs  properly  to  this  department  of  our  subject,  so  that  the 
contributions  of  these  two  on  the  constructive  side  belong  here. 
The  contrast  between  eugenics  and  evolution  is  well  iUustrated  by 
these  words  from  the  founder  of  the  new  science:  — 

Eugenics  strengthens  the  sense  of  social  duty  in  so  many  important  partic- 
ulars that  the  conclusions  derived  from  its  study  ought  to  find  a  welcome 
home  in  every  tolerant  religion.  It  promotes  a  far-sighted  philanthropy, 
the  acceptance  of  parentage  as  a  serious  responsibility,  and  a  higher  concep- 
tion of  patriotism.  The  creed  of  eugenics  is  founded  upon  the  idea  of  evo- 
lution; not  on  a  passive  form  of  it,  but  on  one  that  can,  to  some  extent,  direct 
its  own  course.  Purely  passive,  or  what  may  be  styled  mechanical  evolution 
displays  the  awe-inspiring  spectacle  of  a  vast  eddy  of  organic  turmoil,  origi- 
nating we  know  not  how,  and  traveling  we  know  not  whither.  ...  Its 
constituents  are  always  changing,  though  its  shape  as  a  whole  hardly  varies. 
Evolution  is  in  any  case  a  grand  phantasmagoria,  but  it  assumes  an  infinitely 
more  interesting  aspect  under  the  knowledge  that  the  intelligent  action  of 
the  human  will  is,  in  some  small  measure,  capable  of  guiding  its  course.  Man 
has  the  power  of  doing  this  largely  so  far  as  the  evolution  of  humanity  is  con- 
cerned; he  has  already  affected  the  quahty  and  distribution  of  organic  life  so 
widely  that  the  changes  on  the  surface  of  the  earth,  merely  through  his  dis- 
forestings  and  agriculture,  would  be  recognizable  from  a  distance  as  great  as 
that  of  the  moon.  .  .  . 

Eugenic  belief  extends  the  function  of  philanthropy  to  future  generations, 
it  renders  its  action  more  pervading  than  hitherto,  by  deahng  with  famiUes 
and  societies  in  their  entirety,  and  it  enforces  the  importance  of  the  marriage 
covenant  by  directing  serious  attention  to  the  probable  quality  of  the  future 
offspring.  It  sternly  forbids  all  forms  of  sentimental  charity  that  are  harm- 
ful to  the  race,  while  it  eagerly  seeks  opportunity  for  acts  of  personal  kind- 

1  pp.  7  f.  '  Sociological  Papers,  i,  p.  12. 

2  p.  32.  *  Grammar  of  Science,  p.  9. 


98  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

ness,  as  some  equivalent  to  the  loss  of  what  it  forbids.  It  brings  the  tie  of 
kinship  into  prominence  and  strongly  encourages  love  and  interest  in  family 
and  race.  In  brief,  eugenics  is  a  virile  creed,  full  of  hopefulness  and  appeaUng 
to  many  of  the  noblest  feelings  of  our  nature.  ^ 

Both  Gal  ton  and  Pearson  are  to  be  commended  for  their  pains- 
taking labors  in  one  important  department  of  human  progress. 
The  biometric  method  as  developed  by  Pearson  and  employed  by 
his  co-laborers  is  certain  to  prove  a  valuable  instrument  in  social 
science  although  owing  to  the  unreliable  character  of  much  of  the 
data  gathered  up  to  the  present  the  conclusions  are  far  from 
satisfactory.  The  friction  between  the  workers  at  the  Galton 
Laboratory  and  the  American  workers  at  Cold  Spring  Harbor 
under  Dr.  Davenport  is  perhaps  unfortunate,  yet  the  rivalry  and 
competitive  criticism  which  is  essentially  a  struggle  for  existence 
between  statistics  as  applied  to  the  study  of  hereditary  qualities 
and  a  study  of  family  records  on  the  basis  of  the  Mendelian  theory 
of  unit  characters,  will  doubtless  result  in  hastening  a  knowledge 
of  the  truth.  The  Memoirs  issued  from  the  Eugenics  Laboratory 
are  cautious  and  modest  in  their  statements  and  conclusions,  not 
pretending  to  discover  causes  but  only  correlations.  In  the 
Lecture  Series,  however,  too  often  the  suggestions  of  the  Memoirs 
are  given  out  as  ascertained  facts,  and  the  animus  shown  in  some 
of  the  criticisms  of  the  Mendelian  workers  by  those  of  the  Galton 
Laboratory  suggests  a  consciousness  of  weakness  in  the  biometric 
methods  as  there  used.^ 

The  conclusions  of  both  Galton  and  Pearson  concerning  race- 
stoCk  degeneration  do  not  seem  to  be  borne  out  by  the  Courtis 
tests  in  arithmetic  applied  to  more  than  40,000  children  in 
widely  separated  schools  in  several  states  of  our  country  and 
three  schools  of  London.  These  tests  do  not  indicate  that  there 
is  very  much  difference  in  natural  ability  between  the  children  of 
the  various  social  classes,  although  they  do  show  great  differences 
in  natural  ability  between  individual  pupils  in  all  classes.^  Neither 
are  they  corroborated  by  use  of  the  Binet  tests  on  certain  orphans 

*  Sociological  Papers,  ii,  pp.  52,  53. 

*  See  Eugenics  Record  Office,  Bulletin  no.  11,  February,  1914. 

'  Report  Investigation,  New  York  Schools,  1912,  pp.  62,  66,  74;  especially  tests 
on  twins,  pp.  71,  72. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  99 

received  from  the  lowest  economic  classes,  for  the  results  seemed 
to  indicate  average  intelligence.^  So  while  the  work  of  the  Gal  ton 
Laboratory  is  to  be  commended  in  a  general  way,  the  results  as 
yet  are  by  no  means  conclusive  and  the  question  of  the  relative 
importance  of  "  nature  '^  and  "  nurture  "  is  still  open. 

Vacher  de  Lapouge  (1854-        ) 
Societal  Selections 

Professor  Lapouge,  in  his  Selectiones  Sociales,  takes  very  much 
the  same  position  as  Galton  and  Pearson  concerning  the  applica- 
tion of  biological  formulae  to  social  progress  and  the  necessity 
of  a  thorough-going  system  of  eugenics  to  offset  the  present 
tendency  toward  race  degeneration.  He  pushes  his  theoretical 
conclusions  farther  than  they  but  has  not  done  so  much  in  the  line 
of  original  investigation.  He  makes  more  concessions  than  does 
Pearson  in  his  most  recent  writings  to  those  who  hold  that  many 
influences  may  affect  the  germ  plasm,^  but  like  both  Galton  and 
Pearson  holds  that  social  progress  is  by  selective  rather  than  by 
collective  evolution;  ^  i.  e.,  by  selection  within  the  group  rather 
than  by  any  process  of  group  transformation,  and  Hke  them,  too, 
he  emphasizes  race  far  more  than  environment,'^  holding  that  the 
reason  for  the  short  and  brilliant  career  of  Portugal  was  due  to 
the  loss  of  her  best  blood  and  crossing  with  negro  slaves,^  and  says 
that "  if  the  Greeks  of  the  golden  age  could  suddenly  return  to  life, 
in  less  than  a  century  the  center  of  civilization  would  have 
returned  to  the  Acropolis."  ^ 

With  Lapouge  a  nation  or  race  is  not  a  permanent  type  but  in 
constant  flux  so  that  it  is  not  able  to  accomplish  at  one  time  what 
it  had  been  able  to  accomplish  at  a  previous  period,^  and  indeed 
differs  so  greatly  in  two  epochs  as  to  be  equivalent  to  two  distinct 
races.^  He  points  out  the  fatality  which  results  to  a  superior 
race  that  mixes  with  an  inferior  one  that  greatly  exceeds  it  in 
numbers  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spaniards  in  South  America. 

^  Survey,  November  11,  191 1,  p.  11 88.     Cf.  Report  Massachusetts  Commission 
on  Increase  of  Crim£,  Insanity,  etc.,  19 10;  and  especially  Ward,  Applied  Sociology. 
2  Selectiones  Sociales,  p.  49.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  83  f.      *  Ihid.,  pp.  60  ff. 

^  Ihid.,  p.  77.  8  Ihid.,  p.  69.  '  Ihid.,  p.  62.  »  ijjid.^  p.  66. 


lOO  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  discussing  the  stages  of  growth  and  decay  in  a  civilization, 
which  he  likens  to  a  biological  organism/  he  says:  — 

The  birth  of  a  historic  people  requires  the  presence  in  a  social  environment 
of  superior  ethnic  elements  capable  of  directing  and  drawing  along  (en- 
trainer)  the  masses.  These  elements  ...  are  regularly  provided  by  a 
conquering  people  but  they  can  come  by  pacific  immigration  and  even, 
theoretically,  by  internal  selection.  .  .  .  The  period  of  development  is  that 
where  superior  elements  multiply,  take  the  direction  of  affairs  and  put  on 
them  the  stamp  of  their  personal  genius.  .  .  .  The  golden  age  is  the  cul- 
mination of  eugenics.  .  .  .  The  period  of  decadence  follows  the  weakening 
of  the  superior  elements  and  condemns  itself  by  the  division  of  power  with 
inferior  elements.  The  end  comes  with  the  complete  exhaustion  of  eugenic 
capital,  but  a  nation  may  still  survive  in  this  state  so  long  as  a  shock  from 
outside  does  not  overthrow  the  decayed  structure  (edifice  vermoulu).^ 

Lapouge  believes  that  civilization  leads  inevitably  to  cerebral 
regression  just  as  in  the  case  with  animals  under  domestication,^ 
and  that  education  can  affect  only  the  individual,  so  is  limited  in 
influence  and  nil  in  race-stock  improvement.^ 

He  follows  Darwin  and  Broca  in  recognizing  the  change  in  the 
evolutionary  process  with  the  development  of  man's  intelligence 
and  holds  with  reason  that  "  in  man,  social  selection  overrides 
natural  selection."  ^  Among  the  institutions  which  make  for 
social  selection,  he  discusses  at  length  the  military,  political, 
religious,  moral,  legal  and  economic.  Under  the  last  he  mentions 
age  of  marriage,  occupational  mortality,  migration  and  urbaniza- 
tion.^ 

His  conclusion  is  pessimistic  in  the  extreme:  "  The  future  is  not 
to  the  best,  at  most  to  the  mediocre.  To  the  degree  that  civiliza- 
tion develops,  the  advantages  of  natural  selection  change  to  a 
bitter  scourge  upon  humanity.  All  apparent  progress  is  at  the 
expense  of  capital  drawn  from  the  force  and  energy,  from  the  will 
and  intelligence,  and  this  capital  becomes  dissipated.^  He  holds 
that  the  testimony  of  paleontology  is  to  the  effect  that  the  most 
perfect  forms  are  the  least  stable;  that  the  lower  forms  are  better 
adapted  to  their  environment  as  in  the  case  of  parasites,  mi- 

1  Silectiones  Sociales,  p.  49.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  187  f. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  77  f.  «  Ibid.,  pp.  207-387. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  118.  '  Ibid.,  p.  406. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  100  f. 


NEO-DARWINIAN  SOCIOLOGISTS  lOI 

crobes,  and  insects  which  have  destroyed  the  largest  and  best 
armed  species.^  He  sees  no  evidence  of  purpose  or  plan  in  the 
evolutionary  process,  nor  any  guarantee  for  the  future  of  hu- 
manity.    Utopias,  he  holds,  are  mere  phantasies  of  the  brain. 

Lapouge  sees  one  glimmering  ray  of  hope,  —  systematic  selec- 
tion, or  what  Galton  and  Pearson  are  pleased  to  call  national 
eugenics.  He  sets  forth  facetiously  the  possibilities  of  zootech- 
nic  and  scientific  reproduction  ^  concluding  that  the  triumph  of 
statecraft  would  be  in  the  breeding  of  a  society  of  optimists  who 
would  always  be  content  with  everything.  In  this  we  are  re- 
minded of  the  ultimate  stoical  super-man  of  Nietzsche  evolved  by 
natural,  however,  rather  than  by  artificial  selection. 

Lapouge's  eugenic  program  is  as  follows:  — 

(i)  To  establish  a  natural  aristocracy  in  some  selected  social 
group;  (2)  to  establish  special,  distinct  castes;  (3)  to  transform 
the  group  as  a  whole  to  a  fixed  point;  (4)  to  create  a  race  that 
shall  dominate  everywhere;  (5)  to  recast  humanity  completely 
by  the  aid  of  perfect  local  types;  (6)  to  substitute  for  humanity 
as  it  now  is  a  single  perfect  race;  etc.^ 

This  program  is  to  be  carried  out  in  a  two-fold  way:  by  the 
elimination  of  unserviceable  elements  and  second,  by  the  breed- 
ing of  superior  elements.  He  realizes  the  difficulties  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  plan  but  looks  first  to  the  enlightenment 
of  the  people  and  the  formation  of  public  opinion,  and  then 
expects  that  some  sort  of  socialistic  regime  will  be  necessary  for 
its  consummation. 

In  view  of  the  dispute  among  biologists  as  to  the  place  natural 
selection  plays  in  biological  evolution,  all  social  philosophies 
based  on  this  theory  by  deduction  have  an  uncertain  foundation 
but  this  foundation  becomes  still  more  unreliable  when  we  consider 
that  in  social  evolution  intelligence  adds  a  new  and  disturbing 

*  SilecHones  Sociales,  p.  457.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  472  f. 

'  (i)  De  constituer  une  aristocratic  naturelle  chez  un  people  determine;  (2)  de 
constituer  des  castes  sp^cialisees  et  separees;  (3)  de  transformer  integralement  im 
peuple  a  un  degre  determine;  (4)  de  creer  une  race  dominante  ubiquiste;  (5)  de 
refondre  entierement  I'humanite  a  I'aide  des  types  locaux  les  parfaits;  (6)  de  sub- 
stituer  a  Thumanite  actuelle  une  race  unique  et  parfaite;  etc,"  p.  484. 


I02  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

factor.  The  only  safe  method,  then,  is  to  secure  a  sure  basis,  if 
possible,  by  an  inductive  study  of  the  process  itself  and  only 
after  we  have  done  this  are  we  in  a  position  to  criticize  fairly  the 
school  of  writers  whom  we  have  just  reviewed. 

Before  passing  to  this  inductive  study,  however,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  consider  another  group  of  writers  who  have  laid  stress  on 
the  environment  as  the  most  important  conditioning  factor,  and 
of  these  we  shall  consider  briefly  the  contributions  of  four  repre- 
sentative writers:  Karl  Marx  making  his  approach  through 
economics  and  philosophy.  Buckle,  through  economics  and  sta- 
tistics, and  RatzeP  and  Ripley  through  an  inductive  study  of  the 
influence  of  the  physical  environment  on  individuals  and  social 
groups. 

1  As  interpreted  by  Miss  Semple. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS 

Karl  Marx  (1818-1883) 

Economic  Determinism 

Karl  Marx,  the  founder  of  scientific  socialism,  finds  place  in  our 
discussion,  not  so  much  because  of  his  contribution  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social  progress  as 
because  of  his  emphasis  on  certain  features  and  factors  of  progress 
which  properly  interpreted  are  fundamental  and  have  been  given 
saner  interpretation  since. 

Marx  started  as  a  disciple  of  Hegel  and  never  entirely  freed 
himself  from  Hegelian  a  priorism  and  dialectic.  He  became  a 
Hegelian  of  the  Left,  however,  which  at  the  time  was  dominated 
by  Feuerbach  whose  materialistic  philosophy  is  well  summed  up 
in  the  aphoristic  and  much-quoted  expression  "  der  Mensch  ist 
was  er  isst."  Like  Comte,  his  French  contemporary,  Feuerbach 
united  a  scientific  view  of  life  with  a  passion  for  humanity.  The 
result  among  the  young  Hegelians  was  Hiunanism  linked  with 
Communism.  This  provided  a  fertile  soil  for  the  production  of 
scientific  socialism  with  its  philosophy  of  "  economic  determin- 
ism." 1 

The  transformed  Hegelianism  of  Marx  led  him  to  fiind  the  cause 
of  all  historical  movements  in  material  conditions. ^  His  interest 
in  the  proletariat  class  with  their  bad  conditions  of  life  and  labor ,^ 
led  him  to  a  study  of  the  industrial  revolution  and  its  connection 
with  feudalism.  Out  of  this  study  came  his  teaching  that  class 
struggle  is  the  very  essence  of  history  and  that  methods  of  pro- 
duction and  exchange  are  the  fundamental  causes  of  these  strug- 
gles and  of  the  social  institutions  and  ideals  growing  out  of  them. 

1  John  Rae,  Contemporary  Socialism,  pp.  129  f.;  Kiiknp,  History  of  Socialism, 
ch.  VII. 

2  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party  (1898). 

3  Capital  J  pp.  392  f.,  502  f. 

X03 


I04  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Moreover  he  was  familiar  with  the  teachings  of  the  classical 
economists  "  that  labor  is  the  source  of  value,  but  that  of  this 
value  the  laborer  obtains  for  himself  merely  a  subsistence  wage/ 
the  surplus  being  appropriated  by  the  exploiting  capitalist."  ^ 
Such  theories  gave  him  the  background  for  his  fundamental  doc- 
trine that  this  theft  of  the  surplus- value  of  labor  is  the  fountain- 
head  of  all  social  inequahty  and  of  the  modern  industrial  system 
with  its  exploitation  of  the  laboring  class.  With  these  premises 
his  conclusion  was  inevitable:  The  supreme  need  that  the  workers 
of  each  nation  and  ultimately  of  all  nations  should  unite  in  a  class- 
conscious  revolution  against  their  exploiters  and  secure  the 
socialization  of  all  wealth,  all  of  which  was  the  product  of  social 
labor.3 

Of  special  interest  for  our  purpose  is  Marx's  philosophy  of  his- 
tory which  has  come  to  be  known  as  "  economic  determinism." 
This  principle,  set  forth  in  the  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party 
in  1848,  drawn  up  jointly  by  Marx  and  Engels  is  stated  by  the 
latter  in  the  introduction  to  the  second  edition  to  mean 

That  in  every  historical  epoch,  the  prevailing  mode  of  economic  produc- 
tion and  exchange,  and  the  social  organization  necessarily  following  from  it, 
form  the  basis  upon  which  is  built  up,  and  from  which  alone  can  be  explained, 
the  poHtical  and  intellectual  history  of  that  epoch;  that  consequently  the 
whole  history  of  mankind  (since  the  dissolution  of  primitive  tribal  society, 
holding  land  in  common  ownership)  has  been  a  history  of  class  struggles, 
contests  between  exploiting  and  exploited,  ruHng  and  oppressed  classes. 

Though  in  this  quotation  all  the  emphasis  is  on  methods  of 
production  and  exchange,  the  social  forces  were  not  always  so 
narrowly  limited  by  Marx  and  Engels,^  nor  are  they  so  limited  by 
leading  exponents  of  this  philosophy  today,  but  include  all  human 
endeavor  to  satisfy  the  fundamental  needs  of  life.  In  other 
words,  as  W.  J.  Ghent  phrases  it: 

The  economic  interpretation  of  history  is  the  doctrine  that  the  relations  of 
men  to  one  another  in  the  matter  of  making  a  Uving  are  the  main  under- 
lying causes  of  men's  habits  of  thought  and  feeling,  their  notions  of  right, 

1  Capital,  pp.  119,  150  f.,  ch.  XVII. 

2  Kirkup,  op.  ciL,  p.  154;  cf.  Capital,  p.  517. 

'  Manifesto  (1898)  p.  33,  Capital,  pp.  621,  788  f. 

*  Cf.  Walling,  The  Larger  Aspects  of  Socialism,  p.  379. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS         I05 

propriety,  and  legality,  their  institutions  of  society  and  government,  their 
wars  and  revolutions.^ 

Of  the  fundamental  economic  teachings  of  Marx,  not  one  is 
accepted  today  by  economists  of  recognized  authority.^  His  pro- 
phecy concerning  the  disappearance  of  the  middle  class  has  failed 
of  fulfilment.  His  emphasis  on  the  conflict  between  the  capitalis- 
tic and  proletariat  classes  as  the  very  essence  of  social  and  indus- 
trial evolution  is  now  recognized  as  being  too  easy  a  solution  of 
the  problem  of  conflict  of  interests  between  classes  and  between 
groups,  but  his  teaching  that  social  progress  and  social  institutions 
are  determined  largely  by  economic  conditions,  has  received 
increasing  acceptance  with  the  passing  years.^ 

Henry  Thomas  Buckle  (18  20-1 86  2) 
Intellect  and  Environment 

Frail  of  body  from  earliest  years  with  almost  no  schooling  and 
without  the  home  training  which  was  the  making  of  Spencer, 
Henry  Thomas  Buckle,  self-educated,  if  that  term  is  ever  appro- 
priate to  use,  at  his  death  at  the  age  of  forty-one  years,  left  a 
work  which  has  placed  his  name  high  among  those  who  have 
contributed  to  the  science  of  social  progress. 

Although  his  role  was  that  of  a  philosopher  of  history  and  his 
aim  "  to  bring  up  this  great  department  of  inquiry  [history]  to  a 
level  with  other  departments  "  by  placing  it  on  the  sure  founda- 
tion of  science,  his  History  of  Civilization  in  England  contains 
much  that  bears  directly  on  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of 
adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social  progress. 

Although  well  equipped  for  his  task  as  to  information  gleaned 
from  the  study  of  many  thousand  books,  as  well  as  by  extensive 
travel,  in  logic  he  was  exceedingly  weak.  Here,  as  nowhere  else, 
was  manifested  the  lack  of  training  which  such  a  person  would 
have  received  by  means  of  a  university  education. 

Mr.  Buckle's  approach  to  his  problem  was  through  statistics 
and  economics,  so  his  point  of  view,  his  illustrations  and  con- 

1  W.  J.  Ghent,  Mass  and  Class,  ch,  I.  2  qi  Kirkup,  op.  ciL,  pp.  154  f. 

'  Cf.  discussion  of  Active  Material  Adaptation,  infra,  Part  IV. 


I06  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

elusions,  differ  greatly  from  those  of  Spencer,  being  more  like 
those  of  Comte,  but  most  of  all  like  those  of  Quetelet  whom  he 
follows  closely  in  many  places. 

Comte  made  use  of  history  to  illustrate  his  law  of  the  three 
stages  as  the  foundation  of  his  Philosophy  and  Polity,  Buckle 
made  use  of  history  to  prove  that  a  science  of  history  was  possible 
and  especially  to  establish  his  theory  that  social  progress  was  due. 
entirely  to  increase  of  knowledge. 

He  shows  first,  by  appeal  to  statistics,  that  there  is  regularity 
in  the  recurrence  of  such  social  phenomena  as  deaths,  marriages, 
etc.,  demonstrating  thus  that  there  are  underl3dng  causes  with 
laws  of  manifestation.  From  this  he  concludes  that  free  will,  as 
usually  interpreted,  is  an  illusion.^  In  this  he  goes  further  than 
Quetelet  who  grants  arbitrary  freedom  within  certain  limits,  a 
theory  illustrated  by  M.  Block  as  follows:  "  L'homme  est  libre 
mais  rhumanite  suit  sa  propre  voie;  de  sorte  que  Tindividu  se 
trouve  comme  le  voyageur  sur  le  bateau  a  vapeur;  il  pent  se 
promener  librement  sur  le  pont  a  la  condition  de  ne  pas  gener  les 
manoeuvres  des  marins."  ^ 

He  turns  next  to  a  study  of  the  causes  of  the  rise  and  progress 
of  civilization,  making  use  of  the  statistical  method  in  a  rough, 
loose  way,  and  finds  that  there  are  two  fundamental  factors,  the 
external  or  nature,  and  the  internal,  or  mind.  The  elements  of 
the  former  are  climate,  food,  soil  and  the  general  aspects  of 
nature;  those  of  the  latter,  the  intellect  and  moral  nature.  The 
physical  organism  is  practically  ignored,  and  with  it  the  influence 
of  heredity,  stressed  so  greatly  by  some  later  writers.  Nor  was 
this  due  to  ignorance  of  the  biological  conclusions  of  his  day 
including  the  Origin  of  Species,  Numerous  citations  in  footnotes 
show  he  was  acquainted  with  the  leading  biological  writings  of 
his  time.  He  was  intimate  with  Spencer  and  in  a  letter  refers  to 
Darwin's  Origin  of  Species.  After  hearing  the  evidence  pro 
and  con  he  decides  that  "  the  original  distinctions  of  race  are 
altogether  hypothetical."  "  We  have  no  decisive  ground,"  he 
holds,  "  for  saying  that  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  in  man 
are  likely  to  be  greater  in  an  infant  born  in  the  most  civilized  part 

'  History  of  Civilization,  pp.  17  f.  *  Traits  de  Statistique,  p.  143. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS         I07 

of  Europe  than  in  the  wildest  region  of  a  barbarous  country."  ^ 
He  discredits  all  theories  of  hereditary  transmission  of  virtues  and 
vices,  even  madness,  but  fails  to  discriminate  between  acquired 
and  inborn  variations.^  "  Here  then,''  he  says,  "  is  the  gist 
of  the  whole  matter.  The  progress  is  one,  not  of  internal  power, 
but  of  external  advantage."  ^ 

This  does  not  mean  that  Buckle  was  not  a  believer  in  the 
general  theory  of  evolution  but  biological  evolution  with  him 
stopped  with  the  physical  basis  of  primitive  man  and  all  further 
development  was  the  result  of  environment  and  education. 

With  Buckle  there  are  two  separate  realms,  nature,  with  its 
laws  of  development,  and  the  mind,  with  its  laws.  These  two 
realms  somehow  interact  but  he  makes  no  attempt  to  get  at  the 
real  nexus.  "  On  the  one  hand  we  have  the  human  mind  obeying 
the  laws  of  its  own  existence,  and,  when  uncontrolled  by  external 
agents,  developing  itself  according  to  the  conditions  of  its  organ- 
ization. On  the  other  hand,  we  have  what  is  called  nature, 
obeying  likewise  its  laws;  but  incessantly  coming  into  contact 
with  the  minds  of  men,  exciting  their  passions,  stimulating  their 
intellect,  and  therefore  giving  to  their  actions  a  direction  which 
they  would  not  have  taken  without  such  disturbance."*  "When 
we  consider  the  incessant  contact  between  man  and  the  external 
world,"  he  says,  "  it  is  certain  that  there  must  be  an  intimate 
connection  between  human  actions  and  physical  laws,"  —  and  he 
looks  forward  to  a  time  when  physical  science  shall  show  the 
connection.^ 

His  chief  contribution  to  our  subject  is  in  his  contrast  between 
those  sections  of  the  earth  where  man  is  dominated  by  his  environ- 
ment and  where  civilization  is  thus  a  product  of  the  interplay  of 
forces  unguided  by  intelligence,  as  in  Eg3^t  and  India,  thus 
illustrating  passive  adaptation,  and  those  sections  of  the  earth 
where  the  environment  has  stimulated  the  development  of  the  in- 
tellect until  man  controls  nature  in  the  interest  of  his  highest  well- 
being  as  in  western  Europe,  thus  illustrating  active  adaptation. 

1  In  this  he  deserves  great  credit  as  being  the  forerunner  of  Ward,  Kidd,  Boas, 
Angell,  and  a  host  of  other  modem  sociologists.  ^  Op.  cit.,  p.  161. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  162.  *  Op.  cit.,  p.  19.  *  Op.  cit.,  p.  32. 


Io8  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

He  summarizes  his  conclusions  in  the  first  part  of  Chapter  III 
and  brings  out  so  clearly  the  contrast  between  passive  and  active 
adaptation  that  portions  may  well  be  given. 

Looking  at  the  history  of  the  world  as  a  whole,  the  tendency  has  been,  in 
Europe,  to  subordinate  nature  to  man;  out  of  Europe,  to  subordinate  man 
to  nature.  ...  It  suggests  the  important  consideration,  that  if  we  would 
imderstand,  for  instance,  the  history  of  India,  we  must  make  the  external 
world  our  first  study,  because  it  has  influenced  man  more  than  man  has 
influenced  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  would  understand  the  history  of  a 
country  like  France  or  England  we  must  make  man  our  principal  study, 
because  nature  being  comparatively  weak,  every  step  in  the  great  progress 
has  increased  the  dominion  of  the  human  mind  over  the  agencies  of  the  ex- 
ternal world.  Even  in  those  countries  where  the  power  of  man  has  reached 
the  highest  point,  the  pressure  of  nature  is  still  immense,  but  it  diminishes 
in  each  succeeding  generation,  because  our  increasing  knowledge  enables  us 
not  so  much  to  control  nature,  as  to  foretell  her  movements,  and  thus  obviate 
many  of  the  evils  she  would  otherwise  occasion.  ...  All  around  us  are  the 
traces  of  this  glorious  and  successful  struggle.  Indeed  it  seems  as  if  in 
Europe  there  was  nothing  man  feared  to  attempt.  The  invasions  of  the  sea 
repelled,  and  whole  provinces,  as  in  the  case  of  Holland,  rescued  from  its 
grasp;  mountains  cut  through  and  turned  into  level  roads;  soils  of  the  most 
obstinate  sterihty  becoming  exuberant,  from  the  mere  advance  of  chemical 
knowledge;  while,  in  regard  to  electric  phenomena,  we  see  the  subtlest,  the 
most  rapid,  and  the  most  mysterious  of  all  forces,  made  the  medium  of 
thought  and  obeying  even  the  most  capricious  behests  of  the  human  mind. 
.  .  .  Formerly  the  richest  countries  were  those  in  which  nature  was  most 
boimtiful;  now  the  richest  countries  are  those  in  which  man  is  most  active. 
.  .  .  From  these  facts  it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that  the  advance  of  Euro- 
pean civilization  is  characterized  by  a  diminishing  influence  of  physical  laws^ 
and  an  increasing  influence  of  mental  laws.  .  .  .  These  mental  laws,  when 
ascertained,  will  be  the  ultimate  basis  of  the  history  of  Europe;  the  physical 
laws  will  be  treated  as  of  minor  importance,  and  as  merely  giving  rise  to  dis- 
turbances, the  force  and  frequency  of  which  have,  during  several  centuries, 
perceptibly  diminished.^ 

This  conclusion  leads  Buckle  to  discuss  the  current  meta- 
physical method  of  studying  mental  phenomena, — the  intuitional 
method,  as  we  now  say, — and  to  suggest  as  Comte  had  done  that 
mental  phenomena  must  be  studied  in  their  historical  manifesta- 
tions as  furnishing  an  objective,  "  common  to  all."  He  was 
evidently  reaching  after  the  modern  method  of  physiological- 
psychology. 

1  History  of  Civilization,  pp.  138-143. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        109 

In  Chapter  IV  he  uses  the  historical  method  to  discover  which 
of  the  two  mental  factors  is  the  more  important,  the  intellectual 
or  the  moral  nature,  and  concludes  that 

The  leading  countries  have  now,  for  some  centuries,  advanced  sufficiently 
far  to  shake  off  the  influences  of  those  physical  agencies  by  which,  in  an 
earher  state  their  career  might  have  been  troubled;  and  that  although 
the  moral  agencies  are  still  powerful,  and  still  cause  occasional  disturbances, 
these  are  but  aberrations,  which,  if  we  compare  long  periods  of  time, 
balance  each  other,  and  thus  in  the  total  amount  entirely  disappear.  So 
that,  in  a  great  and  comprehensive  view,  the  changes  in  every  civilized 
people  are,  in  their  aggregate,  dependent  solely  on  these  things:  first  on  the 
amount  of  knowledge  possessed  by  their  ablest  men;  secondly,  on  the  direc- 
tion which  that  knowledge  takes,  that  is  to  say,  the  sort  of  subjects  to  which 
it  refers;  thirdly,  and  above  all,  on  the  extent  to  which  the  knowledge  is 
diffused,  and  the  freedom  with  which  it  pervades  all  classes  of  society.^ 

Buckle  is  open  to  criticism  along  several  lines:  (i)  He  talks 
much  about  progress  without  giving  a  definite  standard.^  He 
speaks  of  intellectual  progress,  progress  of  society,  advance  of 
civilization,  increase  of  general  happiness  but  nowhere  sets  forth 
a  social  goal.  The  dominant  note,  however,  is  the  increase  of 
man's  power  over  the  material  environment  which  we  term  active 
material  adaptation. 

(2)  Knowledge  is  always  considered  as  having  dynamic  quality 
much  as  with  Socrates,  but  this  is  not  true  of  mere  knowledge  of 
the  laws  of  nature  which  is  the  conception  dominant  in  his 
thought. 

(3)  He  is  not  clear  in  his  definition  of  the  moral  element.  In 
one  place  it  would  seem  to  be  a  matter  of  will,  —  "  To  be  willing 
to  perform  our  duty  is  the  moral  part;  to  know  how  to  perform  it 
is  the  intellectual  part."  ^  Again  it  would  seem  to  consist  largely 
of  emotional  elements:  "  If  the  advance  of  civilization  and  the 
general  happiness  of  mankind  depend  more  on  their  moidl  feelings 
than  on  their  intellectual  knowledge,  we  must  of  course  measure 
the  progress  of  society  by  those  feelings  ";  ^  but  again,  morality 
appears  to  be  a  matter  of  conforming  to  standards  of  conduct 
varying  from  country  to  country  and  from  year  to  year,^  while 
on  the  same  page  we  find  the  statement  made  that  "  there  is, 

^  History  of  Civilization,  pp.  204,  205.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  158  f. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  159.  *  Ibid.,  p.  159.  ••  Ibid,,  pp.  162-163. 


no  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

unquestionably,  nothing  to  be  found  in  the  world  which  has 
undergone  so  little  change  as  those  great  dogmas  of  which  moral 
systems  are  composed." 

(4)  In  discussing  the  influence  of  religion,  literature  and 
government  on  social  progress,  we  are  reminded  of  both  Comte 
and  Spencer,  for  with  all  three  the  doctrine  of  relativity  is  promi- 
nent, that  is,  religion,  literature  and  government  are  all  merely 
expressions  of  the  life  of  society  and  relative  to  the  degree  of 
civilization  possessed.  Buckle,  with  Spencer,  believed  that  the 
function  of  government  should  be  purely  negative-regulative,  — 
to  use  Spencer's  phrase,  —  and  in  this  differed  from  Comte  with 
his  paternalism.  Buckle  failed  utterly  to  appreciate  the  in- 
spirational value  of  religion,  literature  and  moral  ideals  and 
failed  to  evaluate  correctly  the  more  positive,  constructive  func- 
tions of  government  that  have  proven  so  essential  to  social  well- 
being. 

(5)  His  conception  of  law  and  his  confusion  of  correlation  with 
cause  lead  to  serious  fallacies  in  his  argmnent.  These  errors  are 
due  to  his  infatuation  with  the  statistical  method  without  appre- 
ciating its  limitations.  His  conception  of  law  is  brought  out  in  a 
footnote  where  he  quotes  Dugald  Stewart  with  approval  as. 
follows:  "A  law  of  nature  being  merely  a  generalization  of 
relations,  and  having  no  existence  except  in  the  mind,  is  essen- 
tially intangible;  and,  therefore,  however  small  the  law  may  be, 
it  can  never  admit  of  exceptions,  though  its  operation  may  admit. 
of  innimaerable  exceptions."  ^  The  change  in  marriage  rates 
corresponding  to  the  rise  and  fall  in  the  price  of  corn  illustrates 
Buckle's  conception  of  law. 

In  his  investigation  of  the  effects  of  environment  on  social  con- 
ditions, again,  he  shows  merely  correlations  but  not  proximate 
causes.2  Granted  that  in  Egypt  with  cheap  food  supply  we  have 
the  early  rise  of  tyrants  and  slaves,  if  we  start  with  Buckle's 
assumption  of  natural  equality,  why  do  some  become  aristocrats 
rather  than  others  ?  The  true  solution  would  seem  to  be  either 
in  difference  of  native  ability,  or  priority  in  securing  possession  of 

*  History  of  Civilization,  p.  28. 

2  For  excellent  criticisms  see  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy^  ii,  pp.  200  f. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        III 

the  most  fertile  land  or  both.  That  is,  Buckle  points  out  correla- 
tions rather  than  causes. 

(6)  Finally,  his  analysis  of  the  mind  or  internal  factor  is  faulty. 
It  is  impossible  to  evaluate  separately  the  operations  of  thought, 
feeling  and  will.  The  self  functions  as  one  and  to  separate  the 
working  of  the  intellect  and  the  moral  factor  is  like  txymg  to 
decide  which  comes  first  the  chicken  or  the  egg. 

Since  he  did  not  pretend  to  be  a  scientist,  as  did  Spencer,  we 
should  not  criticize  him  too  harshly  when  he  invades  the  field  of 
science.  He  did  his  task  in  calling  attention,  as  neither  Comte 
nor  Spencer  had  done,  to  the  mighty  influence  of  the  physical 
environment  on  social  progress,  in  pointing  out  that  evolution 
took  a  new  turn  when  it  had  developed  the  human  organism 
including  the  brain  of  man,  and  in  emphasizing  that  distinction 
most  important  in  our  discussion,  between  what  Professor 
Carver  and  others  call  passive  and  active  adaptation. 

The  task  of  setting  forth  the  relation  between  the  physical 
environment  and  social  progress,  so  well  begun  by  Buckle,  has 
been  carried  forward  by  Friedrich  Ratzel,  W.  Z.  Ripley,  and 
others.  The  work  of  the  former  has  been  interpreted  with  some 
modifications  by  his  pupil  and  disciple,  Ellen  Churchill  Semple, 
and  furnishes  an  important  contribution  to  the  doctrine  of  social 
progress  by  passive  adaptation. 

Ratzel-Semple  1 

A  nthropo-Geography 

"Ratzel,"  says  Ellen  Churchill  Semple,  in  her  book,  Influence  of 
Geographic  Environment,  "  performed  the  great  service  of  placing 
anthropo-geography  on  a  secure  scientific  basis.  He  had  his 
forerunners  in  Montesquieu,  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  Buckle, 
Ritter,  Kohl,  Peschel  and  others;  but  he  first  investigated  the 
subject  from  the  modern  scientific  point  of  view,  constructed  his 
system  according  to  the  principles  of  evolution,  and  based  his 
conclusions  on  world-wide  inductions,  for  which  his  predecessors 
did  not  command  the  data/'  ^ 

1  F.  Ratzel  C1844-1904);  Ellen  C.  Semple  (1863-). 

2  Injluence  of  Geographic  Environment,  Preface. 


112  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  the  spirit  of  Ratzel  and  dependent  on  much  of  the  data 
collected  by  him,  Miss  Semple  makes  an  elaborate  analysis  of  the 
potent  influence  of  geographical  factors  on  history.  In  the 
factors  of  environment  we  have,  according  to  this  author,  a  stable 
force  yet  unceasing  in  its  operations  on  "  shifting,  plastic,  pro- 
gressive, retrogressive  man."  ^ 

Geographic  remoteness  from  centers  of  authority,  as  the  thir- 
teen colonies  from  the  mother  country;  geographical  proximity 
to  centers  of  civilization,  as  Greece  to  the  Orient;  natural  barriers 
that  protect  from  migrating  hordes;  natural  highways  and 
waterways  that  serve  as  arteries  for  the  flow  of  commerce  and 
culture  between  nations,  —  all  these,  she  shows,  make  history 
dependent  on  geography.^  Yet  she  grants  that  the  analysis  of 
the  interplay  of  physical  with  social  forces  is  by  no  means  easy. 
"  We  see  the  result,''  she  says,  "  but  find  it  difiicult  to  state  the 
equation  producing  the  result."  ^  Miss  Semple  points  out  how 
the  land  and  sea  sometimes  co-operate,  sometimes  are  opposed 
in  influence,^  and  how,  though  each  country  is  an  independent 
whole  and  its  history  determined  in  large  part  by  local  geographi- 
cal conditions,  it  is  also  influenced  by  those  as  far  remote  as  the 
downfaU  of  Rome  in  relation  to  the  gradual  desiccation  of 
western  Asia  and  the  Volkerwanderung.^ 

Our  author  wisely  discriminates  between  the  direct  and  indirect 
influences  of  the  geographical  environment,  and  shows  how  the 
latter  are  in  many  respects  the  more  potent,  criticizing  Buckle  for 
over-emphasizing  the  importance  of  awe-inspiring  natural 
phenomena  in  their  direct  effect  on  the  human  mind.  "  Moun- 
tain regions,"  she  says,  "  discourage  the  budding  of  genius 
because  they  are  areas  of  isolation,  confinement,  remote  from  the 
great  currents  of  men  and  ideas  that  move  along  the  river  valleys. 
They  are  regions  of  much  labor  and  little  leisure,  of  poverty  today 
and  anxiety  for  the  morrow,  of  toil-cramped  hands  and  toil-dulled 
brains.  In  the  fertile  alluvial  plains  are  wealth,  leisure,  contact 
with  many  minds,  large  urban  centers  where  commodities  and 
ideas  are  exchanged.    The  two  contrasted  environments  produce 

^  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment,  p.  2.  ^  /^>^.^  pp.  3  f. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  14.  *  Ibid.,  p.  16.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        II3 

directly  certain  economic  and  social  results,  which,  in  turn, 
become  the  causes  of  secondary  intellectual  and  artistic  effects."  ^ 

She  shows  how  this  factor  of  geographical  isolation  produces 
social  variations  much  as  it  does  biological  ^  and  how  in  the  case  of 
colonization,  if  the  new  center  of  social  life  affords  abundant 
opportimity  for  production,  the  result  is  the  rejuvenation  of  the 
race.^ 

"  Environment  influences  the  higher,  mental  life  of  a  people," 
says  our  author,  "  chiefly  through  the  medium  of  their  economic 
and  social  life."  She  shows  how  true  this  is  concerning  politics 
and  even  ethical  ideas.  "  Political  parties  tend  to  follow  geo- 
graphical lines  of  cleavage,"  ^  —  but  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
these  lines  of  cleavage  mark  lines  of  divergent  interests,  as  in  our 
own  Civil  War  when  the  mountaineers  of  the  South  sided  with 
the  Union  because  they  had  no  interest  in  slavery. 

Time  is  an  element  to  be  reckoned  with  for  the  influence  of 
geographic  environment  takes  time.  "  A  habitat  leaves  upon 
man  no  ephemeral  impress;  it  affects  him  in  one  way  at  a  low 
stage  of  his  development,  and  differently  at  a  later  or  higher  stage, 
because  the  man  himself  and  his  relation  to  his  environment  have 
been  modified  in  the  earlier  period;  but  traces  of  that  earlier 
adaptation  survive  in  his  maturer  life."  ^  These  modifications 
are  carried  by  a  people  in  their  migrations  and  determine  their 
reactions  to  a  new  environment  as  in  the  case  of  the  Moors  of 
Spain;  —  "  They  bore  the  impress  of  Asia,  Africa  and  Europe, 
and  on  their  expulsion  from  Spain,  carried  back  with  them  to 
Morocco  traces  of  their  peninsula  life."  ^ 

In  tracing  the  influence  of  environment.  Miss  Semple  shows 
how  complex  is  this  factor,  extending  far  beyond  mere  local  con- 
ditions, including,  in  fact,  the  whole  earth. 

The  earth  is  an  inseparable  whole.  Each  country  or  sea  is  physically  and 
historically  intelligible  only  as  a  portion  of  that  whole.  Currents  and  wind- 
systems  of  the  oceans  modify  the  climate  of  the  nearby  continents,  and  direct 
the  first  daring  navigations  of  their  peoples.  .  .  .  Europe  is  a  part  of  the 
Atlantic  coast.  This  is  a  fact  so  significant  that  the  North  Atlantic  has 
become  a  European  sea.     The  United  States  also  is  a  part  of  the  Atlantic 

1  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment,  p.  20.  2  jj)id.^  p.  21. 

'  Ihid.,  p.  22.  *  Ihid.,  p.  23.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  25.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  25. 


114  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

coast :  this  is  the  dominant  fact  of  American  history.  China  forms  a  section 
of  the  Pacific  rim.  This  is  the  fact  back  of  the  geographic  distribution  of 
Chinese  emigration  to  Annam,  Tonkin,  Siam,  Malacca,  the  Philippines,  East 
Indies  .  .  .  Ecuador  and  Peru. 

As  the  earth  is  one,  so  is  humanity.  Its  unity  of  species  points  to  some 
degree  of  communication  through  a  long  prehistoric  past.  Universal  history 
is  not  entitled  to  the  name  unless  it  embraces  all  parts  of  the  earth  and  all 
peoples,  whether  savage  or  civilized.  To  fill  the  gaps  in  the  written  record  it 
must  turn  to  ethnography  and  geography,  which  by  tracing  the  distribution 
and  movements  of  primitive  peoples  can  often  reconstruct  the  most  impor- 
tant features  of  their  history .^ 

There  are  four  fundamental  classes  of  geographic  influences 
according  to  our  author:  (i)  direct  and  indirect  physical,  (2) 
direct  and  indirect  psychical,  (3)  economic  and  social,  and  (4) 
effects  upon  movements  of  peoples.  As  illustrations  of  the  direct 
effects  working  in  conjunction  with  natural  selection  and  espe- 
cially potent  on  primitive  man,  we  have  variations  in  stature, 
pigmentation  and  acclimatization;  and  of  the  indirect  effects, 
such  anatomical  changes  as  result  from  certain  occupations, 
these  in  turn  being  due  to  physical  environment  as  in  the  case  of 
the  thin  legs  and  thick  arms  of  the  Payaguas  Indians  due  to  so 
much  of  their  life  being  spent  in  canoes.^  The  psychical  effects 
are  registered  in  differences  in  temperament  which  differentiate 
peoples  as  well  as  in  differences  in  literature  and  religion,  while 
the  indirect  effects  are  seen  in  peculiarities  of  language  reflecting 
local  conditions  and  occupations.^  Under  the  third  class  we  have 
the  effect  of  physical  environment  on  a  group  through  the  natural 
resources  provided,  the  occupations  encouraged  or  discouraged 
and  the  facilities  for  exchange  offered;  and  under  the  fourth 
class,  "  the  effect  of  natural  barriers  ...  in  obstructing  or  de- 
flecting the  course  of  migrating  people  and  in  giving  direction  to 
national  expansion,  .  .  .  the  tendency  of  river  valleys  and  tree- 
less plains  to  facilitate  such  movements,  the  power  of  rivers,  lakes, 
bays  and  oceans  either  to  block  the  path  or  open  a  highway,  .  .  . 
and  finally  the  influence  of  all  these  natural  features  in  determin- 

*  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment,  p.  30. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  34  f.  If  due  merely  to  occupation  these  characters  would  not  be  in- 
herited. 

'  Ihid.,  p.  41. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        II5 

ing  the  territory  which  a  people  is  likely  to  occupy,  and  the 
boundaries  which  shall  separate  them  from  their  neighbors."  ^ 

"  The  geographical  environment  of  a  people,"  she  continues, 
"  may  be  such  as  to  segregate  them  from  others,  and  thereby  to 
preserve  or  even  intensify  their  natural  characteristics;  or  it  may 
expose  them  to  extraneous  influences,  to  an  infusion  of  new  blood 
and  new  ideas,  till  their  peculiarities  are  toned  down,  their  dis- 
tinctive features  of  dialect  or  national  dress  or  provincial  cus- 
toms eliminated,  and  the  people  as  a  whole  approach  to  the 
composite  type  of  civilized  humanity.  A  land  shut  off  by  moun- 
tains or  sea  from  the  rest  of  the  world  tends  to  develop  a  homo- 
geneous people.  ...  An  easily  accessible  land  is  geographically 
hospitable  to  all  newcomers,  facilitates  the  mingling  of  peoples,  the 
exchange  of  comimodities  and  ideas.  The  amalgamation  of  races 
in  such  regions  depends  upon  the  similarity  or  diversity  of  the 
ethnic  elements  and  the  duration  of  the  common  occupation."  ^ 

The  remainder  of  the  book  is  largely  an  elaboration  of  the  gen- 
eral outline  given  in  the  first  two  chapters  and  indicates  a  breadth 
of  vision,  a  wealth  of  material  gleaned  from  numerous  authorities, 
and  a  general  grasp  of  all  the  factors  that  enter  into  social  life  and 
social  progress,  that  is  highly  satisfactory.  However  potent  a 
factor  struggle  and  selection  may  be,  even  these,  as  Miss  Semple 
has  so  clearly  shown,  are  largely  determined  by  environmental 
influences. 

William  Z.  Ripley  (1867-       ) 

Race  and  Environment 

Professor  Ripley's  Races  in  Europe  forms  a  fitting  conclusion  to 
this  part  of  our  discussion  for  it  represents  a  synthesis  of  the  views 
of  those  emphasizing  the  all-sufficiency  of  selection  to  explain 
race  progress  and  those  stressing  the  potency  of  physical  environ- 
ment. "  Nature,"  he  says,  "  sets  the  life  lines  for  the  savage  in 
climate;  she  determines  his  movements,  stimulates  or  restrains 
his  advance  in  culture  by  providing  or  withholding  the  materials 
necessary  for  such  advance."^    His  investigations  based  on 

1  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment,  p.  44. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  45.  '  Races  in  Europe,  p.  10. 


Il6  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

observations  and  measurements  of  more  than  25,000,000  persons 
carried  on  by  different  authorities,  including  those  by  himself, 
have  as  one  aim  "  to  show  the  relation  which  has  arisen  between 
the  geography  of  a  country  and  the  character  of  its  people  and  its 
institutions,"  but  more  specifically  to  separate  if  possible  the 
factors  of  "  nature  "  and  "  nurture  "  in  the  racial  composition  and 
ethnic  peculiarities  of  the  peoples  of  Europe. 

Race,  with  Professor  Ripley,  is  not  to  be  identified  with  political 
boimdaries,  language  or  culture,^  but  is  to  be  determined  by 
characters  that  are  inheritable,  such  as  shape  of  the  head,  face 
form,  pigmentation,  stature  and  shape  of  the  nose,  —  characters 
now  designated  as  Mendelian;  but  among  these  he  holds  that  the 
head  form  is  most  permanent,  so  the  best  ultimate  criterion.  In 
considering  the  head  form  he  says  that  no  correlation  has  been 
discovered  as  yet  between  this  or  indeed  between  the  absolute 
size  of  the  head  and  intellectual  capacity .^  A  map  of  the  world 
showing  the  distribution  of  head  forms  indicates  that  a  broad 
headed  race  occupies  central  Asia  and  a  strip  on  the  extreme 
north;  a  medium  headed  race,  or  a  mixed  people,  the  central 
and  eastern  part  of  Europe  and  nearly  all  of  the  Americas  except 
the  west,  while  a  long-headed  race  occupies  Africa,  Australia, 
Melanesia,  western  and  southern  Europe  and  the  extreme  north 
of  the  new  world.^  This  distribution  coincides  roughly  with  that 
of  the  racial  divisions  of  Flower  and  Giddings  ^  based  on  color 
of  the  skin. 

In  discussing  the  best  criterion  of  race  our  author  shows  that 
pigmentation,  though  often  correlated  with  head  form,  is  more 
subject  to  environmental  influences  than  the  latter  character,^ 
so,  too,  stature,  which  is  often  an  ontogenetic  variation  due  to 
congestion  of  population,  occupation,  and  insufficient  nutrition; 
that  head  form  is  better,  also,  than  color  and  form  of  the  hair 
which  seem  to  change  with  slight  race  mixture.^ 

The  particular  problem  of  the  author,  to  analyze  the  racial 
composition  of  Europe,  is  especially  difficult  as  this  part  of  the 

1  Races  in  Europe,  ch.  I,  pp.  214, 454  f .      *  Principles  of  Sociology,  p.  23 1 . 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  39  f.  ^  Races  in  Europe,  chs.  IV  and  XXI. 
*  IhU.,  p.  42.                                             «  Ibid.,  p.  461. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        II7 

earth  is  the  area  of  most  frequent  race  migrations,  race  conflicts 
and  race  mixtures/  yet  by  means  of  the  normal  frequency  curve 
used  especially  to  show  the  cephalic  index,  our  author  concludes 
that  there  are  at  present  three  distinct  races,  though  by  no  means 
pure,  which  he  designates  as  the  Teutonic,  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Alpine. 

The  Teutonic  race,  occupying  especially  Scandinavia  and 
Germany,  is  described  as  possessed  of  long  head,  long  face,  light 
hair,  blue  eyes  and  narrow,  aquiline  nose;  the  Alpine  (Celtic) 
race  as  found  in  the  Alpine  highlands  of  central  Europe,  as  of 
medium  height  and  stocky  in  build,  with  round  head,  broad  face, 
Ught  chestnut  hair,  hazel-gray  eyes  and  variable  nose;  while  the 
Mediterranean  race  of  Italy,  Spain  and  Africa,  is  shown  to  be  of 
medium  height  and  slender  build,  with  long  head,  long  face,  dark 
brown  or  black  hair,  dark  eyes  and  rather  broad  nose.^  He 
believes  that  the  first  and  third  stand  in  direct  descent  from  the 
long-headed  dwellers  of  Europe  in  the  Pleistocene  period  as  rep- 
resented by  the  Neanderthal  and  Cro-Magnon  skulls,  but  that 
they  came  originally  from  Africa,  the  Teutonic  being  a  differen- 
tiation from  the  original  now  represented  by  the  Mediterranean 
race,  increased  stature  and  increased  pigmentation  being  due  to 
environmental  influences  together  with  selection,  especially  arti- 
ficial selection.^  He  believes  the  Alpine  race  to  be  connected 
with  the  round-headed  race  which  invaded  Europe  from  Asia  in 
this  early  period,  at  first  largely  displacing  the  long-headed  race, 
but  afterwards,  in  turn,  crowded  back  by  the  latter  into  the  less 
desirable  sections,  as  the  mountain  regions;  the  long-headed 
people  now  occupying  the  most  advantageous  portions  with  a 
tendency  to  city  life,  while  the  round-headed  are  essentially 
country  dwellers.^ 

Professor  Ripley  considers  not  only  the  problem  of  race  segrega- 
tion and  stratification  in  Europe  as  determined  by  anthropomet- 
ric measurements  but  also  the  derivation  of  these  races  and  their 
relation  to  language,  nationality  and  culture.  All  the  factors 
that  sociologists  have  emphasized  as  causes  of  social  progress  find 

*  Races  in  Europe,  pp.  107  ff.  •  Ibid.,  pp.  462  f. 

2  Rid.,  p.  121.  <  Ihid.,  pp.  335  f.,  chs.  XVII  and  XX. 


Il8  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

place  in  his  discussion,  such  as  geographical  isolation/  social 
contact  together  with  group  struggle  and  selection,^  niigration,^ 
direct  and  indirect  environmental  influence,^  consciousness  of 
kind,^  economic  conditions,^  and  social,  sexual  and  artificial 
selection.' 

Our  author  attacks  the  specific  problem  of  environment  v.  race 
in  explaining  ethnic  peculiarities  and  cultural  products  and  con- 
cludes that  environmental  factors  have  been  all  too  largely  neg- 
lected by  investigators  in  the  past.  "  At  times,"  he  says,  "  they 
rise  paramount  to  all  other  circumstances."  ^  He  shows,  for 
example,  how  climate  has  determined  the  segregation  of  cotton 
mills  about  Lancashire;  how  such  social  phenomena  as  divorce, 
suicide  and  crime  are  the  products  of  density  of  population, 
economic  and  cultural  conditions,  and  these  in  turn  of  physical 
and  social  environment,  rather  than  of  race.^  A  favorable  geo- 
graphical environment  encourages  early  marriages  as  in  the  case 
of  Italy  in  contrast  to  Brittany  ;i°  it  favors  the  development  of 
village  and  city  life  with  social  contacts  resulting  in  increased 
individualism,  liberty  often  descending  to  license  and  vice  and 
political  radicalism,  —  yet  withal,  progress,  whereas  the  peoples 
relegated  to  geographic  isolation,  with  their  purer  family  life 
and  greater  stability  of  character  are  conservative  and  non- 
progressive. 

The  phenomenon  of  the  marvellous  growth  of  cities  during  the 
past  century  is  discussed  with  special  reference  to  its  effects  on 
ethnic  distribution.  City  dwellers  are  found  on  the  whole  to  be 
shorter  in  stature,  lighter  in  weight  (especially  in  tenement 
districts),  and  also  on  the  whole  with  a  greater  tendency  to 
pigmentation  than  dwellers  in  the  country.  ^^  These  facts  have 
given  rise  to  the  theory  of  "  urban  selection,"  —  pigmentation 
being  considered  to  have  some  relation  to  vital  force. ^^ 

1  Races  in  Europe,  pp.  56,  74  f.,  139,  141,  232,  529. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  I,  56.  8  Ibid.,  p.  514. 

»  Ihid.,  p.  16.  «  Ihid.,  pp.  520  ff. 

4  ijjj4^^  Introduction,  chs.  XIX,  XXI.     i»  IhU.,  p.  533. 
«  Ihid.,  p.  2.  ^^  Ihid.,  pp.  551  f. 

•  IhU.,  pp.  338,  475.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  557. 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  49  f.,  85  f.,  89,  201  f.,  292,  398  f. 


ENVIRONMENTAL  SCHOOL  OF  SOCIOLOGISTS        II9 

The  concluding  chapter  is  given  to  a  study  of  acclimatization  in 
its  relation  to  the  problem  of  the  original  diversification  of  races 
from  one  parent  stock,  but  especially  in  its  bearing  on  the 
colonization  of  the  tropics  by  the  white  race.  He  shows  how 
complex  is  the  question  concerning  the  effect  of  climate  on  the 
human  organism  as  when  people  migrate  from  temperate  regions 
to  the  tropics,  and  enumerates  several  disturbing  factors  that  must 
be  eliminated  before  one  can  determine  this  effect,  such  as  the 
natural  change  in  habits  of  life  in  the  line  of  intemperance  and 
immorality  that  so  frequently  accompany  army  life;  the  effect  of 
race-crossing,  choice  of  foods,  differences  of  occupation  with 
indolence  on  the  one  hand  and  over-exertion  on  the  other.  He 
shows  further  how  a  discussion  of  the  effect  of  climate  on  the 
human  body  must  take  into  consideration  the  racial  element  and 
ethnic  peculiarities,  certain  races  being  susceptible  to  certain 
diseases  and  immune  to  others.  Having  eliminated  these  dis- 
turbing elements  our  author  concludes  that  "  the  physical  ele- 
ments of  climate,  ranged  in  the  order  of  their  importance,  are 
humidity,  heat,  and  lack  of  variety."  ^ 

Physical  acclimatization  approximating  the  adaptation  of 
natives,  he  holds,  is  a  process  requiring  generations  and  that  ulti- 
mate racial  adjustment  to  the  tropics  can  be  secured,  if  at  all, 
only  by  the  costly  method  of  trial  and  selection  or  by  the  drift  to 
those  regions  of  individuals  and  races  already  by  nature  and  mode 
of  life  adapted  to  such  life  conditions.  He  shows  that  much 
temporary  advantage  may  be  gained  by  hygienic  precautions,  but 
that  this  does  not  mean  racial  accHmatization,  and  concludes  that 
true  colonization  of  the  tropics  by  the  white  race  is  impossible.^ 

As  to  the  question  of  the  original  process  of  racial  acclimatiza- 
tion and  diversification.  Professor  Ripley  holds  that  it  was  due  to 
spontaneous  variation  and  natural  selection  and  possibly  also  to 
ontogenetic  variations  that  somehow  became  fastened  upon  the 
race.^ 

The  eminently  scientific  character  of  this  work  and  the  judicial 
temper  evinced  on  every  page  make  it  apparently  above  adverse 
criticism.      The  various  factors  that  enter  into  passive  socio- 

*  Races  in  Europe,  p.  571.       2  /J^.^  p.  584.       '  Ibid.,  p.  587;  cf.  pp.  383  f. 


I20  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

physical  adaptation  are  clearly  set  forth  with  suggestions  of  the 
potency  of  artificial  selection  and  hygiene,  —  factors  that  belong 
to  active  adaptation. 

This  work  we  have  so  briefly  reviewed  takes  us  into  the  very 
heart  of  inductive  sociology  and  might  well  introduce  us  at  once 
to  a  review  of  the  social  philosophers  who  have  emphasized  the 
inductive  method  as  applied  to  the  whole  social  process  but  we 
must  turn  aside  to  consider  some  who  have  given  their  attention 
primarily  to  the  problem  of  social  philosophy  as  a  whole,  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  concept  of  society  as  a  psychological  organism, 
and  to  an  analysis  of  the  sodo-psychical  factors  in  the  develop- 
ment of  civilization,  —  all  these  writers  making  considerable  use 
of  the  deductive  method. 


PART  III 
PASSIVE   SPIRITUAL  ADAPTATION 


CHAPTER  VII 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  AS 
AN  ORGANISM 

We  have  noted  the  use  of  the  organic  analogy  by  Comte  and 
Spencer  and  its  exaggerated  use  by  Lilienfeld.  In  this  chapter  we 
will  consider  the  development  of  the  concept,  especially  as  re- 
lated to  our  subject,  in  the  social  theories  of  Schaffle,  Mackenzie, 
Le  Bon  and  Durkheim,  with  some  reference  to  other  writers.^ 

In  our  discussion  of  Spencer  we  called  attention  to  the  very 
great  emphasis  placed  by  him  on  passive  adaptation.  In  his 
thought  society,  meaning,  usually,  the  sovereign  group,  is  a 
quasi-biological  organism,  or  "  super-organism,"  subject,  in  its 
growth  and  decline,  to  the  same  mechanical  laws  as  a  biological 
organism.  Almost  no  place  was  given  by  him  to  the  concept  of 
active  adaptation.  Lilienfeld,  as  we  saw,  brought  into  promi- 
nence the  idea  of  social  pathology  and  social  therapeutics  (a 
figurative  term  for  active  adaptation),  although  his  reasoning 
was  so  largely  deductive  as  to  be  of  little  scientific  value.  Those 
whom  we  are  to  consider  in  this  chapter  have  made  more  use  of  the 
inductive  and  historical  methods  and  have  carried  the  discussion 
further  into  the  realm  of  the  psychical  than  did  the  earlier  writers, 
bringing  into  prominence  the  thought  of  society  as  a  psychical 
organism,  thus  preparing  the  way  for  greater  emphasis  on  active 
adaptation. 

Albert  Schaffle  (1831-1903) 

The  Social  Organism 

According  to  Barth,  Schaffle  made  slight  advance  over  Spencer 
in  the  use  of  the  organic  concept  in  several  minor  particulars:  (i) 
as  to  the  structure  of  society,  Schaffle  does  not  consider  the 
individual  to  be  the  social  unit  in  all  social  relations,  but  rather 

*  Barth  discusses  the  use  of  this  concept  by  Spencer,  Lilienfeld,  Schaffle,  Fouillee, 
and  Worms,  op.  cit.,  ch.  IV. 

123 


124  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

the  family;  *  (2)  he  calls  attention  more  than  Spencer  to  the 
apparatus  for  the  defence  of  the  social  body,  and  (3)  he  empha- 
sizes the  nature  of  the  spiritual  Ufe  of  society  and  its  media  of 
expression  and  development. 

As  to  the  social  process,  our  author  goes  beyond  his  predeces- 
sors in  his  discussion  of  the  decline  of  social  bodies,  —  the  problem 
of  mal-adaptation,  —  even  to  destruction,  making  some  use  of  the 
terms  evolution,  transvolution  and  involution  to  describe  the 
cycle  of  growth  and  decay.  He  goes  further,  too,  in  his  distinc- 
tion between  types  and  stages  of  development.  By  the  former  he 
has  in  mind  ethnological  distinctions  corresponding  roughly  to 
animal  species,  but  characterized  not  only  by  physiological  but 
also  by  mental  and  social  differences;  by  the  latter  he  has  in 
mind  various  social  groupings  which  he  considers  to  represent 
stages  of  development.^  Barth  holds  that  he  has  not  extended 
in  any  marked  degree  the  social  theories  of  his  predecessors.^ 
The  careful  reader  of  Schaffle,  however,  cannot  fail  to  note  a  dif- 
ferent atmosphere  and  an  emphasis  not  found  in  Spencer  on 
the  psychical  character  of  the  "  social  body  "  and  on  purposive 
action. 

Small  characterizes  the  difference  between  these  two  authors  as 
follows:  "  Spencer's  analysis  affects  one  more  like  the  disentan- 
gling of  a  mechanical  puzzle,  while  there  is  more  of  the  atmosphere 
of  actual  life  in  Schaffle's  description  of  the  social  body.  The 
difference  as  I  see  it  reduces  to  this:  Spencer  does  not  succeed  in 
making  his  interpretation  of  society  picture  it  as  more  than  an 
organism  of  mechanism,  Schaffle's  central  conception  of  society  is 
an  organization  of  work^  *  I  should  add,  "  directed  by  pur- 
posive intelligence."  ^ 

1  Op.  ciL,  pp.  138  f. 

2  Barth,  p.  141,  gives  as  Schaffle's  classification  the  following:  (i)  Volkerschaft, 
(ii)  standische  oder  feudale  Gesellschaft,  (iii)  biirgergemeinschaftliche  Polis,  (iv) 
Landesgemeinwesen,  (v)  Nationalgemeinwesen. 

*  "  So  finden  wir,  bei  SchaflSe  kein  principielle  Hinausgehen  iiber  Spencer.  .  .  . 
Es  ist  ihm  aber  nicht  bewusst  geworden,  das  damit  die  Gesetzmassigkeit  des  tier- 
ischen  Lebens,  die  biologische,  verlassen  wird,  und  eine  ganz  neue  an  ihre  Stelle 
tritt,"  —  ibid.,  p.  145.  ■*  General  Sociology,  p.  167. 

*  "  Der  sociale  Korper  wirkt  und  lebte  zwar  durch  Krafte  der  anorganischen 
und  der  organischen  Natur  aber  er  beherrscht  diese  Krafie  geistig  und  verwerthet  sie 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 25 

To  appreciate  Schaffle's  use  of  the  organic  concept  as  applied  to 
society  and  especially  the  bearing  of  his  teaching  on  our  subject 
one  must  understand  his  philosophical  approach.  A  follower  of 
F.  U.  Lange  and  von  Baer  in  his  spiritual  monism  and  so  a  posi- 
tivist  in  his  treatment  of  social  phenomena  from  the  point  of  view 
of  science,  he  nevertheless  makes  place  for  the  hyper-scientific 
world  of  values,  —  the  realm  of  the  aesthetic  and  religious.^ 
Although  making  large  use  of  the  work  of  Fechner,  Helmholtz  and 
Wundt  in  physiological  psychology,  he  repudiates  all  attempts  to 
identify  the  two  orders  on  the  material  side,  and  lays  great  stress 
on  the  fact  of  teleology  in  the  social  process,  asserting  that  this 
fact  gives  warrant  for  belief  in  teleology  in  the  world-order .^ 

With  Nageli  et  ah,  he  posits  as  a  necessary  assumption  to  the 
understanding  of  cosmic  and  especially  of  social  evolution,  an 
entelechy  or  life-force  with  a  tendency  to  reach  out  and  develop  to 
ever  higher  forms  of  Hfe.^ 

A  follower  of  Darwin  in  his  belief  in  natural  selection  at  least  as 
a  powerful  factor  in  organic  evolution,  he  shows  that  in  animal  and 
human  societies  the  individual  is  not  the  unit  of  struggle  but  the 
group,  and  that  group  life  is  characterized  by  mutual  aid.^  He 
holds  that  the  law  of  natural  selection  operates  very  differently  in 
social  evolution  for  the  groups  are  ever  enlarging,  and  the  struggle 
is  not  so  much  for  existence  as  for  kind  of  existence  and  is  also 
between  social  ideals  and  institutions.^ 

technisch.  Der  Mechanismus,  der  Chemismus  imd  das  Spiel  organischer  Vorgange 
werden  im  socialen  Leben  zu  einer  zweckbewnssten  geistig  bewegten  Physik 
erhoben.  .  .  . 

"  Der  sociale  Korper  folgt  aber  auch  einer  vollig  eigenartigen,  wenn  gleich 
gesetzmassigen  Entwickelung.  .  .  .  Diese  Entwickelung  ist  die  Wirkimg  von  in 
historischem  Sinn  constanten  Motiven  und  Bediirfnissen  und  von  eben  solchen 
Naturvoraussetzungen.  Sie  ist  nicht  Ablauf  eines  mechanischen  Uhrwerks. 
Gegeniiber  dem  wunderbar  sicheren  und  regelmassigen  aber  noch  nicht  genau 
erklarbaren  Verlauf  der  Evolutions-  und  *  Involutions  '-Erscheinungen  orga- 
nischer Leiber  ist  die  sociale  Entwickelung  wesentlich  Produkt  der  bewussten 
Triebe  oder  Beweggriinde,  die  in  jeder  Generation  des  Volkes  leben,  jedoch  unter 
dem  Einfluss  fiihrender  Geister  und  ihrer  Ideen  beharrlichen  Neuerungen  und 
Bereicheningen  unterliegen,"  op.  ciL,  i,  p.  4.     Cf.  also,  pp.  9,  10,  12,  828,  831. 

^  Bau  und  Leben,  i,  pp.  5,  63,  66.  '  Ibid.,  ii,  p.  20. 

2  Ibid.,  ii,  p.  23;  cf.  i,  p.  104.  *  Ibid.,  ii,  pp.  11,  25. 

^  Ibid.,  ii,  pp.  2,  29, 47.  His  theory  of  social  development  is  summarized  as  follows 
(ii,  p.  55):  "Die  fortschreitende  Gesellschaftsbildung  (Civilisation)  ist  das  hochste 


126  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Schaffle  wisely  turns  aside  from  the  analogical  reasoning  of 
Haeckel  and  Lilienfeld  formulated  in  their  theory  of  "recapitula- 
tion "  also  from  the  theory  of  "  division  of  labor  "  of  the  latter, 
and  points  to  the  possibility  of  studying  the  social  process 
immediately,  —  "a  process  now  going  on  before  our  very  eyes."  ^ 

Accepting  the  principle  of  adaptation  as  the  key  to  the  under- 
standing of  biological  evolution  he  makes  large  use  of  this  concept 
for  the  understanding  of  social  evolution.  "  Through  the  very 
nature  of  the  widening  struggle  for  existence  and  struggle  of 
interests,  which  characterizes  the  co-operative  labor  of  the  social 
unity,"  he  says,  "  is  brought  about  that  transformation  of 
civilization  which  is  in  the  line  of  the  greatest  possible  perfection- 
ment  and  so  is  in  a  specific  sense  a  development.  Struggle  creates 
parties  relatively  best  adapted  for  the  conflict.  Those  organisms, 
persons,  institutions  (Gesellschafteseinrichtungen)  that  are  rela- 
tively most  perfect  attain  more  or  less  exclusive  worth  while  the 
enemies  and  rivals  that  are  unadapted  are  suppressed  or  forced  to 
an  adaptation  of  a  lower  order  (zu  abweichenden  Anpassung 
genothigt  werden).  The  besfadapted  (Passendere)  attain  devel- 
opment, transmissable  goods  (Ueberlieferung)  and  posterity."  ^ 

Ergebniss  der  vervoUkonmmenden  Auslese  der  menschlichen  Daseinskampfe. 
Genauer  gesagt — ist  sie  das  unausbleibliche  Produkt  aller  Daseins-  und  Interessen- 
kampfe,  welche  von  den  socialen  Einheiten  jeder  Individualisinmgstufe  theils  unter 
sich,  theils  gegen  die  aussere  Natur,  mit  den  wachsenden  Mittehi  der  menschlichen 
Geistes-,  Korper-  und  Vermogensausstattung  und  innerhalb  einer  durch  Recht  und 
Sitte  gesetzten  Streitorganisation  ausgekampft,  durch  den  Trieb  individueller  und 
collectiver  Selbsterhaltung,  durch  den  organischen  Vermehrungstrieb,  durch  den 
Eigennuz,  durch  gemeinniizige  Verbesserungsbestrebungen  erweckt  und  in  immer 
hoherem  Grade  emeuert,  um  die  Befriedigung  nicht  bios  der  sinnlichen  Nothdurft, 
sondem  mehr  und  mehr  um  ein  steigendes  Mass  hoherer  materieller  und  ideeller 
Lebensanspriiche  gefiihrt,  durch  Zufall,  durch  Spiel,  durch  ausseren  und  inneren 
Krieg,  durch  freien  Austrag  und  durch  vielgestaltige  Urtheilsinstanzen  des  Wett- 
streites  entschieden  werden,  imd  nothwendig  dahin  fiihren:  dass  im  Einzelnen  die 
relativ  besten  Anpassungen  sowohl  angeregt  als  zur  Herrschaft,  Ausbreitung  und 
Ueberlieferung  gebracht,  dagegen  die  relativ  schlechtesten  Anpassungen,  die  Ent- 
artungen  imd  fremdartigen  Bildungen  vemichtet,  abgestossen,  oder  zu  besserer 
Anpassung  genothigt  werden,  und  dass  im  Ganzen  ein  wachsendes  Mass  ideeller 
und  materieller  Krafte  fiir  die  collective  Fiihrung  des  menschlichen  Daseinskampfes 
sich  anhauft,  dass  immer  mehr  Gesellschaftsbildung,  das  heisst  immer  mehr  Glie- 
denmg  imd  Vereinigung  der  geistigen  und  physischen  Arbeitskrafte,  sowie  der 
zuhorigen  Giiterausstattungen  stattfindet." 

1  Bau  und  Leben,  ii,  pp.  33  f.,  460.        ^  /^.^  [[^  p.  29;  cf.  also  pp.  10,  31,  166. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  I27 

This  principle  of  adaptation  is  with  him  the  mediator  between 
the  cosmic  spirit  and  the  material  world-order;  i.  e.,  the  spirit  is 
limited  in  its  manifestation  by  bonds  imposed  by  the  material.^ 

With  this  glimpse  into  the  background  of  his  social  philosophy 
we  can  understand  better  his  use  of  the  organic  concept  as  applied 
to  society.  "  At  the  very  summit  of  the  phenomena  of  Ufe  on  our 
earth,"  he  says  in  the  opening  paragraph  of  his  Bau  und  Lehen, 
"  stands  human  society,  —  the  social  body  and  its  private  and 
national  institutions.  Built  up  out  of  matter,  and  impelled  by 
forces  of  the  inorganic  and  organic  world,  it  is  nevertheless  a 
living  body  of  a  pecuUar  kind.  Human  or  civil  society,  a  far 
higher  structure  than  the  societies  of  animals,  is  a  purely  spiritual 
result,  an  indivisible  social  life  of  organized  individuals  wrought 
out  through  the  force  of  ideas  and  achievements  of  art."  ^ 

It  is  true  that  Schaffle  does  not  make  it  as  plain  as  we  should 
desire  just  what  is  included  in  this  concept  "  social  body."  In 
the  preface  to  Bau  und  Lehen  he  quotes  with  seeming  approval 
Goethe,  Pascal  and  Comte  who  conceived  all  past  generations  of 
men  as  forming  an  organic  whole;  in  some  places  the  goal  of  the 
social  process  includes  all  humanity;  in  other  places  he  seems  to 
have  in  mind  primarily  the  sovereign  state,  and  again  the  term 
is  used  as  synonymous  with  a  civilization;  but  his  general  line 
of  argument  would  necessitate  the  limitation  of  the  term  to  such 
a  group  as  possesses  real  psychical  unity .^  It  is  thus  a  very 
elastic  term.  The  one  thing  Schaffle  seems  to  be  groping  after 
is  a  conception  developed  later  by  Le  Bon  and  Durkheim  of  a 
psychical  somewhat  over  against  the  individual  which  moulds  his 
life,  into  which  he  is  assimilated  and  which  he  in  turn  modifies,  — 
and  this  unity  organized  and  active,  expressing  itself  in  social 
institutions.^ 

The  goal  of  the  social  process  is  ^'  the  coming  to  fulfilment  "  of 
the  process  itself, — but  this  is  not  given  definite  content.  With 
increasing   development   comes   increasing   differentiation   and 

^  Bau  und  Lehen,  ii,  p.  31. 
2  Cf.  also,  i,  pp.  9,  10,  12,  828,  831. 

'  Ihid.,  Introduction,  esp.  pp.  6,  7;  cf.  i,  pp.  316  f.;  ii,  pp.  464  f.;  cf.  Jacobs, 
German  Sociology,  pp.  18  f. 

*  Bau  und  Lehen,  i,  p.  203 ;  ii,  pp.  203  f . 


128  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

integration  of  that  which  is  taken  as  the  social  unity. ^  This 
means  division  of  labor  and  increasing  dissimilarity  in  the  parts 
which  make  up  the  "  social  body  "  and  in  the  functions  performed 
by  them. 

The  goal  for  each  individual  should  be  to  find  out  the  place  in 
the  social  body  for  which  he  is  best  adapted  and  fit  himself  for 
that  place.2  The  function  of  government  is  considered  to  be 
primarily  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  backward  members  of 
the  social  body,  and  to  make  them  fit  members,  to  organize  for 
social  efficiency  and  well-being  and  to  correct  pathological  con- 
ditions.3    In  this  task  leadership  rests  primarily  with  the  elite.'* 

In  his  emphasis  on  individual  and  social  purposeful  activity, 
then,  we  have  the  chief  difference  between  SchaflSe  and  Spencer, 
in  this  approximating  more  nearly  to  Comte  and  Lilienfeld.  He 
goes  far  beyond  the  former,  however,  in  his  analysis  both  of  the 
structure  and  development  of  the  social  body,  and  beyond  the 
latter  in  his  use  of  inductive  rather  than  merely  analogical  reason- 
ing with  conclusions  proportionately  more  scientific  and  satis- 
factory. 

J.  S.  Mackenzie  (i860-       ) 
An  Idealistic  Interpretation  of  Social  Progress 

Professor  Mackenzie  has  not  done  so  much  to  develop  the 
organic  concept  as  to  analyze  its  meaning  and  rationalize  its  use. 
His  approach  to  social  philosophy  is  through  Hegelianism  of  the 
Eight  and  the  Hegelian  idealism  and  dialectic  are  evident  at 
many  points. 

Like  Spencer  and  Schaffle  he  believes  in  an  inner  principle  of 
development  but  unlike  them  he  repudiates  the  attempt  to  reduce 
this  to  terms  of  positive  science.  No  one,  perhaps,  has  criticized 
more  cogently  than  he  that  form  of  utilitarianism  which,  as  with 
Bentham,  tries  to  evaluate  pleasures  and  pains  quantitatively, 
but  he  fails  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  there  may  be  a  utilitarian- 
ism which  has  an  objective  standard  entirely  different  from  the 
one  criticized. 

*  Bau  und  Leben,  ii,  pp.  440  f.  ^  Ibid.,  i,  p.  559;  ii,  pp.  194  f. 

*  Ibid.,  i,  p.  202.  *  Ibid.,  i,  p.  435. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 29 

Three  of  his  analyses  are  of  special  importance  for  our  discus- 
sion: that  of  different  kinds  of  unity,  that  of  different  meanings 
of  self,  and  that  of  different  goals  of  social  endeavor. 

I.  Kinds  of  Unity, — The  totality  of  the  world,  or  any  particular 
object  in  the  world,  according  to  Mackenzie,  may  be  regarded: 
(i)  as  a  simple  unity,  in  which  there  is  no  real  difference  of  parts; 
or  (2)  as  a  mere  collection  of  differences,  in  which  there  is  no  real 
unity;  or  as  a  system  in  which  there  is  both  unity  and  difference. 
And  if  it  is  thought  of  as  a  system,  it  may  be  regarded  either  (3) 
as  a  system  in  which  the  parts  have  an  absolutely  independent 
existence,  though  they  are  subordinated  to  the  whole  to  which 
they  belong;  or  (4)  as  a  system  in  which  the  parts  are  deprived  of 
their  independence  by  being  transformed  and  swallowed  up  in  the 
whole;  or,  finally,  as  a  system  in  which  the  parts  have  a  certain 
relative  independence,  but  an  independence  which  is  conditioned 
throughout  by  its  relation  to  the  system,  —  an  independence,  in 
short,  which  is  not  freedom /r(?w  the  system,  but  freedom  in  and 
through  it} 

Mackenzie  goes  on  to  show  that  the  first  might  be  typified  by  a 
single  crystal,  the  second  by  a  heap  of  stones  or  bed  of  flowers,  the 
third  by  the  solar  system,  the  fourth  by  any  chemical  combina- 
tion and  the  fifth  by  the  life  of  a  single  plant. 

Our  author  shows  how  these  five  different  views  of  unity  are 
reflected  in  different  philosophical  systems,  in  various  ways  of 
interpreting  human  freedom,  in  theology,  in  one's  conception  of 
justice  and  finally  in  endeavors  to  understand  society .^  He 
defines  an  organism  as  "  a  whole  whose  parts  are  intrinsically 
related  to  it,  which  develops  from  within  and  has  reference  to  an 
end  which  is  involved  in  its  own  nature,"  ^  and  shows  that  society 
corresponds  to  this  kind  of  unity  rather  than  to  any  of  the  other 
four  mentioned. 

Its  parts  are  intrinsically  related  to  it,  for  the  rational  nature  of  the  beings 
who  compose  it  is  entirely  dependent  for  its  being  and  continuance  on  the 
existence  of  certain  social  relations.  It  develops  from  within ;  for  its  growth 
consists  simply  in  the  unfolding  of  the  rational  nature  of  each  of  its  individual 
members, — that  rational  nature  being,  moreover,  always  essentially  relative 

*  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  p.  129. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  131  f.  3  Ibid.,  p.  148. 


130  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

to  the  nature  of  the  whole  society  in  which  it  develops.  It  has  reference  to 
an  end  which  is  involved  in  its  own  nature;  for  the  end  of  society  is  to  pre- 
serve the  life  and  to  secure  the  highest  life  of  its  individual  members, — this 
highest  life,  moreover,  consisting  not  in  the  attainment  of  anything  external 
either  to  the  individuals  or  to  their  society  but  to  the  perfect  realization  of 
their  own  rational  nature,  which  can  be  attained  only  in  a  perfect  social  lif e.^ 

;  This  interpretation  of  the  organic  nature  of  society  can  be 
understood  only  in  the  light  of  his  philosophical  presuppositions 
developed  in  the  first  three  chapters  of  his  Social  Philosophy 
which  are  essentially  Hegelian.  The  chief  difficulty  is  that  it  is 
vague  and  devoid  of  specific  content. 

11.  Meanings  of  Self.  —  In  his  analysis  of  the  different  mean- 
ings of  self,  objects  are  considered  to  have  selfhood  imder  the 
following  conditions,  arranged  in  a  progressive  series:  (i)  When 
there  is  some  kind  of  rniity  and  identity,  though  given  it  by  an 
apperceiving  mind,  as  when  we  speak  of  a  river  that  empties 
itself  into  the  sea.  A  house,  book,  work  of  art  has  this  kind  of 
selfhood;  (2)  where  there  is  not  only  this  kind  of  apperceived  unity 
but  where  the  object  must  be  so  regarded  in  order  to  be  under- 
stood as  in  the  case  of  a  vegetable  organism;  (3)  where  the  object 
has  some  degree  of  self-consciousness  mediated,  however  vaguely, 
through  sensations  of  pleasure  or  pain,  as  in  the  case  of  an  animal: 
"  Such  a  being  is  a  unity  for  itself,  though  not  conscious  of  itself 
as  a  imity  ";  (4)  where  the  object  is  conscious  of  itself  as  a  unity, 
reflecting  on  its  own  Ufe  and  recognizing  itself  as  one  throughout 
all  its  changes;  and  finally,  (5)  where  the  object  is  conscious  of 
itself  as  a  unity  and  part  of  a  unitary  world,  as  in  the  case  of  man 
at  least  potentially:  "  He  is  aware  of  his  individual  life  not  as  a 
microcosm  in  a  chaos,  but  as  a  microcosm  in  a  macrocosm,  to  the 
objective  unity  of  which  his  individual  life  as  well  as  everything 
else  is  referred."  ^ 

Mackenzie  does  not  enter  into  the  question  current  now  among 
social  psychologists  as  to  the  meaning  of  self  as  applied  to  the 
social  organism,  and  his  whole  discussion  leaves  us  in  doubt  as  to 
what  his  position  would  be,  for  while  he  emphasizes  the  individual 
as  the  sociological  unit,  society  existing  only  for  the  well-being  of 

»  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  p.  238.  «  /^.^  pp.  161  f. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  131 

individuals,^  he  holds  that  the  individual  apart  from  society  is  an 
abstraction.2  He  does,  however,  emphasize  the  psychical  unity 
of  society,  considering  persons  or  groups  who  are  unassimilated 
as  instruments  of  a  civilization  of  which  they  do  not  partake.^ 

III.  Social  Goals,  —  In  discussing  possible  ends  to  which  the 
world-order  is  tending  he  holds  that  it  must  be  considered  in  terms 
of  the  well-being  of  individuals  and  discusses  various  ways  of 
interpreting  individual  well-being  as  in  terms  of  knowing,  feeling, 
wilHng,  in  some  combination  of  these,  or  finally  as  a  realization  of 
our  conscious  nature  as  a  whole.^  His  conclusion  is  that  the  end 
is  in  the  fulfilment  of  certain  wants  of  our  nature  rather  than  in 
the  pleasure  which  ensues  upon  their  satisfaction.^  This  brings 
his  teaching  into  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of  adaptation,  for  our 
real  needs  are  such  as  make  for  largeness  and  fullness  of  life  and 
this  depends  upon  our  being  adapted  to  our  environment  and 
especially  upon  our  mastery  of  our  environment,  as  our  author 
holds.^ 

Mackenzie  divides  these  wants  or  needs  into  three  classes:  (i) 
vegetable,  (2)  those  arising  from  our  organic  or  animal  sensations, 
and  (3)  those  due  to  reason.^  He  shows  that  the  end  cannot  be 
merely  either  (i)  or  (2)  or  both  combined,  so  must  be  (3),  and  this 
requires  that  we  view  our  world  as  issuing  from  intelligence  of 
which  our  own  and  that  of  our  fellow-men  are  parts,  and  that  we 
make  ourselves  at  home  in  this  world. ^  He  concludes  as  follows: — 

*  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  pp.  66,  159. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  120,  180;  cf.  pp.  131,  136. 

3  IhU.,  p.  156.  ^  Ihid.,  chs.  IV  and  V.  «  IhU.,  p.  228. 

'  "  Men  were  first  exploited  by  men;  then  they  were  exploited  by  things;  the 
problem  now  is  to  combine  men  together  that  they  may  exploit  things,"  ibid.,  p. 
107. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  228. 

«  "  We  must  not  only  be  able  to  bring  our  world  into  a  certain  intelligible  order, 
but  we  must  also  be  able  to  see  it  issuing  out  of  an  intelligible  order.  Such  an 
intelligible  world  would  exist  for  us  if  the  world  of  our  experience  were  not  merely 
presented  to  our  intelligence,  but  arose  from  our  intelligence,  i.  e.,  if  we  created 
our  world  as  well  as  perceived  it,  and  such  a  world  would  equally  exist  for  us  if 
we  saw  it  as  issuing  from  the  imity  of  some  other  intelligence  than  our  own.  It 
would  then  appear  not  merely  as  a  collection  of  facts  which  is  reduced  to  system, 
but  as  a  collection  which  flows  from  a  system,  and  which  is  consequently  intelligible 
from  beginning  to  end.  .  .  .  Now  such  an  intelligible  world  is  presented  to  us 


132  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Here,  then,  we  seem  at  last  to  have  found  out  what  the  true  nature  of 
man's  end  is;  and  we  see  that  that  end  is  by  its  very  nature  a  social  one.  It 
is  clear,  too,  that  the  end  which  we  have  now  defined  includes  everything 
which  "we  divine"  as  belonging  to  the  highest  good.  It  includes,  indeed, 
every  one  of  the  ends  which  have  been  previously  enumerated.  It  includes 
what  we  have  described  as  the  objective  ends,  —  the  realization  of  reason, 
order  and  beauty  in  the  world ;  for  the  realization  of  them  is  part  of  our  work 
in  making  our  world  intelligible  and  clear  to  ourselves.  It  includes  also  the 
realization  of  life;  for  it  is  the  fulfilment  of  that  towards  which  our  lives  as 
rational  beings  strive;  and  in  the  fulfilment  of  this  for  ourselves,  there  is 
involved  also  the  realization  of  the  lives  of  other  intelligent  beings;  since  it 
is  only  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  inteUigent  nature  that  our  own  can  receive 
fulfilment.! 

The  social  problem,  as  he  sees  it,  is  to  discover  the  form  of  social 
imion  in  which,  under  given  conditions,  the  progress  will  be  most 
rapid  and  most  secure  towards  that  good  which  we  must  regard 
as  the  ultimate  end.^  He  holds  that,  though  diversity  of  inter- 
ests leads  to  conflict,  ultimately  the  good  of  the  individual  and 
society  are  identical.^ 

In  his  practical  program  of  meliorism,  Mackenzie  emphasizes 
individual  culture,  the  conquest  of  nature  and  right  social  rela- 
tions, all  these  introducing  what  we  have  termed  active  adapta- 
tion.^ 

The  need  of  social  control  is  due  to  the  fact  that 

progress  towards  a  more  complete  mastery  of  nature  is  not  necessarily  a 
progress  towards  more  complete  happiness  for  the  following  reasons:  (i)  As 
the  means  of  material  well-being  increase,  population  also  increases,  and  the 
struggle  for  existence  becomes  keener;  (2)  Human  nature  is  not  sufficiently 
plastic  to  adapt  itself  continuously  to  the  changing  conditions  of  existence; 
(3)  Industrial  progress  brings  with  it  an  increasing  freedom  of  competition, 
and  this  adds  to  the  keenness  of  the  struggle;  (4)  Industrial  progress  tends 
to  reduce  the  working  classes  more  and  more  to  the  condition  of  a  prole- 
tariate, and  in  that  way  militates  directly  against  the  happiness  of  the  great 
mass  of  population.^ 

by  the  lives  of  our  fellow-men  and  in  the  works  which  they  perform.  ...  No 
attainment  of  the  ideal  of  our  rational  nature  is  conceivable,  except  by  our  being 
able  to  see  the  world  as  a  system  of  intelligent  beings  who  are  mutually  worlds 
for  each  other.  ...  It  is  only  in  the  lives  of  other  himian  beings  that  we  find  a 
world  in  which  we  can  be  at  home.  The  society  of  other  human  beings  is  not 
merely  a  means  of  bringing  our  own  rational  nature  to  clearness,  but  it  is  the  only 
object  in  relation  to  which  such  clearness  can  be  attained,"  ibid.,  pp.  231-233. 

*  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  p.  234.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  237. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  236.  *  Ibid.,  p.  241.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  307. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  133 

He  finds  communism  and  socialism  entirely  inadequate  forms  of 
social  organization  and  rule  by  an  aristocracy  of  talent  at  present 
impracticable  so  is  driven  back  to  the  ideal  of  Fraternity  under- 
standing by  that  "  the  recognition  that  the  true  ideal  must  be 
founded  rather  on  the  notion  of  a  readjustment  of  the  hearts  of 
the  citizens."  ^ 

This  introduces  a  conception  of  adaptation  which  may  be 
termed  active  moral,  i.  e.,  the  effort  to  adjust  our  lives  progres- 
sively to  our  ever-advancing  ideal,  and  to  bring  our  fellow-men 
also  into  harmony  with  that  ideal. 

GusTAv  Le  Bon  (1841-       ) 
The  Psychology  of  Peoples 

We  have  considered  the  development  of  the  concept  of  organism 
as  applied  to  society  in  the  social  theories  of  Schajffle  and  Mac- 
kenzie, the  one  making  his  approach  largely  through  biology,  the 
other  through  philosophy,  and  both  emphasizing  the  fact  that 
the  bond  of  social  union  is  primarily  psychical,  the  former  bring- 
ing into  prominence  common  ideals,  symbols,  traditions  and  the 
expression  of  these  in  institutions,  the  other,  the  rational  needs  of 
individuals;  but  we  are  still  left  with  the  vague  social  goal  of 
self-realization,  either  of  individuals  as  with  Mackenzie  or  of  the 
world-force  as  with  Schaffle.  We  turn  now  to  some  writers  who 
have  endeavored  to  work  out  a  clear  concept  of  society  as  a 
psychical  organism. 

Le  Bon  in  his  Psychology  of  Peoples  summarizes  the  conclu- 
sions of  elaborate  investigations  carried  on  by  him  covering  a 
period  of  years  and  published  in  several  volimies,  dealing  with  the 
fundamental  characteristics  of  various  peoples  considered  as 
psychical  unities.  He  shows  how  impossible  is  a  racial  classifica- 
tion based  on  descent,  and  how  unsatisfactory  is  one  based  on 
physiological  characteristics.  A  race  as  he  conceives  it,  is 
primarily  a  social  group  which  by  a  common  physical  and 
psychical  heredity  develops  a  distinct  character  or  "  soul."  In 
early  historical  times  this  soul  did  not  extend  beyond  the  family, 

*  Introdticiion  to  Social  Philosophy,  p.  290. 


134  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

tribe,  city  (as  in  Greece)  or  village  (as  in  India).  More  recently 
it  has  expanded  to  include  the  state  or  nation.^ 

The  fundamental  characteristics  which  differentiate  races,  he 
holds,  are  few  in  number  and  practically  unchangeable.  The 
accessory  characteristics,  however,  due  to  environment,  circum- 
stances or  education  are  changed  with  comparative  ease.^ 

Races  are  classified  as  primitive,  inferior,  average  and  su- 
perior, the  chief  criterion  of  superiority  being  "  aptitude  for 
dominating  their  reflex  impulses."  ^  From  primitive  to  superior 
civilization  there  is  progressive  differentiation  of  individuals, 
sexes  and  races,  though  among  superior  races  there  are  "  no 
inherent  differences  in  men  of  one  race."  The  only  difference  is 
that "  circumstances  have  called  out  latent  possibiHties,"  as  in  the 
case  of  Robespierre,  Fouquer-Tinville  and  Saint  Just.* 

"  Character,"  says  Le  Bon,  "is  formed  by  the  combination  in 
varying  proportions,  of  the  different  elements  which  psycholo- 
gists are  accustomed  at  the  present  day  to  designate  by  the  name 
of  sentiments  .  .  .  [such  as]  perseverance,  energy,  power  of  self- 
control,  faculties  more  or  less  dependent  on  the  will  and  moral- 
ity." ^  "  The  intellectual  qualities,"  he  holds,  "  are  susceptible 
of  being  slightly  modified  by  education,  those  of  character  almost 
wholly  escape  its  influence,"  —  and  this  latter  result  comes  only 
in  the  case  of  neutral  natures,  i.  e.,  those  "  whose  will  is  almost 
non-existent."  ^  "  The  character  of  a  people  and  not  its  intel- 
ligence determines  its  historical  evolution  and  governs  its  des- 
tiny." ^  Because  of  the  different  characters  of  peoples  taken  as  a 
whole,  arise  misunderstandings  and  wars,  subjugation  and  social 
stratification  resulting  in  division  of  labor.  Owing  to  this 
stratification  and  the  exploitation  of  the  masses,  a  people  comes 
to  have  a  form  like  a  pyramid  with  the  elite  at  the  apex,  "  an 
exceedingly  restricted  group  as  compared  with  the  rest  of  the 
population,  but  the  only  group  that  determines  the  rank  of  a 
country  in  the  intellectual  scale  of  civilization."  ^ 

^  Psychology  of  Peoples,  p.  14.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  31.  Cf.  Comte's  use  of  tenn  "heart." 

2  Ibid.,  p.  19.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  32. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  30.  '  Ibid.,  p.  34. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  20.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  35-42, 199  f. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  135 

The  only  way  the  soul  of  a  people  can  be  radically  changed,  our 
author  asserts,  is  by  cross-breeding,  and  he  points  out  the  danger 
that  threatens  America  in  the  hordes  of  emigrants  going  to  her 
shores;  but  the  bad  effects  of  cross-breeding  are  not  considered  by 
Le  Bon  to  be  physiological  so  much  as  socio-psychical.^  Such  a 
period  of  transition  is  always  one  of  internal  struggle  and  only  at 
such  a  time  is  environment  a  potent  factor  in  the  transformation 
of  the  racial  type.^ 

Le  Bon  shows  how  social  institutions  are  a  manifestation  of  the 
invisible  soul  of  a  people  and  how  impossible  it  is  to  change  these 
institutions  except  through  a  change  in  the  soul.^  He  reaches  the 
conclusion  that  the  elements  which,  philosophically  speaking,  are 
inferior  (e.  g.,  military  power)  are  the  most  important  from  the 
social  point  of  view.  "  If  the  laws  of  the  future,"  he  says,  "  are 
to  be  those  of  the  past,  it  may  be  said  that  to  have  attained  to  too 
high  a  degree  of  intelligence  and  culture  is  what  is  most  harmful 
to  a  people.  People  perish  as  soon  as  the  qualities  of  character 
which  form  the  ground  work  of  their  soul  begin  to  decline,  and 
these  quahties  decline  as  soon  as  the  civilization  and  intelligence 
of  a  people  reach  a  high  level ";^ — but  he  does  not  analyze  the 
causes  of  the  decline  in  the  character  of  a  nation  nor  does  he 
show  the  reason  why  this  leads  to  their  conquest  by  a  barbarous 
people. 

Our  author  goes  on  to  consider  how  the  history  of  nations  is  a 
consequence  of  their  character,  illustrating  this  truth  especially 
from  poUtics,  and  shows  how  France  today,  as  for  generations, 
stands  for  state  control,  in  contrast  with  the  English  demand  for 
social  endeavor  by  voluntary  co-operation.^ 

In  book  IV,  Le  Bon  discusses  the  question  of  the  modification 
of  the  psychical  characteristics  of  races  and  shows  how  this  is 
brought  about  by  a  slow  process  of  progressive  adaptation  as  a 
result  of  the  pressure  of  wants,  struggle  for  life,  action  of  certain 

*  Psychology  of  Peoples,  pp.  52  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  54.  3  11^^^  pp^  64  ff. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  80.  Cf.  pp.  55,  193,  213,  where  he  shows  how  the  soul  of  a  people 
may  be  destroyed. 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  130  ff.  His  forecast  that  there  would  be  little  progress  in  state 
control  in  England  and  America  has  been  negatived  by  recent  developments. 


136  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

elements  in  the  environment  (especially  in  new  races),  progress  of 
the  sciences  and  industry,  by  education,  beliefs,  and  in  many 
other  ways.  "  Ideas, '^  he  says,  "  can  have  no  real  action  on  the 
soul  of  peoples  until,  as  the  consequence  of  a  very  slow  elaboration, 
they  have  descended  from  the  mobile  regions  of  thought  to  that 
stable  and  imconscious  region  of  the  sentiments  in  which  the 
motives  of  our  actions  are  elaborated.  They  then  become  ele- 
ments of  character  and  may  influence  conduct."  ^ 

As  to  the  mechanism  of  propagation  of  new  ideas,  it  is  held  to  be 
by  innovation  on  the  part  of  the  elite  and  imitation  on  the  part  of 
the  masses,^  under  some  conditions  taking  a  form  analogous  to 
contagion.^  Religious  beliefs,  he  holds,  have  always  constituted 
the  most  important  element  of  the  life  of  peoples."* 

Le  Bon  makes  verbal  connection  with  our  general  subject  in 
these  words:  — 

The  history  of  civilization  is  .  .  .  composed  of  slow  adaptations,  of 
slight  successive  transformations.  .  .  .  The  brain  cells  do  not  assimilate  in 
a  day  what  it  has  taken  centuries  to  create,  and  what  is  adapted  to  the  senti- 
ments and  needs  of  organisms  that  differ  from  one  another.  Only  slow 
hereditary  accumulations  allow  of  such  assimilation;  * 

but  his  whole  discussion  is  an  elaboration  of  the  concept  of  psychi- 
cal unity  applied  to  the  group,  this  unity  being  the  progressive 
result  of  the  law  of  adaptation,  the  individual  member  forced  to 
adapt  himself  to  the  group  and  the  group-soul  progressively 
changing  in  response  to  new  needs  until  it  has  attained  its  full 
growth  when  there  ensues  a  period  of  decline. 

Thus  with  the  progress  of  social  evolution  and  in  accordance 
with  the  law  of  adaptation  we  find  different  social  groupings  so 
united  by  a  common  physiological  and  psychological  heritage,  so 
bound  together  by  common  interests  and  ideals,  and  responding 
so  alike  to  a  common  stimulus  tha-t  we  may  well  speak  of  such 
groups  as  having  a  "  soul."  ^  Though  in  describing  the  soul  of  any 
particular  group  whether  city  or  state  we  may  use  the  normal 
frequency  curve  representing  all  the  people,  it  is  the  variation 

*  Psychology  of  Peoples,  p.  168.  *  Psychology  of  Peoples,  p.  190. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  174.  '  Ibid.,  p.  96. 

*  Developed  in  his  Crowds.  •  Ibid.,  pp.  6,  59, 146, 171. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 37 

representing  the  elite  that  really  characterizes  the  group.*  The 
mass  are  mere  imitators.  This  unity  thinks  as  one,  feels  as  one, 
wills  as  one.  Such  unity  and  homogeneity,  he  holds,  is  essential 
to  greatness,  hence  is  imperilled  by  large  scale  immigration.^ 

Le  Bon  is  open  to  criticism  chiefly  in  that  no  group  or  race  is  in 
fact  such  a  psychical  unity  as  he  portrays,  and  containing  as  each 
group  does  individuals  representing  all  stages  of  culture,  a  possible 
opening  is  afforded  for  foreign  influences  of  all  sorts.  Tarde  has 
been  his  most  successful  critic  in  this  particular  expressing  him- 
self thus:  — 

We  must,  from  now  on,  no  doubt,  abandon  such  artificial  differences  as  the 
phUosophy  of  history  established  between  successive  peoples.  ...  It  is  no 
longer  allowable  to  interpret  these  much  abused  expressions  "  the  genius  of  a 
people  or  race,"  "  the  genius  of  a  language,"  or  "  the  genius  of  a  religion,"  in 
the  way  that  some  of  our  predecessors,  including  even  Renan  and  Taine, 
imderstood  them.  These  embodiments  of  collective  character  .  .  .  were 
endowed  with  a  fictitious  personal  identity,  which  was,  however,  rather  in- 
definite. Certain  predispositions,  supposed  to  be  invincible,  for  some  partic- 
ular grammatical  types,  religious  conceptions,  or  governmental  forms,  were 
freely  attributed  to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  supposed  to  have 
an  insuperable  repugnance  to  borrowing  conceptions  or  institutions  from 
certain  of  their  rivals.  .  .  .  Sooner  or  later,  one  must  .  .  .  recognize  that 
the  genius  of  a  people  or  race,  instead  of  being  a  factor  superior  to  and  domi- 
nating the  characters  of  the  individuals  ...  is  simply  a  convenient  label,  or 
impersonal  synthesis,  of  these  individual  characteristics;  the  latter  alone  are 
real,  effective,  and  ever  in  activity.  .  .  .  The  impersonal,  collective  char- 
acter is  thus  the  product  rather  than  the  producer  of  the  infinitely  numerous 
individual  characters.' 

We  must  grant  to  Le  Bon,  however,  credit  for  his  exposition  of 
an  important  truth  needed  at  the  time  to  offset  the  over-emphasis 
being  laid  on  the  concept  of  society  as  a  biological  organism 
carried  so  far  especially  by  Schaffle  and  Lilienfeld.  There  is  a 
"  togetherness  "  in  every  social  group.  There  is  a  certain  com- 
munity of  thought  and  Ufe.  Working  for  ages  this  communal 
life  has  no  doubt  registered  its  effects  on  the  physical  organism 
including  brain  and  nervous  system.  To  him  credit  is  due,  also, 
for  placing  in  strong  light  the  truth  that  every  individual  is  born 
as  a  part  of  this  "  soul  '^  and  that  he  must  harmonize  his  life  with 

*  Psychology  of  Peoples,  p.  43.  *  Ihid.,  p.  13. 

'  Social  Laws  (Warren),  pp.  49  ff. 


138  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

it;  further,  that  social  progress  is  advanced  by  the  contact  and 
conflict  of  social  "  souls  "  by  processes  of  imitation,  assimilation, 
conflict  and  survival. 

Emile  Durkeeim  (1858-        ) 
Social  Realism 

Durkheim's  social  philosophy  is  founded  on  Comte^s  positivism 
modified  somewhat  by  Espinas'  social  realism,  and  the  Volks- 
wirtschaftslehre  of  Wagner  and  Schmoller  and  the  psychological 
teachings  of  Wundt.^  He  makes  advance  on  the  authors  pre- 
viously considered  in  two  particulars:  first,  in  his  elaboration 
of  the  thesis  that  society  has  an  objective  reality,  sui  generis,  and 
second,  that  this  solidarity  is  on  the  one  hand  mechanical,  based 
chiefly  on  consciousness  of  kind  and  expressed  in  repressive 
reactions  against  the  individual,  and  on  the  other  hand  organic, 
based  on  division  of  labor  and  consciousness  of  supplementary 
difference  and  expressed  in  family  life,  friendship,  co-operative 
endeavor  and  co-operative  right. 

I.  Society  as  a  Reality,  sui  generis.  This  concept  had  already 
been  developed  by  Comte,  SchaiOle,  Espinas,  Wagner,  Schmoller, 
et  ah,  and  was  being  developed  by  Le  Bon.  Comte,  however, 
considered  only  society,  not  societies;  Schaffle  connected  sociol- 
ogy immediately  with  biology  and  individual  psychology,  making 
the  individual,  for  the  most  part,  the  sociological  unit;  Espinas 
was  interested  chiefly  in  animal  societies  and  greatly  exaggerated 
the  conscious  social  activity  manifested  in  lower  orders  and 
approached  more  nearly  than  Durkheim  to  the  crass  realism  of 
mediaeval  philosophers.  The  German  school  was  interested 
chiefly  in  the  production  of  wealth  from  the  nationalistic  point  of 
view  together  with  the  historical  discussion  of  the  subject,  while 
Le  Bon  was  busied  with  a  study  of  the  phenomena  of  crowds,  and 
in  the  socio-psychical  characters  of  social  groups.  Durkheim's 
approach  is  purely  sociological.  His  aim  is  to  show  that  society 
is  not  merely  a  psychical  organism  but  one  that  is  socio-psychical, 
governed  by  laws  different  from  those  of  individual  psychology, 

^  Deploige,  Le  Conflit  de  la  Morale  et  de  la  Sociologie,  pp.  127,  128. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 39 

hence  the  need  of  a  special  department  of  investigation  with 
its  own  terminology,  —  viz.,  sociology.  This  interest  is  revealed 
in  his  Regies  de  la  methode  Sociologique,  published  in  1894,^  in 
which  we  find  the  thesis  that  "  society  is  not  a  mere  sum  of  in- 
dividuals, but  the  system  formed  by  their  association  represents  a 
specific  reality  which  has  its  own  characters.''  ^  Yet  Durkheim 
admits  that  there  is  no  objective  substratum  of  this  collective 
consciousness  corresponding  to  the  physiological  substratimi  of 
individual  consciousness. 

The  totality  of  the  beliefs  and  sentiments  common  to  the  average  members 
of  a  social  group  form  a  definite  system  which  has  its  own  life.  One  can  call 
it  the  collective  or  common  consciousness.  To  be  sure  it  does  not  have  a  unique 
organ  for  its  substratum,  for  it  is  by  definition,  diffused  throughout  the  extent 
of  the  society;  but  nevertheless  it  has  specific  characters  which  make  it  a 
distinct  reality.  It  is  independent  of  the  particular  conditions  in  which 
individuals  happen  to  be  placed ;  they  pass,  it  remains.  It  is  the  same  at  the 
north  and  in  the  middle  sections,  in  the  large  cities  and  in  the  small,  in  the 
different  professions.  Likewise  it  does  not  change  with  each  generation  but 
on  the  contrary  unites  them.  It  is  then  something  different  from  particular 
consciousness  although  it  is  realized  only  through  individuals.  It  is  the 
psychic  type  of  society,  —  a  type  which  has  its  own  properties,  conditions  of 
existence,  mode  of  development,  just  as  individuals  have,  although  of  a 
different  kind.  By  virtue  of  this  it  has  a  right  to  be  designated  by  a  special 
word.3 

While  the  above  is  true  in  a  certain  general  sense  of  a  sovereign 
group  or  "  people,'' — a  conception  elaborated  by  Le  Bon,  —  it  is 
also  true  and  more  specifically  so,  according  to  our  author,  of 
smaller  social  groupings  within  the  state,  as  the  family  and 
professions,  and  of  these  at  particular  times.*  "  The  study  of 
these  social  solidarities,"  he  holds,  "  is  the  special  province  of 
sociology."  5 

In  this  conception  we  are  getting  away  from  the  individual 
approach  to  sociology  as  made  by  Spencer,®  SchafHe  and  Mac- 
kenzie to  emphasize  the  reality  of  the  group  over  against  the 

*  Cf.  Deploige,  op.  cit.,  pp.  156  f. 

2  Regies f  p.  127,  quoted  by  Deploige,  op.  cit.,  p.  157. 
'  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social,  p.  84. 

*  "  Ce  qui  existe  et  vit  reellement,  ce  sent  les  formes  particulieres  de  la  solidarity, 
la  solidarity  domestique,  la  solidarite  professionnelle,  la  solidarite  nationale,  celle 
d'hier,  celle  d'aujourd'hui,  etc.     Chacune  a  sa  nature  propre."  —  Ibid.,  p.  69. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  69.  8  Ibid.,  p.  382. 


140  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

individual,  prior  to  the  individual  and  making  hini  what  he  is,  — 
in  this  going  back  to  Comte  only  with  refinements.  That  is, 
Durkheim  gives  specific  content  to  the  concept  of  society  as  a 
sodo-psychical  organism:  it  is  the  psychical  somewhat  over 
against  the  individual  which  forms  that  particular  spiritual  en- 
vironment into  which  he  is  born  and  which  moulds  his  life.  This 
environment,  moreover,  is  not  one  but  multiple.  The  individual 
is  born  into  and  moulded  by  the  psychic  somewhat  represented  by 
his  particular  family,  later  by  that  of  the  school  he  attends,  later 
still  by  that  of  his  vocational  associations.  Then  there  is  the 
specific  socio-psychic  moulding  power  of  his  community  and 
state. 

2.  The  Nature  of  Social  Solidarity.  —  This  social  solidarity, 
according  to  our  author,  is  of  two  kinds,  mechanical  and  organic. 
His  purpose  in  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social  is  to  work  out 
a  positive  ethics  and  in  order  to  have  an  objective  "  common  to 
all,"  —  an  object  for  scientific  investigation,  —  all  phenomena  of 
the  inner  life  of  individuals  must  be  correlated  to  objective  ex- 
pressions. The  social  consciousness  expresses  itself  in  laws, 
institutions,  etc.,  and  these  are  of  a  nature  to  be  studied  scienti- 
fically. The  solidarity  of  society  based  on  similarities  or 
"consciousness  of  kind"  is  expressed  in  mores  and  crystallized 
primarily  in  "  repressive  right."  "  The  bond  of  social  solidarity 
to  which  repressive  right  corresponds  is  that  whose  rupture  consti- 
tutes crime.  .  .  .  One  knows  what  the  bond  is,  then,  by  know- 
ing the  particular  crime  which  is  considered  most  important.  .  .  . 
The  essential  characters  of  crime  are  those  which  are  found  where- 
ever  there  is  crime  whatever  may  be  the  social  type.  Now  the 
only  characters  which  are  or  have  been  recognized  as  common  to 
all  are  the  following:  (i)  crime  clashes  with  the  sentiments  which 
are  possessed  by  all  normal  individuals  of  the  society  under 
consideration;  (2)  these  sentiments  are  strong;  (3)  they  are 
definite.  Crime,  then,  is  the  act  which  clashes  with  the  strong 
and  definite  states  of  collective  consciousness."  ^  The  difference 
between  the  immoral  act  and  the  crime,  he  holds,  is  merely  that 
the  former  violates  sentiments  diffused  in  individuals  throughout 

*  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Socialj  Table  of  Contents,  p.  462. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  141 

society  whereas  the  latter  violates  those  sentiments  held  so 
generally  and  so  strongly  that  the  group  reacts  as  a  unit.  He 
shows  that  crime  cannot  be  explained  wholly  on  the  basis  of 
disutility  because  many  acts  are  tolerated  which  are  far  more 
disuseful  than  many  which  are  regarded  as  crimes;  yet  his  dis- 
cussion shows  that  the  principle  of  utility  is  after  all  of  great 
importance.^ 

The  social  reaction  expressed  in  repressive  right  is  called 
mechanical  for  it  corresponds  to  the  instinctive  reactions  of 
biological  organisms  against  irritants.  The  object  of  the  reaction 
is  to  be  free  from  the  irritant,  and  on  the  whole  the  reaction  of 
society  against  crime,  though  largely  instinctive  and  irrational,  is 
useful.^  This  mechanical  solidarity  expressed  in  repressive  right 
is  especially  characteristic  of  primitive  societies,  the  determina- 
tion of  crime  and  punishment  among  higher  societies  having  a 
more  rational  basis,^  though  even  here  the  function  of  punish- 
ment is  to  conserve  the  feeling  of  social  solidarity  rather  than 
reform  the  criminal.'*  "  Every  strong  state  of  consciousness,''  he 
says,  "  is  a  source  of  life;  it  is  an  essential  factor  of  our  general 
vitality.  As  a  result,  everything  which  tends  to  weaken  it 
diminishes  and  depresses  us.  .  .  .  It  is  inevitable  then  that  we 
should  react  vigorously  against  any  cause  which  threatens  such 
diminution;  that  we  arouse  ourselves  to  remove  it  in  order  that 
we  may  maintain  the  integrity  of  consciousness."  ^  This  is  as 
true  of  social  as  of  individual  consciousness.* 

Durkheim  explains  the  quasi-religious  character  of  criminal 
procedure  (le  droit  penal)  as  due  to  the  fact  that  the  sentiment  of 
vengeance  expressed  in  passional  reaction  against  the  criminal  is 
felt  by  each  member  of  society  yet  not  as  a  sentiment  having 
personal  origin  or  reference  but  rather  as  an  echo  of  something 

^  No  one  asserts  that  the  social  struggle  is  so  keen  as  to  eliminate  everything 
disuseful;  yet  on  the  whole  and  in  the  long  run  social  consciousness  is  able  to 
determine  and  does  detennine  the  socially  disuseful  and  the  society  that  fails  to 
determine  its  crimes  on  this  basis  is  on  the  road  to  destruction.  Cf .  Hall,  Crime 
in  its  Relation  to  Social  Progress.  This  seems  to  be  Durkheim's  position.  Cf. 
De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social,  pp.  87  f.,  114  f. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  89  flf.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  91  f.  *  Ihid.,  pp.  94  f. 

^  Ihid.,  p.  103.  ^  Ihid.,  pp.  109,  114. 


142  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

from  without  and  this  something  without,  —  which  is  in  fact  the 
collective  consciousness,  —  is  conceived  as  a  superior  power,  real 
or  ideal.  This  conception,  though  natural  and  necessary,  is 
nevertheless  illusory  according  to  our  author.^ 

This  mechanical  social  solidarity,  expressing  itself  in  repressive 
right  and  punishment,  is  negative,  but  there  is  a  positive  social 
solidarity  which  expresses  itself  in  co-operation,  in  division  of 
labor,  and  co-operative  law  having  as  its  psychological  correlate 
the  consciousness  of  supplementary  difference. 

This  elaboration  of  the  concept  of  organic  solidarity  based  on 
division  of  labor  and  consciousness  of  supplementary  difference 
though  having  antecedents  in  Comte  and  Bain,  is  the  one  great 
contribution  of  Durkheim  and  supplements  in  a  much-needed 
way  the  concept  of  consciousness  of  kind,  the  corner-stone  of 
Giddings'  system. 

The  function  of  the  division  of  labor  is  not  to  produce  civiliza- 
tion, he  holds,  but  to  give  birth  to  groups  which,  without  it, 
would  not  exist. 

It  is  possible  that  the  economic  utility  of  division  of  labor  counts  for  some- 
thing in  this  result  but  in  any  case  its  social  value  far  exceeds  the  sphere  of 
economic  interests,  for  it  results  in  the  establishment  of  a  social  and  moral 
order  sui  generis.  Individuals  are  bound  together  who  without  it  would  be 
independent.  In  place  of  developing  separately  they  unite  in  their  efforts. 
They  are  solidare  and  with  a  soKdarity  which  does  not  reveal  itself  merely  in 
the  brief  moments  of  exchange  of  services  but  extends  much  further,  as  for 
example  in  conjugal  solidarity  among  modem  nations.* 

This  division  of  labor  gives  rise  to  "  consciousness  of  supple- 
mentary difference "  which  has  increasing  importance  with 
advancing  civilization.  Durkheim  finds  biological  and  anthro- 
pological basis  for  this  as  well  as  economic  and  psychological. 
Practically  the  only  functional  difference  between  the  sexes  at 
first,  he  holds,  was  that  due  to  sex,  and  in  this,  too,  we  have  the 
physiological  basis  of  consciousness  of  supplementary  difference; 
but  with  division  of  labor  and  functional  differentiations  came 
increasing  structural  changes,  and  pari  passu  increasing  psy- 
chological, economic  and  social  differentiations  making  ever 
greater  opportunity  for  the  play  of  the  attractive  force  based  on 

*  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social,  pp.  107,  108.  '  Ibid.,  p.  63. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 43 

consciousness  of  supplementary  difference.  The  result  of  this 
process  has  been  ever  increasing  organic  solidarity  in  societies. 

One  of  the  strongest  proofs  of  his  position  he  finds  in  the  de- 
crease of  mechanical  solidarity  and  increase  of  organic  solidarity 
as  revealed  in  the  decrease  of  repressive  rights  and  criminal  laws 
and  increase  of  co-operative  rights  and  laws.^ 

The  social  ideal  is  a  society  where  the  division  of  labor  produces 
such  a  condition  that  social  inequalities  express  natural  inequali- 
ties. Under  such  normal  conditions  we  have  the  greatest  possible 
individual  and  social  well-being. 

The  only  cause  which  determines  the  manner  by  which  work  is  divided  is 
diversity  of  capacity.  By  reason  of  this  the  division  is  made  on  this  basis. 
Thus  there  is  realized  of  itself  a  harmony  between  the  constitution  of  each 
individual  and  his  condition.  One  may  say  that  this  is  not  always  sufficient 
to  content  men;  that  there  are  those  whose  desires  exceed  their  abilities.  It 
is  true  but  such  cases  are  exceptions  not  the  rule.  Normally  man  finds  happi- 
ness in  filling  his  natural  place  in  society;  his  needs  are  in  correspondence 
with  his  means.  Thus  in  the  organism  each  organ  claims  only  that  amount 
of  aliment  proportionate  to  its  dignity .2 

Most,  I  think,  would  say  that  this  was  the  ideal  rather  than  the 
normally  actual.  But  even  as  an  ideal  it  is  suggestive,  and  as  the 
disparity  between  the  actual  and  the  ideal  is  the  background  for 
individual  and  social  telic  endeavor,  we  have  in  this  condition  the 
chief  sphere  for  the  process  of  active  as  against  passive  adapta- 
tion. And  indeed  Durkheim  recognizes  this  but  considers  as 
normal  what  we  should  term  ideal  and  as  abnormal  what  statis- 
tics by  use  of  a  frequency  curve  would  doubtless  show  to  be 
normal.  He  seems  to  have  been  misled  by  Comte's  theory  of 
society  as  a  developing  personality,  by  the  general  organic 
analogy  and  by  Galton's  theory  of  natural  ability.  The  law  of 
adaptation  does  not  work  so  rigidly  in  social  evolution  at  present 
as  to  bring  about  the  survival  of  those  societies  only  where  divi- 
sion of  labor  is  based  on  natural  capacity  to  the  degree  assumed 
by  our  author.  Indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  we  have  no  data  avail- 
able which  afford  proof  of  such  differences  in  ability  as  assumed 
by  Galton  and  Durkheim. 

*  De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social,  ch.  V.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  421,  422. 


144  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Durkheim  recognizes  that  society  by  reglementation  must 
furnish  equality  of  opportunity  for  all  and  prevent  that  injustice 
which  is  the  result  of  external  restraint  based  on  any  other 
principle  than  that  of  ability.  But  society  must  go  further  than 
he  suggests.  It  must  train  its  members  to  perform  those  func- 
tions most  needed  by  society,  and  when  the  need  of  the  group  is 
made  the  standard  of  the  value  of  the  individual  to  the  group  we 
will  have  to  change  the  current  conception  of  natural  capacity 
and  ability. 

While  indebted  to  Durkheim  for  his  elaboration  of  the  concept 
of  social  solidarity  based  on  consciousness  of  kind  and  expressed 
in  repressive  right,  we  are  more  indebted  to  him  for  his  insistence 
that  consciousness  of  supplementary  difference  is  both  a  cause 
and  a  result  of  division  of  labor,  and  that  division  of  labor  is  both 
a  cause  and  result  of  social  solidarity.^  Though  he  holds  that  this 
social  soHdarity  and  social  consciousness  are  objective  and  real 
with  laws  different  from  those  of  biology  or  individual-psychology, 
yet  he  recognizes  that  it  has  no  organic  substratiun  corresponding 
to  that  of  individual  consciousness. 

Fouillee  and  Le  Bon  have  been,  perhaps,  among  the  ablest 
critics  of  this  social  reaHsm,  as  it  has  been  called,^  but  out  of  the 
controversy  has  come  the  truth  now  generally  recognized  that 
there  is  a  psychical  somewhat  over  against  the  individual  which 
determines  his  life  at  least  in  general  outHne.  This  "  somewhat  " 
may  be  organized  as  a  fraternity,  church,  or  state,  but  in  any  case 
it  is  the  great  moulding  and  assimilating  force  in  society.  As  in 
each  organization  there  is  need  of  division  of  labor,  and  as  along 
with  consciousness  of  kind  man  has  a  consciousness  of  supple- 
mentary difference,  so  in  each  organization  we  find  diversity  of 
capacity  and  temperament  yet  fused  into  one  whole,  made  the 
stronger,  usually,  by  the  very  fact  of  these  differences. 

Now  every  such  "  unity  "  is  subject  to  the  general  law  of 
adaptation.  Not  only  does  it  react  passively  to  its  social  environ- 
ment, but  to  succeed  in  the  highest  degree  it  must  take  thought. 

1  For  an  opposite  view,  see  Taussig,  Principles  of  Economics,  i,  p.  38. 
*  Yet  there  is  practically  no  difference  between  the  fundamental  conception  of 
Durkheim  and  his  critics.     Cf.  Fouillee,  Psychologic  du  peuplefranqais,  pp.  10  f. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  1 45 

It  must  secure  inner  cohesion  and  strength  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  elaborated  by  Durkheim  et  aL,  and  must  have  as  its 
ideal  that  function  in  the  larger  whole  for  which  it  is  adapted. 
It  must,  too,  not  only  find  its  place  but  make  its  place  by  seeing  a 
social  need  as  yet  imrealized  by  others. 

Further  Development  of  the  Organic  Concept 

In  the  use  of  the  organic  concept  as  applied  to  society,  we  have 
noted  development  along  several  lines.  First,  from  the  vague- 
ness of  the  concept  of  society  as  used  by  Comte  and  Schaffle, 
through  the  nationaHsm  of  most  of  the  German  school,  to  the 
variable  definiteness  of  the  concept  as  used  by  Durkheim;  i.  e., 
with  him  any  social  group  or  unity  becomes  a  society  under 
certain  conditions.^  It  is  well  to  note  in  passing  that  others  con- 
sider society,  not  as  an  object  or  unity,  but  rather  as  a  process.^ 

A  second  line  of  development  is  in  the  conception  of  the  kind  or 
grade  of  organism  to  which  society  is  analogous.  Spencer  held  that 
society  could  be  compared  only  to  the  lowest  forms  of  biological 
organisms  but  today,  with  increasing  emphasis  on  the  psychical, 
the  tendency  is  to  compare  it  to  the  most  highly-developed  person- 
ality, endowed  with  self-consciousness  and  intelUgent,  purposeful 
volition.^  With  this  has  come,  too,  for  the  most  part,  emphasis 
on  centralized  government,  the  analogue  of  the  ever  increasing 
power  of  the  central  nervous  system  in  biological  organisms. 

A  third  line  has  been  in  a  change  of  emphasis  from  analysis  of 
the  structure  of  the  organism  as  with  Spencer,  through  that  of 
function  as  with  Schaffle,  to  an  analysis  of  social  consciousness  as 
with  Durkheim,  and  of  the  laws  of  social  and  socio-psychical 
development  as  with  the  authors  we  are  about  to  consider. 

Before  passing  to  a  discussion  of  this  last  phase,  which  carries 
us  beyond  the  organicists,  we  must  consider  briefly  some  further 
developments  of  the  concept  of  social  consciousness. 

^  Cf.  Boodin,  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  xLx,  p.  37. 

2  For  an  illuminating  discussion  of  the  theories  of  society  as  held  by  German 
sociologists,  cf.  Jacobs,  German  Sociology,  pp.  31  f.  EMwood,  Sociology  in  its 
Psychological  Aspects,  pp.  382-395.    Boodin,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

'  Boodin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37  f.    Deploige,  op.  cit.,  p.  161. 


146  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  the  writings  of  Durkheim  is  brought  out  clearly  the  concept 
of  social  consciousness  with  some  kind  of  objective  reality,  — 
whether  phenomenal  or  ontological  is  not  discussed.  Granted 
that  there  is  some  kind  of  real  objective  unity  that  is  applicable 
to  human  beings  in  association  whether  phenomenal  or  ontologi- 
cal, static  or  dynamic,  whether  predominatingly  mediated  by 
thought,  feeling,  will,  or  a  combination  of  these,  we  have  next  to 
enquire  if  there  is  anything  in  this  unity  corresponding  to  the 
self-consciousness  characteristic  of  highly-developed  man.  This 
seems  to  be  the  bone  of  contention  among  social  psychologists 
today,  together  with  that  other  related  and  perplexing  problem 
as  to  the  relation  between  the  individual  mind  and  the  social 
mind.  Discussion  of  the  development  of  thought  along  this  line 
would  carry  us  through  the  whole  range  of  recent  socio-psychical 
literature,  but  we  may  call  attention  in  passing  to  James*  doc- 
trine of  selves  and  self-consciousness  as  of  special  importance. 
According  to  him  we  have  a  "  hierarchy  of  the  mes.^^  "  A  toler- 
ably unanimous  opinion,"  he  says,  "  ranges  the  different  selves  of 
which  a  man  may  be  '  seized  and  possessed,'  and  the  consequent 
different  orders  of  his  self-regard  in  a  hierarchical  scale,  with  the 
bodily  me  at  the  bottom,  the  spiritual  me  at  the  top,  and  the 
extra-corporeal  material  selves  and  the  various  social  selves 
between."  * 

This  concept,  making  the  approach  to  the  discussion  of  social 
self-consciousness  from  the  point  of  view  of  biology  and  individual 
psychology  as  do  SchafSe,  Fouillee,  Ratzenhofer,  McDougall, 
Giddings  and  most  of  the  other  sociologists  and  social  psycholo- 
gists, is  repudiated  by  Dewey,  Cooley,^  Boodin^  and  a  few  others 
who  make  the  approach  from  the  point  of  view  of  spirituaHstic 
monism  and  by  Gmnplowicz  from  the  point  of  view  of  positivistic- 
social-pluraKsm,  all  of  whom  arrive  at  what  might  legitimately  be 
termed  social  realism.  According  to  them  individual  conscious- 
ness and  self-consciousness  are  differentiations  of  original  group 
consciousness.     A  clarifying  discussion  of  the  whole  subject  is  the 

^  Briefer  Course,  p.  190.     Cf.  McDougall,  Social  Psychology,  chs.  VII  and  VIII. 
*  Social  Organization,  ch.  I;  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  ch.  I. 
»  Op.  cit. 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY 


147 


analysis  of  social  mind  by  M.  M.  Davis.^ 
follows:  — 


His  outline  is  as 


Social  Mind 


Static 
Aspect 


Dynamic 
Aspect 


Objective 


Subjective 


The  sum  of  common  mental  con- 
tent (ideas  and  sentiments)  of  the 
members  of  a  society. 
The  common  mental  qualities  and 
characteristics  of  such  members. 
Common  mental  content,  com- 
mon mental  qualities  and  charac- 
teristics, which  are  realized  by 
these  members  to  be  common. 
Common    mental    content    and 
qualities  so  realized,  and  function- 
ing therefore  as  dynamic  social 
agents  up)on  the  individuals  dur- 
ing childhood  and  maturity. 


Davis  seems  to  feel  that  by  social  mind  we  should  mean  3 
and  4,  both  subjective  aspects,  the  former  static  whereas  the 
latter  is  dynamic. 

In  its  essence  and  practical  important  bearings,  the  social  mind  is  to  be 
viewed  subjectively.  Common  beliefs,  sentiments,  and  determinations, 
exist  only  in  individual  minds.  They  influence  individual  thoughts  and  acts. 
They  are  essentially  independent  of  any  individual  in  the  sense  that  they 
would  continue  to  be  influential  if  any  one  man  containing  them  was  removed 
from  society.  But  we  call  these  common  beliefs,  etc.,  a  social  mind,  not 
merely  because  they  are  held  in  common  but  because  of  something  more. 
They  become  social  and  make  of  society  a  psychic  unity,  because  of  the  way 
in  which  individuals  regard  them.  They  are  realized  to  be  common.  Be- 
liefs or  tendencies,  once  thought  of  as  common,  acquire  a  new  relation  to  the 
individual  because  of  this  realization.  They  become  d3aiamic  agents, 
influencing  action  directly  and  powerfully. 

This  is  EUwood's  position:  "  Society  as  a  group  of  individuals 
carrying  on  a  common  Hfe  process,  thinks,  feels  and  wills  only 
through  its  individual  members.  Society  .  .  .  must  be  thought 
of  as  a  complex  unity  made  up  of  many  individual  psychic  imits 
that  are  in  interaction,  continually  affecting  and  modifying  each 
other,  so  that  the  only  imity  which  we  have  in  society  is  a  unity  of 
process."  ^ 

Worms  certainly  made  a  good  point  when  he  held  that  social 
consciousness  was  like  the  personal  ego  because  the  essential 
characteristic  of  being  is  doing.     "  Was  wirkt,  wie  das  sodale 

*  Columbia  University  Studies^  xxxiii,  p.  68.  '  Op.  ciL,  p.  330. 


148  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Bewusstsein,  muss  ein  Wesen  sein  und  da  es  Bewusstsein  ist,  muss 
es  sich  denken."  ^  Yet  this  does  not  prove  ontological  reality. 
Men  can  work  together  for  a  common  end  without  having  a 
consciousness  of  corporate  or  socio-psychic  continuity  as  is  true 
of  normal  hiunan  beings.  The  "  constellation  "  or  "  fusion  " 
which  is  the  essence  of  the  social  reality,^  and  the  background  of 
social  self-consciousness,  if  there  be  such,  is  temporary.  No  one, 
so  far  as  I  am  aware,  has  shown  that  there  is  anywhere  in  the 
social  order  a  consciousness  of  socio-personal  continuity,  —  of 
identity  persisting  in  change, — such  as  characterizes  the  personal 
ego. 
We  conclude  as  follows:  — 

1 .  There  is  one  cosmic  process,  differentiated  in  the  social  order 
into  individuals  and  into  social  groupings. 

2.  The  individuals  and  groups  become  organized  on  the  basis 
of  consciousness  of  kind  and  consciousness  of  supplementary  dif- 
ference, having  as  their  basis  individual  and  group  interests. 

A  I        3.   There  is  mental  interaction,  inter-stimulation  and  response, 

resulting  in  a  phenomenon  well  expressed  by  the  term  fusion. 

4.  The  process  of  fusion  or  creative  synthesis  is,  on  the  one 

/Uv^  hand,  a  process  of  progressive  co-adaptation  among  the  members 

f^^^*^-^^^"*^     and,  on  the  other,  a  process  of  progressive  adaptation  of  the 

^*T^\V- '    particular  social  imit  to  its  physical  and  spiritual  environment. 

'  15-  There  is  more  or  less  agreement  in  ideals,  purposes,  etc. 

6.  At  times  there  is  unanimity  in  feeling  due  to  similar  re- 
sponse to  a  common  stimulus. 

7.  There  is  a  permanent  yet  ever-changing  core  in  every  social 
organization  or  organism  to  which  the  spiritual  part  of  every 
individual  member  is  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  assimilated. 

8.  This  core  of  social  personality,  if  one  cares  to  use  the  term, 
exercises  constraint  on  each  individual,  and  forms  the  background 
of  the  group,  but  is  constantly  modified  by  the  total  changing 
situation. 

9.  Each  individual  is  at  times  conscious  of  his  organic  relation 
to  the  various  groups  to  which  he  belongs;  i.  e.,  his  self-conscious- 

^  Barth,  op.  ciL,  p.  162. 

'  Cf.  Boodin,  op.  cU.,  pp.  20,  38. 


^  I 


THE  ORGANIC  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY  I49 

ness  and  self -regarding  sentiment  extend  to  include  the  group  and 
he  feels  or  believes  that  others  are  going  through  a  similar  expe- 
rience, l^ut  there  is  no  group  consciousness  of  this  persisting  core 
of  social  personality  corresponding  to  that  of  the  individual  ego. 

10.  This  gives  ground  for  the  belief  that  the  individual  per-  •. 
sonality  has  some  kind  or  degree  of  ontological  reality  not  pos-  11 
sessed  by  any  group. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS 

Turning  from  those  who  have  emphasized  the  importance  of 
physical  factors  in  social  evolution,  as  Buckle,  Ratzel  and  Ripley, 
from  those  whose  argument  is  based  chiefly  on  a  deductive  appli- 
cation of  the  neo-Darwinian  formula  of  biological  evolution,  as 
Nietzsche,  Kidd,  Galton,  Pearson  and  Lapouge,  from  those,  too, 
whose  interest  has  been  largely  philosophical  or  socio-psychical 
and  who  have  discussed  some  theoretical  principles  of  funda- 
\  mental  importance  to  our  subject  as  the  organicists,  Iwe  turn  now 
to  some  representative  writers  who  have  emphasized  the  necessity 
of  studying  the  process  of  social  evolution  inductively  to  find  out 
the  laws  and  forces  of  social  development/l  (These  writers  differ 
greatly  among  themselves  as  they  are  intereste3  primarily  in  social 
origins  as  the  anthropologists,  or  in  the  whole  process  as  the  his- 
torical school,  or  again  in  the  forces  now  at  work  as  the  economists 
and  social  psychologists  J  They  differ  also  as  they  try  to  find  some 
one  all-embracing  law  or  principle  corresponding  to  the  law  of 
gravitation  or  posit  a  number  of  distinct  laws  and  forces.  ^  A  third 
line  of  cleavage  is  as  to  whether  the  individual  socius  is  made  the 
point  of  departure  and  society  explained  as  some  kind  of  combina- 
tion of  sociij  or  whether  the  group  is  taken  as  the  unitj  f  A  fourth 
distinction  might  be  made  according  as  they  recognize  a  mutual 
hatred  and  struggle  as  the  chief  characteristic  of  primitive  or 
"  natural  "  man  or  sympathy  and  mutual  aid;  and  here  again  a 
strictly  logical  classification  of  writers  is  impossible  for  they  over- 
lap at  so  many  pointsj^ 

The  anthropological  and  historical  schools  have  met  with 
especially  great  difficulties,  as  we  noted  in  the  discussion  of 
Spencer,  because  of  the  uncertainty  connected  with  social  origins.^ 
With  the  discovery  of  relics  of  htunan  ingenuity  in  geological 

1  Of.  Boas,  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  pp.  99, 182. 
ISO 


THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  I51 

strata  and  also  of  portions  of  the  human  skeleton  some  basis 
has  been  fomid  for  scientific  generalizations.^ 

Besides  relics  of  bygone  ages  and  peoples,  anthropologists 
have  endeavored  to  get  light  on  prehistoric  conditions  from  the 
following  sources:  (i)  operations  of  modem  savages;  (2)  the 
publications  of  historians  and  travelers  who  were  acquainted 
with  savage  tribes  long  ago;  (3)  the  languages  of  cultured  and 
uncultured  races;  (4)  the  makeshifts  and  contrivances  of  chil- 
dren and  of  the  folk  who  never  receive  letters-patent  upon  their 
devices.^  But  the  presupposition  in  every  case  except  that  of 
relics  is  that  savages  of  these  later  centuries  are  like  those  of 
earliest  time.  This  assumption  is  based  on  some  logical  principle 
of  classification  as  with  Spencer  and  De  Greef,  on  the  theory  of 
recapitulation  ^  as  with  Lilienfeld  and  many  pedagogical  writers, 
or  on  the  theory  that  mind  is  essentially  the  same  in  its  operations 
and  manifestations  everywhere  and  in  all  ages.  This  last  is 
accepted  so  generally  today  that  it  must  be  regarded  as  of  scienti- 
fic worth  though  even  here  the  principle  must  be  used  with 
caution.'^  Anthropologists  are  generally  agreed  today,  also,  that 
social  development  has  not  been  linear,  but  by  a  process,  either 
similar  to  that  termed  by  Ward  "  sympodial,"  or  irregular,  deter- 
mined by  environmental  conditions. 

At  the  other  extreme  of  those  who  emphasize  social  origins  and 
genetic  development  is  T.  N.  Carver,  who  holds  that  "  all  past 
development  .  .  .  must  be  accounted  for  on  the  ground  of  forces 
and  factors  now  at  work,  and  which  can  be  observed  at  first  hand 
by  the  student  ";  and  that  "  it  is  in  this  study  of  first-hand  mate- 
rials, in  the  observation  of  social  activities  about  us,  that  we  must 
get  our  clue  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  in  social  and  politi- 
cal affairs."  ^ 

^  Keith,  Ancient  Times;  Keane,  Ethnology,  ch.  IV. 

^  Mason,  Origin  of  Invention,  pp.  28,  29.     Cf.  Boas,  op.  cit.,  p.  182. 

'  For  criticism  of  this  theory,  see  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  p.  21;  Mason, 
op.  cit.,  p.  45;  Thomdike,  Educational  Psychology,  i,  pp.  248  ff. 

*  Cf.  Boas,  op.  cit.,  pp.  184-195;  Ross,  Foundations  of  Sociology,  p.  61;  Tylor, 
Early  History  of  Man,  pp.  5,  190.  The  chief  difficulty  is  to  find  primitive  savages, 
practically  all,  even  when  visited  and  "  written  up  "  hundreds  of  years  ago,  having 
come  in  contact  with  higher  or  lower  cultures. 

^  Sociology  and  Social  Progress,  p.  5. 


152  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

It  is  difficult  to  select  representatives  from  the  large  and  grow- 
ing number  of  anthropologists  who  have  contributed  to  our  sub- 
ject.^ Spencer  devoted  much  of  his  sociology  to  a  discussion  of 
primitive  man  but  was  led  astray  by  his  principle  of  classification 
and  by  reports  which  have  since  been  corrected.  More  recent 
investigations  have  tended  to  discredit  his  teaching  concerning 
the  intellectual  and  emotional  equipment  and  beliefs  of  primitive 
man.2  We  will  review  in  this  chapter  the  main  theses  of  Sumner 
and  Boas,  the  former  approaching  the  subject  from  the  neo- 
Darwinian  point  of  view,  the  latter  emphasizing  the  influence 
of  environment  and  opportunity.  We  will  also  touch  upon  the 
conclusions  of  some  others,  adding  suggestions  as  to  the  value  of 
the  concept  of  adaptation  in  anthropological  interpretations. 

William  G.  Sumner  (1840-1910) 
Folkways 

Although  Sumner  was  primarily  a  sociologist,  we  have  in 
Folkways  a  mine  of  classified  information  concerning  social  origins 
which  is  invaluable  if  one  would  appreciate  the  place  of  adapta- 
tion in  the  development  of  folkways  and  mores  among  primitive 
groups.' 

Simmer's  general  attitude  of  laissezfaire  is  brought  out  in  his 
earlier  book  What  Social  Classes  Owe  to  Each  Other.  In  this  later 
work  we  have  the  neo-Darwinian  formula  applied  to  the  develop- 
ment of  folkways  and  social  institutions.  The  main  thesis  is  that 
"  the  mores  are  always  right ";  but  this  is  not  to  be  taken  abso- 
lutely. The  meaning  is  that  the  mores  furnish  the  standard  of 
right  for  each  group  at  every  particular  period.*  Although  many 
rites  and  ceremonies  grew  up  as  a  response  to  what  he  terms  the 
"  aleatory  element "  or  luck,**  and  many  were  positively  injuri- 
ous,* yet  on  the  whole,  and  in  the  long  run,  only  those  groups 
survived  who  built  up  their  folkways  and  mores  on  the  principle 
of  utility. 

1  See  ch.  VI,  review  of  W.  Z.  Ripley. 

*  Thomas,  Source  Book,  pp.  143  ff.;  Angell,  Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology, 
pp.  247  f.;   Keith,  op.  cit.^  p.  26. 

»  For  distinction,  see  Folkways,  ch.  I.  *  Ihid.y  p.  6. 

<  Ibid.,  pp.  28,  58,  521  f.,  532.  «  Ihid.y  pp.  26  f. 


THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 53 

Granting  that  all  origins  are  lost  in  mystery,^  he  holds  that  by 
study  of  primitive  life  as  observed  and  recorded  during  the  past 
few  centuries,  and  of  the  forces  now  at  work,  we  are  able  to  reach 
valid  conclusions  as  to  the  development  of  mores.  How  these 
arise,  largely  by  an  unconscious  process  of  trial  and  error,  and 
how  they  are  related  to  the  folkways  is  well  brought  out  in  a 
recapitulation  he  gives  of  his  preliminary  analysis:  — 

Men  in  groups  are  under  life  conditions;  they  have  needs  which  are  simi- 
lar under  the  state  of  the  life  conditions;  the  relations  of  the  needs  to  the 
conditions  are  interests  under  the  heads  of  hunger,  love,  vanity  and  fear; 
efforts  of  numbers  at  the  same  time  to  satisfy  interests  produce  mass  phenom- 
ena which  are  folkways  by  virtue  of  uniformity,  repetition,  and  wide  con- 
currence. The  folkways  are  attended  by  pleasure  or  pain  according  as  they 
are  well  fitted  for  the  purpose.  Pain  forces  reflection  and  observation  of 
some  relation  between  acts  and  welfare.  At  this  point  the  prevailing  world 
philosophy  (beginning  with  goblinism)  suggests  explanations  and  inferences, 
which  become  entangled  with  judgments  of  expediency.  However,  the  folk- 
ways take  on  a  philosophy  of  right  living  and  a  life  policy  for  welfare.  Then 
they  become  mores,  and  they  may  be  developed  by  inferences  from  the  phi- 
losophy or  the  rules  in  the  endeavor  to  satisfy  needs  without  pain.  Hence 
they  undergo  improvement  and  are  made  consistent  with  each  other.* 

Sumner  makes  the  group  the  sociological  unit  and  evaluates 
individuals  and  classes  according  to  their  production  of  social 
utilities,  holding  that  societal  value  depends  on  a  harmonious 
combination  of  physical,  economic,  moral  and  intellectual  ele- 
ments and  is  measured  roughly  by  income  from  work  contributed 
to  the  industrial  organization,  whether  by  a  member  of  the 
"  masses  ''  or  by  a  genius.' 

A  race  or  group  is  classified  by  means  of  the  normal  frequency 
curve,*  but  the  masses  which  determine  the  classification  along 
certain  lines  are  never  the  cause  of  progress  nor  the  builders  of 
institutions  but  these  results  come  "  by  the  selection  of  the  lead- 
ing men  and  classes  who  get  control  of  the  collective  power  of  the 
society  and  direct  it  to  the  activities  which  will  (as  they  think) 
serve  the  interests  which  they  regard  as  most  important."  ^ 

The  mores  make  the  right,  not  only  because  there  is  no  other 
standard  for  the  group,  but  because  they  are  backed  by  force,  and 
"  nothing  but  might  has  ever  made  right."  * 

»  Folkways,  p.  7.  »  Ihid.,  p.  41.  *  Ihid.,  p.  49. 

*  Ihid.,  p.  34.  *  Ihid,,  p.  43.  «  Ihid.y  pp.  64,  65. 


154  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Sumner  carries  his  discussion  on  to  the  development  of  the 
"  ethos  "  or  group  character,^  —  a  concept  corresponding  to  that 
of  "  soul  "  as  used  by  Le  Bon.  The  greater  part  of  the  book  is 
given  to  illustrations  of  the  above  principles  concerning  the 
development  of  such  mores  as  slavery,  abortion,  infanticide, 
killing  of  the  old,  cannibalism,  sex  relations,  and  those  connected 
with  social  codes,  kinship,  blood  revenge,  primitive  justice,  social 
harlotry,  etc. 

Although  principal  attention  is  given  to  the  spontaneous  devel- 
opment of  folkways  and  mores,  Sumner  makes  place  for  criticism 
and  improvement.  As  these  can  come  only  from  the  elite,  he 
advocates  critical  ability  as  an  important  element  in  education. 
"  It  is  only  by  high  mental  discipline,"  he  says,  "  that  we  can  be 
trained  to  rise  above  that  atmosphere  [of  the  mores]  and  form 
rational  judgments  on  current  cases.  This  mental  independence 
and  ethical  power  are  the  highest  products  of  education."  ^ 
Further  on  he  says,  "  In  the  organization  of  modern  society  the 
schools  are  the  institutional  apparatus  by  which  the  inheritance 
of  experience  and  knowledge,  —  the  whole  mental  outfit  of  the 
race,  —  is  transmitted  to  the  young.  .  .  .  The  transmission 
ought  to  be  faithful,  but  not  without  criticism.  The  reaction  of 
free  judgment  and  taste  will  keep  the  mores  fresh  and  active,  and 
the  schools  are  undoubtedly  the  place  where  they  should  be 
renewed  through  intelligent  study  of  their  operation  in  the  past."  ^ 
Social  evolution  is  thus,  with  Sumner,  almost  entirely  a  passive 
process,  individuals  and  groups  working  out  their  salvation  in 
proportion  to  a  fortunate  selection  of  ways  of  acting.  Rational 
choice  is  very  rare,  even  among  the  most  highly-civilized  races. 

Simfiner  is  open  to  criticism  chiefly  at  two  points,  first,  in  his 
use  of  the  neo-Darwinian  formula  without  proving  that  it  works 
the  same  in  social  as  in  biological  evolution,  and  second,  in  his 
failure  to  bring  out  clearly  the  difference  between  the  right  and 
good  as  seen  by  the  people  and  the  right  and  good  as  seen  by  the 
elite  and  demonstrated  as  such  by  consequences.'*  From  this 
point  of  view  we  might  substitute  for  Sumner^s,  "  The  mores  are 

*  Folkways,  pp.  70  f .  *  Ibid.,  p.  532.  *  Ibid.,  p.  635. 

*  Cf.  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolutjon,  pp.  26  f. 


TEE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  155 

always  right,"  the  other  extreme  brought  out  somewhere  by 
Ross, ''  The  mores  are  never  right  ";  that  is,  mores  are  of  neces- 
sity adaptations  to  past  conditions,  and  as  life  is  a  process  they 
can  never  keep  up  with  that  process.^  Sumner^s  book  is,  how- 
ever, a  valuable  contribution  to  our  discussion  as  his  multitude  of 
citations  and  illustrations  show  how  important  is  this  principle  of 
adaptation  in  the  formulation  of  folkways  among  primitive 
people. 

Franz  Boas  (1858-       ) 

Opportunity  and  Race  Progress 

At  the  opposite  pole  from  Sumner  and  all  Darwinian  anthro- 
pologists, is  Franz  Boas  who  minimizes  differences  in  native 
ability  among  individuals  and  races,  and  emphasizes  the  time 
element  in  social  evolution  which,  working  through  environment 
and  historical  events,  has  determined  the  differential  in  achieve- 
ment of  extant  races.^  According  to  him,  the  present  superiority 
of  European  races  may  be  accounted  for  along  the  following  lines 
of  reasoning:  (i)  Social  and  economic  causes  working  through 
a  more  favorable  habitat  gave  the  European  races  the  advantage 
in  social  progress;  (2)  Consciousness  of  kind  operates  today  to 
prevent  the  rise  of  the  backward  as  it  did  not  a  few  thousand 
years  ago;  (3)  Social  progress  in  Europe  has  brought  a  higher 
form  of  social  organization,  making  possible  greater  achievement; 
(4)  The  devastating  influences  of  diseases  resulting  from  the 
contact  of  primitive  with  cultural  groups  is  a  hindrance  to  the 
progress  of  the  former  today  as  it  was  not  to  the  ancestors  of 
the  latter;  (5)  Industrial  development  among  the  cultural  groups 
gives  them  ever  increasing  advantages  over  the  non-cultural,  and 
the  expansion  of  the  former  holds  back  and  drives  back  the  latter. 
Boas  concludes  that  "  achievement  alone  does  not  justify  us  in 
assuming  greater  mental  ability  for  the  white  race  than  for 
others,  unless  we  can  sustain  our  claim  by  other  proof.''  ^ 

1  Cf.  Sumner,  op.  ciL,  p.  634:  "  The  folkways  need  constant  rejuvenation  and 
refreshment  if  they  are  to  be  well  fitted  to  present  cases." 

2  Mind  of  Primitive  Matty  p.  9. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


156  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Our  author  questions  the  alleged  greater  similarity  of  primitive 
than  of  modern  types  of  man  to  the  anthropoid  apes,  showing 
that  this  is  true  only  of  certain  selected  features,  while  in  some 
other  respects  modern  types  show  greater  similarity  than  primi- 
tive types  to  their  sub-human  forbears.^  Granting  that  on  the 
whole  the  brain  of  modern  man  is  larger  and  heavier  than  that 
of  primitive  man,  he  refuses  to  grant  to  this  fact  a  proof  of  greater 
mental  capacity .^ 

Boas  discusses  at  length  the  influence  of  environment  upon 
human  types  and  shows  how  climate,  food  and  labor  have  regis- 
tered their  effect.^  The  permanency  of  somatic  characters,  so 
emphasized  by  Gumplowicz  and  Deniker,  is  refuted  by  our 
author,  not  only  on  the  authority  of  Wiedersheim,*  but  by  reason 
of  modern  measurements  by  Bowditch,  Peckham,  Ammon,  and 
Ripley  ^  as  well  as  by  his  own  measurements  of  immigrants  to 
America  and  their  descendants.  In  this  study  the  traits  selected 
for  examination  were  head-measurements,  stature,  weight  and 
hair-color,  and  the  ethnic  groups  chosen  were  the  South  Italians, 
representing  the  Mediterranean  type  of  Europe,  the  Central 
European  type,  the  Northwest  European  type,  and  the  East 
European  Hebrews.  "  The  results  of  our  inquiry,"  he  says, 
"  have  led  to  the  unexpected  result  that  the  American-born 
descendants  of  these  types  differ  from  their  parents;  and  that 
these  differences  develop  in  early  childhood,  and  persist  through- 
out life."  « 

Our  author  is  unable  to  explain  these  somatic  changes  from  the 
type,  but  holds  that  they  prove  that  human  types  are  plastic 

1  "  The  European  shares  lower  characteristics  with  the  Australian,  both  retain- 
ing in  the  strongest  degree  the  hairiness  of  the  animal  ancestor,  while  the  specifically 
human  development  of  the  red  lip  is  developed  most  markedly  in  the  negro.  The 
proportions  of  the  limbs  of  the  negro  are  also  more  markedly  distinct  from  the 
corresponding  proportions  in  the  higher  apes  than  are  those  of  the  European," 
Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  p.  22. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  24-28. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  23,  27,  40,  116.  "  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  influence  of 
environment  is  of  such  a  character  that,  although  the  same  race  may  assume  a 
different  type  when  removed  from  one  environment  to  another,  it  will  revert  to 
its  old  type  when  replaced  in  its  old  environment,"  ibid.,  p.  76. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  41.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  45  f.  •  Ibid.,  p.  54. 


THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 57 

within  limits.^  He  shows  further  that  the  changes  in  the  human 
frame  as  a  result  of  civilization  are  analogous  to  those  in  animals 
as  a  result  of  domestication,^  there  being  this  difference,  however, 
that  whereas  change  of  environment  (especially  with  change  of 
nutrition  and  mode  of  life),  conscious  selection,  and  crossing,  have 
all  been  potent  factors  in  the  development  of  different  types  of 
domesticated  animals,  change  of  environment  and  crossing  have 
been  most  strongly  active  in  the  development  of  the  races  of  man.^ 
Boas  explains  the  occurrence  of  distinct  local  types  in  primitive 
races ^  in  contrast  to  the  variability  to  be  found  among  civilized^ 
as  due  to  differences  in  environment,  to  isolation  and  in-breeding. 
Our  author  shows  how  chaotic  our  information  is  as  to  the  charac- 
teristics of  primitive  races,®  and  questions  the  conclusion  of 
Spencer  concerning  the  great  native  differences  in  primitive 
and  civilized  man  as  regards  fickleness,  strength  of  passion, 
lack  of  control,  improvidence,  inabiHty  to  concentrate  atten- 
tion, and  lack  of  originality.^  He  believes  that  "the  differences 
between  civilized  man  and  primitive  man  are  in  many  cases 
more  apparent  than  real;  that  the  social  conditions,  on  account 
of  their  peculiar  characteristics,  easily  convey  the  impression 
that  the  mind  of  primitive  man  acts  in  a  way  quite  different 
from  ours,  while  in  reality  the  fimdamental  traits  of  the  mind 
are  the  same.''  ^  Our  author  admits,  however,  differences  in 
mental  traits  among  individuals  and  races,  and  believes  that 
the  efforts  of  such  investigators  as  Galton  will  be  able  yet  to 
analyze  and  classify  them  with  some  degree  of  precision.^  He 
concludes  that  "  while  it  is  likely  that  changes  of  the  mental 
character  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  undoubted  changes  in  the 
human  anatomy,  ....  we  cannot  prove  that  any  progressive 
changes  of  the  human  organism  have  taken  place;  and  partic- 
ularly no  advance  in  the  size  or  complexity  of  the  structure  of 
the  central  nervous  system,  caused  by  the  cumulative  effects 
of  civilization";    moreover,  that  "the  difficulty  of  proving  a 

1  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  p.  64.  ^  Ihid.,  pp.  loi  f. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  66  f.,  75.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  106  f. 
'  Ihid.,  pp.  68-70.  *  Ihid.,  p.  114. 

4  Ihid.,  pp.  75  f.  «  Ihid.,  p.  116. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  93. 


158  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

progress  of  faculty  is  even  greater."  ^  He  believes  that  a  large 
proportion  of  individuals  among  primitive  races  are  capable  of 
reaching  the  level  of  civilization  represented  by  the  bulk  of  our 
own  people.^ 

Boas  holds  that  language  does  not  furnish  the  much-looked- 
for  means  of  discovering  differences  in  the  mental  status  of  differ- 
ent races,  but  on  the  contrary,  that  similar  cultural  traits  are 
found  in  most  widely-separated  groups  and  languages.^ 

Our  author  criticizes  strongly  the  use  of  the  evolutionary 
formula  as  often  applied  to  social  progress  concluding  that  "  the 
assiunption  of  a  uniform  development  of  culture  among  all  the 
different  races  of  man  and  among  all  tribal  units  is  true  in  a 
limited  sense  only,"  —  that  increasing  complexity,  for  example, 
does  not  apply  to  linguistic  development  or  to  that  of  music  and 
art.4 

Applying  his  conclusions  to  race  problems  in  America,  he  says 
that  "  the  danger  to  the  vigor  of  the  American  nation  due  to  an 
influx  of  alien  European  types,  is  imaginative,  not  real."  ^  His 
attitude  on  the  negro  question  is  very  similar.  Rejecting  the 
theory  of  racial  inferiority,  he  does  not  believe  there  is  anything 
to  be  feared  from  race  mixture.^ 

r  Boas  has  contributed  to  our  subject  chiefly  by  way  of  criticism 
of  the  dogmatism  of  many  social  evolutionists,  and  "  selection- 
ists," by  the  scientific,  inductive  spirit  of  his  work  and  by  the 
prominence  given  to  the  factor  of  environment  in  variation  and 
progress. 

His  contribution  is  almost  wholly  along  the  line  of  passive 
physical  adaptation.  There  is  a  seeming  lack  of  the  sociological 
point  of  view,  however,  especially  in  his  discussion  of  race  prob- 
lems in  the  United  States.  The  problem  of  immigration  and 
the  amalgamation  of  diverse  races  is  as  much  social  as  biological, 
and  the  social  results  that  come  from  the  union  of  representatives 
of  diverse  ethnic  groups  are  not  usually  satisfactory.'    Moreover, 

1  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  pp.  118,  119.  *  Ibid.,  p.  194. 

*  Ibid.y  p.  123.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  262. 

»  Ibid.,  ch.  V,  esp.  pp.  133,  154.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  277. 

'  Boas  touches  this  question  (p.  277),  and  says:  "  When  the  bulky  literature  of 
this  subject  is  carefully  sifted,  little  remains  that  will  endure  serious  criticism;  and 


THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 59 

he  grants  enough  of  the  claims  of  the  biological  sociologists  to 
warrant  belief  in  a  sufficient  differential  in  individual  and  racial 
types  in  the  line  of  quantity  of  intellectual  power  and  quality  of 
predispositions,  to  make  a  considerable  difference  in  the  relative 
strength  of  competing  groups. 

Westermarck  and  Hobhouse^  occupy  a  position  midway  be- 
tween Sumner  and  Boas,  both  being  representatives  of  what  might 
be  called  "  progressive  orthodoxy.''  Westermarck  is  most  widely 
known  for  his  defence  of  monogamy  as  the  primitive  form  of  the 
family  against  Morgan,  Bachofen  and  McLennan,  but  it  should 
also  be  recognized  that  he  stands  for  the  supremacy  of  motive  in 
ethical  evaluations  as  against  the  theory  of  the  utilitarians.^ 

Hobhouse  has  taken  pains  to  criticize  the  neo-Darwinian 
sociologists  and  point  out  how  far  short  this  formula  comes  of  ex- 
pressing the  truth  of  social  evolution,  yet  he  makes  large  use  of 
this  principle  in  his  Morals  in  Evolution^  but  even  greater  use 
of  the  principle  of  adaptation,^  and  shows  how  in  ethical  devel- 
opment the  process  has  been  from  the  unconscious  behavior  of 
individuals  and  groups  in  response  to  needs  and  in  accordance 
with  environmental  conditions,  physical  and  social,  to  the 
reflective  choice  which  characterizes  the  highest  types  of  moral- 
ity.* He  holds,  contrary  to  Buckle,  that  there  has  been  real 
ethical  progress  but  not,  as  most  neo-Darwinians  affirm,  in 
the  development  of  new  instincts  and  impulses  in  man  or  in 
the  disappearance  of  instincts  that  are  old  and  bad,  but  rather 
in  the  rationalization  of  the  moral  code  which,  as  society  ad- 
vances, becomes  more  clearly  thought  out  and  more  consistently 
applied.^  Nor  has  this  ethical  progress  been  in  a  straight  line 
or  correlated  with  progress  along  other  Hnes  as  Comte  assumed. 
"  On  the  contrary,"  he  says,  "  the  very  conditions  of  the  develop- 
ment of  society  have  in  some  cases  been  hostile  to  moral  develop- 
ment for  the  time  being.     An  advance  in  the  arts  of  life  may  well 

I  do  not  believe  that  I  claim  too  much  when  I  say  that  the  whole  work  on  this 
subject  remains  to  be  done."     Cf.  Le  Bon,  op.  cit.,  pp.  52  f. 

1  E.  Westermarck  (1862-),  L.  T.  Hobhouse  (1864-). 

2  Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  IdeaSy  i,  ch.  XI. 

^  Morals  in  Evolution,  Introduction.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  20  f.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  34. 


l6o  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

work  retrogression  in  the  ethical  sphere/'  ^  He  shows  how  the 
principle  of  adaptation  has  been  at  work  but  not  rigidly,  for 
"  Society's  shoulders  are  broad,  and  they  can  bear  many  a  burden 
imposed  by  human  perversity  without  breaking  down.  Many 
injurious  customs  may  arise  and  flourish  as  long  as  they  do  not 
touch  the  social  life  in  a  vital  spot."  ^ 

Hobhouse  deserves  credit  for  distinguishing  between  logical 
classification  and  genetic  order  and  holds  that  as  ethical  and 
social  evolution  have  not  been  linear  we  cannot  be  sure  of  the 
identity  between  the  order  of  classification  and  that  of  temporal 
development. 

The  position  of  Thomas  ^  approaches  more  nearly  to  that  of 
Boas  with  emphasis  on  environment."*  He  is  deserving  of  notice 
because  of  his  grouping  together  of  three  factors  in  progress, 
control,  attention  and  crisis,  —  in  his  discussion  of  these  making 
large  use  of  the  concept  of  adaptation, — also  for  the  importance 
he  places  on  the  "  great  man."  Control  is  the  end,  attention  the 
means,  and  crisis  furnishes  the  occasion  for  the  calling  forth  of 
attention,  while  the  "great  man  "  is  the  one  who  first  responds 
effectively  to  a  social  crisis,  directs  the  attention  of  others  and 
leads  the  way  to  social  telesis.^ 

On  the  whole  Sumner  and  Boas  have  contributed  primarily  to 
the  development  of  the  concept  of  passive  spiritual  adaptation 
whereas  Westermarck,  Hobhouse  and  Thomas  have  contributed 
also  to  that  of  active  spiritual  adaptation. 

This  principle  of  adaptation  has  been  of  service  to  anthropolo- 
gists in  their  endeavors  to  solve  such  problems  as  the  connection 
between  man  and  the  anthropoid  apes  both  physically  and  psy- 
chically,* the  original  habitat  of  man,^  his  earliest  mechanical 

1  Morals  in  Evolution,  p.  35. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

3  W.  I.  Thomas  (1863-). 

*  Shown  by  his  choice  of  selections  in  his  Source  Book,  as  well  as  by  his 
Introduction  and  the  comments  at  the  close  of  each  chapter. 

*  Source  Book  for  Social  Origins,  pp.  14  f. 

*  Cf .  supra,  conclusions  to  ch.  IV, 
^  Hoemes,  Primitive  Man,  p.  6. 


THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  l6l 

inventions  ^  and  social  institutions,  racial  differences  ^  and  early- 
migrations.^  For  example  the  historical  investigations  of  Sir 
Henry  Maine  left  the  question  of  the  pre-historic  family  un- 
touched save  by  inference.  The  anthropological  researches  of 
Bachofen,  McLennan,  Morgan  and  Lubbock  have  come  to  be 
considered  as  based  on  insufficient  and  misleading  evidence,  and 
the  most  potent  weapon  of  criticism  of  their  conclusions,  as  used 
by  Spencer,  Howard,  Westermarck  and  others,  is  just  this  theory 
of  adaptation.  Granted  that  primitive  people  were  ignorant  of 
the  relation  between  copulation  and  child-birth,  we  may  still 
argue  for  a  more  or  less  permanent  relation  between  the  sexes 
from  monogamic  mating  among  birds  and  higher  mammals,  from 
jealousy,  and  from  economic  need,  also  from  the  more  recent 
studies  of  sex  mores  among  extant  types  of  primitive  culture. 
Moreover,  whatever  the  first  form,  promiscuity  could  not  prevail 
because  of  its  dis-utility  owing  to  its  connection  with  venereal 
diseases  and  low  fecundity,  and  because  of  its  effect  on  childhood. 
Thus  the  earliest  form  and  changes  in  it  were  in  accordance  with 
this  principle  of  adaptation. 

^  Mason,  Origin  of  Inventions,  ch.  I. 

2  Marett,  Anthropology,  pp.  93  f.;  Keane,  Ethnology,  ch.  X;  also  Man  Past  and 
Present,  p.  13;  Boas,  op.  cit.,  ch.  II. 
'  Chapin,  Social  Evolution,  pp.  141  f. 


CHAPTER  rx 

THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS 
LUDWIG   GUMPLOWICZ    (1838-1910) 

Progress  by  Inter-Group  Conflict 

GiJMPLOWicz  takes  as  his  point  of  departure  Comte's  positiv- 
ism and  Spencer's  theory  of  deterministic  evolution  but  criticizes 
the  former  for  giving  any  place  whatever  to  policies  of  social 
amelioration,  claiming  that  all  such  are  absurd  in  a  deterministic 
system,  and  criticizes  the  latter  for  taking  the  individual  as  his 
unit  instead  of  the  primitive  horde,  also  for  his  failure  to  distin- 
guish the  different  realms  in  the  cosmic  process  governed  by 
entirely  different  kinds  of  laws.^  In  this  he  seems  strangely 
inconsistent  for  while  criticizing  monism  and  its  attempt  to  find 
a  universal  law  for  events  in  the  whole  domain  of  nature, 
holding  that  all  such  attempts  fail  to  distinguish  between  univer- 
sal and  social  laws,^  yet  a  little  further  on  in  his  discussion  he 
says,  "Modern  natural  science  has  successfully  demonstrated  that 
even  *  human  mind  '  is  subject  to  physical  laws;  that  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  individual  mind  are  emanations  from  matter," 
and  then  proceeds  to  lay  down  ten  laws  that  are  universal.^  He 
is  a  strict  determinist  and  finds  the  goal  of  life-philosophy  in 
resignation  to  the  inevitable."*  This  position  together  with  his 
assumption  of  the  multiple  origin  of  humanity  might  warrant  his 
being  called  a  pluralistic-positivist. 

Gumplowicz  criticizes  the  organicists  with  special  vigor  but 
gives  Spencer  credit  for  a  discriminating  use  of  the  concept.^ 

All  cosmic  phenomena  are  classified  into  physical,  mental 
and  social,®  all  controlled  by  the  operation  of  the  following 

*  Grundriss  der  Sociologie  (1885),  pp.  4 1.  (Moore's  Translation,  pp.  24  f.). 

*  Ihid.,  p.  14  (Moore,  p.  32). 

*  Ibid, J  pp.  62  f.  (Moore,  pp.  74  f.). 

*  Ibid.^  pp.  4,  228. 

*  Ihid.f  pp.  II  f. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  55  f. 

163 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 63 

cosmic  laws:  {a)  causation,  (6)  development,  (c)  regularity  of 
development,  {d)  periodicity,  {e)  complexity,  (/)  reciprocal 
actions  of  foreign  ("  heterogen  ")  elements,  {g)  adaptation  to  an 
obvious  end,  Qi)  identity  of  forces,  (i)  similarity  of  events, 
(J)  parallelism. 

The  law  of  reciprocal  action  of  foreign  or  "  heterogen  "  ele- 
ments is  especially  important  in  Gumplowicz's  theory  and  he 
finds  the  social  analogue  of  the  original  cosmic,  atomic  elements 
in  the  innumerable  small,  diverse  groups  or  hordes  with  which 
history  began.^  He  bases  his  conclusion  concerning  the  multiple 
origin  of  races  (i)  on  the  findings  of  anthropologists  concerning 
the  physiological  differences  of  individuals  in  every  race  and 
tribe,  holding  that  as  these  are  strictly  hereditary  they  signify 
different  origins;  ^  (2)  on  the  fundamental  and  irreducible  differ- 
ences to  be  found  between  various  languages  ^  and  (3)  on  the 
variety  of  primitive  religions.* 

The  starting  point  of  sociology,  then,  is  these  inniunerable 
primitive  hordes,  each  with  its  own  language,  morals,  religion, 
etc.,  each  with  great  similarity  and  equality  between  individual 
members,^  each  possessed  of  consciousness  of  kind  and  instinctive 
hatred  of  every  other  horde  or  group.^  Increase  of  population 
and  necessity  of  self-maintenance  bring  these  groups  into  conflict 
resulting  in  the  annihilation  or  subordination  of  the  conquered. 
This  act  of  enslavement  introduces  into  the  victorious  group  the 
element  of  inequality  which  is  the  starting  point  of  social  organi- 
zation and  which  furnishes  the  basis  of  conceptions  of  right  and 
justice.^ 

^  Grundriss,  p.  66  (Moore,  pp.  78!.). 

2  Der  Rassenkampf,  pp.  41  f.;  Grundriss,  pp.  81  f.  Cf.  also  Fiske,  Excursions 
of  an  Evolutionist,  ch.  V,  who  seems  to  agree  with  Gumplowicz. 

'  Der  Rassenkampf,  pp.  56  f. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  137  f. 

'  Grundriss,  p.  190;  der  Rassenkampf,  p.  64. 

^  Grundriss,  p.  195:  "  Es  gibt  kein  Recht,  das  nicht  der  Ausdruck  der  Un- 
gleichkeit  ware  weil  all  und  jedes  Recht  die  Vermittlung  ist  zwischen  imgleichen 
socialen  Elementen,  die  Urspriinglich,  zwangsweise  herbeigefiihrte  Versohnimg 
widerstreitender  Interessen,  welche  erst  durch  Uebung  und  Gewohnheit  auch  die 
Sanction  der  neuen  Sitte  erlangt,"  ibid.,  p.  190. 

'  Grundriss,  pp.  91  f,,  135  f.,  177  f.,  189  f. 


164  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

There  are  not  now,  he  holds,  and  so  far  as  we  know  there  never 
have  been  any  pure  races,  the  so-called  historical  races  being 
compounds  formed  by  the  amalgamation  of  separate  ethnic 
groups  and  by  cross-fertilization  of  cultures. 

As  all  social  development  has  resulted  primarily  from  inter- 
group  struggle,  there  has  been  no  opportunity  for  selection  as  a 
result  of  struggle  between  individuals,  hence  no  increase  in  the 
innate  mental  capacity  of  man  but  only  in  knowledge  due  to 
social  heredity.^ 

In  discussing  the  origin  of  social  classes  Gumplowicz  uses 
biological  analogies  but  his  interpretation  of  biological  evolution 
is  far  from  satisfactory.  He  makes  heredity  and  adaptation 
(Erblichkeit  und  Anpassung)  the  two  opposing  methods  of 
explaining  the  origin  of  species,  or  again,  autogenesis  and  evolu- 
tion (Autogenismus  und  Evolutionismus)  .^  By  the  first  he  seems 
to  mean  spontaneous  variation  and  its  hereditary  transmission 
and  by  the  latter  physiological  changes  in  the  developing  organ- 
ism to  adapt  it  to  its  environment  and  the  transmission  of  these 
slight  variations  to  the  offspring.  Two  other  terms  are  used,  the 
latter  of  which  seems  entirely  out  of  place  in  biology:  originality 
and  imitation  (OriginaHtat  und  Imitation)  .^  Applying  these  laws 
to  the  formation  of  social  classes  he  says:  — 

We  have  seen  how  some  classes  (the  ruKng,  the  peasant  and  the  business 
classes)  arose  out  of  the  union  of  heterogeneous  ethnical  elements;  how  their 
differences  and  individuality,  original  in  each  case,  date  from  the  time 
previous  to  the  union  and  persist  later  when  they  form  part  of  the  state, 
because  both  the  anthropological  and  moral  peculiarities  of  each  help  to 

1  Grundriss,  pp.  211  f.,  222  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  135.  The  use  of  these  terms  by  Gumplowicz  is  unfortunate  and 
does  not  correspond  to  modem  terminology.  In  biology  we  have  spontaneous 
or  inborn  and  acquired  variations.  The  first  are  inherited,  the  latter  probably 
not.  In  social  evolution,  however,  these  acquired  variations  or  habits  are  handed 
on  by  so-called  social  heredity,  but  both  processes  may  be  explained  by  the 
principle  of  adaptation,  for  those  variations  which  handicap  the  individual,  species, 
dass  or  group  too  much,  prevent  survival  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 

'  "  Auf  doppelte  Art  entstehen  natiirliche  Gebilde,  originar  und  sekundar.  Es 
gibt  in  der  Natiu:  sozusagen  zwei  entgegengesetzte  Stromungen,  die  sich  immer 
und  iiberall  begegnen,  und  die  wir  Originalitat  und  Imitation  nennen  konnten. 

"Was  namlich  die  Natur  originell,  auf  eine  uns  unbekannte  *  schopferische' 
Art  geschaffen  hat,  das  entsteht  auch  haufig  unter  dem  Einfluss  ausserer,  ims  wohl 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  165 

maintain  the  separation  and  opposition  of  the  classes  and  castes  as  they  exist 
later  in  the  state.  But  we  have  also  noticed  that  there  were  other  classes 
(the  priests,  large  industries  in  opposition  to  small,  scholars,  jurists,  ofl&cials, 
etc.)  which  have  arisen  by  a  process  of  differentiation,  and  only  after  this 
process  has  been  completed  and  the  classes  cleariy  marked  off,  do  they  guard 
their  peculiar  interests  in  a  way  analogous  to  that  of  original  classes.^ 

Group  self-interest,  whether  of  the  original,  natural  groups  and 
their  compounds  or  of  the  interest  groups  formed  later  by  the 
two-fold  process  described  above,  is  the  bond  of  unity,  the  source 
of  conflict  and  the  mainspring  of  progress.^ 

The  social  forces  uniting  groups  and  impelling  to  progress  are 
classified  as  we  find  them  in  the  table  on  the  following  page.^ 

begreiflicher  und  zu  Tage  liegender  Umstande;  diese  letztere  Art  des  Entstehens 
nennt  die  Schule  Darwin's  evolutionistisch. 

"  Autogenismus  und  Evolutionismus  arbeiten  sich  nun  iiberall  in  die  Hande. 
Das  verwirrt  unsere  Sinne.  Wir  straiten  bei  jedem  organischen  Gebilde;  ist  es 
autogenetisch  oder  evolutionistisch  ? 

"  Nun  kann  aber  ein  imd  dasselbe  Ding,  ein  imd  derselbe  Typus  (in  vielen 
Fallen  ist  es  nachgewiesen)  auf  eine  oder  die  andere  Weise  entstehen,  denn  im 
Grunde  ist  es  doch  dieselbe  natiirliche  Weise,  so  wie  ein  Malar  ein  Bild  originall 
schaffan  kann.  dasselbe  aber  dann  auch  raproduzieren,  kopieren  kann. 

"...  Die  doppalte  Art  der  Entstahung  ist  iibrigans  leicht  erklarich.  Wenn 
die  geographischa  Laga  und  Baschaffanhait  dar  Umwalt  noch  heutzutage  im  stande 
ist,  auf  die  Modifikation  einas  organischen  Typus  bastimmand  einzuwirkan:  wie 
viel  mahr  miisste  dieses  Agans  auf  die  ursprungliche  Entstahung  von  Variatatan 
einwirken!  Es  waran  sozusagan  ganatische  Untarschiada,  walche  diasar  Faktor 
einst  erzeugte:  er  wirkt  noch  heute  fort  in  gaschwachtam  Masse  aber  jane  ur- 
spriingliche  ganetische  Wirkung  erweist  sich  iiberall  als  dauerhaftar  und  stabilar. 
Frailich  erhalt  dadurch  auch  jane  Argumentation  dan  Schain  von  Barachtigung, 
walche  sich  an  diase  sakundara  Wirkung  klammart  und  indam  sie  die  kurze  Zait  der 
Wirksamkait  diasar  sakundaran  Faktoran  ins  Unandliche  multipliziert,  dadurch 
jede  Annahme  einer  originaran  Entstahungsart  als  iibarflussig  erscheinen  lasst. 
Aber  diase  Operation  ist  nur  arithmatisch  richtig,  sie  hat  nur  einen  logischen  Wart, 
eine  logischen  Barachtigung,  ohne  jedoch  die  Annahme  einar  originaran,  auto- 
genetischen  Entstahungsart,  fiir  die  eine  Reihe  andarar  Momente  sprechen,  je 
widerlegen  zu  konnen. 

"  Ebanso  nun  wie  auf  dam  Gabiete  dar  organischen  Natur,  begagnen  sich  auch 
auf  sozialam  Gabiete  primare  und  sekundare,  autogenetische  und  evolutionistische 
Entstahungsartan  iiberall."  —  Grundriss  (1905).  Few  verbal  changes  from  the 
first  edition,  pp.  137,  138  (Moore,  pp.  134,  135). 

*  Grwidriss,  p.  135.     (Moore,  pp.  134  f.) 
2  Ibid.,  p.  138. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  146;  cf.  Moore,  p.  142. 


1 66 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


Common  dwelling  place  (more  or  less  removed) 

Common  Social  Life 

Material 

Consanguinity 
Relationship 

'  Nobility 

Rank 

Burghers 
Peasants 

O 

? 

^ 

Economic 

[  Professional  r1a,s,ses,  etc. 

/Rural 
Possessions    \  ^t  i. 

I  Urban 

1 

1 

o 

1 
1 

*<* 

(Wirthsrhaftlich) 

'  Landowners 
Farm  tenants 

I 

Occupations  • 

Manufacturers  and  industrial 

workers 
Merchants 
.  Artisans,  etc. 

1 

Language 

Religion 

Moral 

Science 
Art 

Accidental  fat 

e  (emigrants,  etc.) 

"  The  greater  the  number  of  these  socializing  forces  that  bind 
men  together,  the  stronger  is  the  social  bond,  the  greater  the 
social  cohesion,  and  as  a  result  the  greater  the  power  to  withstand 
opposition,  and  especially  as  these  operate  over  long  periods  of 
time."  1 

Like  Spencer,  Schaffle  and  others,  our  author  believes  in  a 
cycle  of  social  development  and  decay  due  to  the  play  of  natural 
laws.  "  It  is  not  difficult  to  show  the  causes  of  this  cyclical 
motion  in  the  natural,  economic  and  social  conditions  of  folk- 
life,"  he  says.  "...  Men's  wants  and  desires  .  .  .  cause  them 
to  raise  themselves  by  groups  and  societies  from  a  primitive  con- 
dition to  a  condition  of  culture  and  civilization;  and,  having 
once  attained  it,  so  to  conduct  themselves  that  their  fall  neces- 
sarily follows  through  other  groups  and  societies  in  a  progressive 
state."  2    The  chief  cause  assigned  for  this  decay  is  increase  of 

*  Grundriss,  p.  145.     Cf.  also  Soziologie  und  Politikj  pp.  84,  92-95. 
2  Moore,  p.  205. 


TEE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 67 

prosperity  among  the  lower  economic  classes  followed  by  de- 
crease in  population.  This  decay  is  inevitable,  according  to 
Gmnplowicz,  for  having  ruled  out  all  telic  activity  no  group  can 
forestall  the  operation  of  these  "  natural  "  laws.  This  particular 
illustration  shows  the  inherent  weakness  of  his  whole  system,  for 
prosperity  leads  to  limitation  or  decrease  of  population  mostly 
through  the  operation  of  telic  foresight.  The  first  effect  of 
industrial  prosperity  is  rapid  increase  of  population,  as  proven 
in  the  case  of  England,  of  Germany  and  of  Japan.  It  is  only 
when  people  have  learned  how  to  prevent  conception  and  when, 
with  emphasis  on  consumption  rather  than  on  production,  they 
prefer  other  things  to  wholesome  family  life,  that  the  results 
portrayed  by  our  author  take  place.  But  if  by  telic  foresight  on 
the  part  of  individuals  population  can  be  limited  or  even  de- 
creased, telic  foresight  on  the  part  of  a  group  might  prevent  this 
result  and  lead  to  social  immortality.^ 

The  individual  as  such  has  almost  no  place  in  Gumplowicz's 
social  theory.  "  The  greatest  error  of  individual  psychology  is 
the  assumption  that  man  thinks.  .  .  .  What  thinks  in  man  is 
not  he  but  the  social  community  of  which  he  is  a  part.  The 
fountain  of  his  thought  Hes  not  in  himself  but  in  the  social  milieu 
in  which  he  lives,  in  the  social  atmosphere  which  he  breathes,  and 
he  cannot  think  otherwise  than  the  influences  of  this  milieu  con- 
centrated in  his  brain  make  necessary. "2  Again  he  says,  "Not 
the  individual  but  the  group  is  egoistic.  The  heroes  of  history 
are  only  marionettes  who  carry  out  the  will  of  the  group."  ^  This 
plasticity  of  the  individual  is  shown  by  the  ease  with  which  he  is 
assimilated  into  a  new  social  environment,*  and  by  the  influence 
upon  him  of  his  economic  and  social  status.^  In  his  Soziologie 
und  Politik,  however,  Gumplowicz  makes  some  place  for  the 
individual  in  his  mechanical  reaction  to  social  pressure  and  so  for 
his  effect  on  the  group.  Speaking  of  the  socio-psychical  factors 
he  says:  "Every  one  of  these  factors  is  a  product  of  the  co- work- 
ing of  the  individual  and  his  group.    Each  of  these  factors,  arising 

1  See  infra,  Conclusion.  ^  Grundriss,  pp.  173  ff. 

2  Grundriss y  pp.  76,  165  f.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  176. 
'  Der  Rassenkampfy  p.  37. 


1 68  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

out  of  a  social  movement,  is  a  psychical  deposit  of  the  social  life  of 
the  group  and  a  result  of  the  manifold  adaptations  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  it.^  Arbitrary  freedom  is  an  illusion.^  Morality  is 
nothing  but  the  reflection  in  the  individual  mind  of  what  has  been 
considered  useful  for  the  group.^  There  is  no  right  or  justice 
apart  from  the  might  of  the  ruling  class  in  the  sovereign  state,  or 
as  an  abstract  ideal  formed  by  the  oppressed  classes  as  a  means  of 
securing  liberation."  * 

Nowhere  is  the  passive,  purely  mechanical  character  of  social 
evolution  better  expressed  than  in  these  words:  "  Out  of  frictions 
and  struggles,  out  of  separations  and  unions  of  opposing  ele- 
ments, finally  come  forth  as  new  adaptation  products  the  higher 
socio-psychical  phenomena,  the  higher  cultural  forms,  the  new 
civilizations,  the  new  state  and  national  unities  .  .  .  and  this 
merely  through  social  action  and  reaction,  entirely  independent 
of  the  initiative  and  will  of  individuals,  contrary  to  their  ideas 
and  wishes  and  social  striving."  ^ 

To  Gimiplowicz  is  to  be  given  credit  for  a  clean-cut  demarca- 
tion and  study  of  the  sociological  field,  —  the  field  consisting  of 
the  two-fold  mechanical  process  by  which  all  the  modern  races 
and  social  groups  with  their  socio-psychical  products  have  been 
evolved,  on  the  one  hand  by  inter-group  conflict,  and  on  the  other 
by  intra-group  differentiation  and  struggle.  His  power  of  keen 
analysis  is  revealed  in  his  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  the  term 
"society"  which  with  him  is  always  either  a  concrete  natural,  or 
interest  group,  or  else  a  class  term  including  all  such  groups.^ 
He  is  worthy  of  commendation,  also,  for  his  consistency,  on  the 
whole,  in  carrying  to  a  logical  conclusion  his  fatalistic  determin- 
ism, issuing  in  atheistic  free-thought  and  stoical  resignation  to  the 
inevitable.     He  is  open  to  criticism  along  the  following  Unes:  — 

I.  He  makes  large  use  of  biological  analogies  but  as  his  biol- 
ogical interpretations  are  unsatisfactory  his  analogies  fail  to  be 

1  Soziologie  und  Politik,  p.  94.    Cf.  Grundriss,  pp.  174  f. 
'  Grundriss,  pp.  167,  215. 
'  Ibid.,  pp.  179  f. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  114  f.,  189  f.,  237. 
'  Soziologie  und  Politik,  p.  94. 

•  Grundriss,  pp.  139  f.;  Soziologie  und  Politik,  pp.  49  f. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 69 

convincing.  The  factors  of  isolation  and  cross-breeding*  are 
ignored  while  the  Darwinian  theory  of  natural  selection  is  mis- 
interpreted. 

2.  His  assumptions  concerning  primitive  groups  and  their 
mutual  hatred  are  not  sustained  by  facts.  There  is  co-operation 
as  well  as  strife,  depending  on  conditions. 

3.  Though  using  the  term  progress  in  various  places,  such  use 
is  not  warranted  from  his  premises  and  from  his  assertion  that 
there  are  no  standards  of  value.  Indeed  there  can  be  no  values 
in  a  strictly  deterministic  system  such  as  he  has  attempted  to 
describe.  He  denies  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  progress  for 
humanity  as  a  whole  or  for  "  civilization,"  though  he  grants  that 
there  may  be  for  individual  groups  for  a  period  of  time.  He 
grants  that  there  may  be  progress,  also,  in  scientific  knowledge, 
although  by  this  he  seems  to  mean  merely  a  heaping-up  of  infor^ 
mation.2 

4.  He  has  failed  to  appreciate  the  dynamic  of  intelligence  both 
in  individual  and  social  amelioration. 

Finally,  while  granting  the  necessity  of  religion  for  complete 
adaptation, — for  most  people, — he  seems  to  feel  that  the  highest 
attitude  toward  the  Great  Unknown  is  that  of  the  atheistic  free- 
thinker.^ Judged  by  the  pragmatic  test  this  cannot  be  true.  His 
fatalistic  philosophy  of  despair,  —  or  of  stoical  resignation,  —  is 
not  such  as  to  inspire  a  group  to  heroic  deeds  or  lead  to  that  kind 
of  social  endeavor  which  might  prevent  the  decay  and  destruction 
of  the  group  that  has  attained  wealth  and  culture.  For  this 
reason  his  social  philosophy  can  never  become  the  philosophy  of 
the  dominant  group.  It  stands  condemned  as  false  before  that 
judge  which  to  him  is  the  only  judge,  —  the  laws  of  life.  Its 
normal  outcome  is  the  destruction  of  the  group  that  accepts  it 
and  applies  its  precepts."* 

Gumplowicz^s  greatest  contribution  to  our  subject  is  just  this, 
—  he  has  carried  passive  social  adaptation  to  its  logical  conclu- 

*  His  "cross-fertilization  of  cultures"  is  the  social  analogue,  however. 

^  Grundriss,  pp.  220  f.         '  Der  Rassenkanipf,  pp.  137  f.;  Moore,  pp.  108,  212  f. 

*  Gumplowicz  comes  under  the  condemnation  pronounced  upon  the  "  anthro- 
pological moralist,"  by  Professor  Carver  in  his  most  recent  book,  Essays  in  Social^ 
Justice. 


I70  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

sion  from  the  standpoint  of  fatalistic  determinism.  If  he  had 
said  the  last  word  the  task  of  the  social  philosopher  would  be  hard 
indeed  because  heartless.  To  rob  people  of  the  illusions  of  hope 
and  delusions  of  religious  belief  without  providing  a  better  sub- 
stitute may  be  in  harmony  with  science,  but  surely  not  with 
pragmatic  philosophy. 

GusTAV  Ratzenhofer  (i 842-1 904) 
Interests 

Social  evolution  with  Ratzenhofer  is  to  be  explained  as  a 
process  of  progressive  adaptation  in  conformity  with  law,  yet  it 
is  not  to  be  explained  in  the  mechanical  terms  of  attraction  within 
and  antagonism  between  "  heterogen  "  groups  resulting  in  anni- 
hilation, modification,  and  new  combinations  of  elements,  as  with 
Gmnplowicz,  but  rather  as  a  process  by  which  the  original 
power,  the  "  Urkraft  '^  or  "  Ursache  "  is  able  to  come  to  ever 
increasing  self-expression  and  self-realization  under  the  limita- 
tions of  organic  structure  and  physical  environment.^ 

The  means  by  which  this  "  Urkraft "  works  in  and  through 
organic  nature  is  termed  Interest,  "  Every  form  of  phenomena 
from  heavenly  body  to  atom,  and  every  organism  is  a  part  of  the 
original  force  with  an  interest  appropriate  to  its  particular  de- 
velopment. .  .  .  These  form  the  principle  of  creation."  ^ 

There  are  two  kinds  of  consciousness,  pure  consciousness,  i.  e., 
the  imdifferentiated  "  Urkraft  "  as  it  exists  in  every  creature,  and 
the  organic  consciousness  or  the  differentiated  "  Urkraft "  that 
has  struggled  up  through  the  evolutionary  process  to  that  self- 
consciousness  which  has  its  highest  expression  in  adult,  civilized 
man.^  This  endeavor  on  the  part  of  the  Urkraft  to  come  to  the 
largest  and  fullest  experience  of  life  is  the  cause  of  differences 
between  species.* 

The  Urkraft  and  the  inherent  (anhaftende)  or  inborn  (ange- 
borene)  interest  are  the  two  principles  of  creation,  working  to- 

^  Die  Sociologische  Erkenntnis,  pp.  24,  28,  29,  39  f. 

2  IhU.,  p.  28. 

'  Ibid.y  p.  26.     Cf.  p.  54. 

*  Ibid.f  pp.  28,  29. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  171 

gether  to  "  try  out  "  all  possible  conditions  of  life  that  the  result 
may  be  the  largest  possible  experience  of  individual,  self-conscious 
life.  This  inborn  interest  is  the  prime  factor  in  attention,  associ- 
ation, purpose  and  will.  "  One  can  apperceive  nothing  and  think 
of  nothing  which  does  not  conform  to  the  interest  inhering  in 
it."  1 

The  factors  to  be  found  in  the  lowest  forms  of  organic  life  which 
make  possible  all  further  differentiation  and  development  are  as 
follows:  — 

1.  The  Urkraft  endowed  with  the  capacity  of  struggling  to 
ever  increasing  development  under  conditions  imposed  by  the 
environment. 

2.  Interest  inborn  in  every  creature. 

3.  The  power  of  assimilation  or  the  physiological  impulse,  also 
rooted  in  the  interest  but  possessing  different  influence  because  it 
works  no  longer  merely  through  the  Urkraft  within  the  creature 
but  draws  to  it  particles  from  the  outside  world. 

4.  The  influence  of  the  phenomenal  world.  The  individual 
impelled  by  interest  and  struggling  to  come  to  completion, 
creates  out  of  the  conditions  of  life  at  hand  the  greatest  possible 
advantage  for  the  development  of  the  species  through  variation 
and  adaptation. 

5.  Individuation,  or  the  process  by  which  the  creature  working 
through  the  inborn  interest  builds  up  a  unitary  consciousness. 

6.  Reproduction  as  the  result  of  the  continuous  working  of  the 
Urkraft  in  and  through  the  individual. 

7.  Heredity,  whereby  the  creature  is  able  to  bring  forth  only  a 
like  offspring  on  the  basis  of  his  inner  capacity .^ 

Selection  and  struggle  for  existence  are  recognized  as  two 
further  factors  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  explanation 
of  biological  evolution.^ 

As  a  result  of  the  struggle  for  development  on  the  part  of  the 
Urkraft  every  "  preformed  "  germ  develops  just  in  proportion  as 
the  conditions  of  life  make  possible,^  even  to  the  expression  of 
purposeful  acts  of  civilized  man.^ 

1  Erkenntnis,  p.  34.        '  Ibid.,  pp.  40  f.        ^  Ibid.j  pp.  302  f.;  Soziologiej  p.  23. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  38,  39.  4  Ibid.,  p.  46. 


172  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  his  discussion  of  the  inborn  content  of  consciousness,  Rat- 
zenhofer  brings  out  a  detailed  analysis  of  interest  which  is  one  of 
his  greatest  contributions  to  sociology  and  especially  to  the 
development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation. 

As  soon  as  the  male  germ  cell  has  united  with  the  ovum  the  following 
dynamic  phenomena  (Krafterscheinungen)  are  present: — » 

1.  The  Urkraft  differentiated  into  life  to  which  we  ascribe  in  general  the 
power  of  bringing  forth  the  whole  developmental  series,  and  through  which 
the  organized  Hfe  is  in  relation  to  the  cosmic  forces.  There  is  also  present 
the  impulse  to  try  out  all  life-situations  in  order  to  produce  the  most  complete 
creatiure  possible.  Thus  this  inherent  life-power  struggles  against  the 
barriers  set  by  its  environment,  but  in  the  sense  of  an  inner  impulse  to  ever 
larger  Hfe,  in  accordance  with  the  universal  law  of  adaptation.  This  struggle 
for  the  largest  possible  life  brings  the  individual  into  conflict  with  other 
individuals  and  thus  makes  room  for  the  Darwinian  doctrine  of  selection.^ 

2.  The  inborn  interest  differentiated  into  several  phenomenal  forms  by 
means  of  the  life  conditions  under  which  the  individual  is  developing  as 
follows:  — 

(a)  The  racial  interest  which  has  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  maintaining, 
through  reproduction,  the  species  to  which  the  creature  belongs; '  .  .  . 

(b)  The  physiological  interest,  in  general  taken  over  from  the  mother 
as  the  new  creature  is  a  continuation  of  her  physiological  activity,  .  .  . 
impels  to  a  search  for  food  and  leads  to  the  development  of  all  other  life 
interests;  .  .  . 

(c)  In  higher  forms  these  original  interests  become  differentiated,  the 
physiological  into  an  individual  interest  which  has  to  do  with  the  maintenance 
and  development  of  individual  life;  *  .  .  . 

(d)  The  racial  interest  which  because  of  the  physiological  connection 
between  the  individual  and  his  ancestry  easily  expands  to  a  social  interest. 
The  emotion  of  love  is  connected  with  this  social  interest  but  also  with  the 
sex  impulse.     Together  they  form  the  basis  of  the  family. 

These  various  interests  often  come  into  conflict;  for  example, 
the  individual  with  the  social,  and  the  social  with  the  racial. 
Under  great  temptation  a  man  may  force  into  the  background 
his  interest  in  his  country,  as  the  traitor;  or  a  man  may  give 
this  interest  preeminence,  seK-interest  and  interest  in  family 
being  thrust  back,  as  the  patriot  in  time  of  war.  ^'  In  the  lordship 
of  the  individual  interest  man  sees  himself  not  merely  physiolog- 
ically but  really,  as  the  center  of  the  universe  while  in  the  lordship 

1  Erkenninis,  pp.  $6  f.  *  Cf.  tbid.,  p.  44.  *  Cf.  Soziologie,  pp.  68  f. 

*  Ratzenhofer  accepts  Spencer's  law  that  individuation  and  fecundity  are  in- 
versely proportional.  Man  is  able  to  thwart  the  purposes  of  the  Urkraft  by  sup- 
pressing the  racial  interest  and  living  only  for  self. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 73 

of  the  social  interest  the  outer  world  attains  a  reality  for  sensation 
which  it  does  not  possess  psychologically.  .  .  .  The  social  in- 
terest widens  our  individuality  so  that  we  accept  the  phenomena 
of  the  outer  world  as  integrating  parts  of  the  ego."  ^ 

"In  general/'  he  says,  "the  development  of  the  social  interest 
depends  on  the  existence  of  such  conditions  as  permit  the  physio- 
logical and  individual  interests  to  take  the  background;  the 
higher  interests  come  forth  in  the  measure  that  the  lower  appear 
to  be  secured.  The  physiological  interest  satisfied  gives  room  for 
the  intellectual  side  of  the  individual  interest,  and  the  narrower 
family  development  must  be  secured  in  order  that  the  interest  in 
social  relations  may  become  lively.''  ^ 

(e)  The  final  mode  of  development  of  the  inborn  interest  is  the  transcen- 
dental. Fear  manifested  in  lower  animals  in  the  presence  of  unusual  noises  and 
terrifying  phenomena  of  nature  is  a  lower  form  of  that  which  in  man  becomes 
reUgion.3  ...  In  man  this  usually  takes  the  form  of  a  sense  of  dependence 
upon  that  Original  Power  which  awakens  his  consciousness.  Moreover  this 
sense  of  dependence  is  suppressed  only  as  a  result  of  man's  attention  being 
given  entirely  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  physical  needs,  or  even  more  fre- 
quently by  the  occupation  of  the  mind  in  day-dreams  as  a  result  of  a  super- 
abundance of  goods.'* 

These  inborn  interests  impel  the  organism  to  activities  looking 
toward  their  satisfaction.  The  satisfiers  lie  in  the  environment, 
physical  and  social,  and  in  the  case  of  the  transcendental,  not  only 
in  the  environment  but  within  the  individual  himself;  i.  e.,  the 
Urkraft  is  the  backgroimd  of  all  existence,  and  the  conscious 
apprehension  of  this  is  the  result  of  a  correct  interpretation  of  all 
experience  including  a  direct  intuition  of  the  relationship  existing 
between  the  individual  consciousness  and  the  Urkraft  of  which  it 
is  a  part.^ 

These  interests  become  in  a  sense  forces,  i.  e.,  an  interest  un- 
satisfied is  a  condition  of  mal-adaptation  and  gives  rise  to  a  feeling 
of  unrest  and  of  discomfort.^  The  very  nature  of  an  organism  is 
to  act  in  the  line  of  satisfying  its  interests  or  needs.  An  organism 
that  did  not  thus  react  to  such  impulses  would  not  survive.^ 

*  Erkenntnis,  p.  62.  *  Ihid.,  p.  64.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  106. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  62.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  65. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  63.  •  Ibid.,  p.  252. 


174  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

The  inborn  interests  or  needs  as  immediately  related  to  organic 
activity  seeking  their  satisfaction,  are  called  motives  (Triebe). 

All  the  modal  forms  of  the  inborn  interest  come  to  expression  in  the  indi- 
vidual first  as  a  result  of  the  directing  activity  of  the  Urkraf  t  working  in  the 
life.  The  force  derived  from  interest  in  the  sense  of  the  life-plan  expresses 
itself  as  motive  (Trieb).  Just  as  interest  comes  to  view  as  feeling-tone 
connected  with  sensation,  so  in  real  life  it  expresses  itself  as  motive,  so  that 
interest  and  life  united  stand  over  against  the  outer  world.  Motives  enter 
into  consciousness  and  grip  the  circuit  of  motor-nerve  activities.  The 
motives  corresponding  to  the  forms  of  development  of  the  interest  which 
work  in  us  are  the  material,  egoistic,  intellectual  and  moral  motives.^ 

The  relation  of  interest  and  motive  is  as  follows:  — 

The  material  motive  [corresponding  to  the  physiological  interest]  has  as 
its  function  to  maintain  and  develop  the  individual  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence imtil  with  death  the  nerves  cease  their  activity.  It  works  largely  in  a 
reflex,  automatic  manner.  But  with  the  development  of  consciousness  it 
loses  its  fundamental  character  and,  subordinated  to  reflection,  draws  on  a 
larger  circle  of  the  world  for  the  satisfaction  of  its  strivings;  now  all  the 
impulses  co-operate  to  develop  the  individual  and  maintain  the  race.  The 
material  interest  as  thus  developed  we  call  the  egoistic  motive  [corresponding 
to  the  individual  interest]  which  of  all  the  motives  exercises  the  most  definite 
influence  on  the  social  process.  With  the  development  of  reason  and  the 
enlargement  of  experience,  this  motive  is  increased  to  embrace  what  is  of  use 
to  every  creature  and  to  the  social  organization,  and  expanding  by  means  of 
the  blood-bond,  comes  to  include  the  race. . . .  Upon  this  motive  of  self-inter- 
est rests  to  an  essential  degree  the  origin,  maintenance  and  development  of 
social  individuals;  it  supports  culture  also  in  the  direction  useful  to  man. 
This  motive,  moreover,  is  the  chief  force  in  all  political  events.  When  the 
individual  is  able  to  identify  self-interest  with  that  of  a  social  institution  he 
works  all  the  harder  to  advance  the  conditions  favorable  to  it,  but  sometimes 
the  welfare  of  the  individual  and  society  come  into  conflict,  and  while  the 
conflict  is  often  solved  instinctively,  sometimes  it  comes  into  consciousness 
in  a  way  to  stir  up  the  intellect,  and  the  intellectual  motive  which  deals  with 
ideas.  These  ideas  are  all  related  to  organic  needs  so  the  intellectual  motive 
is  an  outgrowth  of  the  process  of  adaptation  and  arises  because  the  organism 
cannot  adapt  itself  to  the  given  situation  on  a  lower  plane  of  activity.  .  .  . 

These  motives,  as  the  interests,  tend  to  function  harmoniously  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principle  of  adaptation.  When  a  person  is  lacking  in  the  social 
interest  every  idea  is  bound  up  with  self-interest.  Many  times,  it  is  true, 
individual  interest  comes  into  the  realm  of  intellectual  struggle,  but  without 
being  able  to  yield  its  egoistic  bias.  Intellectual  motives  remain  pure  only 
when  they  keep  free  from  everything  that  has  practical  bearing  on  the  social 
struggle.  On  this  account  the  intellectual  motive  must  be  accompanied  by 
the  moral  motive  [corresponding  to  the  social  and  transcendental  interests]  in 
order  that  it  may  guard  the  objectivity  of  social  interests.* 

*  Erkenntnis,  p.  254.  *  Ibid.,  p.  255  f. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 75 

Nowhere  does  the  intellectual  motive  enter  more  easily  into  the  domain  of 
social  interest  than  in  the  satisfaction  of  religious  need.  On  the  other  hand, 
nowhere  do  inborn  interests  and  the  motives  peculiar  to  them  reveal  them- 
selves more  clearly  than  when  man  endeavors  to  apply  his  religious  ideas  to 
social  Hfe.  .  .  .  Religious  faith  when  grounded  in  a  correct  interpretation 
of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  absolute  is  one  of  the  most  potent 
forces  in  Hfe,  but  such  faith  is  possessed  by  only  a  few,  and  only  by  the  re- 
peated awakening  of  reHgious  sentiments  is  the  moral  emotion  able  to  attain 
lordship  in  the  interest  of  society.^ 

Individuals  dififer  not  only  physiologically,  but  in  innate  mental 
capacity  and  in  will  power.  Races,  too,  differ  in  the  average  of 
these  qualities.^  Men  are  classified  as  to  will  power  into  active 
or  aggressive  and  passive  or  defensive,  the  latter,  numerically  in 
the  majority,  always  subordinated  to  the  comparatively  small 
number  of  the  former.  This  process  of  subordination  of  the 
many  weak  to  the  one  strong  will  is  the  source  of  social  organiza- 
tion.3  The  one  strong  personality  formulates  the  line  of  interest- 
satisfaction  or  social  purpose  accepted  by  groups  and  the  more  or 
less  conscious  acceptance  of  this  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  group 
is  what  constitutes  social  will. 

Contrary  to  Gumplowicz,  our  author  assumes  a  monogenetic 
origin  of  the  human  race  out  of  the  primates  in  the  Tertiary  period, 
although  he  admits  that  the  process  of  evolution  is  shrouded  in 
mystery .-*  The  earliest  stage  was  characterized  by  sociality  and 
co-operation  in  a  struggle  against  physical  conditions  and  wild 
animals.^  Increase  of  population  and  pressure  on  means  of  sub- 
sistence led  to  conflict  of  interests,  separation  and  migration,  and 
the  various  groups  under  the  long  continued  influence  of  different 
environmental  conditions  developed  by  the  law  of  adaptation 
the  ethnic  peculiarities  which  differentiated  the  races  in  earliest 
historic  times.®  The  second  stage,  or  that  of  primitive  culture  was 
characterized,  industrially,  by  fishing  and  agriculture  in  some 
environmental  conditions,  in  others  by  hunting,  herding,  or  both, 
leading  to  the  development  of  nomadic  life.  Socially  this  stage 
was  characterized  by  the  rise  of  institutions.'  In  the  third  or 
barbaric  stage  we  find  increase  of  numbers  leading  to  conflict  of 

*  Erkenntnis,  p.  258.  *  Soziologie,  p.  27.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  14. 

*  Soziologie^  pp.  35  f.         *  Ihid.,  p.  13. 

*  Erkenntnisy  p.  285.         *  Ihid.,  pp.  13,  30  f.,  37  f.,  65,  74. 


176  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

interests  between  groups,  robbery  and  warfare  resulting  in  the 
death  or  enslavement  of  the  vanquished.^  The  fourth  or  stage  of 
warfare  was  characterized  by  the  general  practice  of  living  by 
plunder  and  war  and  by  the  development  of  social  organizations 
adapted  to  such  a  life,  also  by  the  rise  of  private  property  and  by 
the  development  of  rights.  In  the  fifth  stage  we  have  the  ruling 
classes  struggling  for  the  possession  of  the  earth  and  the  subject 
classes  struggling  for  better  conditions  of  Ufe,  hence  a  conflict  of 
classes  within  the  group,  based  on  class  interests.^  In  the  sixth 
stage  we  have  the  spread  of  capitalism,  an  era  of  discovery  and 
exploitation  of  new  lands  and  the  bloody  conflicts  between  culture 
groups  for  the  possession  of  the  earth.  The  extension  of  the  capi- 
talistic system  necessitates  the  development  of  credit  and  leads 
to  the  conflict  between  the  capitalistic  and  laboring  classes.  It 
leads  also  to  the  development  and  spread  of  culture  ^  and  to  the 
rise  and  rule  of  an  aristocracy  of  wealth.* 

A  new  age  is  coming,  —  an  age  of  settled  social  life  character- 
ized by  the  harmonious  organization  of  production.  Every  land 
will  eventually  need  all  its  territory  for  the  support  of  its  own 
people  so  migration  will  cease,  —  except  as  carried  on  by  force 
by  the  stronger  groups.  Each  group  will  produce  those  com- 
modities for  which  it  is  best  adapted,  and  the  whole  world  will  be 
organized  on  a  basis  of  free  international  exchange.  The  stronger 
races  will  increasingly  dominate  the  weaker. 

Finally,  with  geological  changes  in  the  earth  and  with  the 
waste  of  the  ground  materials  of  civilization  which  characterizes 
our  present  age,  will  come  a  time  of  increasing  difficulty  of  pro- 
duction which  will  call  for  a  new  type  of  human  life.^ 

This  brief  sketch  shows  how  prominent  is  the  doctrine  of 
adaptation  in  the  social  theory  of  Ratzenhofer,  and  how  much  he 
has  contributed  to  the  development  of  this  theory  as  a  key  to  the 
understanding  of  social  evolution.  We  have  passive  material 
adaptation  by  the  direct  influence  of  the  environment  on  the 
organism,  leading  eventually  to  changes  in  the  germ  plasm, 

1  Soziologie,  p.  14.  *  Ibid.,  p.  16. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  15.  *  Ibid.,  p.  17. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  15. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  177 

hence,  to  permanent  ethnological  characters. ^  We  have  the 
environment  working  indirectly  by  compelling  certain  groups  to 
certain  kinds  of  industrial  Hfe  and  to  the  development  of  social 
institutions  adapted  to  it.^  We  have  passive  material  adapta- 
tion, moreover,  as  a  result  of  overpopulation  in  proportion  to 
means  of  subsistence  at  the  disposal  of  the  individual  and  group 
leading  to  conflict  of  interests,  struggle,  and  the  survival  of  those 
best  fitted  for  the  particular  environment  and  stage  of  civiliza- 
tion.^ We  have  passive  spiritual  adaptation  by  the  operation  of 
social  pressure  on  the  individual,^  and  in  the  evolution  of  higher 
civilizations  and  social  institutions  as  a  result  of  group  conflict 
and  cross-fertilization  of  cultures.  Finally,  we  have  active  spiritual 
adaptation  through  the  work  of  those  few  great  thinkers  who  are 
able  to  attain  a  measure  of  real  intellectual  freedom  ^  and  become 
leaders  to  hasten,  within  limits,  the  process  of  natural  evolution, 
also  through  organized  social  activity  under  the  leadership  of 
such  rare  individuals.  In  the  latter  case  the  result  is  usually 
attained  by  the  organization  of  a  new  faction  within  the  group  as 
the  center  for  the  advancement  of  the  desired  reforms. 

Walter  Bagehot  (1826-1877) 

Discussion  and  Animated  Moderation 

Although  Physics  and  Politics  was  pubHshed  before  many  of 
the  writings  already  discussed,  and  although  Bagehot  makes  such 
large  use  of  biological  formulae  ^  that  he  might  have  been  classed 
with  that  school  of  sociologists,  his  contribution  is  placed  here 
because  his  chief  interest  is  an  inductive  study  of  the  social 
process,^  and  in  this  study  he  emphasizes  two  elements  as  all 
important  in  social  progress,  imitation  ^  and  discussion.^  The 
book  thus  forms  a  logical  transition  from  the  anthropological 
and  historical  schools  to  those  sociologists  who  endeavor  to  dis- 
cover one  all-important  element  as  the  key  to  the  understanding 

1  Soziologie,  pp.  37  f.,  50  f.  *  Ihid.,  p.  159. 

2  IhU.,  pp.  89  f.  5  IhU.,  p.  184. 

3  Ihid.,  p.  159. 

^  Physics  and  Politics  (New  York,  1873),  ch.  II,  p.  24. 

^  Ihid.,  pp.  118  f.  8  Ibid.,  pp.  33,  100.  '  Ihid.,  ch.  V. 


178  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

of  social  evolution.  Writing  before  Weismann,  he  believed  with 
most  biologists  of  his  day  in  the  inheritance  of  acquired  charac- 
ters although  this  doctrine  is  not  essential  to  his  argument.^  He 
accepted  in  general  the  theory  of  Sir  Henry  Maine  as  to  the  earli- 
est historic  form  of  the  family  and  state,  —  the  patriarchal, — 
but  he  also  accepted  the  conclusions  of  Bachofen,  McLennan, 
and  Lubbock,  as  to  an  earlier  stage  when  loose  sexual  relations 
reigned  along  with  "  mutterrecht."  ^ 

The  first  problem  of  primitive  times,  as  Bagehot  sees  it,  is  to 
get  law,  order,  polity, —  "a  polity  first  —  what  sort  of  polity  is 
immaterial;  a  law  first  —  what  kind  of  law  is  secondary;  a 
person  or  set  of  persons  to  pay  deference  to  —  though  who  he  is, 
or  they  are,  by  comparison  scarcely  signifies."  ^  Despotism  and 
slavery  were  thus  angels  in  disguise,  for  they  were  the  means  of 
disciplining  the  impulsiveness  of  primitive  man.  But  the  nation 
that  went  too  far  in  its  legalism  and  its  conservatism,  cutting  off 
all  innovators  and  innovation,  was  doomed.^ 

The  two  essentials  to  social  as  well  as  biological  success  are, 
then,  stability  and  variation,  social  stability  resulting  from  imita- 
tion, —  mostly  unconscious,  —  and  elimination  of  the  disuseful;^ 
social  variation  resulting  from  invention  and  free  discussion.^ 

Bagehot  wisely  discriminates  between  the  process  of  race  mak- 
ing (confined  mostly  to  prehistoric  times),  and  that  of  nation 
making,  a  modern  phenomenon.'^ 

As  the  importance  of  imitation  will  be  discussed  later,  we  will 
consider  here  only  the  factors  of  discussion  and  animated  modera- 
tion, which  are  his  original  contributions  to  sociology.  Having 
shown  the  necessity  of  custom  and  custom-imitation  together 
with  the  danger  of  over-conservatism,  he  says:  "  The  change 
from  the  age  of  status  to  the  age  of  choice  was  first  made  in  states 
where  the  government  was  to  a  great  and  a  growing  extent  a  gov- 
ernment by  discussion,  and  where  the  subjects  of  that  discussion 

*  Physics  and  Politics,  pp.  7,  8.  *  Ihid.,  ch.  II. 

*  Ihid. J  pp.  12,  122  f.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  92,  103. 

»  Ihid.,  pp.  50,  64,  137.  •  Ihid.,  pp.  65  f.,  156  f. 

'  Ihid.,  pp.  86,  136.  "  If  we  look  at  the  earliest  monuments  of  the  human 
race,  we  find  these  race-characters  as  decided  as  the  race-characters  now,"  ihid.y 
p.  107. 


THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIOLOGISTS  1 79 

were  in  some  degree  abstract,  or,  as  we  should  say,  matters  of 
principle,"  ^  —  such  as  those  connected  with  religion,  philosophy 
and  politics,  in  the  abstract.^  Matters  of  practical  social  import 
were  the  first  questions  to  be  discussed,  but  if  concerning  merely 
methods  of  warfare  as  with  the  Indians,  progress  did  not  result.^ 
The  chief  value  of  discussion,  he  holds,  is  due  to  the  premium  it 
puts  on  intelligence  and  its  effect  in  promoting  tolerance.* 

Bagehot  mentions  the  following  as  conditions  that  may  be 
traced  historically  to  the  nation  capable  of  a  polity  that  suggests 
principles  for  discussion,  and  so  leads  to  progress:  — 

First,  the  nation  must  possess  the  patria  potestas  in  some  form  so  marked 
as  to  give  family  life  distinctness  and  precision,  and  to  make  a  home  educa- 
tion and  a  home  discipline  probable  and  possible.  .  .  .  Secondly,  that  polity 
would  seem  to  have  been  created  very  gradually  by  the  aggregation  of 
families  into  clans  or  gentes,  and  of  clans  into  nations,  and  then  again  by  the 
widening  of  nations,  so  as  to  include  circumjacent  outsiders  as  well  as  the 
first  compact  and  sacred  group, — the  number  of  parties  to  a  discussion  was 
first  augmented  very  slowly.  Thirdly,  the  nimiber  of  "open"  subjects,  — 
that  is,  of  subjects  on  which  public  opinion  was  optional,  and  on  which  dis- 
cussion was  admitted,  was  at  first  very  small.  ^ 

Another  valuable  result  that  comes  from  discussion  is  a  char- 
acter which  he  terms  "  animated  moderation."  ^  "  To  act 
rightly  in  modern  society,"  he  says,  "requires  a  great  deal  of  pre- 
vious study,  a  great  deal  of  assimilated  information,  a  great  deal 
of  sharpened  imagination;  and  these  prerequisites  of  sound  action 
require  much  time."  He  shows  how  true  this  is  especially  in  the 
art  of  benefiting  men,  where  "  haste  makes  waste."  ^  Discus- 
sion, too,  leads  to  intellectuality  and  this  in  turn  by  virtue  of  the 
law  of  conservation  of  energy,  to  limitation  of  population.^  A- 
final  value  comes  from  the  relation  of  discussion  to  intellectual 
development  and  of  this  to  mechanical  ingenuity. 

In  the  final  chapter  he  shows  how  "  a  lazy  nation  may  be 
changed  into  an  industrious,  a  rich  into  a  poor,  a  religious  into  a 
profane,  as  if  by  magic,  if  any  single  cause,  though  slight,  or  any 
combination  of  causes,  however  subtle,  is  strong  enough  to  change 

*  Physics  and  Politics,  p.  158,  "  Ibid.,  p.  184. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  164  f.  8  Ibid.,  pp.  114  f.,  185  f. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  166.  '  Ibid.,  p.  188. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  162,  163.  8  Ibid.,  p.  197. 


l8o  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

the  favorite  and  detested  types  of  character."  ^  The  qualities 
that  go  to  make  up  the  superior  power  of  Enghshmen,  he  holds, 
are  these:  (i)  as  a  whole,  greater  command  over  the  powers  of 
nature,  viewed  not  only  externally  by  results,  but  internally  by 
ability  to  do;  (2)  greater  knowledge  of  how  to  use  these  forces  of 
nature,  as  for  example,  in  the  interest  of  the  health  and  comfort 
of  the  present  body  and  mind.  He  quotes  with  approval  Spen- 
cer's phrase  that  "  progress  is  an  increase  of  adaptation  of  man 
to  his  environment,  that  is,  of  his  internal  powers  and  wishes  to 
his  external  lot  and  life."  ^ 

The  progress  of  mafij  he  holds,  requires  the  co-operation  of  men 
for  its  development.  If  this  cannot  be  secured,  the  group  perishes. 
A  second  principle  is  that  "  the  co-operation  .  .  .  depends  on  a 
felt  union  of  heart  and  spirit;  and  this  is  only  felt  when  there  is  a 
great  degree  of  real  likeness  in  mind  and  feeling,  however  that 
likeness  may  have  been  attained."  ^ 

Bagehot  grants  a  high  place  to  religion  in  that  it  gives  a  con- 
fidence in  the  universe,  but  especially  to  those  religions  that  have 
the  most  obvious  effect  in  strengthening  the  races  which  beHeved 
them,  and  in  making  those  races  the  winning  races;  but  no  one 
quality  receives  the  meed  of  praise  granted  to  animated  modera- 
tion.^      ^ 

Bagehot's  Physics  and  Politics  has  been  one  of  the  most  widely 
read  and  quoted  books  in  sociology  and  has  exerted  a  profound 
and  lasting  influence.  In  it  we  find  the  author  bringing  out  the 
four  ideas  we  are  presenting  in  this  work,  passive  and  active 
material  adaptation  and  passive  and  active  spiritual  (or  social) 
adaptation,  granting  to  the  last  a  far  greater  function  in  social 
evolution  than  most  whose  writings  we  have  considered. 

1  Physics  and  Politics,  p.  206.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  212,  213. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  209.  ■*  Ibid.,  p.  220. 


CHAPTER  X 

SOCIOLOGISTS  EMPHASIZING  ONE  ALL-IMPORTANT 
FORMULA  OR  PRINCIPLE 

Ever  since  the  early  Greek  philosophers  endeavored  to  find  some 
one  primal  element  from  which  the  earth  was  evolved,  there  have 
been  thinkers  from  time  to  time  who  have  endeavored  to  find 
some  formula  to  express,  or  some  principle  to  explain  social 
changes.  Comte,  as  we  have  seen,  at  one  time  hoped  to  find  such 
a  principle  in  social  phenomena  comparable  to  gravitation  in 
physical,  and  in  his  Polity  he  finds  a  near  approach  in  Love, 
Spencer  found  an  all-comprehensive  formula  in  his  general  law  of 
evolution,  and  a  secondary  formula  in  that  of  adaptation.  With 
Darwin  and  especially  with  the  sociological  followers  of  Weis- 
mann,  struggle  and  selection  is  all-important.  Ratzel,  as  we  have 
noted,  finds  the  explanation  in  geographical  conditions  while  the 
economic  determinists,  including  Marx,  find  the  key  in  some 
phase  of  production  or  distribution  of  wealth. 

With  our  distinct  aim  to  trace  the  development  of  the  concept 
of  adaptation  as  the  key  to  social  philosophy,  we  will  consider  in 
this  chapter  the  contributions  of  a  few  representative  writers, 
each  of  whom  has  developed  some  one  principle  as  all-important 
for  the  correct  interpretation  of  social  progress.  This  will  help 
us  to  understand  the  factors  that  make  for  adaptation. 

In  previous  chapters  besides  some  of  the  principles  mentioned 
above  we  have  considered  division  of  labor  together  with  con- 
sciousness of  supplementary  difference  and  constraint  as  worked  out 
by  Durkheim,  conflict  as  developed  by  Gumplowicz  and  organic 
needs  or  interests  as  analyzed  by  Ratzenhofer.  In  this  chapter  we 
will  consider  briefly  Adam  Smith  as  the  forerunner  of  Spencer, 
Fiske  and  others  in  his  emphasis  on  sympathy  and  of  Tarde, 
Bagehot  and  Baldwin  in  the  importance  placed  on  imitation.  We 
will  consider  Tarde  and  Baldwin  for  their  development  of  this 
concept  of  imitation  as  the  one  all-important  method  of  social 

i8i 


1 82  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

progress,  the  latter  also  for  his  genetic  treatment  of  sociology  by 
the  "dialectic  of  growth,"  Drummond  with  emphasis  on  struggle 
for  the  life  of  others  and  Giddings  as  the  exponent  of  consciousness 
of  kind. 

Adam  Smith  (17  23-1 790) 

Fellow-Feeling  v.  Self-interest 

Out  of  the  philosophical  and  ethical  writings  of  Locke,  Butler, 
Hume,  Hutcheson,  Paley  and  others,  —  all  previous  to  the  period 
selected  as  the  starting  point  for  our  discussion,  —  developed  the 
two  schools  of  egoistic  and  universal  hedonism  ^  with  a  more  or 
less  positivistic  and  empirical  basis.  In  Adam  Smith's  Theory  of 
Moral  Sentiments,  pub]ished  in  1759,  we  have  a  compromise  be- 
tween the  two,  both  self-interest  and  sympathy  or  "  fellow-feel- 
ing "  being  recognized  as  primary  endowments  of  man.  Without 
using  the  historic  method  emphasized  so  much  later,  or  attaining 
the  positivism  of  the  modern  period,  he  formulates  and  illustrates 
by  niunerous  examples  principles  later  supported  by  historical 
investigation.  His  doctrine  of  sympathy  was  given  great  promi- 
nence in  the  writings  of  Comte,^  J.  S.  Mill,  and  Spencer,  and  made 
by  Fiske,  Nathaniel  Shaler  ^  and  Giddings  ^  the  key  to  the  under- 
standing of  the  process  of  association. 

Smith's  distinction  between  custom  and  fashion  ^  and  his  dis- 
cussion of  the  influence  of  these  on  the  individual  laid  the  founda- 
tion for  the  later  theories  of  Durkheim  and  Tarde;  his  theory  of 
the  part  played  in  individual  conduct  by  an  appreciation  of  the 
judgment  of  his  fellow-men  ^  has  been  elaborated  by  recent  social 
psychologists,^  and  his  teaching  concerning  the  development  of 
fellow-feeling  in  ever-enlarging  circles  ^  is  akin  to  James'  doctrine 

1  For  egoistic  or  scientific  hedonism,  Sidgwick,  Method  of  Ethics,  pp.  172  f.  For 
universalistic  hedonism,  ibid.,  p.  411;  Thilly,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  pp.  163-200. 

2  It  is  significant  thatComte  set  small  store  by  any  of  the  classical  economists  save 
Smith,  and  this,  doubtless  for  one  reason,  because  of  the  place  he  gives  to  sympathy. 

'  Especially  in  The  Neighbor.  Shaler  connects  sympathy  with  the  sense  of 
touch  and  suggests  a  biological  reason  for  this  connection,  ibid.,  pp.  32  f. 

*  With  Giddings  phrased  "  Consciousness  of  Kind." 
^  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  pt.  5,  chs.  I  and  II. 

«  Ibid.,  pp.  78  f.,  307  f.  '  Cf.  McDougall,  Social  Psychology,  ch.  VII. 

*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  pp.  217  f.,  381  f. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 83 

of  "  selves."  Indeed  in  Smith  we  have  a  theological  and  meta- 
physical ^  interpretation  of  the  principles  which  a  hundred  years 
or  more  later  were  to  be  estabhshed  by  historical  and  empirical 
study  and  interpreted  in  scientific  terms. 

Adam  Smith  has  been  given  the  credit  of  being  the  founder  of 
the  laissezfaire  school  of  economists,  and  to  this  degree  he  stands 
primarily  as  an  exponent  of  passive  adaptation; /but  while  he 
gives  prominence  to  wise  self-interest,  especially  in  his  political 
economy,  he  criticizes  severely  those  who  make  this  the  deter- 
mining factor  in  social  progress  and  raises  to  a  prominence 
previously  unknown  the  correlative  and  corrective  doctrine  of 
sympathy  or  fellow-feeling.  /Nor  does  he  try  to  evolve  the  latter 
from  the  former,  as  did  Helve  tins,  Bentham  and  other  s,^  holding, 
on  the  contrary,  that  the  capacity  for  fellow-feeling  is  an  original 
endowment  of  man  functioning  contrary  to  self-interest  under  the 
sense  of  duty.^ 

Smith  holds  that  etymologically  sympathy  includes  only  fel- 
low-feeling with  the  sufferings  of  another,  but  practically  that 
it  includes  all  kinds  of  fellow-feeling,  and  that  "  our  propensity  to 
sympathize  with  joy  is  much  stronger  than  our  propensity  to 
sympathize  with  sorrow."  ^  This  is  due  to  its  relation  to  individ- 
ual pleasure  and  pain,  based  on  the  purpose  of  the  Creator,  and 
also  on  its  greater  social  utility.^ 

Sympathy  is  the  result  of  imagination, — of  putting  one's  self  in 
place  of  another,^  —  and  so  requires  community  of  experience. 
This  calls  for  a  levelling  process  manifested  especially  in  self- 
control  on  the  part  of  those  in  distress.^ 

Judgment  of  propriety  concerning  the  action  of  another  is 
based  on  imaginary  self-judgment  and  the  sentiment  of  approval 
resulting.  "  If,  upon  bringing  the  case  home  to  our  own  breast," 
he  says,  "  we  find  that  the  sentiments  which  it  gives  occasion  to 

^  Using  these  terms  in  the  Comtean  sense;  cf.  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  pp. 
139  f-,  174,  223,  232. 
2  Ibid.,  pp.  477  f. 

^  Ibid.,  pt.  3,  chs.  II  and  III,  especially  pp.  515  f. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  4,  68,  145. 
^  Ibid.,  Book  I,  Sect.  2,  pp.  94  f.,  310. 
8  Ibid.,  ch.  I,  pp.  178  f.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  25  f. 


1 84  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

coincide  and  tally  with  our  own,  we  necessarily  approve  of  them, 
otherwise  we  necessarily  disapprove  of  them,  as  extravagant  and 
out  of  proportion."  ^ 

Man  is  so  constituted  that  he  derives  pleasure  not  only  from 
a  perception  of  right,  i.  e.,  fitting  or  adapted  to  the  end  proposed, 
according  to  Smith,  but  also  from  an  appreciation  of  utility.^ 
Thus  as  the  perception  of  order,  harmony,  system,  propriety^ 
utility  J  gives  pleasure,  whereas  the  perception  of  the  opposite 
qualities  gives  pain,  so  also  does  the  perception  and  experience 
of  the  familiar  give  pleasure,  —  hence  the  influence  of  custom  and 
fashion  on  moral  sentiments.^ 

Although  merit  and  demerit  should  depend  upon  motive, 
according  to  our  author,  rather  than  upon  results,  and  although 
the  sentiment  of  approval  or  disapproval  should  come  only  from  a 
sympathetic  appreciation  of  motives,  yet  he  grants  that  in  fact 
the  result  of  an  act  is  the  basis  of  judgment  rather  than  motive. 
The  explanation  of  this  irregularity  he  finds  in  the  good  of  the 
species.^ 

Important,  too,  is  the  emphasis  placed  by  Smith  on  the  truth 
that  man  desires  not  only  approval  but  even  more  the  conscious- 
ness of  being  worthy  of  such  approval.^  "  It  is  only  the  weakest 
and  most  superficial  of  mankind  who  can  be  much  delighted  with 
that  praise  which  they  themselves  know  to  be  altogether  un- 
merited. To  desire,  or  even  to  accept  of  praise,  where  no  praise 
is  due,  can  be  the  effect  only  of  the  most  contemptible  vanity."  ^ 

This  necessity  for  the  highest  happiness,  that  conduct  should 
conform  as  nearly  as  possible  to  one's  ideal, — which  according  to 
our  author  is  the  basis  of  the  sense  of  duty,^ — will  be  discussed 
later  under  the  head  of  "  idealization." 

Sympathy,  then,  according  to  Adam  Smith,  is  the  bond  of  social 
cohesion,  the  basis  of  moral  sentiments,  and  the  most  essential 
factor  in  individual  and  social  well-being. 

*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments ^  pp.  25  f . 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  286  f.    Propriety  and  utility  are  practically  identical. 
'  Ibid.,  pt.  5. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  159-175.  *  Ibid.,  p.  189. 

»  Ibid.,  pp.  188  ff.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  184  ff. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 85 

Gabriel  Tarde  (1843-1904) 
Imitation 

The  function  of  imitation  in  social  progress,  brought  out  forcibly 
by  Adam  Smith  and  developed  by  Walter  Bagehot,  has  been 
emphasized  as  the  one  all-comprehensive  factor  by  Tarde  and 
been  given  almost  equal  prominence  by  Baldwin  and  Giddings. 

As  jurist  Tarde  observed  how  large  a  part  imitation  played  in 
crime;  as  statistician  he  dealt  with  recurrences,  repetitions;  as 
psychologist  he  was  particularly  interested  in  the  analysis  of 
motives,  and  the  experience  and  study  of  years  finally  crystal- 
lized into  a  cosmic  philosophy  which  sought  to  explain  evolution 
by  the  three  related  laws  of  repetition,  opposition  and  adaptation, 
—  the  three  subsumed  under  the  one  comprehensive  law  of 
imitation.^  "  Repetition,  opposition  and  adaptation,"  he  says, 
"  are  the  three  keys  which  science  employs  to  open  up  the  arcana 
of  the  universe,''  —  and  these,  though  distinct,  are  closely  con- 
nected. "  In  biology,  for  example,  the  tendency  of  species  to 
multiply  in  geometric  progression  (a  law  of  repetition)  forms  the 
basis  of  the  struggle  for  existence  and  natural  selection  (a  law  of 
opposition);  and  the  appearance  of  individual  variations,  the 
production  of  various  individual  aptitudes  and  harmonies,  and  the 
correlation  of  parts  in  growth  (laws  of  adaptation)  are  necessary 
to  the  functioning  of  both."  ^ 

Tarde  criticizes  those  sociologists  such  as  Durkheim  and  Le  Bon 
who  deal  with  impersonal  forces  and  spontaneous  crowd  impulses 
which  coerce  the  individual,  also  those  who  emphasize  the  group 
as  the  unit.  Mass  movements  according  to  our  author,  have  their 
ultimate  explanation  in  the  inter-cerebral  relations  of  two  minds, 
the  one  reflecting  the  other.  "  It  is  here,"  he  says,  "  that  he  [the 
sociologist]  must  seek  the  key  to  the  social  mystery;  it  is  from  this 
that  he  must  endeavor  to  derive  the  few  simple  but  universal  laws 
which  may  be  distinguished  amid  the  seeming  chaos  of  historical 
and  human  life."  ^  From  this  point  of  view  he  refuses  to  accept 
such  concepts  as  "  social  organism,"  "  soul  of  a  people,"  "  genius 

^  Tarde,  The  Laws  of  Imitation  (Trans,  by  Parsons),  Introduction. 

2  Tarde,  Social  Laws  (Trans,  by  Warren),  p.  7.  '  Ihid.,  pp.  46,  47,  165. 


1 86  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

of  a  people  or  race,"  as  commonly  used,  and  holds  that  they  are 
merely  a  convenient  label,  or  impersonal  synthesis  of  individual 
characteristics  and  that  the  characters  of  individuals  are  alone 
real,  effective  and  ever  in  activity.  Thus  instead  of  assuming  as  a 
starting  point  for  cosmic  evolution  a  homogeneous  mass,  as  did 
Spencer,  and  defining  progress  in  terms  of  differentiation  and 
integration,  Tarde  assumes  a  motley  array  of  elements,  each 
possessing  its  own  individual  characteristics.^ 

Tarde  takes  his  stand  with  the  mathematical  economists  such 
as  Walras  and  Jevons  and  insists  that  the  intellectual  and  volun- 
tary activities  of  the  self  can  be  measured  quantitatively  and  that 
only  so  can  sociology  be  a  science.^  This  leads  to  a  praise  of  the 
statistical  method  of  social  measurements  and  to  the  introduction 
of  his  social  theory. 

The  evolution  of  the  present  world-order,  according  to  our 
author,  consists  in  resolving  the  mass  resemblances  into  resem- 
blances of  detail,  and  in  transforming  the  gross  and  obvious  mass 
differences  into  infinitely  minute  differences  of  detail.  The 
minute  interagreement  of  minds  and  wills,  which  forms  the  basis 
of  social  life,  i.  e.,  the  presence  of  so  many  common  ideas,  ends, 
and  means  in  the  minds  and  wills  of  all  members  of  the  same 
society  at  any  given  moment,  —  is  due,  not  to  organic  heredity 
nor  to  mere  identity  of  geographical  environment,  but  rather 
to  the  effect  of  the  suggestion-imitation  process  which,  starting 
from  one  primitive  creature  possessed  of  a  single  idea  or  act, 
has  passed  this  copy  on  to  one  of  its  neighbors,  then  to  another, 
and  so  on.^ 

The  reciprocal  suggestion-imitation  relation  between  two 
persons,  Tarde  holds,  is  the  fimdamental  social  fact  and  finds 
illustration  in  the  relation  of  mother  and  child  and  also  in  that 
of  teacher  and  pupil."*  "  The  unvarying  characteristic  of  every 
social  fact  whatever  is  that  it  is  imitative.  And  this  character- 
istic belongs  exclusively  to  social  facts."  * 

While  imitation  is  the  great  principle  of  social  imiformity,  it  is 
never  exact;  and  the  refraction  of  imitation  rays  in  the  individual 

1  Social  Laws,  p.  210.  '  Ibid.,  p.  38. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  34.  *  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 87 

or  groups  and  the  new  complex  rays  resulting  from  various  desire- 
belief  combinations  and  oppositions  are  the  mainspring  of  varia- 
tion and  progress.2 

Tarde  differs  from  Ratzenhof er  in  making  the  idea  of  a  satisfier 
precede  desire.  He  grants  the  impelling  force  of  organic  need  but 
holds  that  this  is  a  vital  rather  than  a  social  factor.^  The  social 
substance  or  thing  invented  or  imitated  is  "an  idea  or  voUtion, 
a  judgment  or  a  purpose,  which  embodies  a  certain  amount  of 
belief  smd  desire.  Desire  and  belief:  they  are  the  substance  and 
the  force,  they  are  the  two  psychological  quantities  which  are 
found  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  sensational  qualities  with  which 
they  combine,  and  when  invention  and  then  imitation  takes 
possession  of  them  in  order  to  organize  and  use  them,  they  also  are 
the  real  social  quantities."  ^  Belief  and  desire  according  to  our 
author  are  not  social  forces  until  they  come  to  a  head  in  invention 
and  are  transmitted  by  imitation.  But  beliefs  and  desires  are 
not  always  supplementary  or  co-ordinate,  coming  frequently  into 
conflict  and  this  fact  leads  Tarde  to  a  discussion  of  the  laws  of 
opposition. 

The  social  forces  thus  classified  drive  individuals  on  by  co-opera- 
tion and  opposition,  and  by  struggle  and  survival  produce  ulti- 
mately a  more  or  less  complete  harmony.  "  Any  aggregation 
whatever,"  he  says,  "  is  a  collection  of  individuals  jointly  adapted, 
either  some  adapted  to  the  remainder  or  all  to  a  common  func- 
tion. An  aggregate  means  an  adaptate.  Moreover  different 
aggregates  which  have  relations  with  one  another  may  be  co- 
adapted;  this  constitutes  an  adaptate  of  a  higher  degree,  and  an 
infinite  number  of  such  degrees  may  be  distinguished.  For  the 
sake  of  simplicity,  let  us  distinguish  merely  between  two  degrees 
of  adaptation;  adaptation  of  the  first  degree  is  that  which  the 
elements  of  the  system  in  question  have  among  themselves; 
adaptation  of  the  second  degree  is  that  which  unites  these  ele- 
ments to  the  systems  which  surround  them,  that  is,  to  what  is 

^  The  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  22. 

2  Social  Laws,  pp.  100  f.  For  Tarde's  use  of  "  imitation  "  and  his  justifica- 
tion of  it,  including  in  the  term  counter-irxntSLtion,  see  Introduction,  Les  Lois  d& 
V Imitation;  also  Social  Laws,  p.  42  n. 

^  The  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  145.  •*  Ihid.,  pp.  92,  93. 


1 88  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

vaguely  denoted  by  the  term  environment.  The  adjustment 
with  one's  self  differs  greatly,  in  phenomena  of  every  sort,  from 
the  adjustment  with  others,  just  as  self-repetition  (habit)  differs 
from  the  repetition  of  others  (heredity  or  imitation),  and  as  self- 
opposition  (hesitation  and  doubt)  differs  from  opposition  to 
others  (strife  or  competition)."^  As  to  whether  or  not  there  is  a 
cosmic  adaptation  or  "teleology,"  Tarde  says,  "Henceforth  the 
religious  mind  need  turn  no  longer  far  away  to  the  vast  vault 
of  heaven,  there  to  find  and  worship  the  fathomless  wisdom  that 
moves  the  universe;  rather,  it  must  gaze  into  the  chemist's 
crucible,  and  there  discern  the  mystery  of  those  physical  harmonies 
that  are  surely  the  most  exact  and  marvelous  of  all, — far  more 
wonderful  even  than  the  scattered  disorder  of  the  stars:  I  mean 
the  chemical  combinations."  ^ 

Though  man  has  had  to  give  up  anthropocentric  cosmology  he 
finds  scope  for  teleological  conceptions  in  the  marvelous  adapta- 
tion in  the  details  of  each  organism.  "  There  is  no  single  end 
in  nature,"  Tarde  says,  "no  end  in  relation  to  which  all  others  are 
means;  but  there  is  an  infinite  nimaber  of  ends  which  are  seeking 
to  utilize  one  another.  Every  organism,  and  in  every  organism 
every  cell,  and  in  every  cell,  perhaps,  every  cellular  element,  has 
its  own  particular  providence,  for  itself  and  in  itself.  Here,  then, 
as  before,  we  are  led  to  consider  the  harmonizing  force  .  .  .  not 
as  something  unique,  external  and  superior,  but  as  indefinitely 
repeated,  infinitesimal,  and  internal.  In  reality,  the  source  of  all 
these  harmonies  of  life,  which  become  less  striking  the  farther  we 
get  from  the  starting  point  and  the  wider  the  field  we  embrace, 
is  the  fertihzed  germ;  this  last  is  a  living  representation  of  the 
intersecting  lines  that  meet  in  it,  forming  often  a  felicitous  cross- 
breed; it  is  the  germ  of  new  talents,  which  are  destined  to  spread 
broadcast  and  propagate  themselves  in  turn,  thanks  to  the 
survival  of  the  fittest,  or  the  elimination  of  the  least  fit."  ^ 

The  same  is  true  of  society,  he  holds:  — 

The  final  outcome  ...  of  this  final  preponderance  of  a  single  line  of  social 
evolution  .  .  .  is  the  series  of  scientific  discoveries  and  industrial  inventions 
that  have  gone  on  ceaselessly  accumulating  and  making  use  of  one  another; 

*  Laws  of  Imitation,  pp.  148  f.  *  Ibtd.,p.  154.  Ibid.,  p.  157. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 89 

these  have  become  bound  together  in  a  system  or  bundle,  whose  real  logical 
interrelation,  though  not  without  intricacies  of  its  own,  seems  vaguely  re- 
peated in  the  interrelation  of  the  races  which  have  contributed  to  its  forma- 
tion. If  we  follow  up  this  great  scientific  and  industrial  stream,  we  find  its 
source  in  the  mind  of  every  genius,  whether  obscure  or  celebrated,  who  has 
added  some  new  truth,  some  new  means  of  activity,  to  the  enduring  legacy 
of  humanity,  and  who  has  made  the  relations  among  mankind  more  har- 
monious by  this  contribution,  by  promoting  community  of  thought  and  col- 
laboration of  effort.  And  so  ...  I  maintain  that  the  details  of  human  events 
alone  contain  striking  adaptations;  that  the  basis  of  those  harmonies  which 
are  less  noticeable  in  a  vaster  domain  here  comes  plainly  to  view,  and  that 
the  more  we  rise  from  a  small  but  closely  united  social  group,  such  as  the 
family,  the  school,  the  workshop,  the  rural  church,  the  convent,  or  the  regi- 
ment, to  the  city,  the  province,  or  the  nation,  the  less  complete  and  striking 
does  the  solidarity  become.  .  .  .  This  is  true,  be  it  observed,  unless  some 
powerful  personaHty  intervenes  to  govern  and  overrule  the  interrelation  of 
events.  The  latter,  however,  tends  to  occur  more  and  more  frequently,  since 
civiHzation  is  distinguished  by  the  faciHties  it  offers  for  the  realization  of 
special  schemes  of  social  reorganization;  and  in  this  case  it  does  not  always 
hold  true  that  the  harmony  of  an  aggregate  is  in  inverse  ratio  to  its  mass.^ 

In  Tarde's  philosophy  we  have  a  "  pluralistic  universe."  The 
ultimate  fact  so  far  as  he  can  discover  is  a  vast  multitude  of 
diverse  primal  units.  These  primal  units  or  simple  elements  after 
a  time  form  into  a  vast  array  of  complex  imits  exhibiting  internal 
adaptation.  Ultimately  the  complex  protoplasmic  organism  is 
evolved  having  internal  adaptation  and  a  certain  degree  of 
external,  —  and  so  on  through  the  development  of  species  to 
man  and  through  the  family  to  complex  social  relations.^  Viewed 
statically  adaptation  for  the  most  part  decreases  inversely  with 
the  extent  of  adaptive  relations,  but  viewed  dynamically  the 
progress  of  civilization  reveals  another  movement  tending  to 
increase  the  closeness  of  human  relations  by  association  and 
co-operation  so  that  we  may  look  forward  to  an  ultimate  social 
organization  co-extensive  with  humanity  which  shall  reveal  a 
high  degree  of  internal  adaptation.^  And  just  as  the  evolution 
of  species  is  explained  by  variation,  struggle  and  survival,  so 
the  process  of  socialization  is  explained  by  social  variation 
(invention)  and  imitation,  working  by  the  laws  of  repetition  and 
opposition  to  secure  ultimate  adaptation.     Imitation,  then,  with 

*  Laws  of  Imitation,  pp.  162,  163.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  162.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  169. 


igo  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Tarde,  explains  socialization  much  as  natural  selection  with  Dar- 
win explains  biological  evolution  and  the  origin  of  species. 
The  social  ideal  is  well  expressed  in  the  following:  — 

*  If  we  take  the  ideas  of  invention,  imitation  and  social  logic  as  a  guiding 
thread  we  are  led  to  the  more  reassuring  perspective  of  a  great  future  con- 
fluence ...  of  multiple  divisions  of  mankind  into  a  single  peaceful  human 
family.  The  idea  of  indefinite  progress,  which  is  such  a  vague  and  obstinate 
idea,  has  neither  a  clear  nor  precise  meaning  except  from  this  point  of  view. 
The  necessity  of  a  progressive  march  towards  a  great  but  distant  goal  is  an 
outcome  of  the  laws  of  imitation.  This  goal,  which  becomes  more  and  more 
accessible  in  spite  of  apparent,  although  transitory,  set-backs,  is  the  birth, 
the  development,  and  the  universal  spread,  —  whether  imder  an  imperial 
or  federated  form  is  insignificant,  —  of  a  unique  society.  .  .  .  We  might 
demand  to  what  extent  this  collective  dream,  this  collective  nightmare  of 
society,  was  worth  its  cost  in  blood  and  tears  if  this  grievous  discipline,  this 
deceptive  and  despotic  prestige,  did  not  serve  to  free  the  individual  in  calling 
forth,  httle  by  Httle,  from  the  depths  of  his  heart,  his  freest  impulses,  his 
boldest  introspection,  his  keenest  insight  into  nature,  and  in  developing  every- 
where, not  the  savage  individualities,  not  the  clashing  and  brutal  soul-stuffs 
of  bygone  days,  but  those  deep  and  harmonious  traits  of  the  soul  that  are 
characteristic  of  personaHty  as  well  as  of  civilization,  the  harvest  of  both  the 
purest  and  most  potent  individuaHsm  and  consummate  sociability.^ 

Tarde  is  open  to  criticism  chiefly  in  the  following  points:  — 

1.  His  system  is  essentially  logical  rather  than  factual,  and  he 
has  not  proven  that  logical  classification  fits  life  conditions. 
Although  there  seems  to  be  a  straining  towards  consistency  in  the 
belief-desire  life  of  the  individual,  this  is  seldom  attained,  and 
chaos  is  not  uncommon.  The  same  holds  of  the  co-adaptive 
process  of  socialization. 

2.  His  attempt  to  reduce  life  to  mechanistic  terms  explicable 
by  mechanical  laws  fails  in  two  particulars:  (a)  it  leads  to  strict 
determinism  making  the  apparent  freedom  of  individual  and 
social  activity  an  illusion,^  and  {h)  it  leads  to  a  doctrine  of  socio- 
psychical  measurements  which  is  contradicted  by  every-day 
experience.  The  only  possible  way  that  evaluations  can  be 
quantitatively  compared  is  by  first  reducing  them  to  their  physi- 

1  The  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  xxiv. 

*  Especially  apparent  in  his  discussion  of  suggestion  and  auto-suggestion: 
"  L'^tat  social,  comme  I'^tat  hypnotique,  n'est  qu'une  forme  de  reve.  .  .  .  N'avoir 
que  des  id6es  sugg6r6es  et  les  croire  spontan6es:  telle  est  Tillusion  propre  au  som- 
nambule,  et  aussi  bien  k  rhomme  social,"  Les  Lois  de  VImitation,  p.  83. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  191 

cal  correlates  as  is  done  in  physiological-psychology.  But  this 
process,  as  Miinsterberg  has  shown,  leaves  out  the  very  heart  of 
the  phenomena  compared.  Evaluations  differ  from  moment  to 
moment,  and  social  facts  are  the  outcome  of  these  ever-shifting 
evaluations. 

3.  His  broad  use  of  the  term  imitation  is  questionable,^  its 
exact  meaning  left  undelSned  and  iXsmodus  operandi  mis-explained 
by  use  of  mechanical  similes.  Indeed  his  discussion  of  suggestion 
and  imitation  is  now  passee.^ 

4.  He  made  the  mistake  common  to  many  social  philosophers 
of  trying  to  find  one  all-comprehensive  element  or  principle  as 
a  sociological  solvent.^ 

M.  M.  Davis  credits  Tarde's  social  logic  as  giving  the  following 
valuable  suggestions:  "  It  helps  us  to  conceive  how  beliefs  and 
desires  (inventions)  agree,  disagree,  or  combine,  and  thus,  how 
systems  of  ideas  are  built  up.  We  see  that  the  social  life  of  a 
people  must  be  an  organic  whole  because  of  the  inherent  necessity 
for  logical  harmony  between  those  different  ideas  and  sentiments 
existing  in  individual  minds,  which  are  represented  objectively 
in  social  institutions.  We  see  that  social  change  must  come  about 
through  the  appearance  and  adoption  (imitation)  of  new  ideas, 
(inventions)  which  are  either  in  harmony  with  the  existing  sys- 
tem, or  are  connected  with  such  strong  beliefs  and  desires  that 
they  substitute  themselves  for  parts  of  this  system  and  occasion  a 
re-synthesis.  The  relative  strength  of  such  beliefs  and  desires 
determines  whether  or  not  an  invention  will  be  established 
socially,  that  is,  be  imitated."  *  Davis  criticizes  Tarde,  however, 
for  his  over-emphasis  on  this  one  factor  to  the  practical  exclusion 

1  Cf.  Small,  op.  ciL,  pp.  626  f.;  Baldwin,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations y 
p.  478;  Wallis,  The  Great  Society,  p.  120. 

'  Cooley,  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  pp.  25  f .;  Wallis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  131  f.; 
Thomdike,  Original  Nature  of  Man,  ch.  VIII. 

'  This  criticism  may  be  passed  on  the  endeavor  of  the  present  writer  to  interpret 
social  progress  by  the  principle  of  adaptation,  but  this  difference  should  be  noted: 
The  term  imitation  is  supposed  to  have  definite  content  and  is  used  by  Tarde  to 
explain  a  process  which  includes  innovation,  repetition,  opposition,  and  adaptation, 
whereas  the  term  adaptation  is  used  in  this  volume  merely  to  describe  a  series  of 
relationships  existmg  or  that  should  exist. 

*  Davis,  Psychological  Interpretations  of  Society,  p.  22. 


192  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

of  others.  "  The  general  conception  of  social  progress,"  he  says, 
"is  the  mutually  adaptive  reactions  of  individuals;  and  that  special 
form  of  adaptation  which  we  call  imitation  is  neither  its  only 
social  form  nor  its  only  social  form  of  importance,"  and  quotes 
Cooley  with  approval,  who  says:  "There  are  other  aspects  of 
society  besides  imitation  which  may  be  viewed  as  social  proc- 
esses ;  competition,  communication,  differentiation,  and  others, 
are  each  worthy  of  a  volume  like  Tarde's  Laws  of  Imitation.  .  .  . 
The  real  process  is  a  multiform  thing,  of  which  these  are  but 
glimpses."  ^ 

In  the  writings  of  Tarde  we  have  an  attempt  to  explain  cosmic 
evolution  in  purely  mechanical  terms,  hence  passive  adaptation 
is  ever  in  the  foreground,  but  these  mechanistic  forces  are  ever 
producing  new  compounds  ^  hence  the  possibility  of  progress.  In 
the  human  intellect  these  result  in  new  ideas,  and  in  the  "  heart  " 
in  new  desires  and  sentiments,  and  these  functioning  in  social  life 
as  inventions,  make  possible  that  so-called  telic  process  which  we 
term  active  adaptation. 

James  Mark  Baldwin  (i86i-        ) 
The  Dialectic  of  Growth 

Professor  Baldwin,  as  Tarde,  has  made  imitation  the  funda- 
mental social  process  or  "  true  type  of  social  function,"  although 
he  differs  from  the  latter  in  his  interpretation  of  the  process,  in  his 
analysis  of  the  "  imi table  "  and  in  his  emphasis  on  "  reflective 
imitation."  ^ 

Baldwin  makes  his  approach  to  social  philosophy  from  the 
point  of  view  of  genetic  psychology,  studies  the  process  of  the 
development  of  the  child's  mind  in  contact  with  his  social  environ- 
ment and  from  his  conclusions  formulates  his  principles  of  the 
"Dialectic  of  Personal  Growth"  and  "Dialectic  of  Social 
Growth  "  which  together  form  his  chief  contribution  to  our  sub- 
ject. In  order  to  appreciate  these  principles  some  preliminary 
observations  will  be  in  place. 

*  Davis,  op.  cit.,  p.  104.  2  LHnvention,  pp.  4  f. 

*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  pp.  478  f . 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 93 

As  we  noted  in  our  discussion  of  biological  evolution,  Baldwin, 
with  Osborn  and  Lloyd  Morgan,  formulated  the  doctrine  of 
"  Organic  Selection  "  according  to  which  acquired  characters  are 
considered  to  affect  the  evolutionary  process  either  by  working 
through  the  central  nervous  system  or  by  the  preservation  of 
these  characters  through  habit  and  social  heredity  until  they 
eventuate  in  an  inborn  variation  which  is  transmitted  by  physical 
heredity.^ 

Baldwin  is  a  firm  beHever  in  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection 
and  makes  large  use  of  it  in  his  psychology  and  social  philosophy, 
but  he  brings  the  social  process  into  strong  contrast  to  the 
biological,  laying  chief  stress  on  invention,  imitation,  and  "  social 
heredity,"  and  pointing  out  several  ways  in  which  the  doctrine  of 
natural  selection  fails  when  applied  to  social  evolution.^ 

The  socio-psychical  process  or  the  "  modes  of  social  or  collective 
life  "  are  divided  into  three  classes:  (i)  the  instinctive  or  grega- 
rious; (2)  the  spontaneous  or  plastic;  and  (3)  the  reflective  or 
social  proper.^  The  instinctive  or  gregarious  group  of  collec- 
tive reactions  are  physically  inherited  by  individual  animals. 
Such  modes  of  action,  moreover,  are  fixed  and  unprogressive  and 
are  the  product  of  biological  laws.  The  spontaneous  or  plastic 
group  of  collective  actions  are  "  due  to  experience,  habits  of 
common  or  joint  behavior  which  are  not  inherited,  but  learned.  .  .  . 
These  acquired  modes  of  collective  action  illustrate  social  trans- 
mission rather  than  physical  heredity.  .  .  .  The  individual  does 
not  go  by  this  method  beyond  what  the  group  Hfe  has  already 
acquired.  .  .  All  the  individuals  of  the  group  learn  the  same  things; 
and  what  they  learn  is  the  body  of  useful  actions  already  estab- 
lished in  the  collective  Hfe  of  the  group.  The  laws  of  this  mode  of 
collective  action  are,  accordingly,  psychological,  not  merely 
biological."     He  calls  this  a  "  mode  of  psychological  solidarity  J  ^ 

*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  pp.  545  ff. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  57  f.,  459,  462  f.  "  This  is  the  great  essential  thing  about  social 
truth  as  opposed  to  biological  fact:  it  leaps  the  bounds  of  physical  heredity,"  ibid., 
p.  462, 

'  The  Individual  and  Society,  p.  36.  Baldwin  quotes  with  approval  Tonnies' 
distinction  between  "  Gemeinschaft "  and  "  Gesellschaft,"  Social  and  Ethical 
Interpretations,  p.  486. 


194  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  the  reflective  or  social  group  we  have  not  merely  instinctive  or 
unconscious  imitative  activity,  but  "  an  intelligent  judgment 
made  with  a  view  to  consequences  to  be  attained."  Here,  alone, 
according  to  our  author,  do  we  find  a  group  of  activities  that  may 
properly  be  called  social.  In  this  group  of  intelligent  acts  of 
co-operation  he  notes  the  following  characteristics:  (i)  They  are 
social  novelties,  yet  on  the  whole  progressive  and  constructive  in 
contrast  to  mob  action  which  comes  under  the  second  mode; 
(2)  these  issue  in  a  "  solidarity  of  intelligence,  of  conviction,  of 
higher  sentiment,  .  .  .  [which]  takes  the  place  of  the  solidarity 
of  mere  instinct  or  blind  feeling  " ;  and  (3)  the  result  is  a  solidarity 
of  conscious  intention  and  voluntary  co-operation} 

These  three  modes  are  not  mutually  exclusive  or  definitely 
demarked.  The  instinctive  issues  in  the  plastic  and  this  in  the 
social  yet  all  three  are  co-existent  and  overlap. 

Professor  Baldwin's  genetic  approach  to  social  philosophy  and 
the  gist  of  his  theory  including  the  inter-relation  of  the  individual 
and  society,  the  dialectic  of  personal  growth  and  the  all-impor- 
tant function  of  imitation  cannot  be  stated  better  than  in  his  own 
words  as  found  in  his  latest  work  The  Individual  and  Society, 

The  individual  comes  into  the  world  with  the  impulse  of  the  history  of  the 
race  behind  him.  He  has  few  perfect  instincts,  such  as  many  of  the  animals 
show.  He  is,  on  the  contrary,  plastic  and  educable.  But  his  development 
is  nevertheless  to  be  a  compromise  between  the  two  tendencies  which 
throughout  all  his  life  represent  individualism  and  collectivism.  He  has 
distinctly  egoistic  and  individuaHstic  impulses,  but  with  them  he  has  also 
positive  predispositions  to  social  life.  These  two  germinal  tendencies  are  to 
receive  their  more  perfect  adjustment,  or  at  least  a  working  relation,  in  his 
education  and  training  in  the  habits  and  usages  of  the  social  group. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  more  individualistic  factor  in  his 
heredity;  it  is  summed  up  in  the  word  "  appetite."  He  has  a  mass  of  ten- 
dencies which  are  necessary  to  the  preservation  and  advancement  of  his 
vegetative  and  animal  life.  These  are  of  necessity  direct,  strong,  and  self- 
seeking. 

But  over  against  these  we  find  certain  positive  impulses  which  are  of  a 
quasi-social  or  gregarious  sort,  ready  soon  after  birth  to  develop  the  other 
side  of  his  nature.  Bashfulness,  shame,  jealousy,  are  some  of  the  more 
fundamental  tendencies  rooted  in  the  organic  structure  of  the  human  babe, 
which  seem  to  reveal  ancestral  conditions  of  collective  life  and  habit. 

1  The  Individual  and  Society ^  pp.  36  f.  (italics  as  in  text). 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 95 

With  these  go,  in  a  more  positive  sense,  certain  great  motives  of  action 
which,  natural  as  they  are  and  quasi-instinctive,  become  the  tools  of  "  sociali- 
zation according  to  nature  "  very  early  in  the  individual's  personal  history. 
Play  and  imitation,  twin  brothers  in  the  scheme  of  the  child's  hereditary 
impulses,  come  to  assume,  each  alone  and  both  together,  a  very  extraordinary 
role. 

By  play  the  young  animal  and  the  child  aHke  come  into  the  most  fruitful 
social  relations  with  one  another.  The  meaning  of  the  varied  situations  of 
Hfe  is  learned  in  play,  under  conditions  free  from  the  storm  and  stress  of 
actual  serious  life;  and  thus  the  functions  playfully  exercised  are  developed. 
The  great  activities  of  later  utility  in  the  struggles  of  Hfe,  and  in  the  varied 
social  conditions  of  existence,  are  thus  made  ready.  In  play  we  find  one  of 
the  great  meeting  places  of  the  forces  of  individuaHsm  and  collectivism. 

Imitation  is  another  great  sociaHzing  function.  The  child  naturally  falls 
to  imitating^  and  when  once  this  has  begun  he  is  a  veritable  copying  machine, 
turning  out  acts,  opinions,  decisions,  which  are  based  with  more  or  less  correct- 
ness upon  models  found  in  his  social  environment. 

By  imitation  he  gets  the  ^'  feel "  of  things  that  others  do,  and  so  learns  to 
value  the  safe  and  sane;  by  imitation,  he  tries  on  the  varied  ways  of  doing 
things,  and  so  learns  his  own  capacities  and  limitations;  by  imitation  he 
actually  acquires  the  stored  up  riches  of  the  social  movements  of  history;  by 
imitation  he  learns  to  use  the  tools  of  culture,  speech,  writing,  manual  skill, 
so  that  through  the  independent  use  of  these  tools  he  may  become  a  more 
competent  and  fruitful  individual;  finally,  it  is  by  imitation  in  the  way  of 
varied  and  effortful  trial  that  he  succeeds  in  being  original  and  inventive.  Of 
this  last  result,  more  later  on;  here  let  us  note  simply  that  imitation  in  its 
social  role  is  not  mere  imitation,  mere  copying,  slavish  adherence  to  the 
prevalent  and  easy  ways  of  doing  things;  that  would  be  a  superficial  way  of 
looking  at  this  most  extraordinary  set  of  fimctions.  Imitation  to  the  intelli- 
gent and  earnest  imitator  is  never  slavish,  never  mere  repetition;  it  is,  on  the 
contrary,  a  means  to  further  ends,  a  method  of  absorbing  what  is  present  in 
others  and  of  making  it  over  in  forms  peculiar  to  one's  own  temper  and 
valuable  to  one's  own  genius. 

Armed  with  these  impulses,  the  weapons  of  competition  as  well  as  of 
co-operation,  the  young  hero  of  the  nursery  begins  his  personal  development, 
as  a  center  of  considerate  and  purposeful  action.  The  nucleus  of  personaHty, 
to  the  outsider,  is  the  bodily  self;  it  is  a  sort  of  social  unit ;  but  to  the  individ- 
ual himself,  the  distinction  between  persons  as  minds  and  persons  as  mere 
bodily  presences  soon  springs  up  and  takes  on  greater  and  greater  signifi- 
cance. For  this  is  not  an  inborn  distinction.  The  sense  of  self  is  not  a 
ready-made  and  perfect  gift ;  it  is  a  slow  growth,  the  stages  of  which  show  in 
a  most  interesting  way  the  interaction  of  the  individualistic  and  social 
factors. 

It  begins,  probably,  when  the  child  notes  the  capricious  and  seemingly 
lawless  actions  of  persons,  in  contrast  with  the  more  regular  and  mechanical 
actions  of  things,  such  as  the  swinging  of  the  pendulum,  the  opening  and 
closing  of  the  door,  the  roUing  of  the  ball  upon  the  floor.  Persons  do  the 
most  unexpected,  the  most  inconsistent  things.     And  it  is  these  things  that 


196  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

attract  attention  and  call  out  the  impulse  to  imitate.  The  child  imitates  the 
acts  of  persons. 

Thus  he  is  admitted  to  the  inside  of  the  other's  mind,  as  it  were,  and  dis- 
covers that  bodies  are  not,  as  minds  are,  centers  of  feeUng,  will,  and  knowl- 
edge. He  makes  very  quickly  the  discovery  that  his  own  personaUty  is 
Ukewise  two-sided;  that  he,  too,  is  a  mind  on  the  inside,  and  that  that  which 
others  see  of  him  on  the  outside  is  not  the  mind,  but  merely  the  physical 
person.  He  goes  through  a  series  of  distinguishable  processes  of  interpreta- 
tion, all  worked  out  in  detail  by  the  psychologist,  which  are  of  momentous 
significance  for  the  evolution  of  personality. 

Put  very  briefly  and  untechnically,  these  processes  are  in  outline  as  fol- 
lows: 

The  mind  of  others  is  at  first  to  the  child  the  source  of  capricious  and 
mysterious  actions  and  events.  It  is  located  simply  in  the  physical  person 
of  others:  it  is  then  "  projective  "  —  simply  "  projected  "  into  the  other 
person,  nurse,  mother,  or  whoever  it  be. 

But  this  sort  of  presence  is  then  taken  over  into  himself,  by  imitation,  and 
illustrated  in  those  more  intimate  experiences  which  are  peculiar  to  his  own 
mental  life  —  pains,  efforts,  emotional  crises,  etc.  These  become  the  means  by 
which  he  interprets  the  "  projective  "  characteristics  of  others.  Their  inner 
life  is  understood  in  terms  of  his  own.  The  whole  set  of  events,  having  per- 
sonal, and  not  merely  physical  or  bodily  significance,  becomes  "  subjective  "; 
it  is  peculiar  to  the  "  subject,"  which  is  now  for  the  first  time  differentiated 
with  some  clearness  from  things. 

This  is  followed  again  by  a  return  movement.  The  subjective  experiences, 
—  say  a  series  of  violent  efforts,  or  a  violent  pain,  —  are  in  analogous  circum- 
stances read  into  others  also.  When  the  emotional  expression  warrants  it, 
or  when  cries  or  gestures  indicate  it,  the  subjective  is  made  over  to  other 
persons;  it  is  "  ejected  "  into  the  individuals  of  the  immediate  entourage. 

Other  persons  are  thought  of  then  in  just  the  same  terms  as  the  private 
self;  and  the  private  self  in  the  same  terms  as  other  persons;  it  is  impossible 
to  distinguish  them,  so  far  as  the  meaning  in  subjective  terms  is  concerned. 
The  thought  of  self  is  of  a  larger  self  which  includes  personalities  in  general, 
and  the  different  persons,  in  all  that  which  is  not  singular  or  characteristic  of 
each,  are  fundamentally  the  same} 

This  dialectic  of  personal  growth  has  its  analogue  in  the  give- 
and-take  process  continually  going  on  between  the  individual  and 
society.  "  We  see  that  society,"  says  Baldwin,  "  stands  as  a 
quasi-personality  under  a  two-fold  relation  of  give-and-take 
to  the  individuals  who  make  up  the  social  group.  It  is  related 
to  these  individuals  in  two  ways:  first,  as  having  itself  become 
what  it  is  by  the  absorption  of  the  thoughts,  struggles,  sentiments, 
co-operations,  etc.,  of  individuals;  second-  as  itself  finding  its  new 

1  The  Individual  and  Society,  pp.  18-26. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  I97 

lessons  in  personal  (now  social)  growth  in  the  new  achievements 
of  individuals.  If  we  take  any  lesson  which  society  learns,  — 
any  one  thought  which  it  adopts  and  makes  a  part  of  its  organized 
content,  —  we  can  trace  the  passage  of  this  thought  or  element 
through  the  two  poles  of  the  '  dialectic  of  social  growth  '  just  as 
we  can  also  trace  the  elements  of  personal  suggestion,  in  the  case 
of  the  analogous  dialectic  of  the  individual's  growth.  The  new 
thought  is  *  projective '  to  society  as  long  as  it  exists  in  the 
individual's  mind  only;  it  becomes  '  subjective '  to  society 
when  society  has  generalized  it  and  embodied  it  in  some  one  of 
the  institutions  which  are  a  part  of  her  intimate  organization; 
and  then  finally  society  makes  it  ^  ejective  '  by  requiring,  by  all 
her  pedagogical,  civil,  and  other  sanctions,  that  each  individual, 
class,  or  subordinate  group  which  claims  a  share  in  her  corporate 
life,  shall  recognize  it  and  live  up  to  it. 

"  Society,  in  other  words,  makes  her  particularizations,  inven- 
tions, interpretations,  through  the  individual  man,  just  as  the 
individual  makes  his  through  the  alter  individual  who  gives  him 
his  suggestions;  and  then  society  makes  her  generalizations  by 
setting  the  results  thus  reached  to  work  again  for  herself  in  the 
form  of  institutions,  etc.,  just  as  the  individual  sets  out  for  social 
confirmation  and  for  conduct  the  interpretations  which  he  has 
reached.  The  growth  of  society  is  therefore  a  growth  in  a  sort  of 
self-consciousness,  —  an  awareness  of  itself,  —  expressed  in  the 
general  ways  of  thought,  action,  etc.,  embodied  in  its  institutions; 
and  the  individual  gets  his  growth  in  self-consciousness  in  a  way 
which  shows  by  a  sort  of  recapitulation  this  two-fold  movement 
of  society.  So  the  method  of  growth  in  the  two  cases,  —  what 
has  been  called  the  '  dialectic,'  —  is  the  same."  ^ 

The  relation  between  society  and  the  individual  is  well  ex- 
pressed in  these  words:  "  (i)  Individuals  can  particularize  only 
on  the  basis  of  earlier  generalizations  of  society.  This  gives  an 
initial  trend  to  the  thought-variations  which  are  available  for 
social  use.  (2)  Society  is  absolutely  dependent,  as  to  its  new 
acquisitions,  upon  the  new  thoughts,  particularizations,  of 
individuals;  and  it  again  generalizes  them.     It  can  get  material 

*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  512. 


198  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

from  no  other  source.  (3)  Only  when  both  these  conditions  are 
fulfilled,  —  when  old  social  matter  is  particularized  by  an  individ- 
ual and  then  again  generalized  by  society,  —  can  new  accretions 
be  normally  made  to  the  social  content  and  progress  be  secured 
to  the  organization  as  a  whole."  ^ 

Professor  Baldwin  has  contributed  further  to  social  philosophy 
by  his  analysis  of  "  sanctions  "  meaning  by  this  term  "  all  the 
reasons  which  are  really  operative  on  the  individual,  in  keeping 
him  at  work  and  at  play  in  the  varied  drama  of  life.''  Of  these 
there  are  two  general  classes,  the  personal  and  the  social.  The 
personal  sanctions  are  classified  as  impulse,  lower  hedonic,  desire, 
higher  hedonic  and  right.  The  social  sanctions  are  classified  as 
natural,  pedagogical  and  conventional,  civil,  and  ethical  and  religious. 
Our  author  differs  from  many  in  holding  that  there  is  no  real 
antagonism  between  the  individual  and  the  social  sanctions, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  "  exceptional  man  or  the  exceptional 
judgments  of  the  average  man."  2  "  The  actual  oppositions 
which  do  arise  in  his  life,"  says  Baldwin,  "are  rather  a  propos  of 
questions  regarding  which  he  finds  room  for  discussion,  and  for  the 
more  thoroughgoing  application  of  the  intellectual  sanction."  ^ 

Among  the  most  important  of  these  sanctions,  according  to  our 
author,  are  the  ethical  and  the  religious,  and  in  the  discussion  of 
these,  use  is  made  of  the  "dialectic  of  growth  "  and  of  the  doctrine 
of  adaptation. 

"  There  can  be  no  real  opposition,"  says  Baldwin,  "  between 
society  and  the  individual  in  the  matter  of  the  essential  demands 
of  the  moral  and  religious  consciousness.  The  fact  of  *  publi- 
city '  in  all  religious  and  ethical  thought  makes  it  necessary  that 
the  same  ideal  should  be  erected  in  the  individual  and  in  the  com- 
munity in  which  the  individual  is  reared,  since  the  growth  of  the 
ideal  self-thought  in  the  individual  depends  constantly  upon  the 
absorption  of  moral  and  religious  suggestions  from  the  social 
environment."  ^  The  same  is  true,  he  holds,  concerning  the 
religious  life,  though  he  admits  that  historically  there  have  been 
acute  conflicts  in  the  religious  sphere. 

^  Social  and  Ethical  Inter pretationSj  p.  511.  '  Ibid.,  p.  429. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  424.  *  Ibid.,  p.  434. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  1 99 

Professor  Baldwin  is  open  to  criticism  especially  at  two  points: 
first,  in  the  loose  way  in  which  he  uses  the  term  imitation  and 
second  for  his  failure  to  give  definite  content  to  those  various 
unities  that  make  up  quasi-personalities.  We  have  in  fact 
different  "  societies  "  with  different  ideals,  and  as  one  person 
is  brought  under  the  influence  of  varying  and  often  conflicting 
ideals,  the  result  is  a  greater  diversity  and  confusion  in  the  inner 
life  of  the  individual  than  provided  for  in  Baldwin's  theory; 
yet  on  the  whole  perhaps  no  author  has  contributed  more  to  the 
development  of  the  concept  of  adaptation  as  a  social  theory, 
especially  as  pertaining  to  morals  and  religion.  To  his  ascending 
series  of  "  struggles,"  —  between  individuals  in  the  lower  species 
of  animals,  between  groups  in  the  higher,  and  in  human  society, 
struggle  for  a  Hving,  for  place,  and  excellence,^  —  we  would  add  a 
final  form,  —  struggle  for  social  achievement,^ 

HJENRY  DrUMMOND    (1851-1897) 

Struggle  for  the  Life  of  Others 

Drummond's  great  contribution  to  social  philosophy  is  in 
supplementing  the  law  of  struggle  for  existence  with  that  of 
"  struggle  for  the  life  of  others ''  having  its  mainspring  in  that 
disposition  or  sentiment  termed  love.  "  Experience,"  he  says, 
"  tells  us  that  man's  true  life  is  neither  lived  in  the  material 
tracts  of  the  body,  nor  in  the  higher  altitudes  of  the  intellect,  but 
in  the  warm  world  of  the  affections."  ^  This  fact  which  Comte 
emphasized  in  his  Polity,  Drimimond  endeavored  to  explain 
through  biology.  He  shows  that  love  is  not  a  resultant  of  strug- 
gle for  existence  but  is  rooted  in  the  primal  activity  of  reproduc- 
tion by  cell  division."*  "  Even  at  its  dawn  life  is  receiver  and 
giver;  even  in  protoplasm  is  selfism  and  otherism." 

"  The  two  main  activities  of  all  living  things,"  he  holds,  "  are 
nutrition  and  reproduction.  .  .  .  The  object  of  nutrition  is  to 
secure  the  life  of  the  individual;  the  object  of  reproduction  is  to 
secure  the  life  of  the  species.  .  .  .  The  first  has  a  purely  personal 

1  The  Individual  and  Society,  ch.  III.    Cf.  infra,  ch.  XIV. 

2  For  further  criticism,  see  infra,  p.  308  f. 

'  The  Ascent  of  Man,  p.  215.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  225  f. 


200  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

end  .  .  .  the  second  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  is  impersonal; 
its  attention  is  turned  outwards;  it  lives  for  the  future.  .  .  . 
Almost  the  whole  self-seeking  side  of  things  has  come  down  the 
line  of  the  individual  struggle  for  life;  ahnost  the  whole  unsel- 
fish side  of  things  is  rooted  in  the  struggle  to  preserve  the  life  of 
others."  ^ 

Drummond  is  highly  poetical  in  his  description  of  this  process 
through  the  lower  forms  of  nature,  but  is  more  scientific  and 
satisfactory  when  he  comes  to  ground  his  conclusions  in  the  facts 
of  human  sex  relations  and  maternity.  He  finds  that  as  in  the 
male  the  productive  and  nutritive  functions  are  most  prominent 
whereas  in  the  female  the  reproductive  play  the  important  role, 
so  in  man's  fife,  struggle  for  existence  finds  its  chief  illustration, 
in  woman's,  struggle  for  the  life  of  others.^  This  gives  him  back- 
ground for  his  statement  that  "  the  passage  from  mere  otherism, 
in  the  physiological  sense,  to  altruism  in  the  moral  sense,  occurs 
in  connection  with  the  due  performance  of  her  natural  task  by  her 
to  whom  the  struggle  for  the  life  of  others  is  assigned.  That 
task,  translated  into  one  great  word,  is  maternity,  —  which  is 
nothing  but  the  struggle  for  the  life  of  others  transfigured, 
transferred  to  the  moral  sphere."  ^  And  this  maternity,  he 
holds,  is  not  pre-eminently  the  mother  of  children  nor  of  affection 
between  male  and  female,  but  of  love,  —  "of  love  as  love,  of 
love  as  life,  of  love  as  humanity,  of  love  as  the  pure  and 
undefiled  fountain  of  all  that  is  eternal  in  the  world."  ^ 

With  this  origin,  sympathy  and  love,  he  holds,  are  born  in  the 
home  and  from  the  home-circle  extend  in  ever  increasing  rela- 
tions.^ 

In  the  writings  of  Drummond  we  have  the  advantages  and  dis- 
advantages arising  from  the  attempt  to  interpret  scientific 
processes  in  terms  of  religious  faith  and  dogma.  He  has  done 
more,  perhaps,  than  any  other  one  man  to  bridge  the  chasm 
between  science  and  religion  for  the  orthodox  minister  and  lay- 
man and  make  them  realize  the  possibility  of  seeing  this  orderly 
universe  as  God's  world,  the  whole  process  guided  by  intelligence 

1  The  Ascent  of  Man,  pp.  221,  222.       '  Ibid.,  p.  258.       '^  Ibid.,  pp.  265,  266. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  257.  *  Ibid.,  p.  259. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  20I 

and  love.  His  writings  are  inspiring, — as  religious  writings  always 
should  be,  —  and  tend  to  make  the  religionist  more  respectful 
in  his  attitude  toward  nature  and  natural  law,  and  the  scientist, 
if  not  repelled  by  Drummond's  interpretations,  more  inclined  to 
appreciate  the  values  of  life  as  well  as  life's  processes;  but  such  a 
method  has  this  disadvantage:  bias  prejudices  the  mind  to  see  not 
what  is  but  what  is  desired.  Some  of  his  "  natural  laws  in  the 
spiritual  world  ''  are  examples  of  this  defect. 

The  chief  contributions  of  Drummond  are:  (i)  his  explanation 
of  sympathy  and  love  as  due  to  the  result  of  biological  evolution 
interpreted  in  terms  of  adaptation,  and  (2)  his  explanation  of 
social  organization  as  the  outgrowth,  by  an  analogous  process, 
of  the  instincts  of  nutrition  and  reproduction. 

Franklin  H.  Giddings  (1855-        ) 
Consciousness  of  Kind 

Turning  from  the  doctrine  of  imitation  as  developed  from  Smith 
through  Bagehot,  Tarde  and  Baldwin,  with  a  suggestion  of  most 
recent  lines  of  criticism  of  this  doctrine  by  McDougall,  Cooley 
and  Thorndike,  we  find  in  F.  H.  Giddings  not  only  a  psycho- 
logical analysis  of  imitation  but  especially,  in  his  doctrine  of 
Consciousness  of  Kind,  the  culmination  of  the  analysis  of  the 
function  of  sympathy  as  made  by  A.  Smith,  Fiske,  Drummond, 
et  al. 

In  the  social  philosophy  of  Giddings  we  have  a  selective  syn- 
thesis of  the  contributions  of  the  writers  we  have  considered,  and 
ail  original  contribution  in  his  analysis  of  and  emphasis  on  con- 
sciousness of  kind  as  the  fundamental  social  f act.^  With  Comte  he 
accepts  a  positivistic  and  organic  view  of  society;  ^  with  Spencer 
he  makes  use  of  general  laws  of  cosmic  evolution  to  explain  social 
progress.^  He  accepts  Durkheim's  theory  of  constraint '*  with 
some  recognition  of  his  emphasis  on  consciousness  of  difference  as 

*  "  It  is  about  the  consciousness  of  kind,  as  a  determining  principle,  that  all 
other  motives  organize  themselves  in  the  evolution  of  social  choice,  social  volition 
or  social  policy."  —  Principles,  p.  19. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  6. 

'  Elements,  ch.  XXV,  especially  pp.  335  f.  *  Principles,  p.  15. 


202  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

a  means  of  social  cohesion.^  He  accepts  Tarde^s  law  of  imitation, 
with  slight  modification,^  and  Novicow's  theory  of  progress  from 
physical  through  intellectual  conflicts  to  ever  increasing  har- 
mony.^ Ward,  too,  with  his  emphasis  on  individual  and  social 
telesis,  has  left  his  impress,^  and  Baldwin  with  his  "  dialectic  of 
personal  growth,"  has  left  his;  ^  while  Bagehot's  "  discussion  " 
and  "  animated  moderation  "  find  place  though  under  different 
phraseology.  He  makes  large  use  of  Darwin's  theory  of  natural 
selection,  also,  applying  it  to  groups,  ideals  and  institutions.^ 

Giddings  holds  that  science  cannot  get  beyond  the  dualism  of 
matter  and  mind,  this  being  the  province  of  philosophy."'  He  is 
classed  among  the  dualistic  sociologists  by  Barth,^  and  his  dis- 
tinction between  the  physical  and  psychical  is,  for  the  most  part, 
so  clean  cut  as  to  warrant  such  a  classification. 

"  All  the  conscious  activities  of  mankind,"  according  to  our 
author,  "spring  from  certain  internal  motives,  such  as  passions, 
appetites,  desires  of  various  kinds,  and  ideas."  ^  These  motives 
are  classified  as  those  of  appreciation  giving  pleasure  through  the 
sensory  organs,  and,  later  through  mental  activity;  utilization 
leading  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  various  appetites;  characteriza- 
tion, leading  to  the  satisfaction  of  desire  for  enlargement  of  per- 
sonal life  as  distinguished  from  mere  self-preservation,  and  the 
primary  motive  of  socialization  or  the  desire  for  companionship, 
sympathy,  etc.^*^ 

These  various  motives  work  out  the  processes  or  practical 
activities  through  various  methods:  that  of  appreciation  through 
the  methods  of  response  to  stimuli  and  imitation;  that  of  utiliza- 
tion through  the  methods  of  attack,  impression  and  invention; 
that  of  characterization  through  the  methods  of  persistence, 
accommodation  and  self-control;  that  of  socialization  through  the 
method  of  assimilation,  —  all  of  these  being  so  many  modes  of  the 
one  universal  method  of  conflict.^^ 

1  Elements,  pp.  194  f.,  215,  353.  ^  Elements,  pp.  330  f. 

2  Principles,  pp.  15,  102  f.  ^  Op.  cit.,  pp.  183  f. 
'  Ibid.,  pp.  14  f.;  Elements,  pp.  346  f.              ^  Elements,  p.  45. 

*  Principles,  p.  11.  ^°  Ibid.,  pp.  46  fif. 

^  Elements,  pp.  342  f.  "  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

^  Principles,  see  Index. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  203 

Association  is  based  on  certain  similarities,  first,  on  those  de- 
rived from  kinship,  and  second,  on  those  —  mental  and  moral  — 
due  to  similar  brain  organization.^  As  a  result  of  this  we  have 
"  a  similar  responsiveness  of  two  or  more  individuals  to  the  same 
stimulus  or  stimuli,"  which  may  be  analyzed  into  three  stages  of 
development:  (i)  initial  responsiveness,  —  a  mere  first  interest 
in  any  object  as  in  a  momentary  panic;  (2)  persistent  responsive- 
ness which  becomes  a  habit  or  fixed  manner  as  in  forms  of  speech 
and  courtesy,  and  (3)  rational  responsiveness  "  which  invokes 
the  complex  activity  of  all  the  powers  of  mind  and  will,  and  the 
varied  adaptation  of  means  to  end."  ^ 

We  have  not  only  these  resemblances  between  individuals  but  a 
more  or  less  articulate  consciousness  of  them  and  also  of  dif- 
ferences. This  consciousness,  in  its  lowest  form,  is  called  organic 
sympathy  and  its  contrary,  organic  antipathy.^  These  may  be 
studied  in  animal  reactions  and  also  in  the  developing  mind  and 
activities  of  the  child.  There  are  three  factors  in  organic  sym- 
pathy, according  to  Giddings:  "  (i)  like  responsiveness  of  like 
individuals  to  the  same  stimulus;  (2)  like  sensations  received  by 
like  individuals  from  self  and  others  ;  (3)  the  readier  imitation  of 
one  another  by  like  individuals  than  by  those  who  greatly  dijffer."  * 
The  second  factor  is  illustrated  as  follows:  "  The  sound  made  by 
the  mother's  voice  has  been  like  that  made  by  the  child's  own 
voice;  while  the  sounds  made  by  the  dog  and  bird  have  been 
unlike  those  made  by  the  child's  own  voice.  When  the  infant 
puts  his  hands  together  or  passes  them  over  his  face,  he  receives 
in  his  brain  certain  sensations  of  pressure.  When  he  passes  his 
hands  over  his  mother's  face  and  over  her  hands,  he  again  re- 
ceives sensations  of  pressure;  and  they  are  very  like  the  sensations 
that  he  has  received  from  his  own  body."  ^  The  third  factor  finds 
illustration  in  the  facility  with  which  imitation  operates  among 
the  like-minded  and  the  difficulty  with  which  it  operates  between 
antagonistic  individuals  or  groups. 

1  Elements,  p.  55. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  56;  cf„  Inductive  Sociology,  pt.  2,  ch.  I. 
^  Elements  J  pp.  59  f. 

*  Ihid.j  p.  62.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  60. 


204  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Reflective  sympathy  arises  when  imitation  and  like  response 
are  the  result  of  reflective,  intelligent  volition.  "  Resembling 
individuals  not  only  sympathize  with  one  another,  but  they  know 
that  they  s)niipathize,  and  to  a  certain  extent  they  are  aware  that 
their  sympathy  is  affected  by  the  perception  of  resemblance."  ^ 
Two  other  consequences  of  resemblance  are  affection  and  desire 
for  recognition.^ 

This  four-fold  mode  of  consciousness  appears  to  the  expe- 
riencing individual  as  a  unitary  fact  and  is  called  by  our  author 
consciousness  of  kind  which  he  defines  as  "  that  pleasurable  state 
of  mind  which  includes  organic  sympathy,  the  perception  of 
resemblance,  conscious  or  reflective  sympathy,  affection,  and  the 
desire  for  recognition."  ^  This,  he  holds,  is  the  simplest  of  all 
the  states  of  mind  which  can  be  called  social,  and  its  growth  is  the 
mental  or  subjective  side  of  socialization,  its  objective  side  being 
dependent  upon  communication  and  association.^ 

The  process  of  growing  alike  is  termed  assimilation.^ 

The  fundamental  importance  of  consciousness  of  kind  in  Gid- 
dings'  social  philosophy  is  seen  from  the  following:  "  Conscious- 
ness of  kind  modifies  appetite  and  desire.  .  .  .  [It]  modifies  the 
ideas  and  the  desires  that  enter  into  the  consciousness  of  integral 
self-satisfaction.  .  .  .  [It]  modifies  impression  .  .  .  and  imita- 
tion." ^  He  holds  that  like-mindedness  must  precede  co-opera- 
tion, and  that  where  consciousness  of  kind  exists,  co-operation 
necessarily  follows.^  It  is  the  basis  of  the  form  of  association 
termed  social  pleasure.^  Consciousness  of  kind  is  the  basis  of 
social  groupings  both  component  and  constituent,  the  former 
based  on  likeness  of  type,  the  latter  on  likeness  of  purpose,  and 
expresses  itself  according  to  the  following  law:  "  The  social 
composition  develops  in  proportion  to  the  intensity  and  scope  of 
the  passion  for  homogeneity."  ^     Human  nature,  our  author 

1  Indtictive  Sociology,  p.  64.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  68,  69. 

2  Ibid,,  pp.  64,  65.  5  Ibid.,  p.  70. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  66. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  70-72;  cf.  Principles,  pp.  18  f.;  Inductive  Sociology,  pt.  2,  chs.  II,  III. 
^  Elements,  p.  80. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  89. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  192. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  205 

holds,  is  pre-eminently  social,  and  "  its  chief  trait  is  a  conscious- 
ness of  kind  wider  and  stronger  than  in  animal  groups."  ^ 

Like-mindedness  is  of  two  kinds,  formal  and  rational.  The 
former  is  seen  in  the  popular  acceptance  of  tradition  and  obedience 
to  rules  and  precepts  embodied  in  them,  and  is  produced  (i)  by 
the  tendency  to  accept  as  true  the  thing  vividly  imagined  or 
desired,  especially  if  beHeved  by  others  in  whom  one  has  confi- 
dence, or  if  handed  down  from  the  past,  and  (2)  by  direct  teaching 
and  discipHne.2 

Rational  like-mindedness  is  the  result  of  criticism  and  the  basis 
of  public  opinion.  "  Public  opinion  comes  into  existence  only 
when  a  sympathetic  like-mindedness  or  an  agreement  in  belief  is 
subjected  to  criticism,  started  by  some  skeptical  individual  who 
doubts  the  truth  of  the  belief,  or  the  wisdom  of  the  agreement; 
and  an  opinion  is  then  thought  out  to  which  many  communicating 
minds  can  yield  their  rational  assent."  ^  The  chief  method  of 
developing  public  opinion  is  by  discussion,  and,  indeed  is  propor- 
tional to  discussion.^ 

Component  societies,  for  the  most  part  genetic  aggregations 
and  characterized  by  likeness  of  type,  are  classified  as  families, 
ethnical  groups  (hordes,  tribes,  confederations)  and  demotic 
groups  (famihes,  neighborhoods,  hamlets,  parishes,  towns,  cities, 
states).^  Constituent  societies  based  on  likeness  of  purpose  are 
classified  as  household,  clan  and  other  tribal  associations,  and 
various  civil  societies  and  private  or  public  associations,  including 
political,  juristic,  economic,  and  cultural.^  Although  the 
development  of  component  societies  depends  on  likeness  in  t3rpe, 
that  of  constituent  societies  and  of  the  social  constitution  "  de- 
pends upon  the  growth  of  an  appreciation  of  the  value  of  variety 
or  unlikeness  in  society."  ^  Whether  the  like-mindedness  is 
formal  or  rational  determines  the  character  of  the  social  organiza- 
tion as  to  whether  it  is  predominantly  coercive  or  Hberal. 
"  Social  organization  is  coercive,"  he  says,  "  in  those  commun- 
ities in  which  sympathetic  and  formal  like-mindedness  strongly 

^  Elements,  p.  241.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  179  f. 

2  Ibid.,  ch.  XIV,  especially  pp.  152,  153.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  193  f. 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  155  f.  7  Ji)id.,  p.  215. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  156. 


206  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

predominate  over  rational  like-mindedness.  Conversely,  social 
institutions  are  liberal,  allowing  the  utmost  freedom  of  thought 
and  action  to  the  individual  only  in  those  communities  in  which 
there  is  a  high  development  of  rational  like-mindedness."  ^ 

A  second  law  enforcing  his  thesis  that  highly- developed  con- 
sciousness of  kind  of  a  relative  homogeneous  population  is  neces- 
sary for  the  success  of  a  democracy,  is  as  follows:  "  The  forms  of 
social  organization,  whether  political  or  other,  in  their  relation 
to  the  individual,  are  necessarily  coercive  if,  in  their  membership, 
there  is  great  diversity  of  kind  and  great  inequality.  Conversely, 
institutions  or  other  forms  of  social  organization  can  be  liberal, 
conceding  the  utmost  freedom  to  the  individual  if,  in  the  popula- 
tion, there  is  fraternity  and,  back  of  fraternity,  an  approximate 
mental  and  moral  equality."  ^ 

Efficiency  in  social  organization  is  measured  by  benefit  con- 
ferred on  the  members  and  depends  upon  moral  qualities,  together 
with  a  recognition  of  the  value  of  expert  knowledge  (the  basis  of 
effective  division  of  labor)  .^  The  results  of  such  efficiency  of 
social  organization  are  seen  "  in  the  economic,  intellectual,  and 
moral  life  of  the  community,  and  especially  in  the  development  of 
an  improving  type  of  human  personality."  *  This  means  the 
emancipation  of  man  from  fear  and  superstition,  decrease  of 
emotionalism  and  impulsive  action,  and  increase  of  rational  sym- 
pathy and  purposeful  co-operation.  "If  .  .  .  man  is  becoming 
ever  better  as  a  human  being,  more  rational,  more  sympathetic, 
with  an  ever-broadening  consciousness  of  kind, — then,  whatever 
its  apparent  defects,  the  social  organization  is  sound  and  effi- 
cient." 5 

The  socius  is  thus  the  social  unit  for  Giddings  and  the  social 
mind  is  nothing  more  than  the  interaction  or  organization  of 
individual  minds.^  Taking  his  point  of  departure  from  English 
associational  psychology,  in  sociology  the  association  of  minds  is 
substituted  for  the  association  of  ideas.^ 

1  Elements,  p.  219.  *  Ihid.,  p.  221. 

'  Ihid.,  pp.  225,  226;  cf.  Inductive  Sociology,  pp.  449  f. 

*  Elements,  p.  227.  '  Ihid.,  p.  230. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  119  £.;  Principles,  pp.  420  i. 

'  Principles,  p.  25;  -Barth,  op.  cit.,  p.  183. 


FORMULAE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  20/ 

Giddings  has  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of 
passive  adaptation  by  his  analysis  of  the  psychological  basis  of 
association,  imitation  and  antagonism  in  so  far  as  they  are  merely 
automatic,  organic  reactions  along  the  line  of  least  resistance  and 
utility  not  only  for  the  individual  but  for  the  group.  He  has 
contributed  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  active  adapta- 
tion by  his  insistence  on  the  scientific  distinction  between  man 
and  society,  both  endowed  with  self-determined  will,  and  the 
lower  orders  determined  by  forces  from  without;  also  by  his  anal- 
ysis of  the  social  process  culminating  in  reflective  sympathy, 
rational  like-mindedness,  and  social  will.^  He  gives  to  ideals  and 
religion  a  far  higher  place  than  most  whom  we  have  considered 
and  leaves  the  reader  buoyed  up  by  his  manifest  faith  in  the  pos- 
sibility of  social  reconstruction.^ 

Giddings  is  open  to  criticism  in  that  he  makes  the  individual  the 
sociological  unit,  that  his  test  of  progress  is  individualistic  and 
too  indefinite,  and  that  he  has  over-emphasized  the  one  factor  of 
consciousness  of  kind  to  the  neglect  or  slighting  of  other  factors 
equally  important. 

1  Inductive  Sociology,  pt.  2,  ch.  IV,  "  Concerted  Volition,"  also  pp.  265  f. 
*  Principles,  Book  4,  chs.  Ill  and  IV. 


CHAPTER  XI 
TRANSITION  FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION 

Up  to  this  point  our  discussion  has  been  confined  very  largely  to 
passive  adaptation  in  its  various  phases  and  processes  and  with 
good  reason,  for  most  men  and  social  groups  in  most  of  their 
activities  are  devoid  of  forethought,  yet  our  attention  has  been 
called  repeatedly  to  the  fact  that  social  evolution  is  a  process  of 
increasing  power  of  man  over  his  material  and  spiritual  environ- 
ment. 

Whether  or  not  there  is  any  break  in  the  cosmic  process  war- 
ranting the  distinction  between  passive  and  active  adaptation  is 
a  mooted  question,  some  holding  that  we  have  only  new  and 
increasingly  complex  combinations  of  mechanical  forces,  others 
holding  that  activity  and  consciousness  go  back  to  the  primal 
cell,  but  the  fact  is  indisputable  that  man  as  no  other  animal 
rebels  against  nsitme,  fights,  conquers,  in  some  sense  and  to  some 
degree.  Man  as  no  other  animal  is  a  dynamo  for  the  transforma- 
tion of  mechanical  energy  drawn  from  the  material  environment 
to  personal  energy  which  reacts  on  that  environment.  In  this 
respect  individual  men  differ  greatly,  —  so  do  groups.  Such 
materialistic  monists  as  Ernst  Haeckel  tell  us  that  man  is  noth- 
ing more  than  a  dynamo,  —  a  mere  machine,  —  whose  product 
in  personal  energy  is  strictly  commensurable  with  the  material 
energy  transformed.  This  is  Ward's  position  as  we  shall  see  in 
the  next  chapter.  "  Matter  is  dynamic,"  he  says,  '*  and  every 
time  that  man  has  touched  it  with  the  wand  of  reason  it  has 
responded  by  satisfying  a  want."  But  reason  itself,  according 
to  strict  monism,  is  only  the  most  highly  complex  portion  of  the 
human  machine  and  of  the  same  stuff  as  all  other  machines, 
whether  made  of  inorganic  matter,  or  organic  as  in  the  vegetable 
and  animal  kingdoms.  But  granted,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  all 
that  the  monists  claim;  —  granted  that  there  was  originally  no 
distinct  break  between  man  and  his  pithecoid  precursor,  physical, 

208 


FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION  209 

mental  or  moral,  the  fact  remains  that  there  is  such  a  break 
today.  Homo  sapiens  is  a  distinct  species.  The  "  missing 
link,"  the  hypothetical  homo  alalus  of  Haeckel  has  not  been  dis- 
covered,^  and  recent  paleontological  finds  and  psychological 
experiments  on  extant  representatives  of  primitive  culture  tend 
to  show  that  man  for  possibly  two  hundred  thousand  years  has 
been  infinitely  superior  to  his  nearest  animal  progenitors.^  The 
Cro-Magnon  type  of  the  glacial  period  was  a  race  of  physical  and 
probably  intellectual  giants,^  if  not  also  the  races  represented  by 
the  Dartford  skull  and  the  Galley  Hill  type,  and  even  by  the 
Neanderthal  type  as  revealed  by  remains  found  near  Elberfeld, 
Germany,  near  Le  Moustier,  France,  and  in  the  Island  of  Jersey, 
—  going  back  possibly  from  500,000  to  1,000,000  years.  It  is  of 
greatest  significance  that  food  and  implements  of  war  were  buried 
with  some  of  these  early  remains,  indicating  the  development  of 
religious  ideas.^ 

With  the  possible  exception  of  the  race  of  men  represented  by 
the  Java  skull  (and  it  is  more  than  questionable  whether  or  not 
this  is  a  normal  skull,  much  less  human),  man  for  possibly  half  a 
million  years  has  had  a  brain  capacity  indicating  power  of  active 
adaptation,  and  this  conclusion  is  strengthened  by  the  expres- 
sion of  this  power  in  tools  unearthed  in  geological  strata  of  the 
Tertiary  period,  according  to  some  authorities.^ 

There  are  four  methods  of  approach  to  this  problem  of  the 
transition  from  passive  to  active  adaptation.  From  the  stand- 
point of  biology  and  evolution  we  are  led  to  inquire  as  to  the 
organic  variation  or  mutation,  or  group  of  such  variations  which 

1  Keith  thinks  there  is  some  ground  for  believing  that  the  Heidelberg  man 
was  devoid  of  speech;  Ancient  Types  of  Man,  p.  83.  Brinton,  on  the  contrary, 
agreeing  with  the  text,  —  Races  of  Peoples,  p.  80. 

2  AngeU,  Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology,  Lecture  VIII;  Archives  of  Psy- 
chology, no.  II  (1908);  Boas,  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  ch.  IV;  Keane,  The  World's 
People,  p.  4;  Dawson,  The  Meeting  Place  of  Geology  and  History,  pp.  61  f. 

3  Keith,  op.  cit.,  ch.  VII;  cf.  also,  pp.  33  f.,  83  f.,  105  f. 
*  Marett,  Anthropology,  p.  80. 

^  Cf.  Keane,  op.  cit.,  p.  7.  Haddon  to  the  contrary,  History  of  Anthropology, 
p.  94,  yet  he  says:  "  During  the  latter  half  of  the  paleolithic  age  there  lived  mighty 
hunters,  skilful  artists,  big-brained  men,  who  laid  the  foundations  upon  which 
subsequent  generations  have  built,"  ihid.,  p.  90. 


2IO  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

provided  the  physiological  correlate  of  the  psychical  change  we 
are  endeavoring  to  explain  and  we  find  many  different  anatomical 
factors  championed  as  the  most  important.  Darwin  stresses 
erect  posture  and  prehensile  thumb;  Heineman  holds  that  the 
mutation  which  made  erect  posture  possible  was  in  the  ento- 
cuneiform  bone  and  position  of  the  foramen  magnum,  and  that 
this  change,  forcing  man  from  the  tree  life  of  his  ancestors,  left 
him  at  so  great  a  disadvantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence  that 
success  was  possible  only  by  the  use  of  the  Httle  intelligence  he 
possessed  to  outwit  his  rivals,  this  necessity  and  use  determining 
the  whole  succeeding  order  of  his  evolution;  ^  others,  on  the  con- 
trary, hold  that  the  development  of  the  intellect  came  first  and 
led  to  a  new  mode  of  Hf e  in  a  new  environment  and  that  this  fur- 
nished the  occasion  for  physiological  variations  and  the  selection 
of  those  that  were  especially  serviceable.  Delay  in  the  closing  of 
the  sutures  of  the  skull  was  an  important  factor ,2  so  too,  were  the 
development  of  the  apparatus  of  speech,  the  organ  of  speech 
located  by  Broca  in  the  third  frontal  convolution  of  the  brain,^ 
the  nervous  connection  between  the  organ  and  the  apparatus,  the 
development  of  the  cerebrimi,  and  the  free  use  of  the  forearms 
made  possible  by  erect  posture  and  terrestrial  life. 

Approaching  the  problem  from  the  standpoint  of  psychology 
we  have  two  lines  of  study,  the  first  using  the  comparative  method 
with  the  endeavor  to  find  the  differential  psychical  element  be- 
tween man  and  beast,  and  here  the  power  of  abstraction  and 
association  of  ideas  seems  at  present  to  be  most  stressed;  and 
second,  the  method  used  by  Baldwin  and  others,  of  observing  the 
steps  in  the  child's  mind  by  which  the  transition  is  made  from 
reflexive  and  instinctive  activity  to  that  which  is  self-conscious 
and  purposeful. 

From  the  sociological  point  of  view  we  have  a  study  of  the 
materials  furnished  by  the  development  of  civilization  as  a  whole, 
of  separate  groups  and  of  contemporary  social  movements,  by 
means  of  which  we  are  able  to  analyze  the  social  factors  that 
enter  into  the  transition. 

1  The  Physical  Basis  of  Civilization j  p.  31. 

2  Keane,  Ethnology,  ch.  III.  '  Macnamara,  Human  Speech,  ch.  X. 


FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION  211 

The  fourth  approach  is  through  philosophy  with  the  endeavor 
to  find  an  adequate  ground  for  and  explanation  of  the  cosmic 
process  culminating  in  free  intelligence.  Most  biologists  and 
sociologists  assume  that  this  process  is  one  and  continuous,  to  be 
described  and  explained  in  the  terms  of  exact  science,  but  Huxley,' 
Wallace,^  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Professor  McDougall  ^  and  scores  of 
others  protest  that  not  chemical  affinity,  natural  selection  nor 
any  other  known  law  or  laws  has  explained  the  transition  from 
the  inorganic  to  the  organic,  from  matter  to  mind,  from  instinc- 
tive activity  to  that  which  is  conscious  and  purposeful,  —  from 
determinism  to  free  choice.  Positivists,  on  their  part,  assure  us 
that  though  the  rationale  of  this  process  is  not  yet  clear  in  all  its 
details,  yet  that  the  only  way  of  ever  even  approximating  the 
desired  goal  is  by  means  of  the  assumptions  and  methods  used  by 
them.  But  the  fact  still  remains  that  mind  and  matter  appear  to 
be  entirely  different  and  that  in  the  realm  of  the  psychical  no  one 
has  yet  solved  the  mystery  of  man's  consciousness  of,  or  at  least 
belief  in,  uncaused  freedom,  —  except  to  hold  that  it  is  a  ser- 
viceable illusion. 

Professor  Ward  claims  to  have  explained  the  transition  from 
matter  to  mind  and  from  instinctive  to  intelligent  behavior  but 
at  best  he  has  merely  described  the  process  and  analyzed  the 
elements  that  have  entered  into  it,  —  and  this,  too,  in  language 
that  in  places  reads  more  like  poetry  than  science.     Spencer  in 

1  "  Force  and  matter  are  paraded  as  the  Alpha  and  Omega  of  existence.  .  .  . 
All  this  I  heartily  disbelieve.  ...  It  seems  to  me  pretty  plain  that  there  is  a 
third  thing  in  the  imiverse,  to  wit,  consciousness,  which  ...  I  cannot  see  to  be 
matter,  force,  or  any  conceivable  modification  of  either."  —  Evolution  and  Ethics, 

P-  130- 

2  "  The  special  faculties  we  have  been  discussing  clearly  point  to  the  existence 
in  man  of  a  spiritual  essence  or  nature,  capable  of  progressive  development  imder 
favorable  conditions.  On  the  hypothesis  of  this  spiritual  nature  superadded  to 
the  animal  nature  of  man,  we  are  able  to  understand  much  that  is  otherwise  mys- 
terious or  unintelligible  in  regard  to  him,  especially  the  enormous  influence  of  ideas, 
principles,  and  beliefs,  over  his  whole  life  and  actions."  —  Darwinism,  p.  474. 

'  Professor  McDougaU,  in  his  latest  book,  Body  and  Mind,  shows  how  com- 
pletely inadequate  is  monism,  either  materialistic  or  spiritualistic,  to  explain  cosmic 
evolution,  and  how  far  short  it  comes,  —  and  so,  too,  all  theories  of  psycho- 
physical parallelism,  —  of  enabling  us  to  imderstand  such  phenomena  as  unity  of 
consciousness  and  attention,  adopting  as  his  own  theory  what  he  calls  "  animism  " — 
very  like  the  "  vitalism  "  of  Driesch. 


212  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

planning  his  cosmic  philosophy  deferred  to  a  later  time  the  volume 
that  was  to  describe  the  change  from  the  inorganic  to  the  organic, 
but  never  wrote  it.  The  nearest  he  comes  to  an  explanation 
of  psycho-physical  parallelism  is  in  a  letter  in  which  he  makes  use 
of  a  very  apt  illustration  ^  to  suggest  the  parallelism  but  admits 
that  we  must  assume  that  both  the  physical  and  psychical  are 
dependent  on  the  Eternal  Source  of  Energy  which  is  behind  both 
processes. 

We  have  noted  the  assumptions  of  Ratzenhof er  that  the  original 
force  is  ever  expanding  and  attaining  new  forms  of  Hfe  in  pro- 
portion as  the  conditions  and  elements  are  provided  by  the  en- 
vironment; indeed  most  spiritualistic  monists  assume  that  the 
transition  is  possible  because  the  world-ground  is  intelligent. 
But  even  so,  the  change  is  still  left  a  mystery.  We  must  conclude 
that  at  present  we  can  at  most  but  describe  the  process  in  terms 
of  sequence.  Nor  will  a  mere  logical  classification  of  elements 
that  enter  in  suffice  for  this.  We  must  assume,  provisionally, 
that  for  scientific  purposes  this  is  a  law-abiding  cosmic  order  and 
in  the  spirit  of  Darwin  endeavor  to  find  the  various  elements, 
locate  the  stages  of  development  and  their  order  of  sequence. 
But  we  may  still  hold  that  this  fails  to  give  us  the  life  of  values 
of  conscious  experience.^ 

The  crucial  point  in  the  transition  process  from  passive  to 
active  adaptation  in  its  higher  manifestations,  is  the  power  of 
choice  between  two  apparently  different  courses  of  action.  Prac- 
tically all  monists  tell  us  that  all  we  mean  by  freedom  of  choice  is 
that  it  is  determined  by  individual  character  rather  than  by  out- 
ward constraint;  but  this  fails  to  satisfy.    The  logical  conclusion, 

*  Duncan,  Life  and  letters  of  Herbert  Spencer,  pp.  237-239. 

2  Compare  with  this  the  conclusion  of  Professor  Henderson  of  Harvard  in  his 
book,  The  Fitness  of  the  Environment:  "  We  may  be  sure  that,  whatever  successes 
science  shall  in  future  celebrate  within  the  domain  of  teleology,  the  philosopher 
will  never  cease  to  perceive  the  wonder  of  a  universe  which  moves  onward  from 
chaos  to  perfect  harmonies,  and,  quite  apart  from  any  possible  mechanistic 
explanation  of  origin  and  fulfilment,  to  feel  it  a  worthy  subject  of  reflection. 
From  this  point  of  view,  however,  science  need  expect  no  interference,  but  without 
any  last  vestige  of  former  shackles  may  pursue  the  search  after  mechanistic 
explanations  of  all  natural  phenomena,"  p.  311.  He  quotes  Royce  with  seeming 
approval. 


FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION  21 3 

as  Ward  saw,  is  fatalism.  According  to  this  theory,  when  I 
awake  in  the  morning  some  sense  impression  from  without,  some 
idea-suggestion  from  within,  or  some  organic  need  sets  going  a 
psychical  process  which  with  its  correlated  activities  fills  the 
period  of  conscious  activity  during  my  waking  hours.  Every 
phase  of  that  process  is  strictly  determined.  If  I  deliberate  on 
a  proposed  course  of  action,  I  can  neither  prolong  the  deHberation 
nor  bring  it  to  a  close  imtil  the  proper  combination  has  been 
reached  which  results  in  action.  I  am  but  a  part  of  a  machine,  — 
a  part,  however,  that  has  become  conscious,  —  and  strange  to  say 
deluded  into  the  beHef  that  I  am  more  than  a  mere  machine.  Man 
is  saved  from  despair  by  this  illusion. 

Now  the  ultimate  solution  of  this  whole  question  is  meta- 
physical, hence  outside  the  domain  of  social  philosophy,  yet  one 
phase  of  it  belongs  to  our  consideration.  What  are  the  relative 
consequences  of  consistent  monism  and  libertarianism  (of  some 
sort)  on  human  well-being  and  group  success  ?  Let  us  suppose 
two  competing  social  groups.  In  one  we  have  all  the  adults 
consistent  monists  believing  that  every  thought  and  act  is  a  part 
of  a  strictly  deterministic  system;  that  at  any  crucial  point  in 
individual  life  the  ultimate  decision  might  have  been  foreseen  by 
one  who  knew  all  the  elements  within  the  mind  and  in  the  envi- 
ronment without.  The  only  responsibility  of  the  individual,  then, 
is  to  society.  The  feeling  of  responsibility  is  a  purely  social 
product.  In  the  other  group,  while  granting  that  heredity  and 
environment  determine  very  largely  that  character  which  in  turn 
determines  choice,  there  is  still  belief  that  by  a  sheer  act  of  will 
the  individual  may  tap  new  reservoirs  of  energy  which  will  give 
him  some  new  grip  on  life  and  life's  tasks.^  The  people  in  this 
group  believe  that  there  is  at  least  power  to  prolong  or  close  a 
mental  conflict  involving  a  great  decision;  this  decision,  in  turn, 
having  the  potency  of  changing  the  whole  current  of  life.  Which 
group  will  be  most  productive,  increase  most  rapidly  in  wealth, 
numbers,  power  ?     Which  group  will  win  out  in  the  long  nm  ? 

1  This  view  is  very  like  that  of  James,  Energies  of  Men,  of  Royce,  The  Spirit 
of  Modern  Philosophy,  Lecture  XII,  and  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Lecture  X, 
also  of  Bowne,  Personalism, 


214  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

After  thousands  of  years  of  inter-group  conflict  and  cultural 
development,  the  common-sense  philosophy  of  the  winning 
groups  is  essentially  libertarian.  Historically,  fatalism  has  led 
to  stagnation  and  decay.  If  belief  in  freedom  is  necessary,  and 
this  belief  is  nevertheless  a  delusion,  then  this  is  not  a  rational 
universe,  but  rests  ultimately  on  falsity  not  truth. 

Social  philosophy  must  rest  its  case  on  this  pragmatic  test: 
The  ultimate  truth  as  to  the  relation  between  mind  and  matter, 
and  the  ground  of  distinction  between  passive  and  active  adap- 
tation will  be  based  on  that  philosophy  which  is  most  inspiring 
to  man.  Science  can  give  us  at  best  but  relations  of  co-existence 
and  sequence  between  phenomena.  Our  ultimate  explanation  is 
hyper-scientific,  —  a  matter  of  belief. 

One  author,  John  Fiske,  deserves  special  consideration  in  the 
treatment  of  this  subject  because  he  has  brought  to  light  a 
bio-sociological  factor  of  first  importance  in  the  transition  from 
passive  to  active  adaptation  in  the  individual,  and  as  in  other 
cases  we  will  glance  at  his  general  social  philosophy  before 
taking  up  his  specific  contribution. 

John  Fiske  (1842-1901) 

Prolongation  of  Infancy 

This  great  American  disciple  and  interpreter  of  Herbert 
Spencer  varied  from  the  teaching  of  his  master  in  some  points 
and  at  others  supplemented  and  developed  it.  Accepting 
the  evolutionary  formula  as  a  test  of  social  progress  he  places 
more  stress  than  did  Spencer  on  a  secondary  test,  —  "  the  con- 
tinuous weakening  of  selfishness  and  the  continuous  strengthen- 
ing of  sympathy,"  —  thus  reminding  us  of  Comte.  He  goes 
beyond  his  master  in  his  analysis  of  the  spiritual  environment 
which  conditions  the  life  of  every  individual  and  social  group,  but 
makes  advance  especially  in  the  importance  he  places  on  the 
psychical  factors  in  social  evolution,  coming  to  highest  expression 
in  the  purposeful  activity  of  men  and  in  the  organization  of 
groups.^    A  spiritualistic  monist  and  deeply  religious,  he  stresses 

1  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  ii,  chs.  XXI,  XXII. 


FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION  215 

the  importance  of  religion  in  life  and  the  conscious  endeavor  of 
the  individual  to  conform  his  life  to  the  divine  will.  Fiske 
was  a  bitter  opponent  of  such  teachings  as  those  of  Haeckel  and 
Ward  that  minimize  the  importance  of  man's  place  in  nature, 
for  he  looks  upon  humanity  as  the  flower  of  cosmic  evolution  up 
to  man,  and  the  perfection  of  humanity  as  the  goal  of  social 
progress.  "  Once  dethrone  humanity,"  he  says,  "  regard  it  as 
a  mere  local  incident  in  an  endless  and  aimless  series  of  cosmical 
changes,  and  you  arrive  at  a  doctrine  which,  under  whatever 
specious  name  it  may  be  veiled,  is  at  bottom  neither  more  nor 
less  than  atheism.  On  its  metaphysical  side,  atheism  is  the 
denial  of  anything  psychical  in  the  universe  outside  of  himian 
consciousness."  ^ 

Of  greatest  importance  to  the  present  subject  is  his  discussion 
of  the  change  in  the  cosmic  process  with  the  evolution  of  man. 
"  When  humanity  began  to  be  evolved,"  he  says,  "  an  entirely 
new  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  universe  was  opened.  Hence- 
forth the  life  of  the  nascent  soul  came  to  be  first  in  importance, 
and  the  bodily  life  became  subordinated  to  it.  Henceforth  it 
appeared  that,  in  this  direction  at  least,  the  process  of  zoological 
change  had  come  to  an  end,  and  a  process  of  psychological  change 
was  to  take  its  place.  Henceforth  along  this  supreme  line  of 
generation  there  was  to  be  no  further  evolution  of  new  species 
through  physical  variation,  but  through  the  accumulation  of 
psychical  variations  one  particular  species  was  to  be  indefinitely 
perfected  and  raised  to  a  totally  different  plane  from  that  on 
which  all  life  had  hitherto  existed.  Henceforth,  in  short,  the 
dominant  aspect  of  evolution  was  to  be  not  the  genesis  of  species, 
but  the  progress  of  civilization.  .  .  . 

"  In  the  human  organism  physical  variation  has  well-nigh 
stopped,  or  is  confined  to  insignificant  features,  save  in  the  gray 
surface  of  the  cerebrum.  The  work  of  cerebral  organization  is 
chiefly  completed  after  birth  as  we  see  by  contrasting  the  smooth, 
ape-like  brain  surfaces  of  the  new-born  child  with  the  deeply 
furrowed  and  myriad-seamed  surface  of  the  adult  individual 

1  Destiny  of  Man,  pp.  12,  13,  yet  cf.  Cosmic  Philosophy ^  ii,  p.  230,  where  he 
pomts  out  the  value  of  skepticism. 


2l6  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

brain.  The  plastic  period  of  adolescence,  lengthened  in  civilized 
man  until  it  has  come  to  cover  more  than  one-third  of  his  life- 
time, is  thus  the  guaranty  of  his  boundless  progressiveness.  .  .  .^ 
In  its  crude  beginnings  the  psychical  life  was  but  an  appendage 
to  the  body,  in  fully-developed  humanity  the  body  is  but  the 
vehicle  for  the  soul."  ^ 

Fiske  goes  on  to  show  the  necessity  of  prolongation  of  infancy 
with  the  development  of  higher  forms  of  animal  life,  in  order  that 
the  organism  may  adjust  itself  to  the  ever  increasing  complexity 
of  its  environment.  In  lower  forms  the  reactions  are  automatic 
or  instinctive,  but  such  are  not  sufficient  for  higher  forms  which 
must  learn  by  experience,  and  a  prolonged  infancy  affords  a 
period  of  training  so  that  when  independent  life  is  entered  upon 
the  organism  will  have  a  fair  chance  of  survival.  "  While  the 
nervous  connections  accompanying  a  simple  intelligence  are 
already  organized  at  birth,"  he  says,  "  the  nervous  connections 
accompanying  a  complex  intelligence  are  chiefly  organized  after 
birth.  .  .  .  Infancy,  psychologically  considered,  is  the  period 
during  which  the  nerve  connections  and  correlative  ideal  associa- 
tions necessary  for  self-maintenance  are  becoming  permanently 
estabhshed.  Now  this  period,  which  only  begins  to  exist  when 
the  intelligence  is  considerably  complex,  becomes  longer  and 
longer  as  the  intelHgence  increases  in  complexity.  In  the  human 
race  it  is  much  longer  than  in  any  other  race  of  mammals,  and  it  is 
much  longer  in  the  civilized  man  than  in  the  savage."  ^ 

According  to  our  author  this  prolongation  of  infancy  had  a 
profound  sociological  effect  in  uniting  the  parents  in  a  more 
permanent  family  life  required  for  the  protection  of  the  helpless 
infant,  in  this  way  developing  sympathy,  the  basis  of  sociality. 
"  Thus  we  cross  the  chasm  which  divides  animality  from  human- 
ity, gregariousness  from  sociality,  hedonism  from  morality,  the 
sense  of  pleasure  and  pain  from  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong."  ^ 
The  prolongation  of  infancy  is  of  vital  importance,  then,  not  only 
in  the  development  of  the  nervous  system  and  its  acquirement  of 
modes  of  activity  making  for  adaptation,  but  in  the  establish- 

*  Destiny  of  Man,  pp.  30,  56.  »  Cosmic  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  342. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  65.  *  Ibid.,  p.  346. 


FROM  PASSIVE  TO  ACTIVE  ADAPTATION  217 

ment  and  maintenance  of  family  life,  a  training  school  of  greatest 
value  in  social  adjustment. 

With  the  genesis  of  permanent  family  relation,  according  to 
our  author,  the  evolution  of  man  may  be  said,  in  a  certain 
sense,  to  have  been  completed.  We  thus  have  three  stages  in 
biological  evolution,  the  organic,  including  the  development  of 
the  brain,  the  psychical  beginning  in  the  organic  and  continuing 
to  the  establishment  of  the  family  including  the  training  of 
children,  and  the  social,  having  to  do  primarily  with  man  in  his 
extra-family  relations. 

Fiske  has  contributed  to  our  subject  by  the  comprehensive 
way  he  has  used  the  concept  of  adaptation  to  explain  social 
evolution,  although  almost  entirely  in  the  passive  sense,  clarifying 
and  expanding  some  of  Spencer's  unclear  statements  and  making 
many  valuable  additions.  He  places  more  stress  than  the  latter 
on  the  power  of  the  great  man  ^  though  he  believes  that  this  power 
is  limited  by  the  general  trend  of  the  age  and  character  of  the 
group  to  which  the  man  belongs,  and  gives  greater  prominence 
to  man's  control  over  nature.^ 

Our  author  applies  the  doctrine  we  are  considering  to  man's 
adjustment  to  his  social  environment  using  the  phrase  moral 
adaptation^  also  to  man's  knowledge  and  use  of  natural  law  under 
the  term  intellectual  adaptation,  —  here  approaching  the  use  of 
the  concept  in  its  active  sense.^  Finally,  he  applies  the  theory  to 
man's  conscious  endeavor  to  harmonize  his  Hfe  with  the  cosmic 
spirit,  —  a  process  he  discusses  under  the  caption  "Religion 
as  Adjustment,"  though  his  God  is  not  more  definite  than  Spen- 
cer's Unknowable.^  His  chief  contribution,  however,  as  already 
intimated,  is  his  analysis  of  the  sociological  significance  of  the 
prolongation  of  infancy. 

*  Excursions  of  an  Evolutionist,  pp.  183  f.         '  Cosmic  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  252. 

*  Destiny  of  Man,  p.  33.  *  Ibid.,  pt.  iii,  ch.  V. 


PART  IV 
ACTIVE  MATERIAL  ADAPTATION 


CHAPTER  XII 

INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION 

Active  adaptation  as  a  process  was  defined  in  our  Introduction 
as  the  "  purposeful  modification  of  any  organic  or  quasi-organic 
unity  to  suit  it  to  its  environment,  or  the  purposeful  modification 
of  the  environment  to  make  it  favorable  to  the  unity."  In  the 
preceding  chapter  we  noted  the  difficulty  in  drawing  any  line 
between  passive  and  active  adaptation,  so  here  we  have  the  same 
difficulty  in  distinguishing  between  activities  that  are  deliberately 
purposeful  and  those  that  are  the  outcome  of  a  personal  life  acting 
occasionally  with  forethought  but  usually  as  a  result  of  impulse 
and  habit.  Though  foresight  and  purposeful  activity  are  the 
flower  of  the  process  of  hmnan  development,  their  beginning  far 
outdates  history,  —  indeed  they  are  to  be  found  among  the 
lower  orders. 

For  practical  purposes,  then,  active  material  adaptation  will 
comprise  the  whole  process  of  industrial  development,  or  about 
what  Professor  Ward  includes  under  the  term  material  achieve- 
ment. 

As  representative  writers  who  have  laid  supreme  emphasis  on 
material  achievement  as  the  basis  of  cultural,  or  on  material 
adaptation  as  the  basis  for  spiritual  (including  social)  develop- 
ment, we  will  consider  in  this  chapter  the  social  theories  of 
Ward,  Simon  N.  Patten,  and  Carver. 

Lester  Frank  Ward  (1841-1913) 

Material  as  the  Basis  of  Spiritual  Achievement 

Professor  Ward  has  the  most  thorough-going  system  of  any 
English  writer  since  Spencer,  including  as  it  does  Dynamic 
Sociology,  Psychic  Factors  in  Civilization,  Outlines  of  Sociology, 
Pure  and  Applied  Sociology,  and  Glimpses  of  the  Cosmos.^ 

1  Posthumous  work  now  in  press. 
221 


222  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

A  geologist  and  botanist  of  authority,  Professor  Ward  was  an 
ardent  admirer  and  disciple  of  Darwin,  but  in  the  controversy 
between  the  neo-Darwinian  and  neo-Lamarckian  schools  he 
ranged  himself  with  the  latter,  holding  that  there  was  a  "  bath- 
mic-force  "  ever  pushing  out  to  larger  Hfe  expression  and  to  new 
forms,  accepting  also  the  principle  of  use-inheritance.^ 

In  philosophy  a  strict  monist,  he  endeavored  to  interpret  life  in 
terms  of  the  inter-action  of  mechanical  forces.  A  great  admirer 
of  Comte,  he  made  use  of  his  "hierarchy  of  the  sciences"  and  like 
Comte  emphasized  the  affectional  nature  as  the  dynamic  of  social 
evolution,  even  conceiving  feeling  as  a  cosmic  force,  —  a  function 
of  the  world-soul.  Unlike  Comte  with  whom  cosmic  evolution 
culminated  in  humanity  and  whose  philosophy  eventuated  in  the 
worship  of  humanity  as  the  Great  Being,  Professor  Ward  con- 
sidered humanity  as  but  an  incident  in  the  cosmic  process  and  the 
love  of  nature  as  the  highest  type  of  religious  sentiment.^ 

The  greatest  contribution  of  Professor  Ward  to  social  philos- 
ophy is  his  stress  on  the  all-importance  of  the  intellect  in  social 
evolution  making  possible  permanent  human  achievement,  this 
being  the  characteristic  which  differentiates  man  and  society 
from  lower  orders  of  creation,  and  sociology  from  the  other 
sciences.^  Nature  in  its  processes,  he  holds,  is  wasteful.  Man 
is  an  economizer.'*  He  alone  is  an  economic  animal.  To  be  sure 
human  intelligence  is  rooted  in  animal  intelligence,  with  no  break 
in  the  process,  but  man  is  characterized  by  forethought,  —  telic 
activity. 

Our  author  endeavors  to  explain  or  at  least  describe  the  process 
by  which  the  cosmic  soul  evolved  into  the  human  soul  as  fol- 
lows:— 

The  birth  of  the  soul  was  the  dawn  of  the  psychic  faculty.  It  marks  an 
era  in  the  cosmical  history  of  the  earth.  Dimly  and  imperceptibly  it  worked 
through  the  primordial  ages  in  the  Silurian  mollusk,  the  Devonian  fish,  and 
the  Mesozoic  reptile,  producing  scarcely  any  modification  in  the  normal 
course  of  biologic  evolution.  During  all  these  vast  eons  of  time  the  only 
organic  products  of  beauty  or  utility  were  such  as  nature  in  her  objectless 

*  In  later  life  he  accepted  De  Vries'  mutation  theory. 
2  Pure  Sociology y  p.  430. 

*  Ihid.f  pp.  17  f.  *  Ihid.y  pp.  470,  471. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  223 

march  chanced  to  produce.  But  with  the  advent  of  the  highly  developed 
insects  in  late  Cretaceous  and  early  Tertiary  time  the  psychic  factor  began 
to  react  upon  the  plant  world,  and  .  .  .  flowers  were  the  direct  product  of  a 
growing  aesthetic  faculty,  —  the  response  to  the  demands  of  a  true  soul  force 
in  nature.  Later  the  same  agency,  working  in  bird  life  and  mammaHan  Ufe 
ushered  in  the  rich,  showy  and  nutrient  fruits  of  the  forest  and  the  bread- 
yielding  grains  of  the  meadow  and  the  marsh.  The  wonderful  revolution 
wrought  by  this  same  growing  soul  in  relations  of  the  sexes  among  the 
creatures  last  mentioned  .  .  .  might  fittingly  form  the  theme  of  the  future 
poetry  of  science.  In  human  society  .  .  .  the  soul  is  the  great  transforming 
agent  which  has  worked  its  way  up  through  the  stages  of  savagery  and  bar- 
barism to  civilization  and  enlightenment,  the  power  behind  the  throne  of 
reason  in  the  evolution  of  man.^ 

Let  us  consider  briefly  Professor  Ward's  contributions  to  our 
subject:  — 

I .  Sympodial  Development. — After  contrasting  sympodial  with 
monopodia!  development  in  biology  which  results  in  the  former 
case  in  a  zigzag  instead  of  linear  development,  he  applies  the 
principle  to  social  development  as  follows:  — 

We  may  look  upon  human  races  as  so  many  trunks  and  branches  of  what 
may  be  called  the  sociological  tree.  The  vast  and  bewildering  multiplicity 
in  the  races  of  men  is  the  result  of  ages  of  race  development,  and  it  has  taken 
place  in  a  manner  very  similar  to  that  in  which  the  races  of  plants  and 
animals  have  developed.  .  .  .  Every  one  of  these  races  of  men,  from  the 
advanced  nationalities  .  .  .  back  to  the  barbaric  tribes  that  arose  from  the 
blending  of  hostile  hordes,  is  simply  an  anthropologic  sympode,  strictly 
analogous  to  the  biologic  sympodes.^ 

This  leads  Professor  Ward  to  a  distinction  between  specializa- 
tion and  evolution:  "  The  former  consists  chiefly  in  modification 
of  form  and  size  without  change  in  the  type  of  structure.  The 
latter  depends  entirely  on  modification  in  the  type  of  structure  to 
adapt  it  to  changes  in  the  environment."  The  former  is  merely 
natural  growth  and  progressive  adaptation  to  a  slightly  changing 
environment,  the  latter  a  more  radical  change  such  as  is  necessary 
for  continuous  adjustment  to  a  marked  change  in  the  environ- 
ment. 

Ward  shows  that  highly  specialized  forms  are  more  or  less 
unstable.     "  The  highly  specialized  forms  do  not  degenerate  or 

^  The  Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization,  pp.  48,  49. 
'  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  76,  77. 


224  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

retrograde  at  all,  but  perish  as  they  were,  being  simply  crowded 
out  of  existence.  What  persist  are  the  unspecialized  forms  of  the 
same  type  that  were  contemporary  with  the  specialized  ones,  but 
escaped  competition  because  not  specialized."  ^  Ward  goes  on 
to  show  how  this  principle  applies  to  races. 

Races  and  nations  become  overgrown  and  disappear.  Peoples  become 
over  specialized  and  fall  an  easy  prey  to  the  more  vigorous  surrounding  ones, 
and  a  high  state  of  civilization  is  always  precarious.  Races  and  peoples  are 
always  giving  off  their  most  highly  vitalized  elements  and  being  transplanted 
to  new  soil,  leaving  the  parent  country  to  decHne  or  be  swallowed  up.  .  .  . 
Race  and  national  degeneration  or  decadence  means  nothing  more  than  this 
pushing  out  of  the  vigorous  branches  or  sympodes  at  the  expense  of  the 
parent  trunks.  The  organicists  see  in  colonization  the  phenomenon  of  social 
reproduction.  This  is  at  least  a  half  truth.  Colonization  often  means 
regeneration;  it  means  race  development;  it  means  social  evolution.^ 

Thus  from  England  has  grown  the  United  States,  Canada, 
AustraUa,  South  Africa.  Even  should  England  perish  as  a 
nation,  her  civilization,  her  ideals,  her  achievements  would  live 
on.  With  Ward  this  social  process  and  social  progress  is  more 
important  than  the  continued  existence  of  the  sovereign  group. 

2.  Creative  Synthesis. — This  contribution  of  Professor  Ward 
comes  next  in  order  in  Pure  Sociology  and  introduces  us  to  his 
cosmic  philosophy.  He  compares  cosmic  creation  to  chemical 
combination  which  results  apparently  in  something  different 
from  a  sum  of  the  causes  that  enter  into  the  compound.  "  The 
only  rational  or  thinkable  idea  of  creation,"  he  says,  "  has  always 
been  that  of  putting  previously  existing  things  into  new  forms."  ^ 

Ward  assumes  that  the  initial  force  differentiates  and  that  later 
portions  come  together  forming  ever  new  combinations  and  that 
thus  the  cosmic  order  is  ultimately  evolved  culminating  in  the 
free  intelligence  of  man. 

The  synthetic  creations  of  nature  have  their  characteristic  properties  or 
modes  of  acting,  and  it  is  through  these  that  they  produce  effects.  Taken 
together  these  active  properties  constitute  the  forces  of  nature.  These 
separate  and  apparently  different  forces  are,  however,  only  so  many  modali- 
ties of  the  one  universal  force,  but  it  is  not  only  convenient  but  practically 
correct  to  treat  them  as  distinct.  .  .  .  Man  possesses  feeling  in  common  with 

1  Pure  Sociology,  p.  78.  Such  analogical  reasoning,  while  suggestive,  turns  the 
attention  away  from  a  study  of  the  real  social  causes  that  produce  the  results. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  79.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  81. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  225 

the  lower  animals,  and  it  is  important  to  note  .  .  .  that  feeling  constitutes 
the  dynamic  agent,  and  is  therefore  the  highest  attribute  that  we  have  to 
consider  so  long  as  we  are  deahng  with  the  dynamic  agent.  .  .  .  Now  feel- 
ing is  a  true  cosmic  force  .  .  .  and  constitutes  the  propelling  agent  in 
animals  and  in  man.^ 

Feeling  is  used  by  Ward  in  two  different  senses:  as  the  property 
of  self-awareness  which  is  the  chief  differential  attribute  of  the 
animal,^  and  as  a  force  or  the  dynamic  agent  in  animal  and  human 
evolution.^  It  would  seem  as  though  Ward  were  guilty  of  the 
fallacy  of  the  universal  and  like  Spencer  confuses  logical  classifi- 
cation with  ontological  reality.  Because  man  has  a  multitude 
of  specific  feelings  and  because  animals  behave  as  though 
they  had  inner  experiences  similar  to  man  does  not  prove  that 
feeling  is  one  force,  something  like  gravitation,  always  acting, 
and  a  common  antecedent  to  all  activity.  There  is  a  general 
sense  of  awareness  which  Ward  considers  as  feeling;  there  is  a 
certain  vital  feeling  or  awareness  of  the  general  operation  of  vital 
processes,  especially  the  vegetative,  according  to  Hoffding,*  and 
there  is  the  consciousness  of  certain  specific  agreeable  or  dis- 
agreeable states  or  experiences,  but  there  is  no  warrant  for 
assuming  a  general  feeling,  as  a  force.  Thought,  feeling  and 
will  are  class  terms.  The  phenomenal  realities  are  specific 
thoughts,  specific  feelings,  and  specific  attitudes  which  eventuate 
in  action.  These  are  all  functions  of  personality.  To  assume 
feeling  as  a  force  presupposes  a  cosmic  personality  that  feels,  but 
this  is  contrary  to  Ward's  philosophy. 

3.  Ward's  third  contribution  is  his  doctrine  of  synergy  which 
he  explains  as  follows:  — 

Just  as  in  biology  the  world  was  never  satisfied  with  the  law  of  organic 
evolution  worked  out  by  Goethe  and  Lamarck  until  the  principle  of  natural 
selection  was  discovered  which  explained  the  workings  of  that  law,  so  in 
sociology  it  was  not  enough  to  formulate  the  law  of  social  evolution,  however 
clear  it  may  have  been,  and  the  next  step  has  been  taken  in  bringing  to  light 
the  sociological  homologue  of  natural  selection  which  explains  the  progress  of 

^  Pure  Sociology,  p.  99. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  95, 1 24  f .  For  criticism  of  Ward's  theory  of  the  dynamic  agent  and 
of  social  forces,  see  E.  C.  Hayes,  Publications  American  Sociological  Society,  vol.  v. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  99. 

*  Psychology,  p.  97.    Cf.  Small's  criticism,  General  Sociology,  pp.  532  f. 


226  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

social  evolution.  That  principle  is  not  the  same  as  natural  selection,  but  it 
serves  the  same  purpose.  It  also  resembles  the  latter  in  growing  out  of  the 
life-struggle  and  in  being  a  consequence  of  it ;  but,  instead  of  consisting  in  the 
hereditary  selection  of  the  successful  elements  of  that  struggle,  it  consists  in 
the  ultimate  union  of  the  opposing  elements  and  their  combination  and  assim- 
ilation. Successively  higher  and  higher  social  structures  are  thus  created 
by  a  process  of  natural  synthesis,  and  society  evolves  from  stage  to  stage. 
The  struggling  groups  infuse  into  each  other  the  most  vigorous  qualities  of 
each,  cross  all  the  hereditary  strains,  double  their  social  efficiency  at  each 
cross,  and  place  each  new  product  on  a  higher  plane  of  existence.  It  is  the 
cross-fertilization  of  cultures.^ 

This  theory,  developed  more  at  length  by  Gumplowicz  and 
Ratzenhofer,  is  especially  valuable  as  an  antidote  to  the  over- 
worked natural  selection  theory  of  the  biological  sociologists 
though  the  materialistic  postulates  on  which  it  rests  are  ques- 
tionable. 

A  further  quotation  from  Ward  is  necessary  to  appreciate  his 
doctrine  of  synergy:  — 

The  true  nature  of  the  universal  principle  of  synergy  pervading  all  nature 
and  creating  all  the  different  kinds  of  structure  that  we  observe  to  exist  .  .  . 
is  a  process  of  equilibration,  i.  e.,  the  several  forces  are  first  brought  into  a  state 
of  partial  equilibrium.  It  begins  in  collision,  conflict,  antagonism,  and  oppo- 
sition, but  as  no  motion  can  be  lost  it  is  transformed,  and  we  have  the  milder 
phases  of  antithesis,  competition  and  interaction,  passing  next  into  the  modus 
Vivendi,  or  compromise,  and  ending  in  collaboration  and  co-operation.  .  .  . 
Sjmergy  is  the  principle  that  explains  all  organization  and  creates  all  struc- 
tures.2  ,  .  . 

Upon  the  perfection  of  these  structures  and  the  consequent  success  with 
which  they  perform  their  functions  depends  the  degree  of  social  efficiency. 
In  the  organic  world  the  struggle  has  the  appearance  of  a  struggle  for  exist- 
ence. The  weaker  species  go  to  the  wall  and  the  stronger  persist.  There  is 
a  constant  elimination  of  the  defective  and  survival  of  the  fittest.  On  the 
social  plane  it  is  the  same,  and  weak  races  succumb  in  the  struggle  while 
strong  races  persist.  But  in  both  cases  it  is  the  best  structures  that  survive. 
The  struggle  is  therefore  raised  above  the  question  of  individuals  or  even  of 
species,  races  and  societies  and  becomes  a  question  of  the  fittest  structures. 
We  may  therefore  qualify  Darwin's  severe  formula  of  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence and  look  upon  the  whole  panorama  rather  as  a  struggle  for  structure? 

Another  name  for  social  structures  is  human  institutions y^  and 
the  function  of  these  is  the  control  and  utilization  of  social 

1  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  xii,  p.  585;  cf.  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  171  f- 

2  Pure  Sociology,  p.  175.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  mechanical  principles 
work  in  social  processes  as  indicated  in  this  quotation. 

'  Ihid.,  p.  184.  *  Ihid.,  pp.  185  f. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  22/ 

energy  in  the  interest  of  the  greatest  possible  sum  total  of  pleas- 
ure over  pain. 

4.  Individual  and  Social  Telesis. — Closely  linked  with  creative 
synthesis  is  his  doctrine  of  individual  and  social  telesis  or  anthro- 
poteleology  as  against  theo-teleology  of  popular  religion,  yet  this 
does  not  indicate  that  Ward  believes  in  arbitrary  freedom  of  the 
will.  All  acts  are  but  parts  of  a  cosmic  process  and  the  result  of 
the  inter-action  of  mechanical  forces.^  This  doctrine  is  explained 
as  follows:  — 

Progress  below  the  human  plane  is  altogether  genetic  and  is  called  develop- 
ment. In  the  earlier  human  stages  it  is  mainly  genetic,  but  begins  to  be 
telic.  In  the  later  stages  it  is  chiefly  telic.  The  transition  from  genetic  to 
telic  progress  is  wholly  due  and  exactly  proportional  to  the  development  of 
the  intellectual  faculty.  .  .  .  There  are  two  kinds  of  telic  progress,  or 
telesis,  individual  and  collective.  The  former  is  the  principal  kind  thus  far 
employed.  The  latter  is  as  yet  so  rare  as  to  be  almost  theoretical.  Society 
itself  must  be  looked  upon  as  mainly  imconscious.  .  .  .  The  intermediate 
step  between  individual  telesis  and  social  telesis  is  an  organization  of  individ- 
uals into  a  limited  body.  ...  If  a  small  number  of  individuals  may  think 
and  act  for  a  common  purpose,  a  larger  number  may,  and  there  is  no  neces- 
sary limit  until  the  totality  of  a  people  is  embraced  in  the  nimiber.^ 

Having  surveyed  briefly  some  of  the  main  principles  of  Ward's 
social  philosophy  we  are  prepared  to  consider  the  one  that  is 
most  important  of  all  so  far  as  our  subject  is  concerned,  viz.,  that 
form  of  telesis  which  he  calls  human  achievement.  This  is  of  two 
kinds,  material  and  spiritual,  the  latter  the  flower  of  the  former. 
"  The  subject  matter  of  sociology,"  he  says,  "  is  human  achieve- 
ment. It  is  not  what  men  are,  but  what  they  do."  ^  He  differ- 
entiates biological  and  social  evolution  by  a  formula  with  which 
we  are  famiHar:  "  The  formula  that  expresses  this  distinction  the 
most  clearly  is  that  the  environment  transforms  the  animal,  while 
man  transforms  the  environment^  ^  That  is,  in  one  case  we  have 
passive  material  adaptation;  in  the  other,  active  material  adapta- 
tion. Civilization  is  defined  as  the  sum  total  of  human  achieve- 
ments, material  and  spiritual.  "  Material  civilization,"  he  says, 
"  consists  in  the  utilization  of  the  materials  and  forces  of  nature. 

*  Pure  Sociology,  ch.  Ill,  pp.  465  flf. 

2  Dealey  and  Ward,  Text-hook,  pp.  267,  268. 

'  Pure  Sociology,  p.  15.  ■*  Ibid.,  p.  16. 


228  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

.  .  .  The  spiritual  part  of  civilization  is  at  least  conditioned 
upon  material  civilization."  "  It  does  not  derogate  from  its 
worth/'  he  continues,  "  to  admit  that  without  a  material  basis  it 
cannot  exist;  .  .  .  but  the  moment  such  a  basis  is  supplied  it 
comes  forth  in  all  ages  and  races  of  men.  It  may  therefore  be  re- 
garded as  innate  in  man  and  potential  everywhere,  but  a  flower 
so  delicate  that  it  can  only  bloom  in  the  rich  soil  of  material  pros- 
perity. .  .  .  No  amount  of  care  devoted  to  it  alone  could  make 
it  flourish  in  the  absence  of  suitable  conditions,  and  with  such 
conditions  it  requires  no  special  attention.  It  may  therefore  be 
dismissed  from  our  consideration,  and  our  interest  may  be  cen- 
tered in  the  question  of  material  civilization,  and  this  will  be 
understood  without  the  use  of  the  adjective."  ^ 

"  Involved  in  the  idea  of  achievement,"  ^  he  says,  "  is  that  of 
permanence.  Nothing  that  is  not  permanent  can  be  said  to  have 
been  achieved,  at  least  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  here  em- 
ployed. Now,  material  goods  are  all  perishable.  .  .  .  Achieve- 
ment does  not  consist  in  wealth.  Wealth  is  fleeting  and 
ephemeral.  Achievement  is  permanent  and  eternal.  .  .  .  The 
products  of  achievement  are  not  material  things  at  all.  As  said 
before,  they  are  not  ends  but  means.  They  are  methods,  ways, 
principles,  devices,  arts,  systems,  institutions.^  In  a  word,  they 
are  inventions,  ...  It  is  anything  and  everything  that  rises 
above  mere  imitation  and  repetition.  Every  such  increment  to 
civilization  is  a  permanent  gain,  because  it  is  imitated,  repeated, 
perpetuated,  and  never  lost.  It  is  chiefly  mental  or  psychical, 
but  it  may  be  physical  in  the  sense  of  skill."  ^  He  enumerates 
and  discusses  other  forms  of  achievement  such  as  language, 
literature,  philosophy,  science,  the  invention  of  tools,  instruments, 
utensils,  missiles,  traps,  snares  and  weapons  crowned  by  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  modern  era  of  machino-facture  with  power  of  artificial 

^  Pure  Sociology,  p.  i8.  ^  /jj^.^  pp.  22  ff. 

'  Institutions,  however,  are  not  permanent  as  he  himself  says  on  p.  31.  The 
only  permanent  thing  is  the  process  itself  or  intelligence  that  is  its  source.  Cf. 
Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  ch.  V;  Bowne,  Metaphysics,  ch.  III.  For  criticism 
of  this  doctrine  of  achievement,  see  Gillette,  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  July, 
1914. 

*  Pure  Sociology,  p.  25. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  229 

locomotion  and  electric-intercommunication.  The  process  by 
which  achievement  is  handed  down  is  called  social  heredity;  and 
the  personality  who  is  the  source  of  social  variation  is  the  genius 
of  which  there  are  three  varieties:  the  inventive  genius,  the  crea- 
tive genius  and  the  philosophic  genius.^ 
This  doctrine,  too,  is  given  reKgious  significance. 

Achievement  comes  to  constitute  a  form  of  immortality  and  has  an  ex- 
ceedingly attractive  side.  This  hope  of  immortahty  has  doubtless  formed 
one  of  the  important  motives  in  all  ages,  but  as  the  hope  of  personal  immor- 
tality wanes  under  the  glare  of  scientific  truth,  especially  of  biological  truth, 
there  is  likely  to  be  a  still  stronger  tendency  in  this  direction.  Whatever 
other  forms  of  immortahty  may  be  taught  and  beHeved  in,  the  immortality 
of  deeds  is  not  an  article  of  faith  but  a  demonstrated  fact.  The  real  immor- 
tahty is  the  immortality  of  achievement.  And  after  all  it  is  a  personal 
immortality.  Thus  far  it  resembles  Christian  immortahty  in  that  only  a 
few  attain  it.  Only  the  elect  are  saved.  They  only  are  immortal  who  have 
achieved.2 

Although  this  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  achievement  will 
never  satisfy  those  who  anticipate  conscious  existence  beyond  the 
grave,  nor  does  it  offer  hope  to  the  toiling  masses  as  does  the 
Christian  doctrine,  it  supplements  the  orthodox  view  in  a  most 
helpful  way,  and  is  a  source  of  inspiration  to  the  comparatively 
few  leaders  of  social  progress  whose  reward  is  not  primarily  from 
their  contemporaries  for  whom  they  labor  and  give  their  lives, 
but  whose  reward  comes  in  the  consciousness  that  their  labor  is 
not  in  vain  and  that  whether  or  not  future  generations  connect 
their  name  with  their  achievement,  humanity  at  large  will  enjoy 
greater  well-being  because  they  have  lived.  It  has  special  signif- 
icance, however,  when  applied  to  the  social  group. 

To  summarize  the  bearing  of  Ward's  social  philosophy  on  our 
subject:  The  process  of  cosmic  evolution  up  to  man  is  by  passive 
physical  adaptation  interpreted  largely  in  mechanical  terms  in 
much  the  same  way  as  did  Spencer  whom  he  follows  closely  in 
many  respects.  Our  author  introduces  psychical  terms,  how- 
ever, even  here,  and  considers  with  Schopenhauer  that  the  world- 
soul  with  feeling  as  a  dynamic  has  been  pushing  out  blindly  in 
every  direction,  the  adaptive  variations  blazing  the  path  of 
progress.^ 

1  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  493  f.        2  Ibid.,  p.  43.         »  Ibid.,  chs.  VI  and  Vm. 


230  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

In  the  exposition  of  his  theory  as  applied  to  social  evolution  he 
has  made  large  use  of  principles  elaborated  by  Gumplowicz, 
Ratzenhofer,  Tarde  and  others  with  some  modifications  and 
additions.  The  process  is  almost  entirely  one  of  passive  spiritual 
adaptation  described  by  such  terms  as  social  assimilation,  social 
karyokinesis  (analogous  to  cross-breeding),  compound  assimila- 
tion and  pacific  assimilation,  all  working  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  synergy.^  In  this  discussion  natural  selection  is 
given  a  prominent  place  but  reinterpreted  and  modified  in  view 
of  psychical  and  social  factors  that  enter  into  the  higher  phase  of 
the  cosmic  process  under  consideration.^ 

His  discussion  of  the  dynamic  factors  of  social  progress  forms  a 
transition  from  passive  to  active  adaptation.  The  first  of  these 
dynamic  principles  is  "  difference  of  potential,"  this  term  taken 
over  from  mechanics  and  illustrated  by  sexual  reproduction  in 
biology,  being  used  by  analogy  to  describe  that  phase  of  the  social 
process  which  most  sociologists  today  are  explaining  in  terms  of 
social  suggestion  and  imitation.  The  second  principle,  "  inno- 
vation "  is  interpreted  also  in  terms  of  mechanics,  following 
Tarde,  but  even  more  in  terms  of  biology,  having  its  biological 
analogue  in  the  "  sport,"  or  fortuitous  variation  which  our  author 
considers  to  be  the  chief  method  in  the  origin  of  species.^     The 

1  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  171  f. 

2  The  prominence  given  to  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  is  seen  by  the  following: 
"  If  the  individual  is  at  all  adjusted  to  his  environment  his  action  will  contribute 
in  some  degree  either  to  the  preservation  or  the  continuation  of  life.  At  the  lower 
animal  stages  ...  all  desires  are  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  creature  and  their 
satisfaction  conduces  to  the  life  of  either  the  individual  or  the  species.  Any  con- 
tinuous tendency  to  the  contrary  would  result  in  the  death  of  the  former  or  the 
extinction  of  the  latter.  It  is  not  really  otherwise  with  society.  We  have  fully 
shown  how  everything  in  society  works  for  the  conservation  of  the  group  and  the 
race,  and  how  the  wayward  tendencies  of  mankind  have  been  subjected  to  natural 
and  spontaneous  restraints  in  the  interest  of  social  order.  This  social  adaptation 
is  well-nigh  as  complete  as  organic  adaptation,  and  it  would  be  impossible  for  any 
considerable  number  of  men  to  persist  in  anti-social  acts  for  any  considerable  time 
without  disrupting  society  altogether.  .  .  .  Human  desires  are,  therefore,  more 
or  less  completely  adjusted  to  individual  and  social  needs,  and  it  is  safe  to  assume 
that  the  satisfaction  of  any  normal  desire  also  contributes  in  some  degree  to  the 
preservation  of  the  life  of  the  individual  or  of  other  individuals  ...  or  to  the 
maintenance  of  society,  or  both,"  ibid.,  p.  250. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  240  f. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  23  I 

third  principle  is  conation  or  social  effort  which,  when  directed  to 
material  ends,  belongs  to  our  division  "  active  material  adapta- 
tion "  and  results  in  achievement.  Every  dynamic  action,  he 
holds,  has  three  effects:  to  satisfy  desire,  to  preserve  or  con- 
tinue life  or  to  modify  the  surroundings.  This  last  effort  results 
largely  from  the  projection  of  desire  into  the  future,  and  is 
directiy  proportional  to  the  distance  between  desire  and  its  ful- 
fihnent.  The  effort  put  forth  to  attain  this  delayed  satisfaction 
is  the  cause  of  the  transformation  of  the  environment,  —  a  process 
summarized  by  the  term  achievement.^  Active  adaptation  or 
anthropoteleology,  or  again,  individual  and  social  telesis  come 
into  prominence  only  among  the  most  highly  cultured  men,  with 
most  people  and  groups  the  satisfaction  of  desire  being  the  only 
conscious  aim  of  endeavor.^  In  the  analysis  of  conation  two 
elements  are  emphasized,  human  desire  and  the  instinct  of  work- 
manship the  latter  imder  normal  conditions  leading  to  the  satis- 
faction of  desire  by  work  which  is  pleasure-giving.^  As  man 
always  follows  the  line  of  least  resistance  or  preponderant  mo- 
tives, and  as  the  satisfaction  of  material  wants  is  of  primary 
importance  for  survival,  there  must  be  a  surplus  of  wealth  before 
the  higher  wants  can  be  satisfied  and  a  surplus  always  furnishes 
the  conditions  favorable  for  the  development  of  cultural  wants.* 

In  the  discussion  of  individual  and  social  telesis  Professor  Ward 
contributes  to  the  fourth  division  of  our  subject,  active  spiritual 
adaptation,  the  former  leading  man  to  react  on  the  mores  of  the 
group  in  the  line  of  variation,^  the  latter  making  it  possible  for  a 
group  so  to  co-operate  as  not  only  to  transform  their  material 
environment,  but  their  spiritual  environment  as  well  in  the  in- 
terest of  increased  well-being.^ 

In  his  analysis  of  the  function  of  the  genius.  Ward  holds  that 
here  we  have  an  illustration  of  the  non-advantageous  faculties  of 
mind,  though  they  are  the  outgrowth  of  those  that  are  advan- 
tageous.   The  origin  of  the  genius  is  not  to  be  explained  according 

^  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  248  f. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  465,  545,  555  f.  Human  invention,  however,  antedates  history, 
ibid.,  pp.  515  f. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  245.  *  Ibid.,  p.  244. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  59.  •  Ibid.,  ch.  XX. 


232  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

to  the  principle  of  natural  selection,  but  rather  to  that  of  "  spon- 
taneous variation  "  issuing  in  a  "  sport."  The  aesthetic  faculty 
is  not  considered  to  be  primarily  of  adaptive  value,  but  to  minister 
to  the  satisfaction  of  individual  feelings.  Thus  art  in  its  mani- 
fold forms  is  not  to  be  explained  or  justified  according  to  the 
principle  of  adaptation  but  on  that  of  egoistic  satisfaction. 
Religion,  though  originally  connected  with  the  group  sentiment 
of  safety  and  so  of  adaptive  value  to  the  race,  yet  has  differen- 
tiated into  many  forms,  most  of  which  are  now  probably  some- 
what disadvantageous.^ 

Finally,  in  his  persistent  emphasis  on  the  potency  of  "  nurture  " 
as  over  against  "  nature,"  and  on  the  necessity  of  social  activity 
to  preserve  the  "  social  germ  plasm  "  by  universal  education,  our 
author  has  contributed  still  further  to  this  division  of  our  subject. 
His  Applied  Sociology  is  a  monument  of  painstaking  work  along 
this  line  and  his  general  conclusions  have  been  verified  recently, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  as  we  have  noted  in  previous  chapters. 

In  scope,  ripeness  of  scholarship,  thoroughness  of  analysis  and 
originality.  Professor  Ward's  achievements  in  sociology  remind 
us  more  than  those  of  any  other  English  writer  in  this  field,  of  the 
characteristics  attributed  for  the  most  part  only  to  German 
scholars.  These  very  qualities,  however,  have  made  his  system 
almost  inaccessible  to  the  public,  and  difficult  of  reading  even  for 
students  of  the  subject  as  their  approach  to  social  philosophy  has 
not  been  through  the  natural  sciences  so  much  as  through  psy- 
chology, history,  the  social  sciences  and  philosophy,  —  especially 
through  economics  and  social  psychology.  Moreover  his  reason- 
ing is  largely  deductive  and  analogical  rather  than  inductive. 
He  describes  in  terms  of  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology  rather 
than  analyzes  in  terms  of  economics  and  psychology  and  this 
tends  to  prejudice  the  modern  student. 

The  very  comprehensiveness  of  his  work  together  with  the  fact 
that  much  of  it  was  done  in  times  of  sociological  pioneering,  has 
laid  it  open  to  criticism  at  many  points: 

I .  His  Lamarckian  bias  has  made  his  biological  interpretations 
unacceptable  to  those  who,  with  the  leading  biologists  of  the 
1  Pure  Sociology y  ch.  XVIII. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  233 

present,  are  more  inclined  to  follow  Weismann,  De  Vries  and 
Mendel. 

2.  His  materialistic  monism  ^  is  opposed  by  those  sociologists 
who  prefer  to  follow  such  idealistic  philosophers  as  Hegel  or  Kant, 
by  the  pragmatists  who  follow  James,  by  the  theists  to  whom  the 
"  personalism  "  of  Bowne  furnishes  the  most  acceptable  explana- 
tion of  cosmic  evolution,  and  especially  by  those  who  consider 
that  sociology  should  be  a  science  rather  than  a  philosophy.  A 
monist,  yet  supremely  interested  in  emphasizing  the  place  of 
purposeful  activity  in  social  progress.  Ward  is  forced  to  face  the 
dilemma  of  determinism  and  free  will  which  he  admits  is  a  "  fool's 
puzzle."  2  He  grants  the  necessity  of  practical  belief  in  free  will 
but  denies  a  place  for  it  in  philosophy.  The  difficulty  here,  as  in 
all  monism,  is  its  endeavor  to  interpret  life  in  terms  of  discursive 
thought. 

3.  Growing  out  of  his  monism  and  his  preference  for  deductive 
reasoning,  have  arisen  certain  fallacies  connected  with  his  theory 
of  the  "  dynamic  agent "  and  with  his  analysis  of  "  social  forces."  ^ 
Modern  psychologists  are  calling  our  attention  to  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  feeling  in  general,  or  thought  or  will. 
Experience  gives  specific  feelings,  ideas,  volitions.^     These  may 

*  i.  e.,  an  endeavor  to  interpret  cosmic  evolution  in  terms  of  the  redistribution 
of  matter  and  force.     This  is  shown  in  the  following  quotations:  — 

"  No  line  of  demarcation  can  be  drawn  between  the  properties  of  matter  and 
physical  forces.  ...  It  is  now  known  that  all  matter  is  active,  and  the  only- 
difference  between  substances  is  the  different  ways  in  which  they  act.  .  .  .  Matter 
is  causality,"  Pure  Sociology,  p.  19. 

"  All  life  has  sprung  from  a  homogeneous,  undifferentiated  plasm,  which  con- 
tained within  itself  the  potency  of  all  the  varied  forms  that  have  evolved  out  of 
this  plasm,"  ibid.,  p.  85. 

"  This  eternal  pelting  of  atoms,  this  driving  of  the  elements,  this  pressure  at 
every  point,  this  struggle  of  all  created  things,  this  universal  nisus  of  nature,  push- 
ing into  existence  all  material  forms  and  storing  itself  up  in  them  as  properties, 
as  life,  as  feeling,  as  thought,  this  is  the  hylozoism  of  the  philosophers,  the  self- 
activity'of  Hegel,  the  will  of  Schopenhauer,  the  atom-soul  of  Haeckel:  it  is  the 
soul  of  the  universe,  the  spirit  of  nature,  the  *  First  Cause  '  of  both  religion  and 
science,  —  it  is  Gk)d,"  ibid.,  p.  136. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

'  Cf.  "The  'Social  Forces'  Error,"  by  Professor  E.  C.  Hayes,  Publications  of 
American  Sociological  Society,  vol.  v. 

*  Especially  Thomdike,  The  Original  Nature  of  Man. 


234  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

be  classified  for  logical  purposes,  but  Professor  Ward  seems  to 
identify  the  product  of  logical  classification  with  ontological 
reality. 

4.  Approaching  social  philosophy  from  the  point  of  view  of 
biology  and  individual  psychology,  and  an  individualist  much 
like  Spencer,  his  philosophy  cuhninates  in  an  emphasis  on  pleas- 
ure and  consumption  which  on  the  whole  seems  to  be  its  weakest 
point.  Although  in  Pure  Sociology  abundance  of  life  is  set  forth 
as  the  apparent  end  of  cosmic  evolution,^  in  Dynamic  Sociology y 
pleasure  is  given  a  place  of  pre-eminence,  this  being  correlated 
with  increase  in  the  complexity  of  organisms.^  This  emphasis, 
however,  does  not  grow  out  of  his  system  necessarily,  indeed 
seems  almost  to  have  been  grafted  on.  If  abundant  life  is  the 
end;  if  adaptation  is  the  means  to  abundant  life,  as  he  holds,  and 
if  pleasure  and  pain  are  sign-boards  indicating  the  ways  of  life  and 
death,^  as  he  shows  also,  the  end  of  teUc  endeavor  should  be 
adaptation,  not  pleasure;  and  the  test  of  progress  should  likewise 
be  adaptation  and  abundance  of  life,  —  an  objective  test  which 
Spencer  insisted  rightly  was  necessary  for  science.  This  error,  if 
it  be  one,  is  the  result  of  his  thesis  that  feeling  is  the  dynamic 
agent  in  social  progress.  Desire,  with  him,  is  the  mainspring  of 
human  endeavor.*  Modern  functional  psychology,  on  the  con- 
trary, makes  organic  reactions  the  fundamental  phenomena, 
sensations  of  pleasiure  and  pain  being  considered  as  arising  in 
connection  with  these  reactions  because  of  their  adaptive  value. 
The  organic  needs  that  impel  to  activity  may  well  be  termed 
"  interests  "  as  with  Ratzenhofer. 

^  Pure  Sociology,  p.  114;  cf.  p.  i. 

2  Dynamic  Sociology,  ii,  pp.  173  f.  Cf.  Pure  Sociology,  p.  126,  where  feeling  is 
considered  as  an  end. 

^  Pure  Sociology,  p.  130. 

*  "  Preservation,  continuation,  and  augmentation  are  the  three  aspects  of  the 
cosmic  end.  .  .  .  But  it  merely  happened  that  at  a  certain  point  it  became  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  secure  these  ends  ...  to  furnish  .  .  .  later  creations  with  some 
form  of  interest  that  should  enable  them  to  assist  in  the  prosecution  of  the  plan. 
Hitherto  the  products  of  creative  synthesis  had  been  passive.  Henceforth  they 
were  to  become  active.  .  .  .  The  form  which  this  interest  took  was  the  faculty 
of  feeling,  whereby  these  tocogenetic  creations  were  made  to  care  for  themselves, 
.  .  .  Henceforth  there  was  to  be  animated  nature.  ...  In  it  [feeling]  were 
contained  the  psychic  world  and  the  moral  world.     With  it  came  pleasure  and  pain 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  235 

5.  Ward's  teaching  that  all  the  stress  should  be  placed  on 
material  achievement  —  the  outcome  of  his  monism,  deductive 
method  and  hedonism  —  is  open  to  question.  The  cycle  of 
national  growth  and  decay  as  illustrated  in  history,  as  has  been 
pointed  out  by  many  sociologists,  shows  that  emphasis  on  produc- 
tion of  material  goods  for  the  sake  of  consumption  results  in  national 
degeneration.  If  now  we  take  the  group  instead  of  the  individual 
as  the  sociological  unit,  we  are  warranted  in  saying  that  stress  on 
material  achievement  when  linked  with  hedonism  furnishes  the 
most  destructive  kind  of  a  social  philosophy  so  far  as  the  welfare 
of  the  social  group  is  concerned. 

6.  Closely  Hnked  with  the  above  criticism  is  that  of  his  inter- 
pretation of  the  function  of  art  and  reh'gion.  These  are  the 
product  of  sociological  "  sports  "  according  to  our  author,  as 
noted  above,  and  not  to  be  evaluated  because  of  their  influence 
on  the  life  and  success  of  a  group.  Indeed  they  are  now,  for  the 
most  part,  of  no  adaptive  value,  if  not  positively  disuseful  except 
as  they  satisfy  individual  desire.  The  genius  who  is  the  inno- 
vator hence  the  source  of  those  variations  which  make  for  social 
progress  is  likewise  a  "  sport.''  Religion  in  the  beginning  was  of 
adaptive  value,  according  to  Ward,  else  it  could  not  have  gotten 
a  start,  and  this  value  was  due  to  its  relation  to  the  "  group 
sentiment  of  safety."  This  sentiment,  however,  is  considered  to 
play  an  ever  decreasing  part  in  social  evolution;  patriotism  is 
discounted,^  and  the  decay  of  a  group  or  nation  considered  of  little 
moment.  Individual  pleasure  and  the  process  of  civilization  are 
the  "  be  all  "  and  "  end  all  "  of  telic  activity  and,  with  apparently 
little  appreciation  of  the  potency  of  group  self-consciousness  and 
loyalty  as  factors  in  increasing  social  and  so  individual  well- 
being,  such  concepts  as  social  innovation,  social  suggestion  and 
social  imitation  are  given  almost  no  consideration.^  With  more 
recent  emphasis  on  the  species  as  the  biological  unit,  and  a  social 

with  all  their  momentous  import,  and  out  of  it  ultimately  grew  thought  and  in- 
telligence. Nature  cared  nothing  for  any  of  these.  They  were  unnecessary  to 
her  general  scheme,  and  not  at  all  ends  of  being.  Mind  was  therefore  an  accident, 
an  incidental  consequence  of  other  necessities, — an  epiphenomenon"  Pure  Sociology , 
pp.  127,  128. 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  211  f.  2  cf_^  however,  ibid.,  pp.  568  f. 


236  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

group  of  some  sort  as  the  sociological  analogue,  —  especially 
the  state;  with  the  present  teaching,  also,  which  distinguishes  the 
mere  "  sport  "  from  the  mutation  that  has  adaptive  value  for  the 
species,  the  real  genius  in  human  society  and  his  products,  in  so 
far  as  they  foster  idealism,  lead  to  group  unity,  and  stimulate  to 
productive  endeavor,  are  of  the  very  greatest  utility  to  the  group. 

Finally,  in  his  failure  to  give  due  consideration  to  social  psy- 
chology with  its  concepts  of  group  consciousness  and  the  expand- 
ing self-regarding  sentiment,  he  has  left  untouched  one  of  the 
most  potent  d3aiamics  in  social  cohesion  and  social  telesis. 

The  social  philosophy  under  review,  however,  with  emphasis 
on  material  achievement,  on  the  power  of  intelligent  volition  and 
on  the  value  of  that  education  which  makes  for  control  over  the 
forces  of  nature,  has  been  so  well  adapted  to  the  "  age-spirit  "  of 
all  western  nations  during  the  past  fifty  years  that  it  has  exerted 
a  profound  and  lasting  influence  on  sociological  thought  through- 
out the  world.  More  recent  advance  in  biology,  inductive  social 
science  and  especially  psychology,  tend  to  discredit  some  of 
Ward's  conclusions,  yet  he  will  ever  rank  as  one  of  the  foremost 
of  American  sociologists  and  as  one  who  has  contributed  most  of 
any,  perhaps  in  the  world,  to  the  development  of  the  doctrine 
oi  active  material  adaptation. 

Simon  N,  Patten  (1852-       ) 

Pain-Pleasure-Creative  Economy 

In  the  writings  of  Professor  Patten  we  have  a  forceful  example 
of  the  statement  made  in  the  Introduction  that  the  historical 
tendency  in  social  philosophy  from  Comte  and  Spencer  to  the 
present  has  been  in  the  line  of  increasing  emphasis  on  active  as 
against  passive  adaptation.  In  Professor  Patten's  earlier  writ- 
ings, even  in  his  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  the  latter  point  of  view  is 
dominant,  whereas  in  his  latest.  The  Reconstruction  of  Economic 
Theory,  his  former  position  is  criticized  and  corrected  in  the  light 
of  changes  that  he  admits  have  come  into  his  own  views  in  the 
line  of  greater  emphasis  on  creative  activity.^ 

^  Cf.  Seager's  criticism,  "  Professor  Patten's  Theory  of  Prosperity,"  Annals, 
American  Academy  Social  and  Political  Science,  March,  1902. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  237 

An  apparent  strain  after  the  novel  characterizes  all  his  writings, 
and  in  the  earlier,  especially,  deductive  rather  than  inductive 
reasoning.  That  he  has  given  the  world  hastily-formed  hypothe- 
ses unsupported  by  scientific  investigation  is  indicated  by  the 
fact  that  he  has  had  but  few  followers,  though  many  admirers, 
and  that  he  has  so  frequently  shifted  his  position  and  negatived 
former  conclusions.  Such  a  writer  is  frequently  suggestive  but 
rarely  convincing.^ 

One  doctrine  formulated  by  him,  however,  seems  to  have  found 
an  enduring  place  in  social  philosophy  which  will  be  strengthened, 
I  beheve,  in  the  Hght  of  his  recent  corrections,  —  his  theory  of  the 
contrast  between  a  pain  and  a  pleasure  economy,  or  progress  as 
the  result  of  a  surplus  rather  than  a  deficit  economy. 

This  doctrine  rests  upon  certain  biological  and  psychological 
postulates  which  must  be  sketched  briefly:  — 

I.  Biological  evolution  is  neither  the  result  of  chance  varia- 
tions of  adaptive  value,  preserved  by  natural  selection  as  with 
the  neo-Darwinians,  nor  the  result  of  the  inheritance  of  acquired 
tendencies  or  characters  as  with  the  neo-Lamarckians  but  is  due 
to  the  acquirement  of  surplus  energy  or  variations  resulting  from 
such  surplus  which  lead  to  change  in  environment  and  this,  in 
turn,  to  permanent  modifications.^ 

Invading  the  domain  of  cytology  to  get  a  basis  for  his  psycho- 
logical approach,  he  makes  the  following  assumptions:  (i)  that 
consciousness  and  movement  are  opposite  poles  of  the  same  forces 
and  that  both  are  present  in  the  beginning  of  cell  growth;  (2) 
that  the  original  germ  cell  has  a  capacity  for  consciousness  but  no 
content  until  a  structure  is  developed  through  which  will  and 
memory  are  evolved;  (3)  that  growth  creates  folds  and  they 
become  incipient  ovaries,  the  sex-products  of  which  are  nerve 
cells  which  become  differentiated  until  finally  sensation,  memory, 
and  consciousness  are  eventually  evolved  by  the  process  of 
selection.^ 

*  Cf.  Ward's  appreciation,  Pure  Sociology,  p.  105. 

2  Heredity  and  Social  Progress,  pp.  28  f.,  63;  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  pp.  14  f., 
50  f.;  Theory  of  Prosperity,  pp.  20,  159  f.,  196. 

'  Heredity  and  Social  Progress,  pp.  76,  89,  90.  These  hypotheses  have  no 
inductive  support. 


238  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Advancing  from  cytology  to  physiology,  Patten  argues  ana- 
logically back  from  sociology,  endeavoring  to  explain  the  asso- 
ciation of  cells  in  the  mind  by  the  conscious  association  of 
men  in  society.^  This  is  novel  and  suggestive  if  not  convincing. 
All  improvement  in  mental  power,  he  holds,  is  due  to  improve- 
ment in  mental  mechanism,  i.  e.,  in  the  mechanical  arrangement 
of  the  constituent  elements  ^  and  this  improvement  comes  on  the 
one  hand  from  surplus  energy  secured  in  a  favorable  environment 
which  expends  itself  in  motor  activity  resulting  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  motor  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  in  growth; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  result  of  forced  migration  to  escape 
competition,  which  results  in  the  development  of  new  organs  and 
sensory  feelings.^ 

"  There  are  thus,'*  he  says,  "  two  stages  of  progress,  —  the  bio- 
logic and  the  social,  —  corresponding  to  the  two  possible  environ- 
ments. In  the  biologic  stage  beings  are  pushed  into  a  local 
environment  where  the  objective  conditions  are  so  complete  that 
little  thought  is  needed  to  supply  the  necessities  of  Kfe.  Under 
these  conditions  the  development  of  the  motor  powers  determines 
who  shall  survive.  The  organism  becomes  a  more  nearly  perfect 
individual  because  of  the  growth  of  organs  on  the  one  hand  and 
an  increase  of  desire  on  the  other.  In  the  struggle  for  such  an 
environment  the  beings  with  the  superior  motor  powers  drive  out 
those  with  inferior  motor  powers.  Some  of  the  latter  class  are, 
however,  better  fitted  to  occupy  a  general  environment  where 
their  sensory  powers  are  of  more  use  than  in  the  local  environ- 
ment from  which  they  were  driven.  The  conquered  thus  find  a 
place  to  live  and  by  the  development  of  some  of  the  social  forces 
create  for  themselves  a  new  society  with  new  requisites  for  sur- 
vival. When  the  struggle  for  existence  begins  within  this  new 
environment,  those  with  superior  motor  powers  will  again  survive, 
while  those  with  an  imperfect  motor  organization,  but  with 
improved  sensory  powers,  will  be  forced  again  into  a  more  general 
environment  where  new  social  instincts  must  be  acquired."* 
This  last  quotation  takes  our  author  into  the  domain  of  psychol- 

*  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  pp.  18  f.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  48,  51. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  19  f.  *  Ibid.,  p.  52. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  239 

ogy  which  is  very  important  in  his  social  philosophy,  especially 
the  theory  of  psycho-physical  paralleKsm  in  so  far  as  it  asserts 
that  energy  derived  from  metabolism  must  find  expression  in  some 
other  form  of  activity,  —  muscular,  intellectual  or  emotional,  — 
which  theory  is  the  basis  of  his  doctrine  of  surplus  energy.^ 

The  development  of  social  forces  according  to  Patten  is  not 
due  entirely  to  an  objective  environment  to  which  the  organism 
must  adapt  itself,  perish,  or  move  to  a  new  environment,  but  to  a 
subjective  environment  made  up  of  forms  of  thought  and  ideals,^ 
which  crystallize  into  knowledge  and  belief,^  and  ultimately  find 
expression  in  customs,  habits,  social  institutions  and  race  ideals."* 

The  change  from  one  environment  to  another,  demanding  a 
change  in  habits,  beliefs  and  ideals,  is  fraught  with  great  danger. ^ 

Extension  of  knowledge  comes  through  organic  reactions  first 
to  sense  of  touch,  then  to  vibrations  in  the  surrounding  mediima 
through  sensations  of  light,  sound  and  smell.  Fear  is  the  first 
sensation  which  a  perception  of  these  vibrations  creates,  —  and 
fear  is  usually  connected  with  moving  objects.  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  world  as  an  aggregate  of  materials  shifts  the  interest 
from  pains  to  pleasures,  with  a  corresponding  increase  of  knowl- 
edge.^ Soon  the  distinction  is  drawn  between  the  natural  and 
the  supernatural,  —  the  former  connected  with  pleasure,  the 
latter  with  pain.  "  The  growth  of  knowledge  is  not  due  to 
developed  men  coming  in  contact  with  more  of  nature.  It  is  due 
to  beings  of  limited  sensory  powers  gradually  increasing  their 
powers  as  they  are  forced  to  know  nature  more  intimately  or  to 
come  in  contact  with  larger  areas  of  the  world.  Each  new 
requisite  for  survival  has  caused  the  development  of  some  new 
sensory  power,  and  has  thus  created  an  area  of  knowledge  in- 
dependent of  the  older  areas,  and  in  no  logical  connection  with 
them.  Knowledge  comes  by  leaps  and  bounds  when  a  new 
environment  with  new  requisites  for  survival  is  entered.'^  ^ 

*  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  pp.  26  f.,  64;  Heredity  and  Social  Progress,  chs.  XI, 
XVI;  Theory  of  Prosperity,  ch.  XI;  Annals,  American  Academy  Political  and  Social 
Science  (1897)  p.  34. 

2  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  p.  54.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  56,  ch.  IV. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  49  ff.  *  Ibid.,  p.  60. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  53,  119.  '  Ibid.,  p.  63. 


240  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

This  leads  our  author  to  discuss  the  distinction  between  a  pain 
and  a  pleasure  economy,  the  former  based  on  necessity  of  struggle 
for  existence  carried  on  under  the  dominating  impulse  of  fear,  the 
latter  based  on  life  lived  under  conditions  favorable  to  survival, 
relatively  free  from  competition,  resulting  in  abundance  of  sur- 
plus energy  which  manifests  itself  in  motor  activity,  accompanied 
by  the  motor  sensation  of  pleasure. 

Under  the  former  economy  human  institutions  have  as  their 
basis  the  fear  of  enemies  and  pain,^  causes  lying  in  the  environ- 
ment. But  "  the  development  of  hvunan  society  has  gradually 
eliminated  from  the  environment  the  sources  of  pain.  The 
civilized  world  has  been  freed  from  dangerous  beasts  and  reptiles, 
and  the  growth  of  large  nations  has  cut  off  the  danger  of  invasion 
by  barbarous  and  warlike  hiunan  foes.  .  .  .  The  sensory  powers 
have  free  play  in  analyzing  this  material  into  its  elements,  and 
in  reorganizing  these  elements  into  valuable  goods.  These 
changes  make  a  pleasure  economy  possible  and  destroy  the  con- 
ditions which  make  the  subjective  environment  of  the  old  pain 
economy  a  necessity."  ^  This  transition  is  perilous  and  has 
caused  the  downfall  of  many  nations  owing  to  their  inabiHty  to 
make  a  readjustment. 

The  human  race  is  now,  he  holds,  in  a  state  of  transition 
from  a  pain  to  a  pleasure  economy.^  Under  an  ideal  pleasure 
economy  "  there  would  be  two  prominent  groups  of  motives,  — 
the  one  prompting  actions  which  increase  the  pleasure  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  the  other  prompting  actions  which  promote  the 
progress  of  the  race.  .  .  .  Each  tendency  to  get  pleasure  at  the 
expense  of  social  welfare  would  be  counteracted  by  the  formation 
of  some  ideal  or  social  institution  with  which  would  be  coupled 
impulses  prompting  to  their  realization.  The  requisites  for 
survival  would  be  those  social  impulses  which  preserve  individuals 
from  temptation,  disease  and  crime.  The  number  of  ideals  and 
institutions  would  be  gradually  increased  until  their  united  effect 
would  be  strong  enough  to  determine  the  choices  of  individuals 
and  make  their  conduct  conform  to  the  interests  of  the  race."  * 

1  Theory  of  Social  Forces^  p.  75.  '  Ibid.,  p.  80. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  76.  *  Ibid.,  p.  84. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  24 1 

In  the  ideal  commonwealth  under  a  pleasure  economy  there 
must  be  the  elimination  of  all  such  rivalries  and  conflicts  as  pro- 
duce f ear.i  In  such  a  commonwealth  "  the  economic  forces  would 
constitute  the  first  and  elementary  bonds  uniting  the  members 
of  such  a  society,"  leading  to  division  of  labor,  the  storing  of 
energy  in  the  form  of  capital,  and,  as  a  result  of  differences  in  soil, 
climate,  and  universal  products,  to  commerce.  Self-interest  would 
call  for  co-operation  and  organization.  The  conditions  of  con- 
sumption as  well  as  of  production  would  assist  in  uniting  men.^ 

Increase  in  standard  of  living  with  variety  in  diet  results  in 
greater  social  interdependence  as  well  as  in  increased  individual 
well-being.^  Increasing  range  of  desires  and  the  demand  for 
harmonious  groups  of  utilities  are  potent  factors  in  the  formation 
of  social  organizations.'*  "  The  economic  forces,  therefore,  are 
sufficient  to  create  powerful  bonds  uniting  the  individuals  into  a 
social  commonwealth  even  if  they  feel  no  other  motives  than 
those  due  to  the  pursuit  of  pleasure.''  ^  "  The  race  ideals  are  an 
outgrowth  of  the  same  process  through  which  harmonious  groups 
in  consumption  are  formed."  *  The  aesthetic  ideals  are  the  first 
to  be  formed,  then  the  moral  and  finally  the  religious.^ 

Thus  according  to  our  author,  up  to  the  present  man  has  been 
dominated  largely  by  fear  and  pain  due  to  lack  of  adjustment  with 
his  environment  and  this  failure,  in  turn,  has  been  due  primarily 
to  lack  of  productive  power.  With  increased  power  over  his 
environment  (active  material  adaptation)  there  results  normally 
a  surplus  of  energy,  motor  activity  and  pleasure,  the  process  of 
industrial  evolution  leading  to  ever  increasing  social  bonds  and 
institutions,  these  being  supplemented  by  associations  arising  out 
of  consumption.  The  greatest  danger  in  this  process  arises  from 
the  tendency  to  expend  this  surplus  energy  in  wasteful  consump- 
tion, i.  e.,  consimiption  not  resulting  in  health,  growth,  and  in 
those  forms  of  activity  that  increase  individual  and  social  well- 
being.  Such  wasteful  consumption  is  dissipation  leading  to 
degeneration  and  elimination  by  the  law  of  selection.^    The  con- 

1  Theory  of  Social  Forces,  p.  83.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  90. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  8s  f.  6  Ihid.,  p.  91. 
»  Ibid.,  pp.  86  f.                                     7  7^,^  p,  g4, 

-*  Ibid.,  p.  89.  8  Theory  of  Prosperity,  pp.  166  f.,  180. 


242  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

trast  between  a  pain  and  a  pleasure  economy  is  reflected  also  in 
religion,  the  former  being  linked  with  a  rehgion  of  fear,  sacrifice, 
etc.,  the  latter  with  a  religion  of  love,  worship  and  service. 

Professor  Patten  finds  that  the  classical  economists,  in  fact 
nearly  all  up  to  the  present,  have  built  theories  on  a  pain  or 
deficit  economy  and  he  pleads  now  for  a  reconstruction  of  eco- 
nomic theory  based  on  a  pleasure  or  surplus  economy.  He  holds, 
also,  that  the  practical  problems  of  social  science  can  be  solved 
only  by  increasing  the  surplus  of  the  mass  of  wage  earners  and  by 
guiding  them  in  wise  consumption.  The  surplus  in  the  case  of 
the  rich  should  be  drawn  off  in  social  service.^ 

Passive  adaptation,  both  material  and  spiritual,  finds  large 
place  in  Patten's  social  philosophy  especially  in  his  early  writings. 
Nearly  all  of  his  Theory  of  Social  Forces  and  Heredity  and  Social 
Progress  is  from  this  point  of  view,  so,  too,  much  of  his  Theory 
of  Prosperity.  The  key-note  of  The  New  Basis  of  Civilization 
and  Reconstruction  of  Economic  Theory,  however,  is  active  adap- 
tation. The  resources  of  nature  under  man's  control  should 
provide  for  all  his  increasing  needs.^  Surplus  and  leisure  for  the 
lower  classes  will  lead  to  culture  and  efficiency  ^  and  tend  to  break 
down  social  classes  and  distinctions.*  Reflective  morality,  ideali- 
zation, and  religion  are  needed  to  inspire  to  productivity,  self- 
control,  efficient  consumption,  and  social  service,  and  social 
control  has  a  most  important  function  in  bringing  about  such  an 
industrial  and  social  reorganization  as  shall  make  widespread  the 
surplus  that  tends  to  issue  in  growth,  variation,  pleasure,  ideali- 
zation and  progress.^ 

The  law  of  rhythm  as  manifested  in  the  phenomenon  of  growth 
and  decay  in  nations  is  not  necessary  according  to  our  author,  but 
it  can  be  prevented  from  operating  only  on  the  condition  that 
consumption  is  controlled  with  reference  to  future  efficiency. 
"  The  normal  man  seeks  to  establish  a  direct  relation  between  his 
consumption  and  production,  and  forms  of  consumption  that  do 
not  result  in  the  creation  of  surplus  energy  are  dissipation  and 
hinder  him  in  his  struggle  for  existence  and  superiority.     The 

*  Theory  of  Prosperity,  p.  i68. 

*  The  New  Basis  of  Civilization,  ch.  I. 

»  Ihid.,  pp.  63,  156,  160  f.  <  Ihid.,  ch.  IV.         5  Ihid.,  ch.  VIII. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  243 

dissipated  are  thus  steadily  eliminated,  leaving  those  whose  use 
of  goods  tends  to  create  surplus  energy.  Every  increase  of  pro- 
ductive power  adds  to  the  quantity  of  goods  consumed,  and  these 
if  properly  used  augment  the  surplus  energy  of  workers."  ^ 

Nowhere  is  his  recent  emphasis  on  active  adaptation  so  clearly 
revealed  as  in  his  criticism  of  his  own  theory  of  "  pleasure-pain  " 
economies.  "  I  now  regard  this  division  as  defective,"  he  says. 
"  To  love  pleasure  is  a  higher  manifestation  of  life  than  to  fear 
pain;  but  the  pleasure  of  action  is  in  advance  of  the  pleasure  of 
consumption.  Action  creates  what  pleasure  uses  up.  This 
would  divide  progress  into  three  stages:  a  pain  economy,  a 
pleasure  economy  and  a  creative  economy.  Each  stage  has  its 
own  mode  of  thought,  and  its  own  social  institutions."  His  new 
complete  theory  is  thus  visualized. ^ 


Character  of  the 

Stage  of  Progress 

Form  of  Struggle 

Form  of  Control 

Social  Bond 

I. 

A  pain  economy 

Race  struggle 

Ancestral  control 

Blood  bonds 

2. 

A  pleasure  economy 

Class  struggle 

Wealth  control 

Interest  bonds 

3- 

A  creative  economy 

Self-direction 

Character  control 
Kind  of 

Social  beliefs 
Type  of 

Type  of  Thought 

Thought  Limitations 

Philosophy 

Morality 

I. 

Theological 

Substance 

Anthropomorphic 

Traditional 

2. 

Rational 

Space 

Material 

Utilitarian 

3. 

Pragmatic 

Time 

Ideal 

Tdic 

The  importance  of  the  active  factor  in  securing  adjustment  is 
revealed  in  his  list  of  checks  to  expenditure  which  tend  to  bring 
the  family  budget  to  an  equilibrium. ^  His  conclusion  is  of  in- 
terest for  it  is  his  last  word  to  date  in  his  social  philosophy. 
"  Surplus  promotes  activity  and  that  activity  transforms  the 
natural  surplus  into  wealth.  With  wealth  come  price  relations 
through  which  ancestral  control  is  broken  and  wealth  control  put 
in  its  place.  Price  relations  give  rise  to  budgetary  concepts.  In 
the  endeavor  to  bring  the  family  budget  to  an  equilibrium, 
activity  is  increased  and  consumption  is  put  on  a  cultural  basis 
by  increasing  the  intensity  of  new  wants.  This  brings  on  a  self- 
repression  which  is  the  essence  of  character  building.      The 

*  Theory  of  Prosperity j  p.  15;  Seager,  op.  cit.,  p.  83. 

2  "  Reconstruction  of  Economic  Theory,"  Annals,  American  Academy  Political 
and  Social  Science,  191 2,  (Supplement),  p.  92. 
'  Ihid.,  p.  62. 


244  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

struggle  for  supremacy  is  now  changed  from  a  race  and  class 
struggle  to  an  internal  struggle  for  seK-control.  Primitive  feelings 
and  instincts  are  repressed,  sex  and  appetite  are  curbed,  and  cul- 
tural motives  replace  the  older  sentiments  due  to  race  and  class 
antagonisms.  .  .  .  The  new  and  the  old  types  of  culture,  motive 
and  character  are  bound  to  come  into  sharper  conflict  as  the 
century  advances.  The  older  tendencies  are  coercive  and  will 
strive  to  impress  themselves  as  state  socialism.  The  newer  forces 
will  express  themselves  in  voluntary  association.  It  will  be  a 
struggle  of  tradition,  race  and  class  with  the  blending  influences 
that  make  for  imity  and  character."  ^ 

Professor  Patten  is  his  own  best  critic  of  many  of  his  early 
theories.  If  time  and  intellectual  vigor  permit  he  may  roimd  out 
a  consistent  social  philosophy.  His  greatest  advance  has  come 
from  his  transition  from  an  almost  exclusively  deductive  method 
to  emphasis  on,  though  not  successful  use  of,  the  inductive 
method,  and  from  stress  on  pleasure-pain  motives  and  tests,  to 
objective  tests  measured  in  terms  of  health,  wealth  and  culture.^ 

His  theory  that  progress  is  due  to  surplus  energy  and  that 
historically  social  progress  has  passed  from  a  pain  to  a  pleasure 
economy  and  is  now  entering  a  creative  economy,  is  so  sug- 
gestive that  it  is  most  unfortunate  that  he  has  developed  the 
theory  in  such  a  way  as  to  meet  disapproval  from  the  specialists 
in  every  field  he  has  touched. 

^  "  Reconstruction  of  Economic  Theory,"  pp.  94,  95. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  91:  cf.  pp.  61,  86,  87. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  (continued) 

Thomas  N.  Carver  (1865-       ) 

The  Super-Group 

With  Professor  Carver  the  chief  function  of  sociology  is  to  work 
out  a  consistent  and  thorough-going  theory  of  social  progress  and 
its  only  justification  is  social  amelioration.^  It  is  thus  a  social 
philosophy.  To  the  methods  of  sociological  investigation  out- 
lined by  Comte  he  adds  a  fifth,  viz.,  the  study  of  social  forces  now 
at  work,  and  holds  that  instead  of  interpreting  present  events 
solely  in  the  light  of  historical  analyses  the  more  effective  method 
is  to  interpret  both  the  present  and  the  past  by  an  analysis  of 
forces  now  at  work. 

Two  preliminary  assumptions  are  made:  first,  that  this  is  a 
rational  universe,  —  a  cosmos  rather  than  a  chaos;  and  second, 
that  life  is  a  good  thing;  i.  e.,  that  life  is  better  than  death.  If 
life  is  a  good  thing,  then  more  life  is  a  better  thing.  He  goes  a 
step  further  in  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  and  assumes  that 
this  is  God's  world  and  that  the  laws  of  the  universe  are  God's 
laws.  From  a  religious  point  of  view  it  is  necessary  to  be  obe- 
dient to  the  will  of  God,  but  this  calls  for  an  understanding  of 
that  will  as  revealed  in  the  cosmic  process. 

Professor  Carver  does  not  stop  with  mere  abimdance  of  life  as 
the  goal  of  the  cosmic  process,  but  emphasizes  quality;  as  a  neo- 
Darwinian,  however,  he  believes  that  quality  can  be  secured  only 
by  a  process  analogous  to  that  which  prevails  in  biological 
evolution,  i.  e.,  superabundance  of  life,  variations,  struggle  for 
existence,  elimination  of  the  ill-adapted  and  inheritance  of 
adaptive  qualities,  a  process  leading  gradually  to  the  production 
of  new  and  higher  species,  —  higher,  that  is,  because  better 
adapted  to  life  conditions.    As  the  cosmic  process,  according  to 

*  Sociology  and  Social  Progress^  Introduction. 
24s 


246  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

his  view,  has  issued  in  man  who  is  not  merely  the  product  of 
passive  adaptation,  but  who  is  able  to  react  on  that  process  and 
guide  it  within  certain  limits  in  the  interest  of  increased  well- 
being,  his  cosmology  is  anthropocentric,  or  better,  perhaps, 
socio-centric,  for  while  recognizing  that  the  individual  has  a 
metaphysical  reality  such  as  cannot  be  posited  of  any  other 
creature  or  of  society,  yet  with  him  the  sovereign  group  is  the 
sociological  unit  and  its  success  necessary  to  the  well-being  of  the 
individuals  that  constitute  the  group. 

His  strong  neo-Darwinism  is  indicated  by  the  choice  of  selec- 
tions in  his  Sociology  and  Social  Progress  and  shown  conclusively 
in  The  Religion  Worth  Having^  and  Essays  in  Social  Justice'^  in 
which  the  biological  doctrine  of  struggle  and  survival  is  applied 
rigidly  to  human  life  and  progress  with  emphasis,  however,  on  the 
struggle  between  sovereign  groups. 

The  key  to  Professor  Carver's  social  philosophy  as  suggested  in 
our  Introduction  is  the  doctrine  of  adaptation,  as  set  forth  in  the 
following  scheme:  ^  — 

Environment 

Kind  of  ■ " ^ 

Adaptation  Material  Social 

.      r  Biological  Moral  development 

I  Evolution  Education 

,     .       f  Industrial  Social  Control 

Active  \    ^ 

I  Progress 

Professor  Carver  follows  Weismann  closely  in  his  interpretation 
of  the  doctrine  of  selection,  holding  that  the  ill-adapted  are 
eliminated  only  "  by-and-large  and  in  the  long  run,"  and  that  the 
struggle  is  chiefly  between  species.  He  believes  with  all  biological 
sociologists  that  the  highest  human  powers  and  faculties  and 
institutions  have  been  evolved  by  an  analogous  process. 

In  social  development  the  group  corresponds  to  the  biological 
species  and  although  the  primordial  struggle  for  existence  pre- 
vailed among  primitive  groups  this  has  been  supplanted  by  a 
struggle  between  nations  for  the  markets  of  the  world.  Within 
the  group  there  is  struggle  for  wealth,  place,  power,  etc.,  and  this 

1  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  20  f.,  42-45,  88  flf. 

2  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  I. 

'  Class  lectures;  of.  Sociology  and  Social  Progress,  pp.  9,  10. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  247 

has  gone  through  three  distinct  stages:  "  The  first  stage  is 
struggle  by  destruction,  that  is  private  war;  the  second  is 
struggle  by  palaver,  that  is  poHtics;  the  third  is  struggle  by 
production,  that  is  economic  competition."  ^ 

Struggle  for  existence,  according  to  our  author,  indicates 
scarcity,  for  if  all  wants  were  satisfied  there  would  be  no  scarcity. 
Scarcity  is  thus  relative.^  Its  cause  is  attributed  to  the  niggardli- 
ness of  nature,  for  the  commodities  that  nature  has  supplied  in 
such  abundance  as  to  satisfy  all  man's  wants  have  no  economic 
value.  "  The  fact  that  there  are  human  wants  for  whose  satis- 
faction nature  does  not  provide  in  sufficient  abundance,  in  other 
words,  the  fact  of  scarcity  signifies  that  man  is,  to  that  extent 
at  least,  out  of  harmony  with  nature.''  This  makes  labor  and 
fatigue  necessary  which  are,  therefore,  signs  of  mal-adaptation.^ 
"  That  there  is  a  deeper  harmony  hidden  somewhere  beneath 
these  glaring  disharmonies  is  quite  possible,"  —  but  this  problem 
is  passed  over  to  philosophy.  The  whole  evolutionary  process,  he 
holds,  both  passive  and  active,  both  biological  and  economic,  is  a 
development  away  from  less  toward  greater  adaptation,  from  less 
toward  greater  harmony  between  the  species  and  its  environment. 

Economic  scarcity,  according  to  our  author,  is  the  chief  cause 
of  the  disharmony  between  man  and  man,  and  in  the  conflict  of 
interests  thus  resulting  we  have  the  origin  of  the  problem  of  evil.^ 
"  Fundamentally,"  we  are  told,  "  there  are  only  two  practical 
problems  imposed  upon  us.  The  one  is  industrial  and  the  other 
moral;  the  one  has  to  do  with  the  improvement  of  the  relations 
between  man  and  nature,  and  the  other  with  the  relations  be- 
tween man  and  man."  ^ 

As  to  the  cause  of  economic  scarcity,  it  is  due  primarily  to  the 
indefinite  expansion  of  human  wants,  and  to  the  multiplication  of 
numbers,  and  for  both  man  is  in  a  large  measure  responsible.  "  It 
would  be  difficult  to  find  any  question  in  the  whole  science  of 
jurisprudence,  or  of  ethics,  or  politics,  or  any  of  the  social  sciences 
for  that  matter,"  says  our  author,  "  which  does  not  grow  out  of 

*  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  p.  55. 

2  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  II. 

'  Ihid.,  pp.  38,  40.  *  Ihid.,  pp.  41  f.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  43. 


248  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

the  initial  fact  of  economic  scarcity  and  the  consequent  antag- 
onism of  interests  among  men.  This  reveals,  as  nothing  else  can, 
the  imderlying  imity  of  all  the  social  sciences  .  .  .  and  it  shows 
very  clearly  that  the  imifying  principle  is  an  economic  one."  ^ 

Passing  to  a  consideration  of  methods  of  escape  from  the  dif- 
ficulties imposed  upon  us  by  economic  scarcity,  the  simple  life 
is  found  insufficient  if  linked  with  uncontrolled  passion,  and 
insufficient,  too,  and  for  the  same  reason,  industrialism,  due  to 
the  fact  pointed  out  by  Malthus  that  population  tends  to  in- 
crease faster  than  the  means  of  subsistence. 

Only  one  way  of  escape  seems  open.  "  Even  under  the  con- 
ditions of  economic  scarcity  there  would  be  no  antagonism  of 
interests  between  man  and  man  if  human  nature  were  to  undergo 
a  change  by  which  altruism  were  to  replace  egoism.''  ^ 

As  a  practical  working  program  of  meliorism  our  author 
suggests:  (i)  improvement  in  methods  of  production;  (2)  simpler 
life,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  wealthier  class;  (3)  an  increas- 
ing sense  of  the  responsibilities  of  parenthood,  especially  among 
those  classes  who  can  least  afford  to  spawn;  and  (4)  a  more  wide- 
spread spirit  of  altruism.  "  In  spite  of  all  these  methods,  how- 
ever, there  will  still  be  antagonistic  interests  to  be  adjudicated. 
The  state  must  therefore  continue  to  administer  justice."  ^ 

This  doctrine  of  economic  scarcity  is  closely  connected  with  the 
laws  of  diminishing  returns  and  proportionality,  which  Professor 
Carver  has  elaborated  as  has  no  other  economist.* 

These  laws  have  profound  bearing  on  all  labor  problems,  for 
they  are  due,  fundamentally,  to  the  fact  that  there  are  too  many 
imskilled  laborers  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  land,  capital  and 
organizing  ability  involved.  If  capitalists  are  getting  too  large 
reward,  says  Professor  Carver,  it  is  because  they  are  too  few  in 
proportion  to  the  other  factors  in  production.  One  way,  then,  to 
increase  the  wages  of  the  lowest  economic  class  is  to  increase  the 
niunber  of  capitalists.  Another  way  is  to  decrease  the  number  of 
unskilled  laborers.     The  reason  wages  are  higher  in  one  occupa- 

^  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  p.  50.  ^  Hjid.^  p.  51.         s  /Jj^f.^  pp.  52,  53. 

*  Distribution  of  Wealth,  chs.  II  and  IV.  Cf.  Marshall's  Principles  of  Eco- 
nomics (1910),  p.  169;  also  Efficiency  Society  Transactions,  i,  no.  63. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  249 

tion  than  in  another  is  due  to  a  relative  disproportion  of  numbers 
in  the  two  occupations.  The  reason  prices  of  food  are  high  in  one 
place  and  low  in  another  is  due  primarily  to  the  operation  of  the 
same  law.  In  the  solution  of  the  labor  problem  we  may  be  sure 
that  there  are  not  too  many  capitalists  for  their  return  in  interest 
is  great;  that  there  are  not  too  many  captains  of  industry  for  their 
income  is  enormous;  that  there  is  not  too  much  land,  for  rent  is 
ever  increasing;  that  there  are  not  too  many  skilled  mechanics, 
for  their  wages  are  high.  We  may  be  sure,  however,  that  there 
are  too  many  unskilled  laborers,  for  their  wages  are  low.^ 

A  third  economic  law  is  given  almost  equal  prominence  with 
these  two  and  that  is  the  law  of  productivity  as  a  measure  of  value. 
And  here,  again.  Professor  Carver  has  gone  far  beyond  any  other 
economist,  for  he  has  elaborated  Ricardo's  productivity  theory 
of  land  value  and  rent,  and  the  modern  productivity  theory  of 
wages  and  applied  it  as  a  measure  of  man's  value  to  society.  Just 
as  the  value  of  any  piece  of  land  can  be  determined  by  what  it 
adds  to  the  total  productivity  of  the  community,  and  just  as  a 
man's  wages  are  determined  by  what  he  adds  to  the  total  produc- 
tivity of  the  concern  for  which  he  works,  so  a  man's  value  to 
society  may  be  measured,  theoretically,  by  the  increase  of  eco- 
nomic goods  produced  as  a  result  of  his  contribution,  —  and  this 
holds  not  merely  of  the  manual  laborer  but  of  the  teacher, 
preacher,  and  artist.^  That  is,  education,  art,  morals  and 
religion  are  not  ends  in  themselves,  nor  is  their  end  individual 
enjoyment  or  perfection.  The  social  unit  is  the  group,  and  inter- 
group  competition  makes  group  strength  the  criterion  of  the  good. 
Inasmuch  as  production  of  wealth  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  group 
strength,  education,  art,  morals  and  religion  are  to  be  evaluated 
in  proportion  as  they  increase  the  productive  and  competitive 
power  of  the  group.  Just  in  proportion  as  society  rightly  appre- 
ciates the  utilities  needed  for  group  strength,  and  in  harmony  with 
the  law  of  supply  and  demand,  will  wages  measure  man's  value  to 
society. 

*  Adapted  from  Professor  Carver's  lectures;  cf .  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  XIV. 
2  Cf.  Distribution  of  Wealth,  chs.  I  and  IV;  "  Diminishing  Returns  and  Value,'* 
Rivista  di  Scienza,  iv,  pp.  12-14;  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  VII. 


250  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

This  law  of  man's  value  to  society  is  expressed  by  means  of  the 
following  formulae:  — 

"  The  value  of  a  man  is  equal  to  his  production  minus  his  con- 
sumption. His  economic  success  is  equal  to  his  acquisition  [i.  e., 
his  income]  minus  his  consumption.  When  his  acquisition  is 
equal  to  his  production  [i.  e.,  when  a  man  receives  as  income  the 
equivalent  of  what  he  has  added  to  the  total  productivity  of  the 
group  of  which  he  forms  a  working  part],  then  his  economic  suc- 
cess is  equal  to  his  value."  ^  This  puts  a  premium  on  merit  and 
strengthens  the  group  in  competition  with  other  groups.  The 
function  of  the  state,  then,  is  to  see  to  it  that  a  man  receives  as 
income  what  he  produces,  or  in  other  words,  to  prevent  the  mis- 
carriage of  the  law  of  productivity  applied  to  wages.  "  That  is 
justice."  ^ 

Civilization  is  interpreted  by  Professor  Carver  largely  in  terms 
of  productivity  as  it  is  also  by  Dr.  Ward.  "  Civilization,"  he 
says,  "  is  essentially  a  storing  of  surplus  energy,  and  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  men  have  had  more  energy  to  expend  than  was  necessary 
to  procure  subsistence."  ^  The  beginning  of  this  process,  so  far 
as  the  group  is  concerned,  is  considered  to  be  due  to  the  rise  of  a 
despot,  but  "  slavery,  religious  fear,  aristocracy,  —  these  have  all 
doubtless  been  agencies  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  same 
purpose."  ^ 

Private  property  as  reward  for  efficiency,  and  pride  in  family 
building  closely  Hnked  with  it,  are  considered  to  be  of  primary 
importance.  Indeed  the  two  are  inseparably  connected,  in  the 
thought  of  our  author,  both  historically  and  logically.  Our 
present  industrial  system  places  the  responsibility  for  the  rearing 
of  children  upon  the  one  who  is  responsible  for  their  coming  into 
the  world,  and  this  is  the  best  check  yet  evolved  or  devised  for 
limiting  population  to  means  of  subsistence  according  to  the 
prevailing  standard  of  living.  Remove  this  check  and  popula- 
tion would  increase  so  rapidly  as  to  entail  wide-spread  misery, 
leaving  only  the  natural  checks  of  war,  pestilence  and  famine,  and 

*  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  p.  173. 

*  Sociology  and  Social  Progress,  p.  13. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  13;  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  p.  134. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  25  I 

artificial  checks  imposed  by  social  control.  The  monogamic 
family  has  no  other  justification  than  this,  —  the  regulation  of  the 
increase  of  population  in  the  interest  of  social  efficiency.  Abolish 
private  property  and  the  logic  of  the  situation,  as  many  socialists 
assert,  makes  probable  the  disintegration  of  the  domestic  institu- 
tion. But  with  private  property,  family  pride  is  a  great  incentive 
to  the  production  of  wealth.^ 

As  the  utilization  of  every  possible  motive  is  necessary  to  secure 
maximum  productivity,  all  sociaHstic  schemes  that  look  to  the 
aboHtion  of  private  property  or  of  competition  and  economic 
reward,  are  considered  disastrous. 

In  his  introduction  to  Sociology  and  Social  Progress  emphasis  is 
given  to  the  power  of  idealization  as  one  of  the  important  psychic 
factors  in  the  development  of  civilization.  "  This  may  be  de- 
fined not  very  inaccurately  as  the  power  of  making  believe,  —  a 
factor  which  sociologists  have  scarcely  appreciated  as  yet.  .  .  . 
One  of  the  greatest  resources  of  the  human  mind  is  its  abiHty  to 
persuade  itself  that  what  is  necessary  is  noble,  or  dignified,  or 
honorable,  or  pleasant.''  The  idealization  of  war  in  the  mihtary 
stage  of  civilization,  and  the  idealization  of  work  in  more  recent 
times  are  given  as  illustrations.  "  Work  is  still  a  necessity  as 
imperious  as  war  ever  was.  Looked  at  frankly  and  truthfully 
work  is  a  disagreeable  necessity  and  not  a  good  in  itself.  Yet  by 
persuading  ourselves  that  work  is  a  blessing,  that  it  is  dignified 
and  honorable,  our  willingness  to  work  is  materially  increased, 
and  therefore  the  process  of  adaptation  is  facihtated;  in  other 
words,  progress  is  accelerated.  For  this  reason,  he  who  in  any 
age  helps  to  idealize  those  factors  and  forces  upon  which  the  prog- 
ress of  his  age  depends,  is  perhaps  the  most  useful  man,  the  most 
powerful  agent,  in  the  promotion  of  human  well-being,  even 
though  from  the  strictly  realistic  point  of  view  he  only  succeeds 
in  making  things  appear  other  than  they  really  are.     From  the 

1  Class  lectures;  cf.  Principles  of  Rural  Economics,  p.  337.  Professor  Carver 
seems  to  have  overlooked  the  function  of  the  monogamic  family  in  the  process  of 
social  adaptation.  The  children,  closely  resembling  the  parents,  are  easily  assimi- 
lated to  the  customs  of  the  family  group  and  by  this  means  to  those  of  the  larger 
social  group;  moreover  the  monogamic  family  has  great  possibilities  in  training  for 
social  efficiency. 


252  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

sociological  point  of  view  this  is  the  mission  of  art  and  preaching 
of  all  kinds.''  1 

Desire  for  social  esteem  is  a  fourth  motive  for  productivity  and 
functions  advantageously  in  proportion  as  society  appreciates 
and  rewards  the  producer.^  The  dollar  yard-stick  so  frequently 
anathematized  today  by  moralists,  is  after  all  an  effective  means 
of  securing  the  surplus  so  necessary  for  social  good. 

Patriotism,  when  properly  conceived,  is  a  most  potent  force. 
Every  one  who  is  interested  in  the  success  of  the  group  must  be 
interested  in  doing  that  which  will  insure  success.  The  highest 
form  of  patriotism  is  not  that  which  is  awakened  merely  when  the 
nation  faces  a  crisis,  but  the  form  that  responds  daily  to  the 
nation's  daily  need.  True  patriotism  calls  for  a  willing  subordina- 
tion of  individual  to  group  welfare;  and  as  the  multiplication  of 
numbers  and  production  of  economic  goods,  or  in  other  words,  the 
increase  and  economizing  of  human  energy,  are  of  prime  impor- 
tance, patriotism  calls  for  the  subordination  of  consumption  to 
production.  Pleasure  cannot  be  an  end  in  itself  according  to 
this  philosophy,  but  on  the  one  hand  the  sign  board  of  health  and 
efficiency,  and  on  the  other,  the  means  of  securing  increased 
production. 

Finally,  and  in  some  respects  most  important  of  all,  is  religion. 
Religion  is  defined  as  "  such  belief  in  or  regard  for  supernatural 
agents  as  to  influence  conduct."  The  only  religion  worth  having 
is  the  one  which  so  energizes  life  as  to  make  it  most  productive, 
and  the  best  religion  is  the  one  which  is  the  most  energizing. 
"  That  is  the  best  religion  which  (i)  acts  most  powerfully  as  a 
spur  to  energy,  and  (2)  directs  that  energy  most  productively."  ^ 
In  discussing  this  he  makes  use  of  the  biological  formula  and 
concludes:  "  The  religion  worth  having  is  the  religion  which 
brings  the  largest  success  in  the  final  and  ultimate  sense  to  the 
peoples  and  nations  which  adopt  it  and  enables  them  to  survive  in 
competition  with  peoples  and  nations  possessing  any  other  type 
of  religion.  .  .  .  The  religion  which  enervates  or  subdues  the 

*  Cf.  Comte,  Positive  Philosophy,  ii,  p.  315;  A  General  View,  ch.  VI. 
2  Cf.  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  65  f. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  13. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  253 

spirit  of  a  people,  which  does  not  develop  their  latent  energy,  or 
which  wastes  their  energy  in  a  kind  of  effort  which  does  not  sup- 
port life  or  support  it  abundantly,  will  fail  because  it  will  cause 
the  failure  of  the  people  who  are  handicapped  by  it.  But  the 
religion  which  stimulates  to  high  endeavor  and  develops  the 
latent  energy  of  its  people,  and  directs  that  energy  wisely  and 
productively,  will  succeed  because  the  people  who  are  fortunate 
enough  to  possess  it  will  succeed  and  hold  dominion  over  the 
world.''  1 

The  third  general  division  of  Professor  Carver's  social  philos- 
ophy is  passive  social  adaptation  which  includes  moral  develop- 
ment and  education.  As  already  indicated  the  welfare  of  the 
sovereign  group  is  the  summum  bonum  and  the  standard  for 
judging  all  other  good.  In  this  discussion  we  are  reminded  of 
both  Nietzsche  and  Spencer.  He  differs  from  the  former  in  sub- 
stituting the  concept  of  the  super-group  for  that  of  the  super-man 
thus  making  large  place  for  sympathy,  sociability,  co-operation 
and  religion,  negatived  by  Nietzsche.  He  differs  from  Spencer 
chiefly  in  the  following  points:  — 

1.  Adaptation  rather  than  increasing  complexity  is  considered 
the  test  of  progress  with  no  expectation  of  attaining  a  state  of 
perfect  equilibrium. 

2.  Spencer's  negative  regulative  theory  of  government  is 
replaced  by  a  strong  doctrine  of  social  control. 

3.  The  well-being  of  the  group  is  placed  above  that  of  the 
individuals  that  compose  it.  Spencer  held  this  position  for  the 
group  when  endangered  by  another  group  but  thought  this 
menace  would  decrease  continually  under  industrialism.  Pro- 
fessor Carver  sees  no  possibility  of  removing  the  causes  of  inter- 
group  conflict  because  of  the  working  of  the  Malthusian  law  of 
population  and  the  law  of  diminishing  returns.^ 

With  Professor  Carver,  then,  that  is  good  which  tends  to 
strengthen  the  group  in  competition  with  other  groups.  That  is 
evil  which  tends  to  weaken  the  group.     As  his  social  theory  is  a 

^  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  22,  23. 

2  In  this  he  agrees  with  Van  Dyke  Robinson.  See  Selections,  p.  133.  Cf. 
Essays  in  Social  Justice,  chs.  I  and  II. 


254  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

synthesis  of  biological  "  adaptation  "  and  economic  "  produc- 
tivity ''  so  his  ethical  theory  is  a  synthesis  of  intuitionalism  and 
evolutionary  utilitarianism.  We  have  intuitions  of  right  and 
wrong,  but  these  are  not  absolute.  Our  moral  intuitions  are  our 
personal  interpretations  of  the  mores  of  the  group  to  which  we 
belong.  These  mores  are  the  result  of  social  evolution  and  social 
utility.  We  first  passively  adapt  ourselves  to  them,  then  in  some 
small  degree  react  on  them  in  the  Hne  of  variation,  and  in  a  few 
cases  men  have  gotten  a  deeper  insight  into  social  values  and 
become  prophets  or  moral  reformers.^ 

The  moral  is  the  socially  useful.  The  one  who  acts  contrary  to 
the  mores  of  the  group  is  adjudged  immoral.  The  one  who  acts 
contrary  to  these  mores  or  conventions  that  have  become  crys- 
tallized into  law  is  adjudged  a  criminal.  Motive  does  not  count 
except  as  it  determines  conduct. 

As  the  moral  is  the  useful,  and  the  useful  is  that  which  has 
enabled  the  group  to  win  out  in  its  struggle  with  other  groups, 
and  as  in  the  process  of  social  and  industrial  evolution  economic 
productivity  has  been  found  to  be  above  all  else  that  which  makes 
for  group  success,  therefore  the  most  moral  man  is  the  one  who 
contributes  most  to  the  strength  of  the  group.  By  this  yard- 
stick the  rich  parasite  who  consumes  more  than  he  produces,  is 
highly  immoral. 

Men  should  be  moral,  then,  because  only  thus  are  they  of  value 
to  their  group,  and  the  very  fact  that  they  are  of  value  makes 
them  moral.  MoraHty,  however,  has  to  do  not  only  with  eco- 
nomic productivity  but  also  with  the  relations  of  man  to  his  fel- 
low-men within  the  sovereign  group,  in  other  words,  with  social 
adaptation.  Lack  of  homogeneity  and  friction  within  the  group 
tend  to  weaken  it  in  competition  with  other  groups,  hence  are 
evil.  Morality  requires  a  man  to  be  socially  efiicient  and  that 
means  development  of  personal  efficiency,  physical  and  mental, 
and  such  response  to  his  social  environment  as  to  make  for 
co-operation  and  social  adjustment.  The  so-called  vices  are 
morally  bad,  not  because  they  violate  any  divine  command,  but 
because  they  make  for  personal  and  social  mal-adaptation.^ 

*  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  pp.  14  f.        ^  Principles  of  Rural  Economics,  p.  187. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  255 

Self-control  is  a  virtue,  for  only  through  it  can  social  adjustment 
be  secured.  This  self-control  must  be  extended  to  the  procreative 
impulse,  for  the  bringing  into  the  world  of  those  who,  because 
of  defect  in  the  organism  or  deficiency  in  training,  cannot  be 
socially  efficient,  is  immoral. 

Each  sovereign  group  is  called  upon  to  work  out  its  own  salva- 
tion and  to  struggle  for  world-mastery,  and  in  so  doing  every  act 
is  justifiable  and  good  which  gives  promise  of  securing  this  result. 
Under  this  system  of  group  ethics  we  may  conceivably  have  a 
double  standard  even  as  has  prevailed  from  earhest  times; 
i.  e.,  a  code  of  conduct  may  be  used  in  dealing  with  foreign 
groups  or  representatives  of  these  groups  which  would  not  be 
used  in  intra-group  relations.  Such  a  group  ethics  is  justified  by 
Professor  Carver  on  the  following  grounds:  — 

1.  Group  success  furnishes  a  test  of  the  good  and  true.  This 
is  a  pragmatic  test  based  on  the  neo-Darwinian  theory  of  bio- 
logical evolution  applied  to  society.  The  good  and  the  true  are 
not  absolute,  but  relative  to  group  success.  What  is  right  in  one 
age  and  nation  may  be  wrong  in  another. 

2.  By  inter-group  rivalry  we  have  the  only  adequate  method 
of  evolving  the  most  efficient  social  organization.  We  have  no 
other  test  than  just  this  of  workability.  That  form  of  organiza- 
tion is  best  which  makes  the  group  most  efficient  in  competition 
with  other  groups. 

3.  By  this  method,  also,  the  largest  degree  of  individual  well- 
being  is  secured,  for  individual  happiness  is  linked  with  group 
success.  In  primitive  struggles  the  losing  group  was  annihilated 
or  enslaved.  In  the  modern  struggle  for  the  markets  of  the  world 
the  losing  group  will  be  thrown  back  ultimately  on  its  own 
resources  and  forced  to  remain  a  poverty-stricken  agricultural 
nation  with  Hmited  population  or  accept  the  lowest  wage  for 
manufacturing,  except  as  location  and  resources  give  it  monop- 
oKstic  advantages.  The  group  winning  because  of  economic 
efficiency  can  increase  in  population,  power  and  wealth  with 
accompanying  largeness  of  life. 

Finally,  although  the  emphasis  is  on  group  success.  Professor 
Carver  believes  that  this  gospel  of  productivity  provides  the  only 


256  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

method  of  securing  the  ultimate  triumph  of  that  civilization 
which  would  bring  maximimi  well-being  to  all  individuals,  —  or 
in  religious  terminology,  the  triumph  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 
Most  sociologists  accept  as  inevitable  the  historic  cycle  of  the 
rise  and  fall  of  nations.  Passing  from  a  pain  to  pleasure  economy, 
to  use  Professor  Patten's  phraseology,  consumption  comes  to  be 
regarded  as  an  end  and  the  nation  thus  worshipping  at  the  shrine 
of  pleasure,  falls  a  victim  before  a  powerful  group  still  struggling 
in  the  productive  stage.  The  nation  that  would  become  im- 
mortal and  carry  its  civilization  with  its  government  and  religion 
to  the  farthest  parts  of  the  inhabitable  globe,  must  accept  the 
gospel  of  the  productive  life,  grow  in  population  and  wealth, 
win  the  markets  of  the  world,  colonize,  take  possession  of  un- 
occupied territory,  force  back  the  social  laggards  and  ultimately, 
and  by  sheer  force  of  efficiency,  possess  the  earth. 

Religious  sanction  for  such  a  program  is  claimed  from  the 
teachings  of  Jesus. 

The  perception  of  this  great  economic  principle  of  valuation,  and  the 
application  of  it  to  non-commercial  objects,  such  as  mental  and  moral  quali- 
ties, is  the  leading  characteristic  of  Christ's  teaching  respecting  the  Kingdom 
of  God.  He  who  gives  much  and  takes  little,  whose  service  exceeds  his 
demands  by  the  largest  margin,  is  greatest  in  the  Kingdom.  The  Kingdom 
of  God,  as  set  forth  by  its  greatest  expounder,  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a 
kingdom  in  which  this  principle  of  valuation  prevails.  That  is  the  only 
objective  characteristic  of  the  Kingdom  which  he  ever  emphasized.  The 
nation  which  adopts  the  same  principle  of  valuation  as  its  basis  of  selection 
will  approximate  as  nearly  to  the  ideal  of  the  Kingdom  as  is  possible  in  a 
world  of  physical  reality. 

This  is  the  only  conception  of  a  Kingdom  of  God  on  earth  which  is  possible 
to  a  person  who  beUeves  that  this  physical  world  is  God's  world  and  that  the 
laws  of  selection  now  in  operation  are  God's  laws.  If  that  be  true,  the  kind  of 
a  group  which  best  meets  the  conditions  and  requirements  of  this  struggle 
and  survival,  and  which  can  therefore  win  the  world  in  competition  with  all 
other  forms  and  types  of  social  organization,  must,  of  logical  necessity,  be 
God's  Kingdom.  That  group  will  survive  which  evaluates  most  accurately 
the  fitness  of  its  men  to  help  in  the  struggle,  and  which  distributes  power  and 
responsibility  on  the  basis  of  that  fitness.^ 

As  to  the  psychical  factors  involved  in  the  historical  and  present 
process  of  passive  social  adaptation,  our  author  has  not  contrib- 
uted anything  new.     In  this  field  he  has  followed,  in  general,  the 

1  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  76,  77. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  25 7 

lead  of  those  from  whose  writings  he  has  made  selection  in  his 
Sociology  and  Social  Progress, 

The  importance  of  formal  education  as  a  method  of  socia 
adaptation  is  stressed  and  his  constructive  social  philosophy 
provides  an  educational  goal  of  "  social  eificiency  "  and  a  prin- 
ciple of  value  in  educational  management. 

In  the  discussion  of  "Active  Social  Adaptation"  the  emphasis 
is  on  social  control,  but  the  process  is  illustrated  also  in  the  in- 
novator  and  moral  reformer  who  try  to  adapt  their  social  environ- 
ment to  their  personal  ideals  of  the  right  and  good,  although 
this  latter  part  is  not  stressed. 

Social  control  is  necessary  largely  because  the  social  instincts 
have  not  as  yet  been  sufficiently  developed  to  secure  by  sponta- 
neous action  the  type  of  social  Ufe  that  is  most  efficient.  In 
discussing  this  subject  Professor  Carver  sounds  another  compara- 
tively new  note  for  the  function  of  government  is  considered  to  be 
pre-eminently  that  of  suppressing  uneconomic  competition  and  of 
encouraging  economic  co-operation.  As  competition  among  the 
lower  biological  orders  is  advantageous  in  the  development  of  the 
species  so  is  it  in  society.  The  competitive  industrial  system 
which  rewards  according  to  merit  gives  the  meritorious  the 
opportunity  to  succeed  in  the  struggle  and  leave  the  largest 
number  of  offspring  as  a  social  asset.  But  not  all  competition  is 
economic.  Co-operation  within  the  group  is  essential  to  strengthen 
it  for  its  inter-group  struggle.^ 

The  abstract  discussion  of  individual  rights  and  the  limits  of 
social  control  is  vain.  With  the  sovereign  group,  might  is  right, 
and  the  individual  has  no  rights  apart  from  social  utility .^  There 
is  no  real  issue  as  to  woman's  rights  in  the  matter  of  suffrage.  It 
is  purely  a  matter  of  social  expediency,  and  Professor  Carver  does 
not  believe  it  is  expedient. 

One  of  the  great  problems  for  social  control  in  the  line  of  social 
efficiency  is  the  improvement  of  the  quality  of  the  race-stock. 
This  opens  up  the  whole  question  of  eugenics  which  is  considered 
to  be  of  the  greatest  importance.^      Family  pride,  especially 

1  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  42  f.,  88  fif.;  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  V. 

2  Class  lectures;  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  I. 
'  Principles  of  Rural  Economics,  pp.  354  fif. 


2S8 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


among  the  most  efficient  is  emphasized  as  of  the  greatest  value  in 
helping  to  counter-balance  the  increase  of  population  which  is 
now  so  largely  from  the  lowest  economic  classes.  As  noticed 
above,  economic  efficiency  is  considered  by  our  author  to  be  the 
best  principle  of  selection  yet  discovered,  though  he  admits  that 
this  principle  is  not  now  working  because  of  the  practical  sterility 
of  the  most  efficient. 

Regulation  of  marriage  as  well  as  of  divorce  should  be  a 
function  of  the  sovereign  group.  A  minimum  wage  law  rigidly 
enforced  is  considered  one  of  the  feasible  methods  for  race-stock 
improvement,  for  the  incapables  would  be  thrown  upon  society 
for  subsistence  and  by  segregating  these  the  race-stock  would  be 
improved  in  an  appreciable  degree  within  a  few  generations. 

As  the  chief  function  of  social  control  is  considered  to  be  the 
economizing  of  human  energy,  all  forms  of  waste  must  be  elimi- 
nated. Professor  Carver  gives  attention  to  two  in  particular, 
waste  land  and  waste  labor.  The  following  scheme  sets  forth  his 
analysis  of  these  forms  of  waste:  — 


Causes  of  waste  land  ^ 


I.   Bad  physical  conditions 


Bad  chemical  conditions 


3.   Bad  social  conditions 


(a)  Too  stony, 

(b)  Too  wet, 

(c)  Too  dry. 

( (a)  Too  much  acid, 

I  {b)  Too  much  alkali. 

f  {a)  Bad  taxation, 

\  (b)  Too  much  speculation. 


Forms  of  waste  labor  ^ 


1.  The  involuntarily  unemployed. 

2.  The  imperfectly  employed. 

3.  The  improperly  employed. 

4.  The  voluntarily  idle. 


The  class  of  involuntarily  unemployed  is  made  up  mostly  of 
defective  individuals;  the  imperfectly  employed  of  those  whose 
idleness  is  due  to  enforced  "  lay-offs  "  and  seasonal  occupations; 
the  improperly  employed,  of  those  who  are  not  doing  the  work  for 
which  they  are  best  adapted  and  the  voluntarily  idle,  of  the 
tramps  and  idle  rich.  There  are  two  classes  of  the  latter,  those 
who  have  produced  sufficient  wealth  for  their  maintenance  and 
have  retired  from  the  productive  life,  and  those  whose  sole  occu- 

*  Principles  of  Rural  Economics,  p.  132.  *  Ibid.,  p.  185. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  259 

pation  is  to  spend  what  others  have  produced.  Society's  most 
serious  problem  is  with  the  fourth  class,  and  especially  with  the 
idle  rich  whose  talents  presumably  are  above  the  average  and  who 
could  thus  be  of  great  value  to  society  as  producers. 

This  gospel  of  the  productive  life  is  applied  to  the  problem  of 
social  service  concerning  which  so  much  is  being  said  and  written 
of  late. 

The  result  is  that  as  much  cant  is  being  preached  in  the  name  of  social 
service  as  ever  was  preached  in  the  name  of  spirituahty.  This  is  to  be  ex- 
pected of  those  who  do  not  realize  that  all  productive  work  such  as  growing 
corn,  wheat  or  cattle  to  feed  the  world,  or  growing  wool  or  cotton  to  clothe 
the  world,  is  social  service;  and  that  the  best  social  service  which  the  average 
man  can  perform  is  to  do  his  regular  work  well,  —  to  grow  good  crops  if  he 
is  a  farmer,  and  to  bring  up  his  family  in  habits  of  industry,  sobriety,  thrift 
and  rehability,  and  mutual  happiness;  that  anything,  in  short,  is  social 
service  which  builds  up  the  country  and  makes  it  strong,  powerful,  progres- 
sive and  prosperous.^ 

One  other  kind  of  adaptation  is  suggested  by  Professor  Carver 
but  not  labeled,  —  the  adaptation  of  man  and  society  to  the 
evolving  cosmic  process,  phrased  by  John  Fiske  as  religious 
adaptation.  It  is  implied  where  the  thought  is  emphasized  that 
this  is  God's  world  and  that  the  highest  t)^e  of  obedience  is  to 
find  out  God's  will  as  revealed  in  the  cosmic  process,  and  having 
found  out,  conform  both  individual  and  social  life  to  that  will.^ 

Progress  by  struggle  and  survival  is  God's  will  for  it  is  God's 
way.  Success  for  the  individual  man  and  the  race  by  the 
economizing  of  human  energy,  and  by  testing  all  consumption  by 
its  bearing  on  future  production  is  also  God's  will  for  it  is  God's 
way.  Support  is  found,  too,  in  interpreting  God's  will,  by  appeal 
to  the  Bible,  and  especially  to  the  words  of  the  Great  Teacher. 

Amid  the  pessimistic  utterances  of  those  who  see  the  inevitable 
downfall  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  accordance  with  those  laws 
that  have  effected  the  downfall  of  the  other  great  races  which 
have  become  rich,  effete,  and  thus  the  prey  of  stronger,  struggling 
races,  Professor  Carver  utters  a  strong  prophetic  message  of 
hope,  —  but  on  one  condition:  "  Repent  or  ye  shall  all  likewise 

1  Principles  of  Rural  Economics,  p.  355;  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  ch.  XVI. 

2  The  Religion  Worth  Having,  pp.  85  f. 


26o  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

perish/'  —  and  repentance  means  turning  from  the  "  pig-trough  '* 
to  the  "  work-bench  ''  philosophy  of  life;  turning  from  the  ideal  of 
"  graceful  consumption "  and  "  eminent  leisure ''  to  that  of 
production,  of  the  economizing  of  hiunan  energy,  and  of  consump- 
tion not  as  an  end  but  as  a  means  to  further  production. 

This  social  theory,  like  all "  prophecies  "  will  meet  with  theoret- 
ical and  practical  opposition.  It  will  be  opposed  on  the  latter 
side  by  those  who  have  been  taught  by  experience  that  sole 
emphasis  on  one  phase  of  life  is  narrowing  and  deadening  and  who 
do  not  believe  that  a  race  can  be  evolved  which  can  combine  this 
excessive  emphasis  on  the  production  of  material  goods  and  on 
reproduction,  with  emphasis  on  cultural  values  to  the  degree 
assumed  by  our  author,  and  to  the  degree  required  to  make  his 
theory  effective.  It  will  be  opposed  on  this  side,  too,  by  those 
who  live  to  consume. 

On  the  theoretical  side  it  is  open  to  criticism  along  the  following 
lines:  — 

(i)  It  is  logical  and  abstract  and  of  value  as  a  social  philosophy 
in  proportion  as  its  premises  are  true,  but  even  so,  it  is  concerned 
too  largely  with  "  by-and-large  "  and  "  in-the-long-run  "  without 
sufficient  regard  to  individual,  concrete  conditions. 

(2)  It  is  built  up  on  a  rigid  application  to  social  progress  of  the 
neo-Darwinian  formula  for  biological  evolution  and  fails  to  be 
convincing  just  in  proportion  (a)  as  this  formula  fails  to  explain 
biological  evolution,  and  (b)  in  proportion  as  this  formula  needs 
to  be  modified  or  is  shown  to  be  inapplicable  to  social  evolution. 

(3)  Over-emphasis  is  placed  on  the  sovereign,  territorial  group 
as  the  sociological  unit.  There  seems  good  reason  for  holding, 
on  the  contrary,  that  the  sovereign  group  is  not  an  end  in  itself, 
but  only  a  means  to  the  well-being  of  the  largest  possible  number 
of  individuals  and  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  this  result  can  be 
attained  only  by  the  conflict  between  territorial  groups. 

(4)  In  his  desire  to  give  prominence  to  the  objective  standard 
of  the  good,  the  right  and  the  just.  Professor  Carver  has  denied  all 
worth  to  motive  as  such;  but  a  man's  attitude  toward  life,  his 
ideal,  his  intelligent  purpose  are  most  potent  factors  in  enabling 
him  to  find  that  place  and  do  that  task  which  shall  prove  most 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  26 1 

serviceable  to  the  group.^  "  Hearty  "  co-operation  between  an 
employer  and  his  employees  has  proven  to  result  in  increased 
production.  An  employer  who  is  interested  merely  in  output  may 
introduce  a  system  of  profit-sharing  or  welfare  work  with  the  sole 
purpose  of  securing  increased  dividends,  another  employer  may  be 
interested  in  his  men  as  fellow  human  beings  and  co-workers  in 
increasing  the  well-being  of  the  community  and  sovereign  group, 
and  work  directly  to  foster  this  spirit  of  co-operation.  Surely  this 
latter  attitude  on  the  part  of  an  employer  is  a  desirable  quality  to 
emphasize  and  the  one  having  such  an  attitude  is  on  the  whole 
more  apt  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  his  employees  than  the  one 
who  does  not  have  it.  To  be  sure  the  important  thing  is  the 
result, — but  to  emphasize  the  worth  of  the  attitude  or  motive  and 
the  duty  of  having  such  an  attitude  would  seem  to  be  of  some 
intrinsic  value. 

(5)  His  psychological  analyses  are  not  satisfactory.  The 
individual  is  always  set  over  against  other  individuals  or  groups 
with  emphasis  on  conscious  conflict  of  interests  and  a  solution  of 
the  conflict  is  sought  on  the  basis  of  rational  self-interest.^ 
Modern  social  psychologists,  as  Baldwin,  McDougall,  Dewey, 
EUwood  et  al.,  have  shown  how  the  self -regarding  sentiment 
expands  to  include  other  individuals  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
the  consciousness  of  conflict,  or  to  reduce  it  to  a  minimum  through 
co-operation  for  the  attainment  of  a  common  purpose.  There  is 
not  ordinarily  such  a  cold  calculation  of  interests  as  assiuned. 
Most  responses  of  the  ego  are  to  interests  which  are  either  in- 
stinctive or  developed  by  social  experience  and  education.  These 
responses  are  for  the  most  part  automatic  rather  than  reflective 
and  controlled  by  social  impulses,  by  a  sense  of  duty,  by  regard 
for  public  opinion  and  other  motives  working  to  a  very  large 
extent  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness. 

(6)  The  theory  in  question  does  not  make  sufficient  place  for 
rational  imitation,  individual  and  social,  as  a  method  of  social 
advance,  nor  for  the  possibility  of  race-stock  improvement  by 
this  method  linked  with  social  control.^     If  our  interest  is  in 

1  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  p.  4.  '  Mentioned,  however,  Essays,  ch.  V. 

2  Ibid.,  ch.  III. 


262  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

humanity  rather  than  in  the  success  of  the  territorial  group  we 
may  well  believe  that  wise  social  control  of  the  defective  class  in 
one  group  would  be  reflectively  imitated  by  others  and  result 
ultimately  in  a  higher  type  of  physical  organism  and  psychical 
endowment  for  humanity  as  a  whole  than  we  have  reason  to 
believe  would  result  merely  from  inter-group  conflict  even  of  the 
commercial  type. 

(7)  The  appeal  to  Biblical  sanction  for  the  "  productive  life  " 
as  interpreted  by  our  author,  is  questionable.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  find  support  for  such  a  doctrine  in  the  parable  of  the  ten 
talents,  but  it  is  not  so  easy  to  interpret  thus  the  parable  of  the 
lord  of  the  vineyard  who  rewarded  alike  the  workmen  commenc- 
ing at  the  third  hour  and  the  one  at  the  eleventh  hour,  thus 
apparently  negativing  the  theory  that  motives  do  not  count;  nor 
does  it  "  feel  "  like  the  Gospel  of  the  Kingdom  as  proclaimed  by 
Jesus  with  emphasis  on  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  love  toward 
even  one's  enemies,  and  such  service  as  can  hardly  be  interpreted 
in  terms  of  "  self -centered  appreciation  "  and  inter-group  com- 
petition. We  believe  that  the  constructive  theory  outlined  in 
our  conclusion  is  more  in  harmony  with  Bibhcal  teaching. 

Despite  these  points  which  are  at  least  open  to  question,  Pro- 
fessor Carver's  social  philosophy  is  most  suggestive  and  stimulat- 
ing, and  illuminating,  too,  in  helping  one  to  understand  the 
present  European  war  which  is  the  result  in  large  measure  of  the 
commercial  rivalry  between  Germany  and  England.  It  is  a 
social  philosophy  very  similar  to  the  one  under  discussion  that  has 
caused  the  marvelous  growth  and  industrial  expansion  of  Ger- 
many during  the  past  half-century.  On  the  whole  the  people  of 
that  country  have  been  inspired  by  a  purpose  to  produce  rather 
than  to  consume,  and  ultimately  to  possess  the  earth.^  They  have 
had  the  vigor,  the  ambition,  —  and  the  conceit,  —  character- 
istic of  adolescence  whether  individual  or  social.     But  certain  of 

^  Professor  Carver  does  not  justify  Germany's  militarism,  however,  but  believes 
that  the  desired  results  might  have  been  attained  by  populating  contiguous  terri- 
tory, buying  up  the  land  and  eventually  by  annexation.  A  coalition  of  nations 
jealous  of  success  was  almost  inevitable  in  any  case  with  war  as  a  result.  Indeed 
war  seems  to  be  the  logical  outcome  of  such  a  social  theory  with  so  great  emphasis 
on  the  success  of  the  territorial  group. 


INVENTION  AND  PRODUCTION  263 

the  wisest  of  English  social  philosophers  have  seen  the  inevitable 
outcome  of  such  commercial  rivalry  and  have  called  their  country- 
men to  rally  to  the  industrial  and  political  defence  of  their  father- 
land, ^  —  and  these  two  are  peculiarly  linked  in  England.  The 
commercial  rivalry  between  these  two  sovereign  groups  has 
resulted  in  the  development  in  each  of  a  strong  national  con- 
sciousness and  in  methods  of  education  and  social  control  having 
as  their  aim  the  strengthening  of  the  group  and  the  securing  of 
greater  efficiency  and  well-being  among  the  people.  The  war  has 
called  attention  to  various  forms  of  waste  of  human  energy,  —  as 
from  the  excessive  use  of  alcohol,  —  and  thought  is  being  given  to 
a  solution  of  the  problem.  It  is  almost  certain  that  one  of  the 
results  of  this  war  will  be  to  make  acceptable  to  all  western 
nations  a  program  of  social  control  very  similar  to  that  outlined 
by  Professor  Carver,^  and  if  so,  it  will  not  take  many  years  to 
secure  for  the  people  of  these  nations  a  degree  of  well-being  which 
might  not  have  come  otherwise  in  centuries.  Should  the  other 
nations  of  Europe  adopt  a  program  of  expansion  like  that  of 
Germany,  the  inter-group  struggle  will  become  as  acute  as 
portrayed  by  our  author  and  in  that  event  the  nation  with  the 
most  efficient  standard  of  living  will  win  out.  This,  in  the  view 
of  our  author,  will  probably  be  the  basis  of  the  final  conflict.^ 

1  Cf.  Pearson's,  National  Life  from  the  Standpoint  of  Science. 

2  Essays,  ch.  X,  "  Constructive  Democracy." 


PART  V 
ACTIVE   SPIRITUAL  ADAPTATION 


CHAPTER  XIV 

ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION 

Active  spiritual  (including  social)  adaptation  was  defined  in  the 
Introduction  as  "  the  purposeful  adjustment  of  the  individual  to 
his  spiritual  environment,  social,  ideal  and  transcendental,  the 
work  of  true  teachers  and  social  reformers,  and  purposeful  social 
control."  We  have  already  noted  many  contributions  to  the 
development  of  this  phase  of  our  subject,  but  have  reserved  till 
now  the  discussion  of  it  as  a  specific  form  of  social  progress. 

This  doctrine  of  active  spiritual  adaptation  has  one  root  in  the 
monism  of  Schopenhauer  with  Will  as  the  supreme  characteristic 
of  the  AH,  especially  as  this  has  been  interpreted  through  the 
writings  of  Nietzsche  (combined  in  his  social  philosophy  with 
neo-Darwinism),  and  through  the  philosophy  of  William  Wtmdt 
with  emphasis  on  "  teleology,"  and  adopted  in  sociology  by 
Ratzenhofer  and  Ward.  It  has  a  second  root  in  the  a  priorism  of 
Kant  which  brings  into  prominence  the  activity  of  the  ego  in  the 
acquirement  of  knowledge,  also  in  his  doctrine  of  the  practical 
reason  with  exaltation  of  the  will,  especially  as  this  has  issued  in 
modern  pragmatism.  It  has  a  third  root  in  modern  social  psy- 
chology issuing  in  a  kind  of  social  reaUsm  with  its  doctrine  of 
social  will. 

Since  Darwin  there  has  been  a  growing  tendency  to  fuse  these 
various  philosophical  teachings  and  interpret  them  in  terms  of 
life  and  adaptation.  We  have  noted  this  tendency  in  our  pre- 
vious discussions  and  the  contributions  to  it  by  various  social 
philosophers,  especially  important  being  Tarde's  theory  of  inno- 
vation, Bagehot's  doctrine  of  progress  by  discussion,  the  teaching 
of  Schaffle  and  other  social  psychologists  concerning  the  social 
will.  Ward's  theory  of  individual  and  social  telesis,  and  the 
emphasis  placed  by  Patten  and  Carver  on  idealization,  religion 
and  social  control  in  the  wide-spread  production  of  surplus 
and  its  wise  use.  In  this  chapter  and  the  next,  under  "  active 
social  adaptation  "  we  will  consider  Novicow's  "  hierarchy  of 

267 


268  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

struggles,"  Carlyle's  Great  Man  theory,  James'  teaching  concern- 
ing "  Energies  of  Men,"  and  Ross'  Social  Control.  This  will  pre- 
pare the  way  for  a  discussion  of  idealization  and  religion  or 
"  active  spiritual  adaptation  "  in  the  narrower  use  of  the  term. 

Jacques  Novicow  (1849-       ) 
Social  Progress  by  Cultural  Attraction  and  Expansion 

Although  Novicow  is  given  scant  recognition  by  American 
sociologists,  his  writings,  especially  Les  Luttes  are  deserving  of  a 
prominent  place  in  this  book  for  two  reasons:  (i)  He  antedated 
by  many  years  the  four-fold  analysis  of  adaptation  worked  out 
independently  by  Professor  Carver  which  has  formed  the  basis  of 
this  present  discussion,  and  (2)  his  analysis  of  the  European 
situation  with  its  inter-group  rivalry  for  territorial  and  commer- 
cial expansion  is  especially  worthy  of  recall  now  that  this  rivalry 
has  resulted  as  he  feared  and  as  he  tried  to  prevent  by  turning 
the  thoughts  of  cultured  men  and  leaders  in  social  progress  to  that 
highest  form  of  conflict,  struggle  for  excellence.  His  suggestion 
of  a  federation  of  nations  is  not  far  removed  from  that  advocated 
at  present  by  such  American  exponents  of  peace  as  ex-President 
Taft  and  Senator  Lodge,  but  he  stands  almost  alone  in  his 
emphasis  on  growth  of  nations  by  cultural  attraction  and  expan- 
sion rather  than  by  territorial  or  even  commercial.  This  last 
point  is  particularly  noteworthy  in  our  present  discussion  and 
warrants  his  consideration  in  this  division  of  our  subject  rather 
than  earlier  where  the  date  of  his  writing  and  his  biological  and 
psychological  postulates  would  otherwise  cause  him  to  be  placed. 

Novicow  begins  his  study  of  "  conflicts  "  by  showing  that 
struggle  and  alliance  are  twin  phenomena  in  all  cosmic  evolution, 
—  that  "  the  universe  is  a  totality  of  systems  being  continually 
formed  and  broken  up."  He  holds,  moreover,  that  "  the  group- 
ings which  we  consider  as  irreducible  units,  the  molecule,  cell, 
individual,  state,  for  example,  are  pure  subjective  categories  of 
the  mind  "  ^  as  are  also  the  divisions  between  the  sciences.^ 

Passing  from  the  domain  of  the  inanimate  to  that  of  the  ani- 
mate, he  shows  that  there  are  struggles  not  only  between  associa- 

*  Les  Luttes,  p.  5.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  7  f. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  269 

tional  groups,  animal  and  human,  but  between  organisms  within 
the  group,  and  not  only  between  organisms  but  among  cells  in  an 
organism;  that  there  is  struggle  between  psychical  elements 
resulting  in  consciousness;  struggle  for  mastery  between  thoughts; 
struggle  between  industries;  —  struggle  everywhere,  but  every- 
where, also,  alliance.  He  holds,  moreover,  that  as  no  definite 
point  can  be  fixed  at  which  the  associational  process  begins,  so 
there  is  no  known  end  until  all  humanity  is  organized  (in  alliance 
with  all  useful  animals  under  domestication)  in  a  struggle  against 
inanimate  nature  and  disuseful  animals.^ 

Considering  the  different  forms  of  struggle  between  living 
beings,  our  author  says  that  there  are  two  fundamental  divisions: 
(i)  those  having  as  their  purpose  the  assimilation  more  or  less 
complete  of  the  elements  of  the  conquered  to  the  advantage  of 
the  conqueror,  —  in  a  word,  absorption,  and  (2)  those  having  as 
their  purpose  the  removal  of  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  attain- 
ment of  the  vital  end  of  the  individual,  —  in  a  word,  elimination. 
Each  of  these  is  shown  to  have  two  phases:  attack  and  defense; 
i.  e.,  "  living  things  struggle  to  absorb  or  eliminate  others,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  on  the  other,  to  preserve  themselves  from  absorp- 
tion or  elimination."  ^  in  the  vegetable  world,  and  between 
herbivorous  animals,  the  struggle  results  in  elimination;  between 
animals  and  plants  and  between  carnivorous  animals  it  is  chiefly 
one  of  absorption.  In  general,  plants  are  subordinated  to  animals, 
weak  animals  to  strong,  and  both  plants  and  animals  to  man. 
These  biological  processes  have  their  analogue  in  the  forms  of 
struggle  between  social  groups.^ 

Struggle  and  alliance,  according  to  Novicow,  work  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law  of  adaptation  and  will  always  be  in  evidence,  for 
absolute  adjustment  or  equilibrium  is  impossible  as  the  imiverse 
is  in  a  state  of  perpetual  creation  or  transformation. 

In  biological  evolution  we  have  passive  physical  adaptation  as  a 
result  of  the  impact  of  external  nature  on  the  organism  and  active 
adaptation  in  a  more  or  less  telic  effort  put  forth  by  a  portion  of 
the  organism  *  to  facilitate  adaptation.  This  he  calls  production. 
Continuing  he  says:  — 

^  Les  Luttes,  p.  30.  *  /jj^.^  p.  19.  3  /Jjj.^  pp.  21  f. 

*  This  theory,  formulated  by  Lamarck,  is  now  discredited. 


270 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


Adaptation  to  the  physical  environment  is  science.  .  .  .  The  totality  of 
the  human  sciences  elaborates  a  conception  of  the  universe  as  complete  as 
possible  and  if  this  conception  were  perfect  the  adaptation  of  man  to  his 
cosmic  environment  would  be  absolute.^ 

The  influence  which  one  organism  exerts  on  another  is  strong  in  proportion 
to  their  resemblance  or  to  their  affinity.  In  that  case  movements  produced 
by  one  organism  are  reproduced  spontaneously  by  the  other.  .  .  .  Imitation 
is  passive  adaptation  to  the  social  environment. ^  .  .  . 

Active  adaptation  to  the  physical  environment  has  the  same  name  in 
sociology  as  in  biology,  —  production.  As  the  mental  horizon  of  man  is  much 
higher  than  that  of  animals  he  foresees  the  possibility  of  adapting  his  environ- 
ment to  his  needs  in  a  greater  measure.  Moreover  as  his  faculty  of  prevision 
becomes  greater,  production  takes  two  forms:  man  can  transform  external 
objects  for  his  immediate  use  but  he  can  also  create  utilities  to  enable  him  to 
adapt  a  portion  of  the  planet  to  his  needs  (as  digging  canals,  draining 
swamps,  irrigating  arid  lands,  etc.).  .  .  .  Organization  and  biological  tools 
on  the  one  hand  and  science  and  social  tools  on  the  other  are  in  the  closest 
co-ordination.  .  .  . 

The  active  adaptation  of  the  social  environment  can  be  designated  by  the 
general  term  love.  Indeed  to  love  any  one  is  to  desire  to  make  that  person 
like  oneself.  Charity  has  for  its  goal  to  procure  for  others  the  material  well- 
being  which  we  ourselves  enjoy.  The  apostle,  the  propagandist,  have  for 
their  aim  to  lead  others  to  think  as  they  do.  Charity  and  propaganda  are 
the  two  forms  which  bring  about  the  active  adaptation  of  the  social  environ- 
ment.' 


The  forms  and  processes  of  adaptation  as  explained  by  Novicow 
are  shown  in  the  following  diagram :  ^  — 

Adaptation 


Phenomena 

Passive 

Active 

Biological 

f  Organ  i?ation 

Biological  tools 

Social  tools  of  the  first 

Physical 

Science 

Produc-    " 

degree 

Psychical 

environment 

tion 

and 

Adaptation  of  the  planet 

(second  degree) 

Sociological 

Social 

Love 

Charity 

.  environment    Imitation 

Propaganda 

1  Novicow  with  Aristotle  identifies  knowledge  with  power,  but  man's  actual 
adaptation  to  his  environment  is  never  on  a  par  with  his  knowledge. 

2  Here  our  author  follows  the  now  discarded  theory  of  instinctive  imitation. 
Such  a  theory  fails  to  give  sufl&cient  prominence  to  individuality  and  the  satisfac- 
tion of  individual  interests  by  instinct  and  habit. 

'  Les  Luttes,  pp.  38-40. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  271 

Passive  adaptation  (science)  and  active  adaptation  (production)  go 
together,  reacting  on  each  other  constantly.  The  more  easily  one  receives 
impressions  from  without  the  more  easUy  does  he  act  on  that  which  is  ex- 
ternal. .  .  .  The  struggle  for  existence  results  in  the  survival  of  the  most 
apt.  Now,  most  apt  from  the  point  of  view  of  psychology  is  synonymous 
with  most  inteUigent.  .  .  .  Man  has  conquered  the  animals  because  he  was 
able  to  adapt  himself  more  quickly  to  his  environment  than  other  living 
species,  or  (what  is  exactly  the  same  thing)  because  he  was  the  most  intelli- 
gent. 

What  one  calls  intellectual  culture  is  also  a  form  of  adaptation  to  the 
environment.  Cultured  man  possesses  a  more  or  less  complete  representa- 
tion of  the  universe  and  sums  up  in  himself  the  mental  labors  of  humanity. 
His  horizon  is  greatly  extended  in  space  and  time  and  this  means  that  he  is 
capable  of  representing  to  himself  a  great  number  of  images  and  states  of 
consciousness.  .  .  .  The  struggle  for  existence  assures  the  victory  to  the 
individuals  and  societies  who  possess  the  most  exact  conception  of  the  uni- 
verse.^ 

Novicow  goes  on  to  interpret  life  in  terms  of  rhythm,  and 
adaptation  as  "  eurhythm  "  and  holds  that  as  the  change  from 
anarchic  movements  to  those  that  are  co-ordinated  requires  time, 
so  adaptation,  physical,  mental  and  social,  also  requires  time. 

The  various  forms  of  struggle  are  analyzed, —  the  physiological, 
the  economic,  the  political,  the  intellectual  and  those  which  arise 
in  the  domain  of  sentiment,  —  and  these  are  shown  to  form  a  hier- 
archy, the  most  rapid,  the  most  complete,  and  the  most  pleasure- 
giving  being  in  the  realms  of  mind  and  heart,  these  latter  varieties, 
too,  being  the  last  to  be  attained.  In  the  physiological  realm 
man  has  passed  from  cannibalism  (absorption)  through  murder, 
plunder  and  dispossession  of  territory  (elimination),  through  wars 
for  the  possession  of  women  and  slaves  to  provide  satisfaction  of 
physiological  interests,  on  to  that  highest  form  of  struggle  be- 
tween the  sexes  known  as  love.  "  All  love  is  a  combat  because  in 
all  love  there  is  one  being  who  subordinates  his  life  to  the  ends  of 
the  other,  hence  a  vanquished  and  a  vanquisher."  ^ 

The  physiological  ^  and  economic  struggles  ^  are  practically  the 
same  on  the  lower  levels  of  social  life  but  the  latter  differentiates 
as  society  progresses  and  finally  enters  the  domain  of  politics 
taking  the  form  of  invasions,  demands  for  concessions,^  etc. 

*  Les  Luttes,  p.  42.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  73  flF. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  71.  6  Ibid.,  pp.  82  flf. 

»  Ibid.j  pp.  64  ff. 


272  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

The  political  struggle  is  rooted  largely  in  physiological  and 
economic  interests,  though  later  it  enters  the  mental  realm  and 
has  for  its  purpose  religious  coercion.  The  unit  in  this  struggle 
is  always  the  territorial  group.  Inter-group  conflicts  are  held 
to  have  two  fundamental  purposes:  (i)  group  aggrandisement  or 
group  safety  on  the  one  hand  and  (2)  so-called  rights  either 
national  or  international  on  the  other. 

The  intellectual  struggle  ^  comes  relatively  late  and  is  closely 
related  to  the  political,  i.  e.,  that  nation  will  win  out  in  the  long 
run  which  has  the  language  that  best  facilitates  intercourse;  that 
knowledge  which  makes  possible  the  greatest  production,  hence 
gives  industrial  supremacy;  that  literature  which  is  most  inspir- 
ing and  most  successful  in  securing  the  "  sympathy  ''  of  members 
of  other  nations;  that  philosophy  which  gives  the  most  exact 
concept  of  the  cosmic  order  and  that  reUgion  which  is  most  potent 
in  expanding  ideas.^ 

As  feeling  (le  sentiment)  is  a  most  important  element  in  struggle 
and  adaptation,  this  psychological  factor  is  analyzed  at  some 
length,  but  here,  as  in  some  other  places,  Novicow  fails  to  be 
convincing  because  of  his  hedonistic  psychology  with  its  whole 
emphasis  on  the  motives  of  pleasure-seeking  and  pain-avoiding. 
As  with  Ward,  feeling  is  a  "  social  force  "  though  not  labelled  thus, 
and  is  the  dynamic  in  social  attraction  and  expansion.^ 

All  the  cultural  elements,  together  with  those  social  character- 
istics which  give  zest  to  life,  are  most  potent  in  making  the 
winning  group. 

It  is  by  the  totality  of  moral  and  intellectual  qualities;  by  the  power  of 
seduction;  by  means  of  a  high  culture,  artistic  development,  enthusiastic 
interest  in  the  researches  of  science  and  the  speculations  of  philosophy,  that 
make  a  coimtry  interesting  and  evoke  a  sympathetic  response  in  its  neigh- 
bors. Now  such  a  people  attracts  strangers.  The  stranger  carries  over  new 
ideas  and  stirs  the  intellectual  movement.  This  movement  favors  philos- 
ophical speculation.  A  good  philosophical  method  contributes  to  the  ad- 
vancement of  the  sciences.  Science  leads  to  the  improvement  of  technique 
and  to  the  perfecting  of  social  institutions.  In  turn  these  two  factors 
[moral  and  intellectual]  increase  riches  and  riches  create  poUtical  power.* 

1  Les  Luttes,  pp.  96  ff.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  112  ff.,  164  f. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  96  £.  *  Ibid.,  p.  120. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  273 

Now  this  winning  quality  of  evoking  sympathy  (se  rendre 
sympathique)  is  incompatible  with  the  use  of  physical  force. 

No  one  can  compel  love  by  force.  The  only  way  one  can  evoke  sympathy 
is  by  possessing  the  qualities  which  are  admired.  If  one  society  experiences 
admiration  for  the  intellectual  culture  of  another,  this  admiration  provokes 
sympathy  and  leads  it  to  imitate  the  models  which  are  pleasing.  To  provoke 
imitation  is  the  most  efficient  process  in  the  domain  of  sentiment} 

Although  Novicow's  use  of  the  terms  sympathie  and  sympathetic 
que  are  not  the  best  in  this  connection,  his  emphasis  on  the 
importance  of  "  provoking  imitation  "  as  a  factor  in  social  prog- 
ress is  of  the  greatest  significance  in  our  discussion.  The  con- 
clusion to  his  analysis  of  feeling  is  as  follows:  — 

The  power  which  one  society  possesses  of  assimilating  a  lower  society  and 
its  power  of  radiating  influence  is  in  direct  proportion  to  the  sympathy  it  can 
evoke.  Now  the  abihty  to  absorb  strange  elements  and  to  make  conquests 
outside  are  the  very  conditions  of  the  growth  of  societies.  We  conclude, 
then,  that  .  .  .  other  things  being  equal,  the  nation  which  evokes  the  most 
sympathy  will  be  the  most  powerful.* 

In  discussing  "  denationalization  "  Novicow  points  out  the 
value  of  homogeneity  to  a  political  group  and  shows  how  ineffectual 
are  the  coercive  methods  used  almost  exclusively  up  to  the  present 
time  by  rulers  in  their  endeavor  to  assimilate  subject  peoples 
differing  in  language  and  culture.'  He  condemns  the  current 
political  theory  and  practice  which  make  the  territory  belonging 
to  a  nation  imder  the  absolute  control  of  the  rulers  to  be  disposed 
of  as  they  wish  without  regard  to  the  desire  of  the  private  owners 
and  occupiers  of  the  land,  and  holds  that  migration,  alliance, 
union  and  realignment  of  groups  should  be  absolutely  free  and 
based  entirely  on  the  laws  of  social  attraction  or  "  sympathy." 
For  example  he  believes  that  the  northern  states  were  not 
justified  in  '61  in  preventing  the  secession  of  the  southern  states; 
that  Alsace  and  Lorraine  should  themselves  decide  as  to  whether 
they  would  be  a  part  of  Germany  or  France."* 

The  reason  assigned  for  the  failure  of  coercion  to  secure  group 
homogeneity  is  the  fact  noted  above  that  assimilation  is  a  matter 
of  feeling.     The  "  sympathy  "  of  the  subject  people  must  be  won 

^  Les  Luttes,  pp.  122,  276  fF.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  127. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  124.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  251,  252. 


274  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

and  then  assimilation  comes  by  imitation.  It  is  of  greatest 
importance,  for  example,  that  the  ruler  of  such  a  conglomerate 
state  as  Austria-Hungary  should  have  such  personal  magnetism 
as  to  win  the  affection  and  loyalty  of  the  people  whether  Magyar, 
Italian,  German,  Jew  or  Slav.  With  personal  prestige  he  can 
win  not  only  by  encouraging  the  spread  of  culture  among  the 
aliens,  but  even  more  by  personal  example  exercised  first  on  his 
friends  but  ultimately  on  all  throughout  the  realm.^ 

Justice  in  all  dealings  with  subject  groups  is  also  a  supreme 
requisite  in  assimilation,  and  the  granting  of  large  civil  and 
political  rights.^ 

Passing  to  an  analysis  of  the  successive  phases  in  the  develop- 
ment of  social  consciousness  our  author  shows  that  just  as  in- 
dividual consciousness  arises  out  of  struggle  and  the  rupture  of 
mental  equilibrium,  this  rupture  resulting  either  in  pleasure  or 
pain,^  so  social  consciousness  arises  only  in  the  presence  of  the 
unusual  and  "  startling."  Psychic  pleasures,  he  holds,  are  far 
higher  and  more  enduring  than  physiological,  hence  culture  in  its 
varied  forms  is  most  important  for  a  group,  —  and  culture  tends 
to  be  made  incarnate  in  hiunan  institutions. 

The  human  body  is  a  totality  of  organs  of  service  to  the  psychic  life  of  the 
brain.  Society  is  a  totality  of  institutions  of  service  for  intellectual  produc- 
tion. This  production  is  the  end  of  the  Ufe  of  societies  and  naturally  takes 
first  place  in  national  consciousness.  In  civilized  societies  the  savants, 
philosophers,  reKgious  innovators,  authors  and  artists  are  in  the  first  rank. 
Their  glory  far  transcends  that  of  the  rich  and  the  men  of  state.* 

Novicow  shows  that  social  consciousness  up  to  the  present  has 
been  developed  largely  by  wars  and  conquests  but  that  it  is 
possible  to  have  as  a  social  goal  the  expansion  of  nationalism  by 
intellectual  conquest,  —  by  the  attractive  power  of  a  culture  that 

1  "  Pour  ^tre  aime,  il  faut  ^tre  aimable.  Aussi,  sur  ce  terrain,  le  dominateur 
ne  pent  agir  que  par  ses  qualit6s  personnelles.  S'il  est  intelligent,  noble  de  char- 
actere,  loyal,  fier,  avec  cela  affable,  s^duisant,  bref  s'il  a  ce  prestige  magique  que 
donne  la  superiority  morale,  il  exerce  un  grand  attrait  sur  son  entourage  .  .  .  mais 
les  sentiments  se  manifestent  aussi  dans  les  societes  par  le  c^r^monial  et  les  moeurs. 
Id  a  dominateur  peut  agir  de  nouveau  par  des  mesures  legislatives,  mais  naturelle- 
ment  son  action  la  plus  puissante  s'exerce  par  I'exemple."  —  Les  Luttes,  p.  149^ 
of.  pp.  288  f . 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  290  f.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  159  f.  *  Ibid.,  p.  166. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  275 

evokes  sympathy  because  it  promises  the  highest  joys  of  Ufe.^ 
But  to  raise  inter-group  conflict  to  this  peaceful,  intellectual  plane, 
there  must  first  be  a  general  recognition  of  the  fact  that  power 
comes  from  wealth  and  wealth  from  intelligence  and  morality.^ 
Success  in  the  inter-group  struggle  for  existence  is  thus  dependent 
on  psychic  factors,  —  but  so  is  it  also,  according  to  our  author, 
among  animals. 

Beings  possessed  of  a  brain  have  triumphed  over  those  which  did  not  have 
one.  At  the  moment  when  animals  appeared  on  the  earth  endowed  with  a 
nervous  system,  they  formed  some  conception  of  the  universe.  It  is  thus 
possible  to  say  that  struggle  between  species  is  at  bottom  a  struggle  between 
different  conceptions  of  the  universe.' 

Almost  no  one  today  would  agree  with  Novicow  in  thus 
attributing  to  the  lower  orders  a  power  of  abstraction  so  potent 
in  the  struggle  for  life.  A  life  philosophy  is  potent,  however,  in 
the  social  struggle.  India  and  China,  for  example,  can  never 
become  progressive  so  long  as  they  are  dominated  the  one  by 
mysticism,  the  other  by  ancestor  worship. 

As  adaptation  is  synonymous  with  intelligence,  according  to  our 
author,  and  as  intelligence  is  continually  increasing,  we  have  in 
this  fact  a  test  of  progress.  Indeed  this  increase  of  intelligence 
is  progress.*  The  connection  between  intellectual  progress, 
struggle  and  adaptation  is  expressed  thus:  — 

The  more  perfect  a  species  becomes  the  more  the  individuals  composing 
it  multiply  (human  beings,  for  example,  are  far  more  numerous  than  other 
mammals),  and  the  greater  is  the  rivalry.  The  more  violent  the  conflict, 
the  more  rapid  are  the  physiological  and  psychological  changes  because  of 
the  importance  for  success  of  each  point  of  advantage.  That  is,  progress  is 
in  direct  ratio  to  competition.^ 

Novicow  sounds  a  new  note  in  sociological  discussion  in  his 
doctrine  that  the  way  for  a  society  to  preserve  its  national  type 
is  through  imitation. 

1  Les  Luttes,  pp.  178  f.  '  Ibid.,  p.  182.  '  Ibid.,  p.  188. 

*  Or,  comme  adaptation  est  synonyme  d'intelligence,  on  voit  que  c'est  en  vertu 
des  lois  universeUes  de  la  nature,  que  I'inteUigence  va  toujours  en  s'accroissant. 
Cat  accroissement  s'appelle  le  progres.  —  Ibid.,  p.  188. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  189.  This  is  a  misstatement,  for  as  Spencer  has  shown,  reproduction 
decreases  with  biological  evolution. 


276  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

If  a  society  desires  to  preserve  its  type,  it  should  possess  a  sum  total  of 
mental  activity  equal  to  that  of  all  its  rivals;  i.  e.,  it  ought  to  assimilate  all 
the  ideas  of  its  neighbors.  As  soon  as  a  society  is  not  capable  of  this  effort 
its  denationalization  is  inevitable,  its  type  is  condemned.  Passion  for  the 
new,  then,  is  a  special  sign  by  which  one  can  recognize  that  a  nation  is  still  in 
its  period  of  growth.  The  connoisseur  of  spiritual  things  who  is  on  the 
watch  for  every  fresh  exotic  production,  preserves  his  nation  from  stagnation 
and  torpor.  To  understand  everything,  to  feel  everything,  —  this  it  is  that 
makes  the  grandeur  of  nations  as  of  individuals.^ 

That  imitation  as  here  used  is  not  merely  instinctive  but  rather 
reflective  is  shown  not  only  by  use  of  the  simile  expressed  by  the 
word  connoisseur  but  also  by  the  following:  — 

To  provoke  imitation  is  to  attack;  to  endure  a  propaganda  (or  a  system 
of  teaching)  with  the  purpose  of  selecting  parts  for  personal  advancement  is 
to  defend  oneself.  Now  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  impose  imitation  by 
violent  methods  since  such  methods  stir  up  antagonistic  feelings  which  act 
by  way  of  constraint.  One  can  only  provoke  imitation.  The  nations  which 
have  this  factdty  in  a  high  degree  win  out  in  the  struggle  for  existence  while 
those  who  have  it  in  a  low  degree,  fail.  .  .  .  Imitation  varies,  naturally, 
within  wide  limits.  Up  to  a  certain  point  it  preserves  national  individuaUty 
but  carried  further  it  can  destroy  it.  .  .  .  The  societies  which  know  how  to 
preserve  a  just  balance  .  .  .  prosper;  those  who  do  not  know  how,  perish.^ 

The  means  which  assure  mental  preponderance,  i.  e.,  assimila- 
tion and  expansion,  are  exactly  analogous  to  those  which  today 
assure  political  preponderance:  organization  and  equipment 
(ou tillage) .  The  battle  of  the  future  is  to  be  between  ideas  rather 
than  armies,  and  for  this  intellectual  struggle  artists,  poets, 
savants  and  women  are  needed.^  Moreover  there  is  need  of  an 
organization  of  peaceful  propaganda.^  The  outcome  will  be  the 
amelioration  of  every  department  of  life.  Among  other  things 
there  will  be  an  increase  in  the  individuality  of  nations. 

Each  nation  wiQ  endeavor  to  be  self-sufficient,  to  individualize.  Individ- 
uality is  most  marked  among  the  most  advanced  civilizations.  All  savages 
are  alike.  To  produce  characters  as  different  as  Dante,  Michael  Angelo  and 
Spinoza  requires  high  intellectual  culture  in  a  group.  In  the  first  place  divi- 
sion of  labor  is  proportional  to  the  degree  of  civilization.  .  .  .  But  division 
of  labor  is  true  of  societies  with  relation  to  himianity.  After  having  at- 
tempted to  cultivate  in  the  same  degree  the  totaHty  of  human  knowledge 
there  may  come  a  time  when  nations  will  speciaHze,  —  certain  nations,  for 
example,  having  greater  aptitude  for  the  natural  sciences  will  cultivate  them 
in  preference  to  the  social  sciences.** 

^  Les  Luttes,  p.  301;  of.  p.  541.         '  Ibid.,  pp.  305  f.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  324. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  303.  *  Ibid.,  p.  438. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  277 

Contrary  to  the  school  of  Treitschke,  Novicow  holds  that  war  is 
not  necessary  to  keep  alive  national  spirit,  but  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  collective  desire  for  intellectual  supremacy  will  prove  far 
more  potent.  Indeed  the  state  is  not  the  final  form  of  human 
association,  he  holds,  but  even  now  that  form  known  as  "  na- 
tionality," i.  e.,  a  group  united  by  the  bonds  of  cultural  likeness 
and  sympathy.  Such  intellectual  rivalry,  moreover,  will  provide 
the  largest  possible  well-being  and  happiness,  for  intellectual 
activity  is  the  very  quintessence  of  life  and  pleasure.^ 

To  live  signifies  to  think,  to  feel,  to  will,  to  act;  and  the  more  vibrant 
the  thought,  the  more  profound  the  feeling,  the  more  ardent  the  desire,  the 
quicker  the  action  and  the  more  rapid  the  changes,  the  more  intense  is  the 
life.  .  .  .  The  law  of  acceleration  which  pervades  all  nature  is  also  at  work 
in  the  evolution  of  societies.  Passing  from  the  physiological  phase  through 
the  economic  and  political,  the  struggle  for  existence  ends  with  the  intellec- 
tual phase  where  it  attains  its  greatest  intensity.  When  the  nations  shall 
have  entered  this  struggle  definitely,  when  the  social  transformations  which 
it  demands  shall  have  been  completely  effected,  there  will  be  an  activity  and 
an  intensity  of  movement  throughout  humanity  in  comparison  with  which 
our  actual  existence  will  appear  to  be  mere  lethargy .2 

The  hierarchy  of  human  struggles  culminating  in  free  assimila- 
tion and  in  the  provoking  of  imitation  is  shown  in  the  diagram 
on  the  next  page. 

In  a  panoramic  review  of  himian  struggles  our  author  deduces 
several  laws:  — 

(i)  "  Progress  consists  merely  in  abandoning  the  slower  proc- 
esses of  adaptation  to  environment  to  adopt  those  that  are  more 
rapid."  ^  But  as  this  change  is  wholly  dependent  on  the  increase 
of  knowledge  and  intelligence,  progress  may  be  defined  as  a  pro- 
gressive change  from  non-rational  to  rational  processes  or  from 
passive  to  active  adaptation. 

(2)  Self-interest  has  always  been  the  mainspring  of  struggle 
and  progress  yet  the  unlooked-for  result  has  been  increasing 
advantage  to  the  conquered  and  increasing  social  solidarity.^ 

(3)  Methods  and  processes  that  are  effective  in  the  lower 
phases  of  struggle  are  not  effective  in  the  higher,  as  coercion, 
for  example,  in  social  assimilation.^ 

^  Les  Luttes,  pp.  327,  410,  434.  *  Ihid.,  p.  406. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  328,  329.  3  /J^.^  p.  404.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  416. 


278 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


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ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  279 

(4)  The  different  forms  of  social  conflict  are  merely  a  continua- 
tion of  astronomical  and  biological  processes  to  be  interpreted  in 
terms  of  movement,  rhythm,  equilibrium  and  adaptation.  "  Mat- 
ter tends  constantly  toward  equilibrium.  Biological  equilibrium 
is  adaptation  to  environment.  Adaptation  to  environment  is  a 
correlation  between  exterior  objects  and  their  interior  image,  i.  e., 
truth.  Truth  is  the  suppression  of  the  notions  of  space  and 
time."  He  goes  on  to  show  that  as  the  economy  of  time  leads  to 
association,  at  first  between  cells,  finally  between  millions  of  men, 
we  are  compelled  to  believe  that  an  extension  of  association  would 
lead  to  still  great  economy  of  time  and  increase  of  human  well- 
being,  hence  to  the  suppression  of  war  as  the  general  rule  of  social 
Hfe.i 

As  peace  means  death  whereas  conflict  means  life,  conserva- 
tism in  a  society  means  death  whereas  liberalism  and  rapidity  of 
change  mean  life.  Nor  does  conflict  necessarily  produce  pain. 
Defeat  is  painful  but  not  struggle  as  such.  Work,  for  example,  is 
painful  only  when  of  a  certain  kind  and  carried  on  too  long.  Nor, 
again,  does  struggle  for  existence  necessarily  engender  hatred. 
Industrial  competition,  for  example,  leads  to  co-operation  and 
co-operation  deadens  the  hatred  stirred  up  by  rivalry.  Thus 
while  conflict  may  arouse  hatred  it  also  unites  men  against  a  com- 
mon enemy.  The  ideal  of  struggle,  then,  is  that  it  be  carried  on 
with  courtesy,  that  it  lead  to  loyalty,  and  that  it  unite  as  many  as 
possible  in  a  common  purpose.  These  conditions  are  fulfilled  best 
when  struggle  is  on  the  intellectual  plane.^ 

After  discussing  the  application  of  these  principles  to  "  se- 
curity "  ^  and  "  justice  "  ^  (including  international),  our  author 
passes  to  a  consideration  of  the  interests  of  the  units  composing 
social  groups. 

Novicow  agrees  with  Ferriere  as  against  Spencer  that  in  the 
biological  organism  as  well  as  in  the  social,  the  whole  exists  for 
the  good  of  the  parts.  ^  Each  individual,  he  holds,  tends  to  secure 
the  greatest  amoimt  of  happiness  possible  but  he  insists  that  the 
first  condition  of  this  is  to  adapt  the  earth  to  his  needs  in  the 

*  Les  Luttes,  pp.  426  f.  "*  Ibid.,  pp.  481  f. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  458  f.  »  Ibid.,  pp.  461  S.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  532. 


28o  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

greatest  possible  degree.  "  To  live  the  best  possible,  this  is 
the  end  of  every  member  of  society."  ^  With  this  end  in  view, 
how  the  earth  is  divided  among  different  poHtical  groups  is  of 
as  Httle  importance  as  the  administrative  divisions  in  the  case  of 
a  state.2 

How  self-interest  leads  to  social  solidarity  is  brought  out  in  his 
theory  of  the  scale  of  interests:  "  To  be  the  richest  in  the  richest 
society;  to  be  the  first  in  the  most  powerful  society;  to  be  a  part 
of  the  most  civilized  nationahty,  —  this  is  the  individual  point  of 
view.  But  considering  each  nation  as  a  unit  in  a  still  higher  order 
we  may  say  that  each  society  is  interested  in  being  the  richest 
among  the  richest  societies;  the  best  organized  (the  most  perfect) 
among  the  best  organized;  the  most  civilized  among  the  most 
civilized."  ^  In  answer  to  the  question  as  to  how  one  can  enrich 
himself  without  impoverishing  another,  he  says:  "  By  producing 
the  most  riches  in  the  shortest  time."  So  one  can  surpass  others 
in  intelligence  without  diminishing  the  development  of  society 
"  by  imposing  his  ideas  on  others  merely  by  the  power  of  per- 
suasion." ' 

The  continuity  of  organic,  including  social  evolution  is  brought 
out  in  the  following:  — 

To  climb  the  ladder  of  being  constitutes  the  interest  of  every  living  creat- 
ure from  the  smallest  microbe  to  the  greatest  nation.  To  be  the  most 
intelligent  animal  assures  the  victory  over  other  animals.  To  be  rich  gives 
the  possibility  of  cultivating  the  mental  powers;  to  be  rich  and  intelligent 
gives  the  possibility  of  occupying  the  foremost  place  in  the  state,  and  this, 
in  turn,  furnishes  the  opportunity  of  adapting  one's  social  environment  most 
quickly  to  one's  needs.  To  be  part  of  the  richest  society  permits  one  to 
profit  by  the  most  complete  material  and  mental  equipment.  This  equip- 
ment gives  poKtical  power  and  political  power,  in  turn,  assures  the  most  rapid 
extension  of  nationality.' 

Finally,  self-interest  and  emphasis  on  rivalry  in  excellence  leads 

to  international  solidarity,  —  all  co-operating  for  the  conquest  of 

nature  to  secure  the  greatest  possible  satisfaction  of  human 

needs.* 

That  which  causes  suffering  to  humanity  is  the  lack  of  adaptation  between 
man  and  nature.     When  men  come  to  understand  that  their  true  enemy  is 

1  Les  Luttesy  p.  544.  '  Ihid.,  p.  553. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  547.  *  Ihid.,  p.  571. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  28 1 

the  inorganic  world  they  will  realize  their  solidarity.  The  differences  which 
divide  them  are  merely  the  toys  of  a  child  in  the  face  of  terrible  dangers  which 
come  from  nature  who  like  a  cruel  foster-mother  condemns  millions  of 
himian  creatures  to  misery  and  famine.  Incapable  of  seeing  what  is  their 
true  enemy,  —  thanks  to  their  dulness  of  mind,  —  men,  divided,  succumb 
by  millions  to  the  onslaughts  of  nature. ^ 

The  real  worth  of  Novicow's  contribution  to  social  theory  has 
been  obscured  by  the  many  fallacies  in  his  reasoning  due  chiefly 
to  false  postulates  in  biology  and  psychology.  The  5e//-interest 
that  leads  to  co-operation  is  not  merely  the  empirical  self  but  the 
conjunct  selfj — to  use  the  phrase  of  Professor  Palmer ,2 — and  this 
conjunct  seK,  in  turn,  is  the  product  of  co-operation.  The  phe- 
nomena to  be  interpreted  are  individuals  and  groups  struggling  for 
existence.  This  struggle  leads  to  co-operation  and  co-operation 
to  an  extension  of  self-consciousness  and  the  self-regarding  senti- 
ment. At  times  the  empirical  self  stands  out  over  against  some 
social  group  but  again  it  is  merged  in  the  group.  Now  govern- 
ment, ideally,  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  the  corporate  activity 
of  the  members  of  a  group  to  secure  their  greatest  individual  well- 
being  and  the  survival  and  expansion  of  the  group.  Any  activity, 
therefore,  is  proper  for  the  government  which  promises  this 
result. 

But  again,  Novicow's  dual  interest  in  emphasizing  struggle  on 
the  intellectual  plane,  and  individualism  linked  with  laissez  faire 
doctrine,  has  led  him  to  confuse  theoretical  and  practical  measures, 
forgetting  that  as  societies  are  now  below  the  plane  of  struggle  for 
excellency  they  cannot  at  present  use  merely  those  methods  which 
belong  to  the  latest  phase  of  social  evolution.  Free  trade,  un- 
restricted immigration  and  absolute  liberty  in  making  and 
breaking  alliances  among  border  groups  may  be  in  harmony  with 
social  self-interest  in  some  cases,  but  not  in  all  at  present.  Nor  is 
the  endeavor  to  secure  national  homogeneity  always  consistent 
with  unrestricted  immigration.  Our  author  shows  lamentable 
ignorance  of  the  practical  phenomena  of  large  scale  immigration, 
segregation  and  race  prejudice  as  a  menace  to  homogeneity  in 
some  sections  of  the  United  States. 

^  Les  Luttes,  p.  572.  '  The  Nature  of  Goodness j  pp.  170  f. 


282  .        ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

His  theory  is  open  to  the  same  criticism  as  that  of  the  neo- 
Darwinians:  The  inter-group  rivalry  is  not  so  keen  as  to  eliminate 
all  but  the  best  adapted,  hence  emphasis  on  mere  activity  and  the 
assimilation  of  everything,  is  a  dangerous  doctrine.  Activity 
and  adaptation  are  by  no  means  in  direct  ratio,  nor  are  intelli- 
gence and  adaptation. 

Notwithstanding  these  shortcomings  his  four-fold  analysis  of 
adaptation  with  emphasis  on  active  material  adaptation  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  the  increasing  elimination  of  space  and  time, 
and  on  active  social  adaptation  secured  by  means  of  reflective 
imitation  and  the  provoking  of  imitation  in  others  through  the 
power  of  an  attractive  example,  together  with  his  teaching  con- 
cerning the  hierarchy  of  struggles  culminating  in  group  rivalry  for 
excellence,  especially  cultural,  warrant  Les  LuUes  being  given 
the  prominent  place  accorded  it  in  this  discussion. 


CHAPTER  XV 

ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  (continued) 

Thomas  Carlyle  (i 795-1881) 

The  Role  of  the  Great  Man 

Though  antedating  the  period  selected  for  the  main  part  of  our 
discussion,  the  great  man  theory  of  Carlyle  has  been  too  impor- 
tant in  modern  history,  literature  and  social  writings  to  be  passed 
by  without  mention.  /-  Himself  a  genius,  a  prophet,  a  teacher,  a 
moral  reformer,  he  appreciated  the  contributions  to  social  progress 
of  those  in  whose  souls  and  lives  the  best  in  others  had  been  fused, 
and  who  gave  it  back  to  the  world  not  only  with  the  stamp  of  their 
personaHty  but  in  such  form  and  with  such  energy  as  to  stir  up 
new  currents  of  thought,  feeling  and  activity  destined  to  change 
the  whole  flow  of  human  history.  /But  not  only  do  great  men  give 
back  to  their  fellow-men  in  new  form  what  they  have  received, 
he  holds,  but  great  menare  in  touch  with  the  divine.     The  spark 
that  Hghts  their  souls  and  fires  tEeiF  wills  is  not  of  the  earth,    ^^/^ 
earthy,  but  from  above.  /  "  The  history  of  what  man  has  d^ccomr  aZ^J^^ 
plished  in  this  world,"  he  says,  "  is  at  bottom  the  history  of  the^.^^^^.,.^^..,,.,-*- 
great  men  who  have  worked  here.     They  were  the  leaders  of  men,  ^'i^-d.^^. 
these  great  ones,  the  modelers,  patterns,  and  in  a  wide  sense  crea- 
tors, of  whatsoever  the  general  mass  of  men  contrived  to  do  or  to 
attain;  all  things  that  we  see  standing  accomplished  in  the  world 
are  properly  the  outer  material  result,  the  practical  realization 
and  embodiment  of  thoughts  that  dwelt  in  the  great  men  sent 
into  the  world;  the  soul  of  the  whole  world^s  history,  it  may  justly 
be  considered,  were  the  history  of  these.  .  .  .  No  time  need  have 
_gone  to  ruia,xQulditjiave/(0^/^i  a  man^eat^enough,  a  man  wise^ 
.and  gopdenough ;  wisdom  to  discern  truly  whatlhe  time  wanted^, 
valor  to  lead  it  on  the  right  road  thither;  tiiese_are  the  salvatioiu 
^f_jLny^^ne.      But  I  liken  common  languid  times,  with  their 
unbelief,  distress,  perplexity,  with  their  languid  doubting  char- 
acters and  embarrassed  circumstances,  impotently  crumbling 

283 


284  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

down  into  ever  worse  distress  towards  final  ruin;  —  all  this  I 
liken  to  dry  dead  fuel,  waiting  for  the  lightning  out  of  heaven  that 
shall  kindle  it.  /  The  great  man,  with  his  free  force  direct  out  of 
God's  own  hand,  is  the  lightning.  His  word  is  the  wise  healing 
word  which  all  can  believe  in./  All  blazes  round  him  now,  when 
he  has  once  struck  on  it,  into  fire  like  his  own.  The  dry  moulder- 
ing sticks  are  thought  to  have  called  him  forth.  They  did  want 
him  greatly;  but  as  to  calling  him  forth!  —  Those  are  critics  of 
small  vision,  I  think,  who  cry:  *  See,  is  it  not  the  sticks  that  made 
the  fire  ? '  .  .  .  There  is  no  sadder  symptom  of  a  generation 
than  such  general  blindness  to  the  spiritual  lightning,  with  faith 
only  in  the  heap  of  barren  dead  fuel."  ^ 

/  Refreshing  indeed  is  this  glowing  appreciation  of  the  power  of 
personality,  —  this  veneration  of  the  great  personality  after  our 
many  excursions  into  those  types  of  social  philosophy  which  see 
only  the  great  cosmic  machine  with  man  but  a  cog!^ 

Carlyle  makes  practical  application  of  the  above  thesis  to  his 
own  time  in  England,  —  England  suffering  from  a  dearth  of  great 
men,  —  England  but  "  dry  mouldering  sticks  "  awaiting  the 
kindling  touch  of  genius.  He  finds  an  analogy  to  the  political 
and  social  condition  of  his  day  and  a  key  to  the  solution  of  the 
problem  in  the  condition  of  the  monastery  of  St.  Edmundsbury 
in  the  twelfth  century  and  the  reconstructive  work  of  Abbot 
Samson  as  portrayed  in  the  Chronicles  of  Jocelin. 

Abbot  Samson,  we  are  told,  was  not  a  high  dignitary  but  only 
suh-Sacrista;  that  he  had  learned  during  many  years  of  faithful 
service  the  great  lesson  (j^M^tL^-^^^^hP^^^^W^^^^- qualir^u. 
fied  to  command;  a  man  "  whom  no  severity  would  break  to 
cbmpIainTand  no  kindness  soften  into  smiles  or  thanks."  There 
is  something  in  his  selection  to  the  high  office  of  Abbot,  too,  as 
told  by  our  author,  which  is  significant  of  Carlyle's  own  ideal  of 
selection  to  public  office.  He  was  not  chosen  by  popular  vote 
of  any  group  of  people  but  by  a  process  of  "  winnowing."  ^ 

*  Heroes  and  Hero  Worship,  Lecture  I. 

*  The  Chapter  selects  twelve  monks  who  with  the  Prior  are  to  confer  with 
the  King,  the  Bishop  of  Winchester,  and  the  Chancellor,  and  secure  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  abbot,  if  possible  from  their  own  convent.  The  thirteen  are  ordered 
to  nominate  three  from  their  monastery  and  these  names  are  given  to  the  King,  — 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  285 

Samson  the  poor  but  capable  monk  is  selected  for  the  high  office 
because  of  the  instinctive  wisdom  of  the  thirteen.  "  Great  souls, 
true  governors,"  says  our  author,  "  go  about  under  all  manner  of 
disguises  now  as  then.  .  .  .  Those  superstitious  blockheads  of 
the  Twelfth  Century  had  no  telescopes,  but  they  still  had  an  eye; 
not  ballot-boxes,  only  reverence  for  Worth,  abhorrence  of  Un- 
worth."  He  contrasts  with  this  the  methods  of  England's  choice 
that  placed  George  the  Third  as  "  head  charioteer  of  the  destinies 
of  England  "  and  allowed  Burns,  the  genius  and  poet  "  to  gauge 
ale-barrels  in  the  Burg  of  Dimafries."  ^ 

Abbot  Samson  begins  at  once  the  task  of  bringing  order  out  of 
chaos,2  and  he  is  able  to  do  this  supremely  valuable  social  task 
because  of  what  he  is,  because  of  his  power  over  other  men,  and 
because  of  his  unquestioned  authority.  The  character-sketch  of 
this  "  hero  "  is  worth  reproducing:  — 

In  most  antiquarian  quaint  costume,  not  of  garments  alone,  but  of 
thought,  word,  action,  outlook  and  position,  the  substantial  figure  of  a  man 
with  eminent  nose,  bushy  brows  and  clear-flashing  eyes,  his  russet  beard 
growing  daily  grayer,  is  visible,  engaged  in  true  governing  of  men.  It  is 
beautiful  how  the  chrysalis  governing-soul,  shaking  off  its  dusty  slough  and 
prison,  starts  forth  winged,  a  true  royal  soul!  Our  new  Abbot  has  a  right 
honest  unconscious  feeUng,  without  insolence  as  without  fear  or  flutter,  of 
what  he  is  and  what  others  are.  A  courage  to  quell  the  proudest,  an  honest 
pity  to  encourage  the  humblest.  Withal  there  is  a  noble  reticence  in  this 
Lord  Abbot:  much  vain  imreason  he  hears;  lays  up  without  response.  He 
is  not  there  to  expect  reason  and  nobleness  of  others;  he  is  there  to  give 
them  of  his  own  reason  and  nobleness.  Is  he  not  their  servant,  as  we  said, 
who  can  suffer  from  them,  and  for  them;  bear  the  burden  their  poor  spindle- 
limbs  totter  and  stagger  under;  and,  in  virtue  of  being  their  servant,  govern 
them,  lead  them  out  of  weakness  into  strength,  out  of  defeat  into  victory! » 

The  Abbot  begins  his  task  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  ma- 
terial aspects  of  his  great  problem,  —  with  a  "  radical  reform  of 

with  the  addition  of  three  others,  —  those  on  the  nominating  committee  each  nomi- 
nating a  fellow-member.  The  King  orders  three  other  names  added  from  outside 
the  convent,  and  then  from  the  nine,  orders  three  names  to  be  struck  off,  then  one 
declines,  two  more  are  ordered  struck  off,  then  still  another,  leaving  but  two  names, 
those  of  Samson  and  the  Prior,  and  of  these,  the  choice  is  Samson.  —  Past  and 
Present,  ch.  VIII. 

1  Past  and  Present,  p.  86. 

2  "  Man  is  the  Missionary  of  Order;  he  is  the  servant  not  of  the  Devil  and 
Chaos,  but  of  God  and  the  Universe."  —  Ibid.,  p.  91. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  89-90. 


i 


286  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

his  economies  "  and  with  much- needed  repairs  of  the  Monastery 
itself.  Material  rubbish  is  cleared  away,  —  and  spiritual  rubbish 
as  well! 

Faithful  in  his  immediate  tasks  at  St.  Edmundsbury,  he  is 
equally  faithful  to  his  king  in  time  of  war  and  to  his  country  as  a 
member  of  Parliament  in  times  of  peace.  Thus,  "  by  the  heavenly 
Awe  that  overshadows  earthly  business,  does  Samson,  readily  in 
those  days,  save  St.  Edmund's  Shrine,  and  innumerable  still 
more  precious  things!  " 

"  By  heavenly  Awe!  "  —  for  Carlyle  ranks  as  vital  in  the  great 
man  and  his  power,  religious  conviction,  —  and  by  religion,  he 
means,  f^  the  thing  a  man  does  practically  lay  to  heart,  and  know 
for  certain'^  or  again i^^  the  manner  in  which  he  feels  himself 
to  be  spiritually  related  to  the  unseen  world  or  no  world. '^^ 

Personality,  then,  is  the  key  to  Carlyle's  social  philosophy,  —  a 
personality  born  a  genius  and  developed  by  faithfulness  in  ap- 
prenticeship tasks,  thus  learning  to  guide  others;  —  "  faithful 
over  few  tilings  "  rewarded  by  being  made  "  ruler  over  many 
things."  /The  supreme  need  of  every  nation  in  every  age  accord- 
ing to  him,  is  the  willingness  and  the  machinery  for  selecting  as 
leaders  the  one  born  and  trained  to  rule.  And  finding  such  he 
should  be  clothed  with  authority  by  the  powers  of  earth,  fortified 
with  belief  that  this  authority  is  also  of  God,  so  that  he  may  be 
able  to  compel  as  well  as  merely  lead./ 

In  early  times,  such  great  men  were  heroes  and  worshipped  as 
such,  —  and  Carlyle  would  bring  back  that  day,  turning  aside 
from  all  pretense  of  democracy  for  an  aristocracy  of  the  truly 
great. 

William  James  (1842-1910) 

The  Energies  of  Men 

Standing  almost  alone  among  the  galaxy  of  great  thinkers  and 
writers  whom  we  have  passed  in  review,  William  James  was  a 
firm  believer  in  unconditioned  freedom  of  the  will,  at  least  in  some 
small  degree.  His  starting  point  for  philosophical  thought  is  the 
experience  of  life  with  all  its  contradictions;  and  unlike  the 
*  Heroes  and  Hero  Worship,  p.  6,  Lecture  II. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  287 

absolutists  in  philosophy,  whether  materialistic  or  spiritualistic, 
heroes  not  pretend  to  think  through  these  contradictions  and 
resolve  them  into  an  ultimate  harmony.^     For  him,  real  freedom 
'  is  a  datumof  experience  hence  a  fact  to  be  reckoned  with  in  every  , 
attempt  to  interpret  life  in  terms  of  thought.^     The  outcome  of  ^ 
his  philosophy  is  a  ''  pluralistic  universe  ^^  ^  q^  ^q  qj^^  hand  and 
"^gragnatism_^^  on  the  other;   i.  ey philosophy  for  him  has  no  ^^^ 
value  except  for  life,  no  truth  except  as  it  is  true  to  life,  and  no  y^^^^^^/^ 
test  of  truth  save  the  test  of  life,*  and  as  thought  cannot  inter-  >-y^^^^^^ 
pret  all  the  facts  of  life  in  terms  of  unity  it  must  use  those  of 
plurality  y/ 

From  this  point  of  view  it  is  natural  that  he  should  criticize  the 
monism  of  Spencer  and  the  attempts  of  all  strictly  logical  evolu- 
tionists to  evolve  the  complexities  of  the  universe  as  we  know  it 
and  of  life  as  we  experience  it,  from  one  primordial  principle 
whether  matter,  force,  or  matter-force. 

/  Turning  specifically  to  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  James  made 
a  notable  contribution  in  an  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  in 
1880  on  "  Great  Men,  Great  Thoughts,  and  the  Environment."  ^/ 
He  proposes  this  problem :  "  What  are  the  causes  that  make  com-     (2W«-<-* 
munities  change  from  generation  to  generation,  —  that  make  the  (3^^t!#c^*I< 
England  of  Queen  Anne  so  different  from  the  England  of  EHza-        ^/;    P 
beth,  the  Harvard  College  of  today  so  different  from  that  of    iJ 
thirty  years  ago  ?  "  and  answers,  "  The  difference  is  due  to  the 
accimiulated  influences  of  individuals,  of  their  examples,  their 
initiatives,  and  their  decisions."     He  sets  his  own  solution  over  ^i!^t^_^^.e,c^ 
against  that  of  Spencer  and  his  followers  who  hold,  according  to^^^^^^^^^^ 
James,  that  "  the  changes  go  on  irrespective  of  persons,  and  are  •  '  ^^^X*^^ 
independent  of  individual  control  ";  that  '^  they  are  due  to  \)cl^  X-^ct^.^j^ 
environment,  to  the  circumstances,  the  physical  geography,  the  'J^^^etj^ 
ancestral  conditions,  the  increasing  experience  of  outer  relations,  ^^^^''^^-'^^-tM 
to  everything,  in  fact,  except  the  Grants,  and  the  Bismarcks,  the  . 
Joneses  and  the  Smiths."  ^ 

^  Pragmatism,  pp.  20  f.  '  Pragmatism,  p.  161. 

2  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  175.  *  Ibid.,  Lecture  II. 

"  Reprinted  in  The  Will  to  Believe,  pp.  216  ff. 

*  John  Fiske  as  a  follower  of  Spencer  repudiates  this  interpretation  {Excursions 
of  an  Evolutionist,  ch.  VI),  and  quotes  Spencer  as  saying  that  sociology  "  has  in 


288 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


James  shows  how  impossible  it  is  to  find  the  causes  of  human 
variation  either  in  heredity  or  in  the  environment,  and  holds  that 
the  deflecting  cause  which  produces  a  genius  instead  of  a  dunce 
35^ust  lie  in  a  region  so  recondite  and  minute,  must  be  such  a 
ferment  of  a  ferment,  an  infinitesimal  of  so  high  an  order,  that 
surmise  itself  may  never  succeed  even  in  attempting  to  frame  an 
image  of  it."  ^  "  The  causes  of  production  of  great  men,"  he 
continues,  "  lie  in  a  sphere  wholly  inaccessible  to  the  social  phi- 
losopher. He  must  simply  accept  geniuses  as  data,  just  as  Darwin 
accepts  his  spontaneous  variations."'^  For  him,  as  for  Darwin, 
the  only  problem  is,  these  data  being  given,  how  does  the  environ- 
ment affect  them,  and  how  do  they  affect  the  environment  ? 
"  The  mutations  of  societies  .  .  .  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion," he  says,  "  are  in  the  main  due  directly  or  indirectly  to  the 
acts  or  the  example  of  individuals  whose  genius  was  so  adapted 
to  the  receptivities  of  the  moment,  or  whose  accidental  position  of 
authority  was  so  critical  that  they  became  ferments,  initiators  of 
movement,  setters  of  precedent  or  fashion,  centers  of  corruption, 
or  destroyers  of  other  persons,  whose  gifts,  had  they  had  free 
play,  would  have  led  society  in  another  direction."  ^ 

From  this  quotation  it  is  certain  that  James  recognized  the 
relativity  of  genius  even  as  did  Spencer,  Fiske,  Tarde,  and  Ward, 
but  with  this  difference:  with  James,  the  work  of  the  genius  is 
'relative  to  the  receptivity  of  his  group  and  age,  with  the  others, 
the  relativity  of  genius  is  due  to  the  fact  that  he  is  the  product  of 
his  group  and  age,  though  he  may  be  so  great  a  variation  from  the 
type  as  to  warrant  the  appellation  "  sociological  sport."  ^ 

every  case  for  its  subject-matter  the  growth,  development,  structure,  and  functions 
of  the  social  aggregate,  as  brought  about  by  the  mutual  actions  of  individuals,  whose 
natures  are  partly  like  those  of  all  men,  partly  like  those  of  kindred  races,  partly  dis- 
tinctive." The  fact  remains,  however,  that  the  burden  of  Spencer's  teaching  is 
contrary  to  that  of  James.     Cf.  quotation  from  Spencer,  Will  to  Believe,  p.  232. 

1  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  225.  2  j^id.^  p.  227. 

'  Cf .  Ward,  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  243  ff.  Lombroso  held  that  the  genius  and  the 
insane  were  but  a  step  removed  from  each  other.  Galton  showed  by  a  study  of 
many  families  that  the  genius  was  sometimes  of  sound  family  stock,  but  again 
related  to  a  defective  strain.  Nordau  and  Sumner  have  distinguished  between  the 
genius  who  is  a  true  leader  in  the  line  of  advance,  and  the  genius  who  is  a 
degenerate  although  confining  their  discussion  for  the  most  part  to  the  latter. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  289 

y     V 

"  Social  evolution,"  says  James,  "  is  a  resultant  of  the  inter-  "'if^^'^^^ 
action  of  two  wholly  distinct  factors,  -^ the  individual,  deriving  his  ^'-*^'''^^^''*'^ 
peculiar  gifts  from  the  play  of  physiological  and  intra-social  "V/ 
forces,  but  bearing  all  the  power  of  initiative  and  origination  in    ^ 
his  hands;  and,  second,  the  social  environment,  with  its  power  of 
adopting  or  rejecting  both  him  and  his  gifts.     Both  factors  are 
essential  to  change.  /  The  community  stagnates  without  the  / 
impulse  of  the  individual.     The  impulse  dies  away  without  the! 
sympathy  of  the  community."  ^ 

James  has  made  another  important  contribution  in  his  discus- 
sion of  the  inner  source  of  power  of  individuals,  under  the 
caption.  The  Energies  of  Men.^     His  approach  is  through  the 
familiar  experience  of  "  warming  up  "  to  a  job,  physical  or  intel- 
lectual, and  especially  through  the  experience  of  track  athletes, 
who  after  reaching  a  point  of  fatigue  push  on  by  sheer  force  of 
will  and  tap  a  new  level  of  energy,  —  a  process  known  as  "  getting        ^       a 
second  wind."     "  There  may  be  layer  after  layer  of  this  expe-  \^ 
rience,"  says  James,  "  a  third  and  a  fourth  wind  may  supervene."  |  /  ^*^^^ 
^ 'Rental  activity,"  he  continues,  "  shows  the  phenomenon  as  well       , 
as  physical,  and  in  exceptional  cases  we  may  find,  beyond  the  very     ^*-^  ^^"^ 
extremity  of  fatigue  distress,  amounts  of  ease  and  power  that  we    ^<>wv**-< 
never  dreamed  ourselves  to  own,  —  sources  of  strength  habitually  .ji^,^,,^,,,,.,^^ 
not  taxed  at  all,  because  habitually  we  never  push  through  thej;;:|^r-  ^ 
obstructions,  never  pass  those  early  critical  points." 

James  compares  the  phenomenon  of  "  efficiency-equilibrium  " 
with  that  of  nutritive  equilibrium  and  holds  that  "  few  men 
.live  at  their  maximmn  of  energy,  and  second,  that  any  one 
may  be  in  vital  equilibrium  at  very, different  rates  of  energizing." 
This  opens  up  an  ethical  and  sociological  problem  of  great  im- 
portance. "  In  rough  terms,"  he  says,  "  a  man  who  energizes 
below  his  normal  maximum  fails  by  just  so  much  to  profit  by  hi§  yfc^r*-^-^ 
chance  at  Hfe;  and  a  nation  filled  with  such  men  is  inferior  tojL_jgf^^^^^ 
nation  run  at  higher  pressure.  The  problem  is,  then,  how  can 
men  be  trained  up  to  their  most  useful  pitch  of  energy  ?  And 
how  can  nations  make  such  training  most  accessible  to  all  their 
sons  and  daughters  ?  " 

*  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  232.     '  "The  Energies  of  Men,"  Science,  March,  1907. 


290 


ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 


Two  questions  are  raised  in  this  connection,  first,  "  What  are 
the  limits  of  human  faculty  in  various  directions  ?  and  second.  By 
what  diversity  of  means,  in  the  different  t3^es  of  human  beings, 
may  the  faculties  be  stimulated  to  their  best  results  ?  " 

Granting  that  as  a  rule  men  habitually  use  only  a  small  part  of 
the  powers  which  they  actually  possess  and  which  they  might  use 
under  appropriate  conditions,  the  question  arises,  "  To  what  do 
the  better  men  owe  their  escape  ?  and,  in  the  fluctuations  which 
all  men  feel  in  their  own  degree  of  energizing,  to  what  are  the 
improvements  due,  when  they  occur  ?  "  —  and  he  answers, 
"  Either  some  unusual  stimulus  fills  them  with  emotional  excite- 
ment, or  some  unusual  idea  of  necessity  induces  them  to  make  an 
extra  effort  of  will.  Excitements,  ideas,  and  efforts,  in  a  word, 
are  what  carry  us  over  the  dam." 

James  illustrates  his  theory  by  several  historical  examples  and 
points  out  especially  the  power  of  suggestive  ideas  to  awaken  the 
energies  of  loyalty,  courage,  endurance  or  devotion. 

"  Conversions,"  he  holds,  "  whether  they  be  political,  scientific, 
philosophical,  or  religious,  form  another  way  in  which  bound 
energies  are  let  loose.  They  unify  us  and  put  a  stop  to  unscientific 
mental  interferences.  The  result  is  freedom,  and  often  a  great  en- 
largement of  power.  A  belief  that  thus  settles  upon  an  individual 
always  acts  as  a  challenge  to  his  will." 

Christian  Science,  faith-cure  and  prayer  are  given  credit  for 
being  instruments  for  the  tapping  of  this  reservoir  of  energy  to 
the  good  of  man,  and  he  concludes:  "  The  two  questions,  first 
that  of  the  possible  extent  of  our  powers;  and  second,  that  of  the 
various  avenues  of  approach  to  them,  the  various  keys  for  unlock- 
ing them  in  diverse  individuals,  dominate  the  whole  problem  of 
individual  and  national  education.  We  need  a  topography  of 
„,the  limits  of  human  power,  similar  to  the  chart  which  oculists  use 
of  the  field  of  human  vision.  We  need  also  a  study  of  the  various 
types  of  human  beings  with  reference  to  the  different  ways  in 
which  their  energy  reserves  may  be  appealed  to  and  set  loose. 
Biographies  and  individual  experiences  of  every  kind  may  be 
drawn  upon  for  evidence  here."  ^ 

^  This  James  has  done  in  his  Varieties  of  Rdigious  Experience, 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  29 1 

James  has  thus  contributed  to  our  subject  by  holding  that  the 
relation  of  a  man  to  his  age  and  group  is  not  wholly  due  to  the    (// 
fact  that  he  is  produced  by  it,  but  even  more  by  the  fact  that 
rarely  does  a  man  have  available  energy  to  break  away  from   ^^' 
the  conventions  that  repress  him  and  attain  new  heights,  and 
further  that  though  he  himself  gain  a  new  vision  of  the  true  and 
good,  the  spread  of  this  depends  on  the  sympathy  he  may  be       '?  i 
able  to  secure  in  his  social  environment. 

He  shows  further  that  certain  emotional  experiences  and  certain 
ideas  have  the  power  of  tapping  for  man  his  ever-present  reservoir 
of  energy,  or  to  change  the  figure  of  "  carrying  him  over  the 
dam.''  The  true  genius  is  the  man  who  by  heredity  or  by  some 
inner  power  is  able  to  attain  levels  of  ej£ciency-energy  far  beyond 
those  of  the  average  of  his  group  and  inspire  his  fellow-men  to  like 
attainment.  Such  a  man  is  an  example,  an  exponent,  and  leader 
in  active  spiritual  adaptation. 

Edward  Alsworth  Ross  (1866-       ) 
The  Psychology  of  Social  Control 

Professor  Ross  has  made  contributions  to  our  subject  primarily 
along  two  Hues:  first,  in  his  criticism  of  the  theories  of  other  sociol- 
ogists and  second  in  his  constructive  analysis  of  social  control.     C^) 

As  a  sociological  critic  he  is  perhaps  without  a  peer  among 
American  scholars  in  this  field;  yet  brillant  and  suggestive  as  are 
these  criticisms  he  seems  to  lack  the  ability  to  "  see  Hfe  steadily 
and  see  it  whole,"  hence  the  many  apparent  inconsistencies  in  his 
writings. 

As  many  of  his  criticisms  have  already  been  cited,  and  the  rest 
are  easily  accessible  in  his  Foundations  of  Sociology,  we  will  con- 
sider here  merely  his  distinction  between  change,  adaptation  and 
progress,  and  then  discuss  his  analysis  of  social  control. 

Although  Professor  Ross  denies  any  place  to  the  term  progress  / 
in  social  science, ^  he  makes  large  use  of  it  in  his  Social  Psychology  ■ 
and  Social  Control,  and  defines  it,  now  in  terms  of  adaptation,  as 
where  he  says  "  Progress  follows  the  line  of  advantage,  substitut- 
ing always  the  better  adapted,"  ^  but  again  in  terms  of  mere 
^  Foundations  of  Sociology,  pp.  75,  76.  ^  Social  Psychology,  p.  94. 


u) 


292  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

change  as  in  the  following:  "The  accumulation  of  changes  in  the 
rational  principle  is  progress:  of  utilities,  practical  progress;  of 
truths,  intellectual  progress.  /  Mor^il  progress  and  aesthetic  prog- 
ress do  not  come  about  essentially  by  origination  and  rational 
diffusion.  'Progress  in  these  departments  is  usually  the  conse- 
quence of  material  or  intellectual  advancement. 'y 

In  his.  Foundations  of  Sociology  he  differentiates  progress, 
change  and  adaptation  as  follows:  "  Change  means  any  qualita- 
tive variation,  whereas  progress  means  amelioration,  perfection- 
ment.  The  one  is  movement;  the  other  is  movement  in  the 
direction  of  advantage.  Progress  is  better  adaptation  to  given 
conditions.  Change  may  be  adaptation,  —  at  first,  perhaps,  very 
imperfect,  —  to  new  conditions.''  The  difference  is  illustrated  as 
follows:  "  When  a  mammal  thrust  northward  gets  a  heavier  coat 
of  hair,  or  a  bird  acquires  the  nest-building  instinct  with  the 
advent  of  a  rodent  that  destroys  her  eggs  on  the  ground,  we  have  a 
case  of  adaptation.  Now,  this  way  of  interpreting  change  is 
becoming  ever  more  helpful  to  the  student  of  society.  .  .  . 
Movements  that  seem  regressive  are  equally  ambiguous.  Mili- 
tarism is  hardly  a  regress  when  a  people  finds  itself  menaced  by 
the  approach  of  an  aggressive  neighbor.  .  .  .  The  growth  of 
one-man  power  is  degeneration  if  it  is  caused  by  a  lowered  citizen- 
ship; it  is  only  adaptation  if  the  faciHties  for  focusing  public 
opinion  have  so  improved  that  the  cruder  checks  on  the  executive 
have  ceased  to  be  necessary.  /l  conclude,  then,  that  social 
dynamics  ought  to  drop  such  vague  and  dubious  conceptions  as 
progress  and  regress,  and  address  itself  to  the  simple  fact  of  social 
changeJ^  y 

Now  progress  as  used  in  these  and  other  examples  is  defined  very 
much  as  we  have  defined  adaptation,  and  adaptation,  he  says,  is 
becoming  ever  more  helpful  as  a  way  of  interpreting  change.  In- 
deed in  none  of  these  examples  is  there  any  necessary  distinction. 

We  find  that  he  uses  adaptation  in  a  way  that  would  seem  to 
make  it  the  standard  of  progress  in  his  discussion  of  "  the  genesis 
and  evolution  of  ethical  elements  "  ^  where  he  holds  thaty^ome- 
thing  very  like  the  struggle  and  survival  principle  of  biological 

^  Social  Psychology,  p.  286.   ^  Foundations,  pp.  185-189.   '  Social  Control,  ch.  XXV. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  293 

evolution  is  at  work  in  society,  and  that  in  the  struggle  among 
"  views,"  "  customs,"  "  methods  "  and  "  civilizations  "  some 
perish  while  others  survive./  "  The  genesis  of  ethical  elements," 
he  says,  "  as  well  as  the  genesis  of  customs  and  behefs,  is  a_2 
process  of  selection  and  survival.  Just  as  the  development  of 
Zuni  or  Lydian  pottery  is  due  to  a  competition  which  makes  the 
handiest  and  handsomest  form  of  pot  the  prevailing  type,  and  to 
the  renewal  of  this  healthy  competition  whenever  an  inventive 
potter  or  a  foreign  art  suppHes  a  new  pattern,  so  the  improve- 
ment in  the  ethical  standard  of  a  civilization  is  due  to  the  survival 
and  ascendency  of  those  elements  which  are  best  adapted  to  an 
orderly  social  life.  ...  It  is  just  this  selection  which  explains  the 
snug  fit  of  early  ethical  elements  to  the  needs  of  the  group  that 
develop  them."  In  this  same  connection  he  shows  how  certain 
conventions  "  develop  very  naturally  by  a  process  of  unconscious 
adaptation  out  of  the  mental  contacts  and  long  intercourse  of 
associates."  ^ 

This  doctrine  of  adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social  progress  seems 
to  be  the  one  thing  lacking  to  make  clear  his  interpretation  of  the 
"  Vicissitudes  of  Social  Control,"  ^  where  he  shows  how  change  in 
control  is  brought  about  by  change  in  social  need  due  largely  to 
change  in  the  economic  condition  of  the  people.  In  other  words 
the  vicissitudes  of  social  control  are  due  to  society s  need  of  adapting 
itself  to  changed  conditions  of  existence. 

There  seem  to  be  some  features  of  social  progress  which,  accord- 
ing to  Ross,  make  the  biological  categories  of  struggle  and  sur- 
vival, or  the  principle  of  adaptation,  inapplicable.  Commenting 
on  the  struggle  between  civilizations,  he  says,  "  This  struggle  of 
rival  elements  of  culture  is  by  no  means  the  same  thing  as  the 
struggle  between  persons.  When  one  race  has  overrun  and 
trampled  down  another,  it  is  always  interesting  to  see  if  the 
spiritual  contest  of  the  two  civilizations  has  the  same  issue  as  the 
physical  contest  of  the  two  races.  Will  the  upper  civilization  ' 
smother  the  lower,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  Aztecs, 
the  Germans  and  the  Wends,  the  Romans  and  the  Etruscans,  the 
Saracens  and  the  Roman  Africans;  or  will  the  one  beneath  grow 

*  Social  Control,  pp.  342-345.  ^  Ihid.,  ch.  XXIX. 


294  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Up  through  and  subdue  the  one  above,  as  the  Romans  were 
captivated  by  the  Greek  culture,  the  barbarians  by  Roman 
civilization,  or  the  Mongols  by  Islam  ?  "  ^     This  is  a  strong 
criticism  of  the  neo-Darwinian  sociologists  and  militates  against 
the  rigid  use  of  the  biological  doctrine  of  selection  applied  to 
social  progress  but  it  does  not  mihtate  against  the  use  of  the 
doctrine  of  adaptation  or  adjustment^  for  a  new  amalgam  of 
cultures  is  the  net  result  of  a  multitude  of  minor  struggles,  and 
the  new  political  unit  faces  the  problem  of  survival  through 
adaptation.    Ross  seems  to  recognize  this  for  he  says:  "The 
struggle  between  groups  of  men  involves  a  testing  of  the  codes 
and  moralities  that  govern  them,  and  must  in  the  long  run  con- 
duce to  the  triumph  of  those  codes  and  moralities  which  strengthen 
the  group  over  those  which  do  not.''     In  this  statement  we  have  an 
approach  to  the  appHcation  of  group  struggle  and  survival  em- 
phasized by  the  neo-Darwinian  sociologists. 
f      As  a  constructive  sociologist  Ross  may  well  be  classed  as  an 
I  "  eclectic  "  because  of  the  wide  use  he  has  made  of  the  discoveries 
I  and  formulations  of  others  in  the  same  field.     He  has  also  formu- 
I  la  ted  many  new  laws  but  it  is  diiB&cult  to  enumerate  those  due  to 
|him  alone. 

His  most  important  contribution  to  our  subject  along  positive 
lines  is  to  be  found  in  his  Social  Control.  In  this  he  discusses 
the  functions  of  natural  control  in  securing  order  and  progress 
under  the  four  headings  of  "  sympathy, '^  "  sociabiHty,"  "  sense 
of  justice,"  and  "  individual  reaction."  The  role  of  each  is 
presented  in  strong  terms,  but  each  and  all  together  are  found 
unequal  to  the  task  of  securing  social  order  and  progress. 

This  is  followed  by  a  consideration  of  the  "  need,"  "  direction," 
and  "  radiant  points  "  of  social  control.  In  Part  II  we  are  pre- 
sented with  an  able  survey  of  the  "  means  of  control "  such  as 
public  opinion,  law,  belief,  social  suggestion  including  education 
and  custom,  social  religion,  personal  ideals,  ceremony,  art, 
personality,  enlightenment  and  illusion.  With  the  exception  of 
law  and  personal  ideals  these  forces  for  the  most  part  act  in  such 
a  way  as  to  make  it  possible  to  classify  tiie  process  by  which 
1  Social  Control,  p.  340. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  295 

society  is  thus  moulded,  under  passive  adaptation.  In  law  and 
consciously  directed  public  opinion  we  have  "  social  telesis  ";  in 
personal  ideals,  art,  personality,  enlightenment  and  social  religion, 
we  have  "  individual  telesis  "  yet  working  for  social  control 
through  suggestion  and  imitation  in  which  the  passive  element 
predominates. 

In  considering  the  "  genesis  of  ethical  elements,"  variations  in 
the  discovery  and  enunciation  of  moral  truths  are  held  to  be 
due  to  the  prophet  or  moral  genius  owing  to  his  superior  social 
insight,^  and  the  successful  promulgation  of  these  truths,  to  the 
elite.  But  variations  having  been  accounted  for  in  this  way 
through  "  innovation,"  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  principle  is 
held  to  be  due  to  struggle  and  survival,  the  decisive  factor  being 
social  utility.^ 

In  his  discussion  of  "  the  system  of  control  "  we  have  an 
analysis  of  the  functions  and  methods  of  control  as  exercised  in 
organized  government.  First  to  be  considered  is  class  control 
which  is  defined  as  "  the  exercise  of  power  by  a  parasitic  class  in 
its  own  interest,"  —  as  in  the  case  of  slavery  and  serfdom. 
Under  class  control  private  property  develops  and  "  is  so  shaped 
as  to  permit  a  slanting  exploitation  under  which  a  class  is  able  to 
live  in  idleness  by  monopolizing  land  or  other  indispensable 
natural  means  of  production."  The  system  of  class  control  is 
modified  "  to  economize  coercion,  to  economize  supervision,  to 
economize  direction."  ^  As  the  parasitic  class  in  control  cannot 
easily  bolster  up  their  authority  by  use  of  art,  personality  and 
social  religion,  which  emanate  from  the  great  man,  the  prophet 
or  the  ehte,  use  is  made  of  forcCy  superstition,  fraud,  pomp  and 
prescription  which  are  degenerate  forms  of  those  natural  supports 
of  social  order  already  considered,  viz.,  law,  behef  in  the  super- 
natural, custom,  ceremony  and  illusion.^  "  Born  in  aggression 
and  perfected  in  exploitation,"  Ross  says,  "  the  State  even  now, 
when  it  is  more  and  more  directed  by  the  common  will,  is  not  easy 
to  keep  from  slipping  back  into  the  rut  it  wore  for  itself  during  the 
centuries  it  was  the  engine  of  a  parasitic  class."  ^ 

1  Social  Control,  p.  357.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  376,  377.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  386. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  342,  349,  357.       ■*  Ibid.,  pp.  381,  382,  386  f. 


296  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

Social  control  is  distingmshed  from  class  control  by  the  fact 
that  in  the  latter  case  society  being  on  the  competitive  basis,  "  the 
hopelessly  poor  and  wretched  are,  to  a  large  extent,  the  weak  and 
incompetent  who  have  accumulated  at  the  lower  end  of  the  social 
scale,  because  they  or  their  parents  have  failed  to  meet  the  tests 
of  the  competitive  system."  In  this  case  control  is  largely  in  the 
hands  of  the  efficient  and  in  the  interest  of  the  social  whole. 

Ross  assumes  in  the  above  that  the  present  competitive  system 
is  a  success  in  producing  social  segregation  on  the  basis  of  native 
ability  and  social  worth,  —  a  questionable  assumption. 

The  vicissitudes  of  social  control,  he  points  out,  are  primarily 
in  response  to  social  needs,  and  of  these  the  economic  are  con- 
sidered of  first  importance.^  Conflict  of  groups  and  conflict 
of  classes  within  the  group  are  also  recognized  as  potent  causes 
of  change,  the  class  conflict  being  due  not  alone  to  sharp  conflict 
of  interest  but  to  great  contrast  of  means  and  a  great  inequality  of 
opportunity,"^  "  Another  cause  of  vicissitude,"  he  says,  "  is 
change  in  the  culture  and  habits  of  a  people^ ^  whether  due  to  fresh 
knowledge,  new  ideas,  foreign  influences,  or  novel  experiences.^ 

Ross  divides  the  supports  of  order  into  two  groups,  the  ethical^ 
including  public  opinion,  suggestion,  personal  ideals,  social 
religion,  art,  and  social  valuations  based  on  sentiment  rather  than 
judgment  of  social  utility,  and  the  political,  including  law,  belief, 
ceremony,  education  and  illusion,  —  the  last,  "  frequently  the 
means  dehberately  chosen  in  order  to  reach  certain  ends."  *  The 
political  supports  are  instnmients  of  the  ethical. 

He  believes  that  social  control  by  the  hero,  by  custom,  by 
supernatural  religion,  and  by  mob,  ban  or  boycott,  is  passing,  and 
that  enlightened  self-interest,  suggestion,  moral  idealism  and 
social  religion  will  become  increasingly  potent.^ 

In  discussing  the  limits  of  social  control  he  takes  a  decided 
stand  against  all  social  theories  that  place  the  good  of  the  group 
above  that  of  its  constituent  members,  holding  that  "  society  is 
not  a  being,  but  just  people  in  their  collective  capacity,"  and 

1  Social  Control,  p.  395.  *  Ibid.,  p.  411. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  402.  '  Ibid.f  pp.  415-416. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  404. 


ACTIVE  SOCIAL  ADAPTATION  297 

"  that  the  only  weKare  there  is,  is  the  welfare  of  persons  present 
or  to  come/'  ^ 

Ross  formulates  the  following  canons  as  to  the  limits  of  social 
control:  ^  — 

1.  Each  increment  of  social  interference  should  bring  more 
benefit  to  persons  as  members  of  society  than  it  entails  incon- 
venience to  persons  as  individuals. 

2 .  Social  interference  should  not  lightly  excite  against  itself  the 
passion  for  hberty. 

3.  Social  interference  should  respect  the  sentiments  that  are 
the  support  of  natural  order. 

4.  Social  interference  should  not  be  so  paternal  as  to  check  the 
self -extinction  of  the  morally  ill-constituted. 

5.  Social  interference  should  not  so  limit  the  struggle  for 
existence  as  to  nullify  the  selective  process. 

The  criteria  of  social  control  are  economy,  inwardness  (reaching 
the  feelings,  reason  and  will),  simplicity,  and  spontaneity,  fostered 
by  diffusion,  —  as  in  public  opinion,  suggestion,  social  reUgion  and 
art. 

His  conclusion  harmonizes  his  theory  of  social  control  with  the 
position  we  are  advocating:  — 

The  better  adaptation  of  animals  to  one  another  appears  to  be  brought 
about  by  accumulated  changes  in  body  and  brain.  The  better  adaptation  of 
men  to  one  another  is  brought  about,  not  only  in  this  way,  but  also  by  the 
improvement  of  the  instruments  that  constitute  the  apparatus  of  social 
control.  In  the  same  way  that  the  improvement  of  optical  instruments 
checks  the  evolution  of  the  eye,  and  the  improvement  of  tools  checks  the 
evolution  of  the  hand,  the  improvement  of  instruments  of  control  checks  the 
evolution  of  the  social  instincts.  The  goal  of  social  development  is  not,  as 
some  imagine,  a  perfect  love,  or  a  perfect  conscience,  but  better  adaptation; 
and  the  more  this  is  artificial,  the  less  need  it  be  natural.' 

Ross  does  not  believe  that  any  one  form  of  control  is  adapted  to 
all  races  and  temperaments,  but  that  under  the  influence  of  social 
forces,  the  form  of  control  best  suited  to  a  people  is  the  one 
selected,  and  that  those  in  authority  should  study  and  use  these 
means  of  control  though,  as  in  the  case  of  supernatural  religion, 
they  may  rest  on  illusion.'* 

1  Social  Control,  p.  418.  '  Ibid.,  p.  437. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  419  f.  *  Ibid.,  p.  441. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION 

We  have  already  noted  to  some  extent  the  influence  of  these 
factors  in  the  various  social  theories  passed  in  review,  but  have 
reserved  till  this  later  chapter  a  more  complete  analysis  of  the 
process  of  idealization  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  adapta- 
tion. This  process  may  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  "  active  moral 
adaptation  "  leading  to  "  active  social  adaptation  "  and  finally 
to  "  religious  adaptation." 

Idealization  as  a  factor  in  social  progress  has  three  elements:  (i) 
the  intellectual  by  which  the  ideal  is  created,  i.  e.,  imagination, 
(2)  the  emotional  response  of  the  individual  by  way  of  attraction, 
and  (3)  the  volitional  expression  of  thought  and  feeling  in  art, 
religion  and  rational  conduct.  In  the  latter  case,  where  the 
individual  endeavors  to  harmonize  his  life  with  his  ideal,  we  have  a 
form  of  adaptation  that  may  be  ternied  active  moral,  and  growing 
out  of  this  is  a  fourth  element,  —  the  desire  and  effort  to  bring 
others  to  accept  the  ideal  which  dominates  our  Ufe,  due  to  the 
demand  of  our  whole  nature  for  internal  harmony,  and  adjust- 
ment with  our  spiritual  environment.  Normal  man  can  never  be 
(satisfied  to  live  in  solitude,  even  in  his  thought  life,  nor  can  he  be 
satisfied  to  live  in  conflict.^  John  Wesley  was  wise  when  he  urged 
his  missionaries  as  they  started  for  America  to  "  find  companions 
or  make  them."  If  man  cannot  find  or  make  companions  in  the 
flesh  he  seeks  them  in  the  spiritual  realm,  either  as  revealed  in 
their  writings  or  as  created  by  his  imagination. 

1  Social  mal-adaptation  not  only  does  violence  to  our  egoistic  and  social  interests 
and  instincts  and  hence  leads  to  dissatisfaction  and  an  endeavor  to  secure  adjust- 
ment, but  it  causes  intellectual  conflicts  and  the  tendency  of  the  mind  is  to  secure 
harmony.  The  resoluti9n  of  conflict  is  always  pleasure-giving.  Cf .  Bradley, 
Appearance  and  Reality,  ch.  XIV;  also  Comte,  A  General  View,  pp.  387  f. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  299 

Idealization  and  Religion  according  to  Comte 

The  process  of  idealization  issuing  in  religion  was  recognized 
and  valued  in  the  Positive  Philosophy  but  not  analyzed  and  \ 
developed  as  it  was  later  in  the  Polity  when  Comte  had  come  to 
rate  the  feelings  more  highly  than  the  intellect,  the  beautifying 
of  life  above  material  achievement,  and  had  come  to  worship 
woman  because  she  was  the  highest  expression  of  this  phase  of 
life.i  "^  "" 

The  idealizing  activity  of  man  finds  expression,  according  to  I 
Comte  in  art  in  its  various  forms  of  poetry,  oratory,  music,  paint-  ! 
ing  and  sculpture,  and  in  religion.     Art  is  defined  as  "an  ideal  1 
representation  of  facts  "  and  its  object  held  to  be  "  to  cultivate  \ 
our  sense  of  perfection."   _In  jirt,  he  holds,  the  unity  of  human 
nature  finds  its  most  complete  and  most  natural  representation, 
for  it  is  in  direct  relation  with  the  three  orders  of  phenomena  by 
which  human  nature  is  characterized.     It  originates  in  feeling, 
has  its  basis  in  thought,  and  its  end  in  action,  hence  its  power 
of  exerting  an  influence  for  good  alike  on  every  phase  of  our  exist- 
ence, whether  personal  or  social.     Thus  art,  standing  midway 
between  philosophy  and  polity,  should  be  controlled  by  the 
former,  as  the  emotions,  unguided,  express  themselves  in  extrav- 
agant and  sometimes  harmful  ways.    Art  in  turn  should  influence 
polity,  since  "  in  every  operation  that  man  undertakes,  he  must 
imagine  before  he  executes." 

Philosophy  and  art  must  work  together  in  the  formation  of 
social  Utopias,  art  to  form  the  ideal  and  philosophy  to  see  that 
this  ideal  is  related  to  the  real.  "  As  humanity  is  subject  to  the 
order  of  the  external  world,"  he  says,  "  the  ideal  must  always  be 
subordinated  to  the  real.^  ...  In  our  artificial  improvements  we 
should  never  aim  at  anything  more  than  a  wise  modification  of  the 
natural  order;  we  should  never  attempt  to  subvert  it."  ^ 

Art  of  various  kinds  is  a  factor  in  progress,  he  holds,  because  it 

*  A  General  View,  chs.  V  and  VI. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  316.  He  shows  how  this  truth  is  illustrated  in  the  developing  mind 
of  the  child:  "  As  his  notions  of  fact  change,  his  fictions  are  modified  in  conformity 
with  these  changes." 

3  Ihid.,  p.  319. 


300  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

has  to  do  chiefly  with  the  feeKngs.    "  Of  all  the  phenomena  which 
relate  to  man  human  affections  are  the  most  modifiable  and  there- 
fore the  most  susceptible  of  idealization.     Being  more  perfect 
than  any  other,  by  virtue  of  their  higher  complexity,  they  allow 
greater  scope  for  improvement.  ...  All  aesthetic  study  .  .  . 
may  become  a  useful  moral  exercise,  by  calling  sympathies  and 
antipathies  into  healthy  play.     The  effect  is  far  greater  when  the 
representation,  passing  the  limits  of  strict  accuracy,  is  suitably 
!  idealized.     This,  indeed,  is  the  characteristic  mission  of  art.     Its 
I  function  is  to  construct  t3^es  of  the  noblest  kind  by  the  contem- 
I  plation  of  which  our  feelings  and  thoughts  may  be  elevated."  ^ 
There  are  three  stages  in  the  aesthetic  process,  imitation,  ideal- 
ization and  expression.     Poetry  is  the  art  which  idealizes  the 
most  and  imitates  the  least.  The  function  of  the  poet  is  esteemed 
because  of  his  power  to  idealize  and  to  stimulate.^ 

As  to  the  relation  of  art  to  social  progress  our  author  says: 

/  "  Utopias  are  to  the  art  of  social  life  what  geometrical  and  me- 

l  chanical  types  are  to  their  respective  arts.     In  these  their  neces- 

j  sity  is  universally  recognized;  and  surely  the  necessity  cannot  be 

I  less  in  problems  of  such  far  greater  intricacy.    Accordingly  we  see 

that,  notwithstanding  the  empirical  condition  in  which  political 

art  has  hitherto  existed,  every  great  change  has  been  ushered  in, 

one  or  two  centuries  beforehand,  by  an  Utopia  bearing  some 

analogy  to  it.     It  was  the  product  of  the  aesthetic  genius  of 

Humanity  working  under  an  imperfect  sense  of  its  conditions  and 

requirements."  ^ 

The  function  of  art  in  education,  in  the  propagation  of  positi- 
vism, in  government  and  religion  is  discussed  at  some  length,  and 
he  concludes  "  that  the  priest  of  Humanity  will  not  have  attained 
his  full  measure  of  superiority  over  the  priest  of  God,  until,  with 
the  intellect  of  the  philosopher,  he  combines  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
poet,  as  well  as  the  tenderness  of  woman  and  the  people's 
energy."  * 

1  A  General  View,  p.  315. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  325.  Compare  the  teaching  of  Buckle  who  ignores  this  function  of 
literature  and  art,  —  supra,  ch.  VI. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  317.  *  ^b^-y  P-  354. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  30I 

The  process  of  idealization,  directed  by  social  utility,  eventu- 
ates in  the  worship  of  Humanity.  "  Towards  Humanity,  who  is 
for  us  the  only  true  Great  Being,  we,  the  conscious  elements  of 
whom  she  ^  is  composed,  shall  henceforth  direct  every  aspect  of 
our  life,  individual  or  collective.  Our  thoughts  will  be  devoted  to 
the  knowledge  of  Humanity,  our  affections  to  her  love,  our  actions 
^to  her  service."  ^ 

The  principle  of  adaptation  is  clearly  manifested  in  this  dis- 
cussion for  not  only  is  the  development  of  art  dependent  on  social 
utility,^  but  its  influence  is  based  on  the  doctrine  of  relativity  or 
"  adaptability."  The  ideal  must  spring  out  of  the  real  and  in- 
spire men  to  transform  the  real,  gradually ^  in  the  line  of  perfec- 
tionment. 

The  ideal  of  humanity  as  a  Great  Being  is  a  fiction  of  the  mind, 
according  to  Comte,  but  though  an  illusion  is  in  a  sense  true 
because  this  fiction  and  religious  worship  connected  with  it,  are 
necessary  to  progress. 

Idealization  and  Religion  According  to  Ross 

Idealization  according  to  Ross  is  the  product  of  self-esteem 
reacting  reflectively  in  accordance  with  our  mental  and  tempera- 
mental make-up.  The  process  is  both  personal  and  social/ 
Society,  by  a  process  of  utility  and  selection,  evolves  certain 
"  types  "  of  character  and  conduct.  The  individual  accepts  these, 
with  modification,  as  his  personal  ideals.  The  social  type  is 
always  above  the  average  man  so  that  "  it  is  able  to  lift  him  once 
he  comes  to  live  it  and  lay  hold  on  it."  ^ 

Ross  shows  how  each  social  class  and  calling  has  its  type  or 
Jdeal,  in  each  case  developed  by  the  principle  of  adaptation,  as  for 
example,  contempt  of  danger  in  the  soldier  type,  harshness  in  the 
jailor,  tenderness  in  the  nurse;  and  how  these  types  are  magni- 1 
fied  and  glorified  by  literature,  oratory,  art  and  religion  thus 

^  Feminine  because  the  Great  Being  is  a  personification  of  those  qualities  that 
find  their  highest  expression  in  woman. 
2  A  General  View,  p.  365. 
'  Ihid.,  p.  325. 
*  Social  Control,  p.  220. 


302  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

making  a  strong  appeal  to  the  individual  who  desires  social  esteem 
and  dreads  the  shame  of  social  disapproval.^  Types  complete  in 
every  feature,  however,  are  provided  only  for  the  chief  positions 
I  in  life.  For  the  rest,  society  by  dissecting  and  comparing  normal 
conduct  for  all  sorts  of  exigencies  brings  to  light  certain  resem- 
blances; but  each  individual  has  to  work  out  for  himself  his  own 
personal  ideal. 

The  generalized  types  formulated  by  society  by  a  process  of 
passive  adjustment  furnish  the  background  for  conventional 
\  ethics;  the  personal  acceptance  of  and  reaction  on  these  general- 
\  ized  types  furnish  the  highest  form  of  reflective  ethics.^^  "  The 
greatest  effect  of  an  ideal,"  says  Ross,  "  is  not  attained  when  it  is 
pitched  very  far  above  natural  inclination,"  —  otherwise  it  will 
attract  such  a  slender  portion  of  the  whole  area  of  variation  that 
it  will  benefit  very  few  people;  yet  on  the  other  hand  too  low  a 
standard  may  do  no  good  by  not  being  far  enough  above  the 
average  to  raise  it.^ 

Idealization,  accofiing  to  our  author,  is  a  powerful  means  of 
control  and  at  present  has  more  promise  than  any  of  its  rivals,  — 
\  though  not  a  final  form.     "  §ocial  order  will  have  to  rest  on  arti- 
'  ,fice  till  there  is  joined  to  natural  altruism,  as  we  find  it  developing 
in  the  family,  a  clearness  of  vision  that  sees  in  the  upright  dis- 
charge of  the  requirements  of  every  social  office  and  station  the 
highest  ministry  to  the  welfare  of  our  fellows."  ^     He  does  not 
show  how  this  vision  is  to  be  secured,  however,  —  for  this  vision 
itself  needs  to  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  adaptation. 
.      Art,  according  to  Ross,  as  with  Comte,  is  the  means  of  express- 
'  ing  ideals.     It  functions  in  social  progress  by  arousing  the  pas- 
sions, by  kindling  sympathy,  by  exploiting  the  aesthetic  sense  and 
the  sense  of  the  sublime,  by  perfecting  social  symbols  and  by 
fascinating  with  new  types.      It  performs  one  of  its  greatest 
functions  in  transmuting  realities  and  in  veiling  with  some  attrac- 
tive image  the  grisly  features  of  hardship,  mutilation,  and  death, 
especially  in  its  glorification  of  war  and  sacrifice  when  these  are 
needed.    Art  softens  inevitable  ills,  persuades  to  present  hardship 

^  Social  Control,  p.  235.  ^  Ihid.,  p.  243. 

2  Ihid.,  p.  242.  *  Ihid.,  p.  246. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  303 

for  the  sake  of  future  gain  and  lures  man  to  the  supremest 
sacrifices  for  the  sake  not  of  self,  but  of  society  at  large.^ 

Closely  related  to  idealization  is  illusion,  —  a  device  evolved  to 
control  those  who  cannot  be  controlled  by  other  devices,  such 
as  the  illusion  of  pseudo-consequences  exploited  in  Sunday-school 
literature;  that  of  social  solidarity  which  has  no  real  basis  of  appeal 
to  the  individual,  and  that  of  asceticism,  —  a  s)miptom  of  bad 
race  temperament,  depressing  climate,  low  physical  tone,  or 
the  resource  of  a  class  desiring  power.  Another  illusion  is  that 
of  the  dicta  of  intuitional  rather  than  social  moralists  who  are 
interested  in  abstract  duty  rather  than  in  social  welfare.^ 

Ross'  use  of  the  term  illusion  in  some  of  these  cases  at  least  is 
questionable.  All  are  inductions  from  experience,  perhaps  exag- 
gerated or  mixed  with  error,  or  generalizations  that  are  not 
applicable  in  every  individual  case. 

Social  valuations  and  the  genesis  of  ethical  elements  are  next  dis- 
cussed and  large  use  is  made  of  the  principle  of  adaptation, 
some  of  these  valuations  being  derived  from  race  experience, 
others  being  the  creation  of  genius.  "  The  improvement  in  the 
ethical  standard  of  a  civilization,"  he  says,  "  is  due  to  the  survival 
and  ascendancy  of  those  elements  which  are  best  adapted  to  an 
orderly  social  life.^^^  The  principle  of  selection,  he  holds,  explains 
only  the  rise  of  the  ethos  of  the  clan.  "  We  need  invention  to 
explain  the  rise  of  a  national  or  race  ethos. "/^  In  this  distinction 
we  have  a  contrast  between  passive  and  active  adaptation. 

Ross'  discussion  of  religion  is  unsatisfactory  because  unclear  if 
not  contradictory.  In  one  place  he  seems  to  accept  the  reality  of 
mysticism  from  which  springs  legal  reHgion,^  but  in  other  places 
this  is  held  to  be  an  illusion  though  necessary,^  while  the  only  true 
religion  is  held  to  be  social  idealism  based  on  sympathy,  —  very 
like  Comte's  Religion  of  Humanity?  This  social  religion  is 
defined  as  "  the  conviction  that  there  is  a  bond  of  ideal  relation- 
ship between  the  members  of  a  society  and  the  feelings  that  arise 
in  consequence  of  this  connection."     In  one  place  he  seems  to 

1  Social  Control,  pp.  264  f.  *  Ihid.,  pp.  197,  207,  216. 

2  Ibid.,  ch.  XXIII.  6  Ibid.,  pp.  209,  212,  441. 
»  Ihid.y  p.  342.          '•  Ibid.,  p.  350.  '  Ibid.,  ch.  XVI. 


304  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

accept  the  interpretation  of  religion  as  given  by  Jesus/  but  again 
turns  aside  from  all  super-naturalism  although  apparently  he 
rejects  the  religion  of  naturalism.^ 

1  On  the  whole  Ross  seems  to  consider  religion  to  be  an  idealiza- 
1  tion  of  social  relations  and  experiences,  and  ojie  of  the  most  potent 
1  factors  in  securing  both  order  and  progress.  T  "  A  body  of  religious 
belief  of  the  kind  I  have  described  [the  faith  that  makes  for  ethical 
religion]  ",  he  says,  "  is  a  storage  battery  of  moral  emotion.  It 
is  a  means  of  storing  up  for  society  the  moral  energy  of  the  ethical 
elite,  and  enabling  it  to  do  work  by  producing  sociable  emotions 
and  modifying  conduct  in  desirable  ways."^ 

Comparing  the  value  of  social  religion  with  other  means  of 
social  control  he  says:  "  The  palm  must  always  belong  to  that 
influence  which  goes  to  the  root  of  man's  badness,  and  by  giving 
him  more  interests  and  sympathies  converts  a  narrow  self  into  a 
broad  self."  ^  He  concludes  that  "  social  religion  has  a  long  and 
^j  possibly  a  great  career  awaiting  it."  "As  it  disengages  itself 
(from  that  which  is  transient  and  perishable,"  he  continues,  "  as 
jthe  dross  is  purged  away  from  its  beliefs  and  the  element  of  social 
icompulsion  entirely  disappears  from  it,  social  religion  will  be- 
come purer  and  nobler.  No  longer  a  paid  ally  of  the  policeman, 
!no  longer  a  pillar  of  social  order,  it  will  take  its  unquestioned  place 
with  art,  and  science,  and  wisdom,  as  one  of  the  free  manifesta- 
tions of  the  higher  human  spirit." 

Idealization  and  Religion  According  to  Baldwin 

Professor  Baldwin's  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  ^  so 
abounds  in  material  bearing  on  this  phase  of  our  subject  that 
selection  or  a  brief  summary  is  difficult. 
/  The  imagination,  according  to  our  author,  is  not  merely  con- 
f  structive  in  its  activity  but  "  creative  "  for  the  products  of  its 
activity  are  "  new  forms  into  which  the  materials  of  our  thought 
are  cast  as  a  result  of  variations  in  our  actions  in  the  process  of 

^  Social  Control,  pp.  204  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  213.      The  Religion  of  Naturalism  is  not  given  the  best  possible 
interpretation. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  212.  *  Ibid.,  p.  216.  **  Also  his  Individiml  and  Society. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  305 

adaptation  to  the  ends  of  utility."  "  It  is  by  adapted  action," 
he  continues,  "  that  our  mental  life  is  held  together  in  great  con-' 
sistent  thought-systems;  and  it  is  by  new  refinements  upon  these 
adapted  and  correlated  actions  that  new  variations  are  intro- 
duced into  the  systems  of  our  coherent  thought."  ^  Thus  the 
truth  is  that  thought  is  a  function  of  doing  as  well  as  the  reverse, 
that  "what  we  do  is  always  a  function  of  what  we  think,"  2 
and  the  thought  that  is  eventually  incorporated  into  our  thought- 
system  is  the  result  of  activity  that  has  proven  of  adaptive 
value. 

The  idealizing  as  well  as  constructive  function  of  the  imagina- 
tion is  prominent  in  the  dialectic  of  growth  in  the  developing 
child,  and  in  this  process  several  "  selves  "  emerge  in  conscious- 
ness: (i)  the  habitual  self  consisting  of  a  "  solidified  mass  of  per- 
sonal material  which  he  has  worked  into  a  systematic  whole  by  a 
series  of  acts  ";  ^  (2)  the  accommodating  self,  still  in  the  "  projec- 
tive," unfinished  stage  "  that  is  constantly  being  modified  by  the 
influences  outside,  and  in  turn,  passing  the  new  things  learned 
over  to  the  self  of  habit, — the  self  that  learns,  that  imitates,  that 
accommodates  to  new  suggestions  ";  (3)  an  ethical  self  gradually 
emerging  partly  by  obedience  and  partly  by  suggestion,  built  up 
as  a  result  of  contact  with  father,  mother,  nurse,  and  others, 
whose  actions  he  cannot  interpret  but  whom  he  must  obey,  and 
who,  he  comes  to  learn,  in  turn  obey  a  common  law;  (4)  an  ideal 
self  "  which  represents  his  best  accommodation  to  self  in  general," 
and  (5)  a  public  self  the  basis  of  the  ideal  self.'* 

Having  described  the  process  by  which  the  ideal  self  arises  in 
consciousness,^  Baldwin  says,  "  The  regular,  law-abiding,  sanc- 
tion-bringing, duty-observing  self  hovers  over  his  thought, 
inspires  it  and  regulates  its  tendencies  to  action."  "  This  general 
notion  of  self,"  he  continues,  "  is,  like  all  general  notions  con- 
sidered as  general,  not  a  presentation,  not  a  mental  content,  but 
an  attitude,  a  way  of  acting;  and  the  child  has  to  bring  all 
the  partial  personal  tendencies  to  action  which  spring  up  on  the 

^  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  94. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  92,  97.  ■*  Ibid.,  pp.  283,  284,  315. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  34.  5  Ibid.,  pp.  36  f. 


3o6  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

thought  of  the  partial  more  isolated  selves  of  his  habit,  into  the 
way  of  action  which  we  call  ethical  conduct."  ^ 

The  concrete  body  of  this  ideal,  that  is,  the  child's  actual 
mental  picture  of  what  is  good  in  a  person,  is  made  up  from  his 
own  acts  and  the  acts  which  he  conceives  as  possibly  his  own. 
"  And  then,  so  far  as  he  feels  it  to  be  inadequate,  he  seeks  to  find, 
in  the  persons  projective  to  him  some  one  or  more  whose  actions 
are  better  than  his.'* 

Ethical  conduct  has  one  aspect  which  our  author  calls  sentiment 
and  defines  as  "  the  emotional  or  active  tendency  of  consciousness 
away  beyond  the  confines  of  its  actual  interpretations.''  ^  This 
general  sentiment  has  three  phases  the  ethical,  social,  and  re- 
ligious, which  are  of  special  importance  in  our  present  discussion. 

"  The  most  general  and  important  phase  of  ethical  sentiment," 
he  says,  "  is  that  known  in  theoretical  ethics  as  the  sense  of 
obligation."  This  arises,  he  shows,  from  a  sense  of  incomplete- 
ness, of  mal-adaptation,  of  social  restraint  compelling  obedience  to 
a  law  higher  than  any  worked  out  by  himself  .^  When  the  child 
has  attained  an  appreciation  of  right  conduct  he  "  ejects  "  this 
into  his  associates,^  and  by  the  dialectics  of  personal  and  social 
growth  there  is  worked  out  a  general  public  opinion. 

By  social  or  public  sentiment  is  meant  that  pressure  of  social 
suggestion  and  constraint  on  the  individual  of  which  the  child,  — 
and  all  persons,  —  are  more  or  less  conscious  much  of  the  time^ 
this  sentiment  growing  out  of  the  conflicts  between  the  habitual 
self  and  the  public  self .^  This  public  sentiment  as  felt  and  given 
intellectual  form,  becomes  ethical  judgment.  The  child  judges 
and  realizes  that  he  is  judged,  —  another  dialectic  process.^ 

The  religious  sentiment  of  the  growing  child  is  merely  an  ex- 
tension of  the  ethical  and  social,^  and  has  two  elements,  sl  feeling 
of  dependence  with  three  phases,  spontaneous,  intellectual  and 
ethical,  and  sl  feeling  of  mystery  engendered  as  a  result  of  his  ever 
increasing  experience  of  the  imexpected  and  inexplicable  in  his 
relations  with  persons.^ 

^  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  295.  *  /jjj.^  pp.  ^6,  297. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  299,  331;   cf.  The  Individual  and  Society,  p.  72. 

*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  315. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  326.  '  Ibid.,  p.  441.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  347 1. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  307 

The  developing  sense  of  dependence  in  its  intellectual  phase 
gives  rise  to  the  two  categories  of  cause  and  design  ^  which  enter 
as  elements  into  the  construction  of  his  ideal  of  the  great  spirit) 
in  its  ethical  phase  it  gives  rise  to  such  attributes  of  Deity  as  jus- 
tice, mercy,  grace,  love  and  righteousness.  This  sense  of  depend- 
ence further  explains  the  essential  anthropomorphism  of  the 
religious  consciousness.^ 

There  are  two  elements  in  the  "  personal  sense  "  as  revealed  in 
this  anthropomorphism:  "  (i)  There  is  the  tendency  to  make 
ejective  the  ideal  person  reached  by  the  road  already  traced;  to 
make  it  real,  a  separate  being  or  personality.  There  must  be 
somewhere,  feels  the  child,  a  self  which  answers  to  all  the  elements 
of  the  law:  to  the  charity,  the  love,  the  beauty  of  the  ideal,  whose 
presence  in  my  thought  makes  my  own  self  morally  so  incom- 
plete. .  .  .  The  great  spirit  becomes  the  way  of  speaking  of 
this  being,  —  that  is,  it  is  the  race-child's  way.  (2)  The  other 
element  in  religious  emotion  is  the  child's  expectation  of  yet  more 
manifestations  from  this  highest  of  all  persons,  —  manifestations 
which  he  cannot  anticipate  nor  cope  with;  which  he  must  submit 
to  when  they  come,  learn  of  only  when  they  have  come,  propitiate 
in  the  ways  that  please  persons,  and  stand  in  awe  of  from  first  to 
last."  3 

"  The  ejective,  personifying  element,  which  the  history  of 
primitive  peoples  puts  so  clearly  in  evidence,"  our  author  con- 
tinues, "  gives  positive  content  to  the  religious  sentiment  as 
mentioned  above;  while  the  projective  or  negative  element,  as 
seen  thus  in  this  latter  aspect  of  the  child's  growth,  is  the  awe- 
inspiring,  something-over  of  mystery  equally  emphasized  in  the 
rites  and  cults  of  primitive  ceremonial."  * 

This  developing  sense  of  mystery  in  the  dialectic  of  personal 
growth  is  analyzed  as  follows:  — 

First.  The  ethical  child,  —  and  man  too, — must  think  of  God  as  thinking  of 
him;  as  having  a  positive  ethical  attitude  toward  him.  .  .  . 

Second.  In  this  highest  stretch,  therefore,  of  the  religious  Hfe  into  which 
the  child  is  now  entering,  God  is  a  real  person,  standing  in  real  relations  of 

^  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  337;  also  to  those  of  "  omnipotence  and 
omnipresence,"  p.  346. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  346.  3  /^^  pp_  230,  331.  *  Ibid.,  p.  331. 


3o8  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

approval  and  disapproval, — says  the  religious  sense, — to  me  who  worships 
him.  .  .  . 

The  divine  person  is,  in  the  religious  hfe,  very  much  the  same  sort  of  a 
postulate  that  the  social  fellow  is  in  the  ethical  life,  and  that  the  world  of 
external  and  personal  relationships  is  in  the  intellectual  life. 

Third.  The  intelligence  is  baffled  both  by  the  limitations  of  its  own  growth 
and  by  the  very  "  projective  "  and  "  prospective  "  nature  of  the  movement  upon 
which  the  religious  sense  rests.  .  .  . 

Fourth.  The  essential  mysticism  of  the  religious  consciousness  lives  to  the 
last.^ 

Our  author  concludes  his  discussion  as  follows:  "  The  place  of 
religion  in  social  development  is,  in  view  of  its  dependence  upon 
the  growth  of  self  at  all  its  stages,  that  of  emotion  of  the  social 
sort.  It  becomes  most  important  in  its  alHance  with  the  ethical 
hfe  in  the  higher  reaches  of  human  development.''  ^ 

Thus  out  of  the  activities,  the  conflicts  and  the  relationships  of 
life  evolves  in  the  child  and  in  the  race,  by  the  dialectic  of  personal 
growth,  reference  for  ideal  personality. 

Professor  Baldwin's  analysis  of  the  dialectic  of  personal  growth 
issuing  in  reverence  for  personaUty  is  most  suggestive  and  helpful, 
but  there  are  other  processes  of  idealization  issuing  in  so-called 
religion  which  his  analysis  does  not  cover.  He  lays  stress  on  the 
esprit  de  corps  ^  to  be  found  in  certain  groups  and  on  the  social 
instincts  that  give  rise  to  the  social  self  but  he  has  not  analyzed 
the  expansion  of  self-consciousness  to  include  a  group  so  satis- 
factorily as  has  McDougall  for  example.  The  truth  seems  to  be 
that  whereas  empirical  self -consciousness  is  clarified  and  intensi- 
fied by  conflict  with  nature  and  with  other  individuals,  social 
self-consciousness,  i.  e.,  self -feeling  that  includes  a  group,  de- 
velops through  co-operation  with  other  selves  imited  by  common 
interests  and  by  conflicts  with  other  groups. 

In  proportion  as  esprit  de  corps  is  developed  and  enthusiastic 
effort  put  forth  for  the  success  of  the  group;  in  proportion  as  the 
members  have  faith  in  the  organization  or  institution  and  in  the 
ideal  for  which  it  exists;  in  proportion  as  they  love  and  serve  it, 
sometimes  being  willing  even  to  die  for  it,  a  phenomenon  results 
that  has  some  warrant  to  be  called  "  social  religion."     This  was 

*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  355  (italics  in  text). 
2  Ihid.,  p.  357.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  232,  407  f. 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  309 

Comte's  attitude  toward  humanity  idealized  and  personified  as 
the  "  Great  Being."  Such  is  the  attitude  of  many  toward 
socialism.  There  is  a  third  phenomenon  that  is  frequently 
called  religion,  namely  a  worshipful  attitude  toward  the  cosmos. 
A  sense  of  mystery  and  power  above  and  beyond  the  highest 
reach  of  intellect  or  of  experience  evokes  the  negative  self-feeling 
with  a  sense  of  dependence,  submission,  and  obedience.  With 
feeling  dominant  the  result  is  mysticism;  with  the  intellect 
dominant  we  are  apt  to  have  some  form  of  religious  monism,  i.  e., 
an  attitude  of  beHef  and  trust  in  the  Eternal  Source  of  Power. 
Now  as  the  process  of  the  evolving  self-consciousness  on  the  one 
hand  and  of  the  expanding  self-consciousness  or  self-feeling  on  the 
other  are  not  distinct  processes  but  essentially  one  with  two 
aspects,  and  as  the  processes  of  idealization  growing  out  of  them 
are  valid  for  life  activity,  so  the  religious  culmination  of  each  may 
be  considered  as  tme.  We  need  a  reverence  for  personality, 
individual  and  transcendental,  as  we  have  in  theism;  we  need 
also  reverence  for  personality  as  incarnate  in  our  fellow-men  and 
as  approached  in  the  unity  and  power  of  intelligent  social  en- 
deavor. 

In  the  chapter  on  biological  evolution  we  noted  the  value  of 
the  doctrine  of  adaptation  in  explaining  the  origin  of  conscious- 
ness and  the  development  of  the  instincts  (including  the  social) 
and  of  the  higher  intellectual  quaHties  of  man.  In  our  discussion 
of  the  transition  from  passive  to  active  adaptation  we  considered 
this  same  question  further  with  the  addition  of  new  material, 
especially  the  importance  of  "  prolongation  of  infancy "  in 
enabling  the  individual  to  become  adjusted  to  his  spiritual 
environment.  We  have  seen  how  Baldwin  has  endeavored  to 
explain  the  development  of  idealization  and  religion  by  the  "  di- 
alectic of  personal  growth,"  and  have  discussed  the  function  of 
these  two  factors  through  the  writings  of  several  authors,  especially 
Comte  and  Ross.  The  sum  of  the  whole  matter  seems  to  be  that 
beginning  historically  in  the  personification  of  the  forces  of  nature 
as  in  animism,  the  process  of  idealization  has  culminated  now  in 
the  personification  and  worship  of  the  social  ideal  as  with  Comte, 
now  in  the  personification  and  worship  of  the  cosmic  process  itself 


3IO  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

as  in  the  spiritualistic  monism  of  Fiske,  but  again  in  belief  in 
and  worship  of  the  first  cause  considered  to  be  a  self-conscious 
personality,  as  with  Baldwin. 

Idealization  must  by  its  very  nature  be  accompanied  by  some 
sort  of  emotional  experience  and  a  volitional  tendency  to  satisfy 
the  interest  through  which,  alone,  the  process  could  have  been 
initiated  and  carried  to  completion;  i.  e.,  the  ideal  is  formed  in 
response  to  felt  need.  It  grows  out  of  the  experience  of  mal- 
adjustment with  the  spiritual  (including  social)  environment,  and 
is  a  force  drawing  the  individual  into  assimilation  with  the  ideal 
life  of  interest  and  desire.  The  mal-adjustments  which  lead  to 
the  formation  of  ideals  are  manifold,  arising  chiefly  from  the  fact 
that  the  individual  has  many  conflicting  interests  within  his  own 
personal  life  (as  between  the  desire  to  satisfy  hunger  and  the 
desire  for  intellectual  or  aesthetic  enjojonent),  and  from  the  fact, 
also,  that  he  is  a  member  of  various  social  unities  with  conflicting 
"  mores  "  and  conflicting  ideals.  But  this  very  conflict  of  ideals 
and  interests,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  condition  of  development. 
As  friction  between  the  wheels  and  track  is  necessary  for  progress 
by  the  locomotive;  as  consciousness  itself  is  born  out  of  the  fric- 
tion developed  in  the  process  of  personal  growth,^  so  the  higher 
reaches  of  intellectual  and  moral  power  are  the  outcome  of  con- 
flicts won  in  struggles  on  the  lower  planes  of  living.  This  leads 
us  to  formulate  the  law  that  mal-adaptation  on  the  lower  planes 
of  life  is  essential  to  progress  to  a  higher  plane.  To  use  another 
illustration:  as  biological  progress  is  marked  by  the  development 
of  "  inhibitors  "  or  factors  that  control  or  prevent  the  functioning 
of  other  factors  or  "  characters,"  ^  so  social  and  moral  evolution  is 
marked  by  the  development  of  self-control,  and  self-control,  both 
individual  and  social,  is  secured  only  by  the  experience  of  conflict 
and  victory,  —  of  mal-adaptation  leading  to  a  higher  form  of 
adaptation.^ 

^  Sabatier,  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  15. 

2  Professor  C.  B.  Davenport  would  seem  to  make  self-control  wholly  a  matter  of 
the  presence  of  "  inhibitors  "  in  the  germ  plasm  which  mider  normal  conditions 
come  to  expression  and  prevent  anti-social  conduct.  In  a  letter  to  the  author  he 
says,  "  In  the  development  of  the  child,  the  inhibitors  develop  one  after  the  other  in 
those  who  are  self-controlled  and  fail  of  development  in  those  who  lack  self-control "; 


IDEALIZATION  AND  RELIGION  3  II 

To  conclude  this  present  discussion:  Man  must  adapt  himself 
to  his  physical  environment  and  adapt  it  to  his  needs.  Out  of 
this  problem  and  process  arises  the  necessity  of  adapting  himself 
to  his  social  environment  and  in  the  case  of  the  cultured  man  of 
influencing  others  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  his  manifold 
personal  interests  (or  needs).  But  among  these  needs  are  some 
that  are  social,  intellectual,  aesthetic,  moral  and  religious,  and  the 
satisfaction  of  these  demands  co-operation  with  his  fellow-men 
rather  than  exploitation.  Thus  the  self  develops  both  intensively 
and  extensively,  each  experience  of  mal-adaptation  making  possible 
a  higher  form  of  adaptation  culminating,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the 
formation  of  the  personal  ideal,  the  group  quasi-personal  ideal,  and 
the  cosmic  or  divine  ideal. 

The  process  of  adjusting  oneself  progressively  to  the  ever- 
enlarging  personal  and  group  ideal  is  a  phase  of  spiritual  adapta- 
tion which  might  be  called  moral  adaptation,  and  if  the  personal 
and  group  ideal  is  given  religious  sanction,  i.  e.,  if  the  intellectual 
form  is  supported  by  beUef  in  and  adoration  of  an  objective  cor- 
relate of  the  ideal,  and  the  individual  endeavors  to  conform  his  life 
to  that  ideal  we  have  religious  adaptation. 

Is  there  another  phase  of  the  religious  Hfe  and  thought  which 
corresponds  to  active  material  and  active  social  adaptation  in  the 
sense  of  a  manipulation  of  the  ontological  correlate  of  the  per- 
sonal religious  ideal  in  the  interest  of  self-satisfaction  ?  In  other 
words,  instead  of  conceiving  of  this  object  of  religious  thought 
and  worship  as  a  self-conscious  intelligence  to  whose  will  the 
individual  and  society  must  conform,  may  it  be  conceived  as  the 
cosmic  order  in  process  of  self-evolution,  of  which  man  is  a  part 
and  which  he,  in  turn,  helps  to  create  ?     The  religious  ideal  as  a 

cf.  article  by  him  in  The  Medical  Times,  Oct.  1914.  According  to  this  theory,  self- 
control  is  entirely  spontaneous  and  primarily  a  matter  of  germinal  qualities  that 
develop,  under  normal  conditions,  in  all  but  the  feeble-minded.  This  automatic 
self-control,  if  there  be  such,  is  not  the  kind  the  author  has  in  mind,  but  the  control 
that  comes  through  training  and  is  at  least  in  part  the  result  of  conscious  effort.  In 
both  cases,  however,  there  is  struggle,  for  struggle,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  determining 
factor  in  the  development  of  germinal  capacity  including  these  inhibitors;  effective 
training  has  a  considerable  element  of  coercion,  and  conscious  effort  is  anything  but 
"  spontaneous."  We  seem  justified  in  saying,  then,  that  power  of  active  adaptation 
is  dependent  on  struggle  or  mal-adaptation  in  some  form  and  to  some  degree. 


312  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

mental  construction  is  a  human  invention.     Is  the  final  cause 
in  some  sense  and  degree  a  human  creation  ? 

If  the  absolute  is  experience,  as  Bradley  holds,^  or  if  the  cosmic 
process  is  itself  creative,  as  according  to  Ward  and  Bergson,  then 
man  may  have  as  his  religious  goal  not  simply  conformity  to  the 
will  of  God  or  to  the  unfolding  of  the  cosmic  order,  but  he  may 
even  dare  to  make  the  cosmic  order  conform,  in  some  small 
degree,  to  his  ideal  and  minister  to  his  needs.  Primitive  man 
endeavored  to  "  manipulate  "  God  or  the  gods  by  sacrifice, 
incense,  prayers,  etc.  The  Christian  of  today  seeks  to  win  favor 
and  the  supply  of  his  needs  by  prayer,  and  in  the  thought  of 
many,  by  the  kind  of  life  that  merits  divine  favor.  Compara- 
tively few  have  attained  the  thought  of  compelling  divine  favor 
by  living  in  conformity  with  divine  (because  cosmic)  laws;  — 
and  fewer  still  have  gone  so  far,  probably  too  far,  as  to  believe  that 
there  is  no  other  divine  law  than  just  these  laws  we  have  been 
and  are  discovering,  formulating  and  controlling  in  the  realms  of 
nature  and  mind.  Are  we  warranted  in  taking  the  step,  then,  of 
asserting  that  as  the  incarnation  of  creative  intelligence,  men  as 
creators  are  making  cosmic  laws,  and  in  a  sense  making  the  God 
they  worship  ?  If  so,  we  have  a  new  and  final  form  of  adaptation 
which  might  be  called  active  religious  adaptation,  but  as  this 
assumes  that  there  is  no  higher  form  of  consciousness,  thought, 
feeling  or  will  than  that  possessed  by  man,  we  cannot  give  our 
assent  to  this  hypothesis. 

^  Appearance  and  Reality. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SUMMARY  AND   CONCLUSION 

The  purpose  of  our  investigation  as  set  forth  in  the  Introduction 
was  to  make  a  historical  approach  to  a,  constructive  social  phi- 
losophy having  as  its  central  theme,  adagtatio^ in  its  four-fold 
aspect  of  passive  material  and  spiritual  and  active  material  and 
spiritual,  —  this  approach  beginning  with  Auguste  Comte  and 
Herbert  Spencer,  though  in  a  few  cases  including  previous  writers 
whose  contributions  seemed  essential  to  an  appreciation  of  those 
coming  later.  The  method  chosen  was  to  review  briefly  the  social 
theories  of  writers  in  this  field  who  have  been  most  influential  in 
the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation,  and  in  an  order  so 
far  as  possible,  both  historical  and  logical. 

Comte's  Positivism  was  reviewed  as  a  fitting  prolegomenon  to 
social  philosophy  and  it  was  shown  how  he  had  contributed  to  the 
problem  and  formulated  this  principle  of  adaptation  in  its  various 
aspects  though  with  different  terminology.  His  chief  contribu- 
tion, we  saw,  was  his  insistence  on  the  possibility  of  a  scientific 
study  of  society,  and  the  necessity  of  such  a  study  as  the  basis  of 
social  reconstruction.  Comte,  however,  did  not  believe  in  cosmic 
evolution,  so  his  system  was  a  "  subjective  synthesis  "  without  a 
necessary  objective  correlate.  / 

/  Herbert  Spencer  is  to  be  credited  with  the  first  comprehensive 
attempt  to  formulate  the  principle  of  cosmic  evolution  and  this  he 
did  in  terms  of  increasing  differentiation  and  integration.  In  his 
Social  Statics,  he  formulated  the  principle  of  adaptation  and 
applied  it  as  a  test  to  various  institutions.  In  his  Progress,  Its 
Law  and  Cause,  he  worked  out  the  organic  analogy  as  applied  to 
society.  In  his  Sociology,  he  showed  how  the  general  law  he  had 
formulated  for  cosmic  evolution  applied  to  the  development  of 
society  as  a  whole  but  especially  to  various  social  institutions, 
giving  much  consideration  to  primitive  conditions.  We  noted 
that  while  the  theory  of  passive  adaptation,  both  physical  and 

313 


314  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

social,  was  developed  to  a  high  point  by  this  author,  he  gave 
almost  no  place  to  the  concept  of  active  adaptation. 
/  With  a  discussion  of  these  two  founders  of  sociology  considered 
both  as  a  science  and  philosophy,  we  turned  to  a  discussion  of 
methodology,  considering  especially  the  statistical  method  as 
developed  by  Quetelet,  the  analogical  method  finding  its  most 
complete  expression  in  Lilienfeld,  the  method  of  classification  as 
exemplified  by  De  Greef ,  and  the  inductive  method  as  outlined  by 
Comte  and  used  by  Darwin  and  his  successors,  —  this  method 
including  the  historical  and  what  we  termed  the  inverse  historical., 
or  the  study  of  the  present  as  a  key  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
past. 

Turning  to  the  subject  of  passive  physical  adaptation,  we 
contrasted  the  theories  of  Lamarck  and  Darwin,  the  former  hold- 
ing that  variation  and  progress  were  the  result  of  the  activity  of 
the  organism  in  response  to  felt  need  of  adjustment  to  life  condi- 
tions, these  useful  variations  being  transmitted  by  heredity;  the 
latter  laying  chief  stress  on  the  passivity  of  the  organism  and  the 
active  character  of  nature  in  selecting,  as  it  were,  for  survival, 
those  organisms  and  species  particularly  qualified  to  win  out  in 
the  struggle  for  existence  (including  the  leaving  of  offspring), 
though  resorting  at  times  to  the  supplementary  principle  of  use- 
inheritance.  We  reviewed  also  his  Descent  of  Man  in  which  the 
same  principles  are  used  to  explain  the  development  of  social 
instincts,  conscience,  and  indeed,  all  the  qualities  that  go  to  make 
the  winning  individual  and  group.  The  contributions  of  Weis- 
mann,  De  Vries  and  Mendel  were  mentioned  and  a  brief  survey 
given  of  the  standing  of  Darwinism  today  among  leading  biol- 
ogists. Their  disagreement  on  points  of  vital  importance  in 
social  philosophy  led  to  the  conclusion  that  biology  furnished,  as 
yet,  a  precarious  foimdation  for  a  constructive  theory  of  social 
progD^  In  almost  every  case,  however,  adaptation  was  the  one 
thmg  insisted  upon,  though  some  gave  wide  latitude  to  the  degree 
necessary  for  survival. 

This  general  spirit  of  uncertainty  or  positive  disagreement 
furnished  us  a  background  for  the  study  of  social  philosophers 
who  have  built  their  theories  on  the  neo-Darwinian  formula  and 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  315 

we  concluded  that  their  analogical  method  was  unsatisfactory, 
also  that  the  biometric  method  of  the  Galton  JEugenicsLaboratory 
had  not  as  yet  yielded  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  relative  in- 
fluence of  "  nature ''  and  "  nurture,"  because  the  data  were 
unreliable  and  because  of  the  inherent  difficulty  of  separating 
these  two  factors.  Evidence  brought  forward  in  later  chapters 
has  tended  to  confirm  this  conclusion  and  to  leave  us  in  uncer- 
tainty as  to  whether  or  not  progress  from  the  far  distant  period  of 
the  Neanderthal  and  Cro-Magnon  types  of  man  has  been  in  native 
mental  ability  or  merely  in  somatic  variations  in  the  line  of  or- 
ganic adaptation  to  geographical  environment,  and  in  acquired 
intellectual  and  moral  quaHties  transmitted  by  social  heredity. 
The  arguments  of  the  neo-Darwinian  sociologists  are  too  largely 
deductive  and  analogical  to  be  conclusive,  whereas  at  least  some 
of  the  evidence  produced  by  the  environmental  school  is  inductive 
and  indisputable.  /The  former  to  a  large  extent  have  made  the 
cardinal  mistake  of  assuming  that  the  different  races  of  mankind 
are  analogous  to  biological  species  whereas  at  present  the  con- 
sensus of  opinion  is  that  there  is  but  one  species,  while  the  term 
^' race"  has  no  definite  connotation.  Evidence  concerning  the 
difference  in  social  instincts,  keenness  of  sense  perception,  and 
intellectual  and  emotional  qualities  between  primitive  and 
modern  man  is  so  conflicting  as  to  counsel  moderation  of  state- 
ment rather  than  dogmatism.  The  evidence  on  the  whole,  how- 
ever, indicates  that  as  there  have  been  somatic  variations  mak- 
ing for  better  adaptation  to  life  conditions,  especially  in  the 
decrease  in  the  size  of  the  mandibles,  in  pigmentation  and  accli- 
mation, so  there  have  been  variations  in  the  nervous  system 
and  brain  tissue  making  for  greater  adaptation  to  the  conditions 
of  existence  and  success  imposed  by  modern  life  in  civilized 
nations.  Differences  in  individuals  are  unquestioned,  but  when 
the  group  is  made  the  sociological  unit  the  standard  of  ability  is  no 
longer  individual  but  social,  and  we  have  no  sure  word  concerning 
the  native  ability  of  the  average  in  any  civilized  nation  today  as 
compared  with  the  average  in  any  primitive  group  now  extant  or 
that  ever  existed.  No  two  groups  come  into  competition  now, 
and  never  have,  so  far  as  we  know,  under  such  conditions  that  we 


3l6  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

can  be  assured  that  the  success  of  the  winning  group  has  been 
merely  on  the  basis  of  native  ability  rather  than  on  opportunity 
and  training.^  This  suggests  as  a  definite  criticism  of  the  neo- 
Darwinian  sociologists  that  just  as  the  severity  of  competition 
among  lower  biological  orders  is  in  dispute,  so  among  social 
groups  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  inter-group  competition  is 
now  or  ever  will  be  so  acute  as  to  eliminate  all  but  the  best 
adapted. 

The  biological  sociologists  make  much  of  societal  selection  as  a 
method  of  improving  native  ability,  —  and  well  they  may, — but 
at  present  we  have  little  knowledge  of  value  as  a  guide.  Before 
agreement  can  be  reached  on  many  of  the  points  involved  we  must 
await  further  evidence  concerning  the  correlation  between  physical 
qualities  on  the  one  hand  and  intellectual  and  moral  qualities  on 
the  other,  for  societal  selection  in  so  far  as  it  is  non-mirposeful,  like 
natural  selection,  works  only  by  death  or  sterility./^As  to  positive 
eugenics,  we  need  to  know  more  concerning  the  native  quaHties 
which,  when  trained,  will  make  for  the  most  efficient  group  life.^ 
We  need  to  know  more  also  concerning  the  various  methods  of 
societal  selection  and  "  counter  selection  "  ^  that  we  may  en- 
courage those  that  are  favorable  to  the  production  and  preserva- 
tion of  socially  efficient  individuals  and  prevent  from  operation 
those  that  are  unfavorable.^     The  goal,  of  course,  is  to  work  out 

*  If  1,000  babies  bom  from  the  aristocracy  of  America,  1,000  babies  from  the 
proletariat  class  and  1,000  babies  bom  from  some  primitive  group  could  be  reared 
xmder  like  conditions  and  at  maturity  brought  into  some  kind  of  competition  we 
would  have  the  conditions  for  a  sociological  test  of  value  in  determining  race-stock 
efficiency.  But  even  in  this  case  the  test  would  not  necessarily  be  physical  vigor 
or  military  prowess  except  in  so  far  as  necessary  for  self-preservation,  nor  yet  in- 
dustrial superiority  except  in  so  far  as  necessary  for  cultural  achievement.  While 
these  tests  would  be  valid  in  proportion  as  existence  and  growth  of  the  groups 
were  vitally  involved,  if  the  competition  was  no  more  severe  than  among  civilized 
groups  today  the  test  might  well  be  the  ability  to  work  out  a  corporate  life  so 
manifestly  desirable  that  it  would  be  copied,  with  variation,  by  the  other  groups 
and  not  only  in  one  instance  but  continually,  for  the  supreme  test  is  "  in  the  long 
run."  The  supremely  desirable  thing  is  not  only  the  immortality  of  achievement 
as  the  term  is  used  by  Ward,  but  the  continuous  achievement  of  an  immortal 
group,  and  immortal  because  it  continues  to  achieve  that  which  is  worthy  of 
imitation. 

2  See  A.  G.  Keller,  Societal  Evolution,  ch.  VI. 

»  Cf.  Walter,  Genetics,  ch.  XI. 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  317 

that  kind  of  social  life,  social  organization  and  social  control 
which  shall  result  eventually  in  the  birth  only  of  those  who,  when 
properly  trained,  will  fit  most  effectively  into  the  life  of  the 
group  and  of  humanity  at  large. ^ 

These  criticisms  of  the  neo-Darwinian  sociologists  have  forced 
us  to  introduce  conclusions  from  later  chapters,  —  and  now  to 
return  to  the  progress  of  our  investigation.  /We  turned  from  this 
school  to  a  consideration  of  passive  socio-physical  adaptation,  or 
the  development  of  social  groups  with  reference  to  their  physical 
environment,  and  concluded  that  geographical  conditions  "  set 
the  life  lines  of  groups,"  condemning  some  to  isolation  and  stagna- 
tion and  opening  up  to  others  possibilities  of  enlarged  life  not 
only  by  affording  better  facilities  for  self-support  but  also  by 
inducing  inter-group  contact.  J^ 

Up  to  this  point  emphasis  had  been  chiefly  on  the  physiological 
basis  of  race-progress  with  race  conceived  in  biological  terms,  but 
anthropologists  having  assured  us  that  there  are  at  present  no 
pure  races  and  that  ethnic  groups  must  be  defined  with  reference 
to  cultural  even  more  than  to  physical  characteristics,  it  was 
necessary  to  turn  to  some  writers  who  had  developed  the  thought 
of  society  as  a  psychical  unity,  and  the  more  so  as  the  concept 
"  society  "  had  been  used  without  definite  content. 
/  In  the  discussion  of  Schaffle,  Mackenzie,  Le  Bon,  Durkheim 
and  other  social  psychologists,  we  developed  the  concept  of 
^ciety  as  a  psychical  "  somewhat,"  variously  organized,  in  a 
sense  over  against  the  individual,  molding  his  life  and  in  txim 
modified  by  his  reaction. /This  brought  us  to  the  phase  of  our 
subject  characterized  as  passive  spiritual  adaptation  and  an  ap- 
proach to  social  philosophy  through  social  psychology,  —  though 
to  a  considerable  extent  of  a  deductive  variety.  We  concluded 
that  every  group  or  social  organization,  united  by  common 
interests  and  co-operating  for  a  common  end  was  a  psychical  unity 
with  the  possibility  that  such  a  unity  might  at  certain  times  and 
under  certain  conditions  rise  to  such  community  of  thought, 

1  For  the  most  recent  attempt  to  work  out  a  social  philosophy  on  the  biologi- 
cal basis,  using  the  terms  variation,  selection,  transmission  and  adaptation  as 
"  key-words,"  see  the  admirable  book  by  Professor  A.  G.  Keller  of  Yale,  Societal 
Evolution. 


3l8  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

feeling  and  volition  as  to  warrant  the  application  of  such  terms  as 
social  organism^  social  consciousness  and  even  social  personality. 

The  next  line  of  development  considered  was  through  those 
social  philosophers  who  had  emphasized  an  inductive  study  of  the 
social  process,  dividing  the  writers  into  three  groups:  the  an- 
thropological, dealing  largely  with  primitive  man  and  the  begin- 
nings of  social  evolution,  the  historical,  endeavoring  to  analyze 
the  forces  at  work  in  the  progress  of  civilization  and  trace  the 
causal  nexus,  and  another  group  attempting  to  explain  social 
evolution  in  terms  of  some  one  law  or  principle.  /We  noted  the 
large  use  of  the  concept  of  adaptation  by  Sumner  and  Boas,  the 
one  interpreting  social  progress  almost  entirely  in  terms  of  natural 
selection,  the  other,  in  terms  of  environmental  influences,  and 
showed  how  useful  this  concept  had  been  in  explaining  ethnic  and 
social  origins.  We  saw  how  Gumplowicz  by  his  teaching  con- 
cerning progress  by  inter-group  conflict  and  cross-fertilization  of „ 
cultures,  and  Ratzenhofer  by  his  theory  of  interests  had  enriched 
our  knowledge  of  progressive  social  adaptation,  and  finally  how 
through  the  contributions  of  the  third  group  of  writers  we  had 
been  enabled  to  understand  the  process  of  association  and 
integration  within  each  society. 

As  a  net  result  of  our  study  of  the  phenomena  of  association  up 
to  this  point,  we  have  reached  the  concept  of  society  ^s  a  psycho- 
logical organization  with  some  sort  of  self-consciousness  and  will^ 
revealed  at  least  on  occasion;  we  have  seen  how  societies  are 
evolved,  on  the  one  hand,  by  such  inner  forces  and  processes  as 
social  and  sexual  selection,  division  of  labor,  consciousness  of  kind 
and  consciousness  of  supplementary  difference,  sympathy,  mutual 
aid,  suggestion,  imitation  and  social  constraint,  —  by  a  process, 
that  is,  of  inner  co-adaptation  (largely  passive),  and  we  have 
noted,  on  the  other  hand  how  such  societies  are  evolved  by  a 
process  of  progressive  adjustment  to  their  geographical  and  super- 
organic  environments  by  natural  selection  and  acclimation, 
by  inter-group  contacts  and  conflicts,  by  racial  and  cultural 
assimilation  and  amalgamation,  by  social  suggestion,  imitation 
and  constraint, — by  a  process,  that  is,  of  outer  adaptation^ — and 
this,  too,  largely  passive. 


\ 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  319 

In  all  our  discussion,  however,  while  chief  stress  has  been  laid  on 
progress  by  these  non-purposeful  reactions  between  societies  and 
between  societies  and  their  constituent  units,  the  function  of 
individual  and  social  purposeful  activity  has  been  brought  to 
view,  especially  in  the  theories  of  Baldwin  and  Giddings  with 
emphasis  on  the  social  goal  of  "  the  evolution  of  personality  j 
through  ever  higher  stages  until  it  attains  to  the  ideal  that  we  \ 
name  humanity.''^ 

With  a  brief  discussion  of  some  of  the  factors  that  enter  into  the 
transition  from  matter  to  mind,  from  unconscious  to  purposeful 
activity,  —  from  passive  to  active  adaptation,  —  with  special 
attention  to  Fiske's  theory  of  "  prolongation^^ infancy,^'  we 
turned  to  a  consideration  of  the  social  theories  of  some  who  had 
stressed  purposeful  activity  as  expressed  in  active  material 
adaptation.  We  noted  Ward^s  contributions  concerning  material 
asMevement,  individual  and  social  telesis,  and  the  power  of 
"  nurture  "  as  contrasted  with  "  nature."  We  considered  Pat- 
ten's theory  of  '^  pain-pleasure-creative  economy  "  with  well- 
being  measured  in  terms  of  health,  wealth  and  culture,  and 
reviewed  at  length  the  social  theory  of  Carver  with  a  criticism 
of  his  "  gospel  of  the  productive  life."  We  saw  that  with  him  the 
goal  of  cosmic  evolution  was  the  super-group  possessing  the  earth 
by  virtue  of  its  greater  group  efficiency,  this  efficiency,  in  turn, 
being  measured  by  the  sum  of  the  efficiency  of  the  individual 
members  as  properly  organized,  directed  and  controlled. 

Having  considered  with  these  writers  the  fundamental  need  of 
active  material  adaptation  we  turned  to  a  discussion  of  active 
spiritual  adaptation  and  reviewed  at  length  the  social  philosophy 
of  Noyicow  as  revealed  in  Les  Luttes,  bringing  out  his  four-fold 

1  Giddings,  Principles  of  Sociology,  p.  421.  Ellwood  phrases  the  goal  as  follows: 
"  The  goal  and  purpose  of  our  life  ...  is  not  self-realization,  but  the  progressive 
realization  of  a  society  of  harmoniously  adjusted  individuals."  —  Sociology  in  its 
Psychological  Aspects,  p.  393.  According  to  Mackenzie,  the  social  goal  includes 
three  elements:  the  subjugation  of  nature,  the  perfection  of  social  machinery  and 
personal  development  including  self-restraint.  "  What  we  want,"  he  says,  "  is 
not  a  universe  in  which  we  may  enjoy  ourselves,  but  a  universe  that  shall  be  inter- 
esting, i.  e.,  one  to  which  we  may  devote  ourselves,  and  in  devotion  to  which  we 
may  find  the  realization  of  a  higher  life  than  that  of  our  individual  selves."  — 
Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  ch.  IV. 


320  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

doctrine  of  adaptation,  his  teaching  concerning  the  hierarchy  of 
struggles  culminating  in  group  rivalry  for  excellence  carried  on  by 
free  assimilation,  by  provoking  imitation,  and  by  an  organized 
propaganda  for  the  extension  of  its  culture.  We  considered  next 
a  group  of  writers  who  have  exalted  the  place  of  the  individual  as 
the  instigator  of  social  movements  in  the  line  of  better  adaptation 
and  welfare,  as  Carlyle  with  his  Great  Man  theory  and  James  with 
his  modification  of  this  interpreted  by  his  doctrine  concerning  the 
"  Energies  of  Men,"  also  Ross  with  his  analysis  of  social  control, 
concluding  that  natural  sanctions  niust  be  supplemented  by  those 
that  are  artificial,  created  by  the  eHte.  We  turned  then  to  the 
function  of  idealization  as  set  forth  by  Comte,  Ross  and  Baldwin, 
noting  its  expression  in  art,  reflective  moraUty  and  religion  and 
its  culmination  in  reverence  for  ideal  personality  and  religious 
adaptation.  We  concluded  that  idealization  especially  when 
reflective  was  one  of  the  most  potent  factors  in  social  progress.  ^ 

In  the  study  of  this  process  of  active  spiritual  (including  social) 
adaptation,  several  concepts  stand  out  with  great  clearness: 
idealization,  innovation,  reflective  imitation,  rivalry  in  excelr 
knee,  and  the  provoking  of  imitation  by  the  power  of  example,  all 
of  these  processes,  though  primarily  individual,  having  a  social 
analogue.  /This  analogy  between  the  psychical  activity  of  in- 
dividuals and  social  unities,  together  with  the  fact  that  the 
ipidividual  is  a  social  product  and  should  have  a  social  goal,  war- 
rants the  use  of  the  term  social-personalism  to  indicate  the  social 
philosophy  that  has  emerged  in  outline  from  our  study  of  the 
development  of  the  doctrine  of  adaptation  as  a  theory  of  social 
progress.  X  By  this  phrase  is  meant  that  the  acme  of  cosmic 
evolution  is  not  the  social  group  even  in  its  collective  activity 
(unless  it  can  be  interpreted  as  a  quasi-personality),  but  the 
individual  person,  for  personality  alone  has  power  over  the  cosmic 
process,  the  group  always  acting  on  the  initiative  of  persons,  — 
but  this  personality  socially  determined  and  with  a  social  goal. 

To  analyze  this  concept  more  in  detail:  Mind  is  superior  to 
matter  for  it  knows,  feels  and  controls  it,  within  limits/  Reflective 
creation  is  the  highest  form  of  intellectual  activity  and  personaL 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  3  21 

affection,  of  emotional  activity.  /  Now  reflective  creation  and 
affection  are  functions  of  the  individual,  never  of  a  group,  how- 
"ever  much  the  individual  may  be  determined  byTis  social 
environment.  This  truth,  together  with  some  metaphysical  con- 
siderations, warrants  the  use  of  the  term  personalism}  But  this 
very  fact  of  the  determination  of  the  individual  by  society  war- 
rants the  qualifying  word  social^  and  finally,  the  fact  that  in  the 
highest  forms  of  associational  activity  we  have  such  a  "  together- 
ness "  of  self-conscious  activity  that  approach  is  made  to  the 
phenomenon  of  personality,  and  that  the  goal  of  the  individual  is 
not  merely  personal  but  also  some  form  of  associational  well- 
being,  warrants  the  compoimd  sociaUpersonalism.  Let  us  note 
how  this  concept  has  grown  out  of  our  historical  survey  of  the 
development  of  the  concept  of  adaptation:  — 

In  our  study  of  biological  evolution  we  saw  how  the  individual 
organism  was  the  product  of  the  species  and  of  the  material 
environment  (with  due  allowance  for  mutation),  also  how  the 
good  of  the  species  including  future  generations  seemed  to  have 
consideration  above  the  welfare  of  the  mere  individual.  We  have 
seen  that  personality  is  likewise  the  product  of  physical  and  social 
heredity  and  of  social  suggestion,  i.  e.,  it  is  a  social  product,  modi- 
fied by  individual  reaction  in  the  line  of  variation.  Thus  are 
evolved  temperament,  intellectuality,  moral  judgment,  religious 
sentiment,  —  indeed  all  the  qualities  that  constitute  and  dif- 
ferentiate personalities.  But  this  personality  cannot  be  satisfied 
with  mere  self-development.  Social  instincts  and  social  interests 
impel  to  ever  widening  activities  and  an  ever  enlarging  "self" 
and  "  self -regarding  sentiment."  ^  /Thus  normally  the  goal  of 
the  individual  cannot  be  merely  selfish  in  the  narrow  sense  but 
social  and  one  can  find  true  happiness  only  in  social  adaptation,  q^^ 
and  the  highest  happiness  only  in  the  consciousness  that  the  in-  J^ 
dividual  life  is  unfolding  in  harmony  with  the  cosmic  order  or  with 
the  divine  will,  —  i.  e.,  in  religious  adaptation. 

With  self-development  comes  an  expanding  net-work  of  con- 
flicting and  co-operating  interests,  those  of  the  "inclusive"  group 

*  Cf.  Personalism,  by  B.  P.  Bowne. 

*  McDougall,  Social  Psychology,  pp.  174  ff. 


322  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

taking  precedence  over  those  of  the  "  included  "  groups,  requiring 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  these  smaller  unities.  The  individual  must 
at  times  deny  his  physiological  and  egoistic  interests  ^  for  the 
satisfaction  of  his  racial  and  social  interests  as  represented 
in  his  family;  and  the  welfare  of  the  family  and  its  constituent 
members  must  at  times  be  sacrificed  for  the  social  interest  as 
represented  in  the  state.  This  problem  of  conflicting  interests 
between  individuals  and  groups  finds  a  solution  as  soon  as  all  can 
be  united  in  the  attainment  of  a  common  purpose.  War  does  this 
temporarily,  and  Novicow  has  suggested  the  possibility  of  union 
for  cultural  expansion,  but  this  is  a  far  distant  goal.  Now  organ- 
ization, it  would  seem,  offers  the  desired  remedy.  There  is  no 
friction  in  the  perfect  organism.  The  individual  is  able  to 
organize  his  various  interests,  —  often  conflicting,  —  by  making 
them  all  tributary  to  the  attainment  of  a  life  purpose.  Such  is 
the  power  of  personality.  Just  in  proportion,  too,  as  various 
social  unities  attain  quasi-personality  will  such  organization  of 
interests  be  possible  as  shall  reduce  friction  to  a  minimum. 

Social  evolution  seems  to  be  aiming  not  only  at  the  develop- 
ment of  groupings  of  ever  increasing  size  and  complexity  but  also 
of  ever  increasing  integration  and  organization  which  means 
specialization  on  the  part  of  the  various  unities  that  make  up  the 
whole.2  In  the  human  personality  we  have  the  highest  type  both 
of  integration  and  of  specialization  with  this  difference  between  it 
and  all  other  unities:  The  biological  organism  is  constituted  of 
parts  that  have  no  value  except  in  relation  to  the  well-being  of  the 
whole,  thus  specialization  is  entirely  subordinated  to  the  need  of 
organic  adaptation.  In  all  social  unities,  however,  as  Spencer 
insisted,  the  individual  has  value  on  his  own  account.  He  is  an 
end,  not  merely  a  means.  The  organization  of  group  interests, 
then,  and  the  demand  for  specialization  on  the  part  of  the  con- 
stituent members  must  be  carried  on  with  due  regard  for  this 
worth  of  personality,  —  and  so  it  is  in  the  long  run,  for  the  group 
that  does  not  follow  this  procedure  is  doomed  to  fail. 

*  Following  Ratzenhofer's  classification. 

^  There  seems  to  be  a  limit,  however,  to  this  movement,  noted  especially  of 
late  in  industry. 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  323 

We  agree  with  Giddings,  Baldwin  and  others  that  society  is  a 
psychological  organization  but  insist  that  "  society  "  must  be 
given  content  and  interpreted  so  as  to  include  these  various  con- 
flicting, co-operating,  combining  unities,  each  a  quasi-organism 
with  a  super-organic  environment  to  which  it  must  adjust  itself, 
each  a  potential  quasi-personality.  We  agree,  too,  with  Schaffle 
who  holds  that  the  individual  should  seek  to  find  his  place  in 
society,  fit  himself  to  function  there  as  efficiently  as  possible 
and  that  society  should  assist  in  this  process.  We  hold  that  the 
same  should  be  true  of  every  social  unity,  —  of  the  family,  of 
the  church,  of  the  club,  political  party  or  state. 

Just  as  individual  personality ,  then,  is  not  only  socially  condi- 
tioned but  has  a  social  goal,  viz.,  to  function  as  efficiently  as  possible 
in  ever  enlarging  social  unities,  —  so  should  each  of  these  social 
unities  as  it  attains  quasi-personality  seek  to  function  as  efficiently 
as  possible  in  the  more  inclusive  social  organizations  of  which  it 
forms  an  integrating  part. 

Approaching  this  same  problem  from  anotiier  point  of  view, 
we  have  seen  that  social  evolution  reveals  an  ever  increasing 
power  of  active  adaptation  and  of  progress  by  co-operation,  inno- 
vation and  reflective  imitation  rather  than  by  struggle  for  exist- 
ence and  survival.  ,Npw  that  which  is  increasingly  imitated  is 
personal  and  group  adaptive  activity;  i.  e.,  as  the  normal  physical 
organism  is  continually  reacting  to  stimuli  along  the  line  felt  to 
be  life-preserving  and  life- enlarging,  so  the  conscious  personality, 
in  so  far  as  guided  by  real  interests,  imitates,  with  adaptive 
variations,  other  persons  in  the  line  of  increasing  well-being;  and 
groups,  in  proportion  as  organized  and  directed  by  intelligence, 
also  imitate  other  groups  in  their  adaptive  activities.  The^ 
individual,  moreover,  has  as  a  copy  for  imitation  not  only  the 
real  but  the  ideal  which,  as  Baldwin  has  shown,  is  a  social  product. 
So  every  quasi-personal  social  unity  may  form  a  group-ideal,  — 
as  in  the  case  of  labor  unions,  fraternities,  communities,  —  which 
is  far  above  the  real  of  present  attainment.  This  group-ideal, 
too,  is  a  social  product  and  one  in  which  the  super-organic 
environment  plays  a  most  important  part,  and  usually  this  ideal 
includes  not  only  the  welfare  of  its  members,  but  also  that  of  a 


324  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

more  inclusive  social  unity.  The  church-ideal,  for  example,  in- 
cludes the  "  denomination  "  or  Christianity  as  a  whole;  that  of 
the  local  union  includes  the  trade  union  or  the  "laboring  class." 
This  leads  to  a  point  where  we  can  suggest  a  social  goal  so  far  as 
I  know  not  previously  formulated  in  social  philosophy,^  and  with 
no  word  to  express  it,  I  suggest  exemplifaction  ^  to  complete  the 
triad  begun  by  innovation  and  imitation. 

This  ideal  of  living  a  Hfe  that  shall  enter  into  other  lives  by  the 
power  of  example  is  by  no  means  new  as  applied  to  individuals. 
It  seems  to  have  been  prominent  in  the  consciousness  of  Jesus 
when  he  said  "  Follow  me  ";  when  he  taught  that  he  was  the 
Way,  and  when  he  said  to  his  disciples,  "  Let  your  light  so  shine 
before  men  that  they  may  see  your  good  works."  We  find  it 
in  the  words  of  Paul  (I  Cor.  xi.  i) :  "  Be  ye  followers  of  me  even 
as  I  also  am  of  Christ."  ^  This  ideal  as  applied  to  groups  is  new, 
however,  so  far  as  I  know,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the 
Hebrew  prophet  who  taught  that  Israel  should  be  a  "  light  to  the 
Gentiles  "  (Isa.  xlix.6),  but  even  here  the  thought  seems  to  be 
that  of  social  service  by  supremacy  and  social  control,  rather  than 
by  the  persuasion  of  example.^ 

i     The  doctrine  is  just  this:  Every  social  unity,  —  family,  church, 

Iclub,  village,  city,  state,  nation,  —  should  have  as  its  goal  self- 

Vpreservation  and  self-enlargement,  and  should  be  led  to  see  that 

these  can  be  secured  best  (i)  by  striving  to  develop  such  an 

*  Novicow's  analysis  of  adaptation  and  his  phrase  "provoquer  I'imitation"  were 
unknown  to  the  writer  until  the  manuscript  was  in  the  hands  of  the  printer.  Chap- 
ter XIV  was  afterwards  written  and  a  few  changes  made  in  this  chapter.  With 
Novicow,  however,  individual  pleasure  is  the  goal  of  life  and  individual  and  social 
processes  including  "provoquer  I'imitation"  are  considered  but  means  to  that  end 
dictated  by  self-interest.  Our  position,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  active  adaptation 
is  the  end  and  pleasure  and  pain  sign-boards  to  indicate  the  right  way. 

*  The  words  exemplification  and  exemplariness  have  somewhat  different  meaning. 

*  "  MLnrfTdi  iwv  ylv&rOe,  KiiBcas  K&yoU  xP''<rrov.      Cf.  II  Thessalonians,  iii.  7-10. 

*  Cf.  Ward's  "  immortality  of  achievement."  The  highest  form  of  struggle  and 
rivalry,  as  Novicow  has  shown,  and  the  form  most  potent  in  social  progress,  is 
rivalry  in  excellence,  i.  e.,  struggle  for  that  attainment  that  shall  become  inmiortal 
through  reflective  imitation.  "  Imitation  "  as  here  used,  so  too,  "  example  "  have 
the  broad  meaning  of  Tarde  and  Baldwin  with  no  thought  of  slavish  copying. 
In  this  sense  a  person  is  imitated  as  his  life  is  a  source  of  inspiration  and  suggestion. 
Only  in  this  sense  is  Jesus  the  example  for  man. 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  325 

organized  life  and  one  so  manifestly  helpful  to  its  members  that 
it  will  increase  by  the  power  of  attraction  and  by  the  spread  of 
its  principles  and  methods  by  reflective  imitation  on  the  part  of 
other  groups  so  situated  that  these  principles  and  methods  are 
practically  imitable,  and  (2)  by  seeking  to  function  as  efficiently 
as  possible  in  a  more  inclusive  group;  i.  e.,  to  find  or  make  its 
place  in  a  still  larger  organization.  Its  intrinsic  goodness  ^  may 
be  determined  by  social  judgment,  its  extrinsic  goodness  by  its 
efficiency  as  a  member  of  a  more  inclusive  organization  and  by  its 
spread  through  reflective  imitation  on  the  part  of  other  groups 
likewise  inspired  by  a  purpose  of  attaining  the  highest  possible 
success  measured  in  terms  of  social  well-being. 

This  social  philosophy  called  social-personalism  includes  the 
following  elements:  — 

I.  The  supreme  worth  of  the  individual  because  he  is  the  high- 
est expression  of  cosmic  evolution  as  measured  by  his  creative 
activity  in  the  line  of  active  material  and  spiritual  adaptation,  the 
former  giving  him  power  to  coerce  nature  in  the  line  of  minister- 
ing to  his  needs,  the  latter  giving  him  power  {a)  to  react  on  society 
by  imitative  variation,  innovation  and  suggestion;  {h)  to  in- 
fluence men  in  the  interest  of  self-satisfaction;  {c)  to  form  ideals 
and  conform  or  adapt  his  life  progressively  to  them;  {d)  to  win 
his  fellow-men  by  example  and  persuasion,  to  the  acceptance  of 
his  ideals  and  so  restore  the  social  equiUbrium  disturbed  by  his 
creative  variation  from  the  standards  of  the  group,  and  (e)  in 
conjunction  with  others,  to  compel  social  adaptation  on  the  part 
of  social  laggards  and  the  anti-social. 

II.  The  individual  goal  of  self -development  and  social  efficiency. 
The  first  is  called  for  (i)  because  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  person- 
ality, and  (2)  as  a  basis  for  passive  and  active  adaptation  both  on 
the  part  of  the  individual  and  of  society,  and  the  second  is  called 
for  to  give  specific  direction  to  self-development  and  activity; 
i.  e.,  it  is  not  mere  self-development  that  makes  for  individual 
well-being  and  social  strength,  but  the  kind  of  development  that 
fits  the  individual  for  the  place  in  social  life  that  he  can  fill 
supremely  well  according  to  his  capacity.    This  goal  of  social 

^  For  use  of  the  terms  intrinsic  and  extrinsic,  see  Palmer,  op.  ciL,  pp.  18  f. 


326  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

efficiency,  moreover,  requires  that  each  should  find  his  place  in 
the  various  organizations  to  which  he  belongs,  increase  his  effi- 
ciency for  that  place  to  the  highest  degree  (with  due  regard  to 
conflicting  interests),  and  use  his  influence  to  strengthen  the 
organization  in  its  task  of  survival,  growth  and  social  utility,  and 
in  its  attempt  to  form  and  attain  the  group-ideal  of  functioning 
in  a  larger  social  unity.  ^ 

III.  The  responsibility  of  society  for  the  character  of  every  per- 
sonality. Every  member  of  a  group  is  now  very  largely  a  social 
product.  A  society  can  have  the  kind  of  members  it  really 
wants.  Social  conscience,  then,  should  be  made  to  feel  that  it  is 
responsible  for  the  character  of  every  individual. 

IV.  The  general  ideal  for  every  social  quasi-personality  (or  unity) 
of  social  exemplifaction;  i.  e.,  to  work  out  such  an  organized  life 
and  one  so  fruitful  in  securing  the  highest  possible  well-being  of 
its  members  and  of  humanity  as  a  whole,  that  it  will  spread  by 
reflective  imitation  ^  on  the  part  of  other  social  unities. 

V.  The  social  goal  of  functioning  in  a  more  inclusive  unity 
(mentioned  in  II);  but  this  goal  is  not  to  be  confined  to  the 
national  group  as  in  the  theories  of  Pearson,  Carver  and  many 
German  writers,  but  moves  on  in  ever  widening  circles  with  the 
extension  of  co-operation  and  the  expansion  of  the  self-regarding 
sentiment  until  it  embraces  all  humanity. 

The  social  philosophy  briefly  outlined,  the  outcome  of  a  survey 
of  many  social  philosophies  written  under  greatly  diverse  condi- 
tions of  thought  and  life,  fused  on  a  principle  that  seems  to  per- 
vade all  forms  of  cosmic  development,  —  that  of  adaptation,  — 
suggests  answers  to  the  problems  propounded  in  the  Introduction 
concerning  the  what,  the  how,  the  whence,  the  whither  and  the 

1  The  goal  of  exemplifaction  has  not  been  applied  to  the  individual  for  such  a 
goal  might  possibly  lead  to  a  narrow  self-consciousness,  pride,  and  arrogance,  though 
this  is  not  probable  if  balanced  with  emphasis  on  social  efl&ciency.  Indeed  this  ideal 
of  exemplifaction  furnishes  a  principle  of  judging  conduct  that  is  more  practicable 
than  Kant's  "  Act  as  if  the  maxim  of  thy  action  were  to  become  by  thy  will  a  univer- 
sal law  of  nature."  It  is  better  for  it  makes  place  for  the  relativity  which  we  have 
found  is  characteristic  of  all  morality.  An  act  might  well  be  worthy  of  reflective 
imitation  by  others  similarly  situated  and  yet  not  such  as  could  be  used  as  the  basis 
for  a  universal  principle, 

*  See  note  4,  p.  324. 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  327 

why  of  that  process  at  least  in  its  higher  phases.  As  to  the  first: 
social  evolution  is  the  process  of  the  formation  and  progressive 
adaptation  of  social  unities  to  their  ever  changing  physical  and 
spiritual  environment.  As  to  the  second,  the  "  how,"  this 
process  may  be  described  in  terms  of  the  "  dialectic  of  growth  " 
or  a  "  give-and-take  "  between  the  psychical  unities  and  their 
physical  and  spiritual  environment.  The  evolution  of  every  social 
group  is  like  an  ascending  spiral  in  the  form  of  an  ellipse  with 
two  foci,  the  socius  and  the  various  associational  groups  that  are 
gradually  formed  by  the  process  of  differentiation  and  integration. 
In  this  process  the  conflict  of  interests  and  mal-adaptations  on 
lower  planes  of  life  result  in  co-operation,  in  higher  adaptations, 
and  in  the  organization  of  interests  both  individual  and  social. 
But  the  process  thus  described  in  thought  terms  does  not  ade- 
quately represent  the  real  Hfe  of  values  given  in  experience  which 
is  too  rich  and  too  large  to  be  subjected  to  such  an  analysis.  Life 
must  be  experienced  and  appreciated,  not  merely  analyzed  and 
described. 

Viewed  historically,  this  process  of  experience  and  appreciation 
shows  development  in  three  directions:  (i)  the  self-conscious 
personality  has  attained  greater  power  over  self,  nature,  and 
fellow-man,  and  in  its  search  for  the  true,  the  beautiful  and  the 
good,  has  come  to  believe  in  a  Final  Cause  which  it  tends  to  per- 
sonify in  exaggerated  terms  of  its  own  powers  and  values,  and  to 
worship  as  God;  (2)  the  self-conscious  personality  has  enlarged 
in  interest,  in  sympathy,  in  purpose,  in  self-feeling,  till  it  in- 
cludes in  certain  experiences  all  himianity.  Now  this  self- 
conscious  personaHty  in  these  experiences  of  power,  of  intuition, 
of  evaluation,  of  up-reach  and  out-reach,  is  the  highest  form  of 
reality  that  can  be  grasped  by  consciousness,  but  there  is  reaison 
for  behef  that  the  God  of  idealization,  and  the  socius  of  reUgious 
feeling,  is  a  still  higher  form  of  reaHty  and  personaHty,  though 
impossible  of  expression  in  terms  of  discursive  thought;  (3) 
experience  and  appreciation,  though  in  the  last  analysis  personal, 
have  a  social  basis  and  a  social  outlook.  Out  of  this  fact  have 
developed  social  organizations  with  common  interests  and  a 
common  goal.     Such  interest  groups,  as  we  have  seen,  may 


328  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

become  quasi-personalities,  and  as  such  are  a  second  fruitage  of 
cosmic  evolution.  Now  out  of  these  three  lines  of  development 
of  experience  and  appreciation,  intensive  personal,  extensive 
personal,  and  social,  together  with  the  realization  that  develop- 
ment has  come  through  struggle,  issues  the  belief  that  cosmic 
evolution  has  not  in  any  of  its  phases  been  the  mere  outcome  of 
the  interaction  of  blind  forces  but  rather  the  expression  of  Intelli- 
gence and  Love. 

The  "  how "  of  the  process  suggests  the  "  whither "  and 
"  why."  If  the  phenomenal  order  is  a  universe,  a  cosmos,  i.  e., 
if  there  is  a  Yfoxld-order  dependent  on  infinite  intelligence  rather 
than  a  vioxld-disorder  which  is  the  outcome  of  the  permutations 
and  combinations  of  blind  forces,  a  study  of  the  process  should 
suggest  its  goal.  Although  our  discussion  has  brought  out 
several  suggested  goals,  the  outcome  of  it  would  seem  to  indicate 
that  nothing  higher  has  been  formulated  than  the  increasing 
adaptation  of  men  in  societies  to  their  physical  and  spiritual  environ- 
ment, this  adaptation  being  interpreted  in  terms  of  power  and 
fullness  of  life,  attained  and  expressed  in  its  highest  associational 
forms  in  reflective  innovation,  reflective  imitation  and  exempli- 
f action,  with  emphasis,  too,  on  the  affectional  nature  and  on  ideal- 
ization expressing  itseK  in  art  in  its  varied  forms  and  in  religion. 

As  to  the  true  type  of  religion,  we  have  noted  in  our  survey 
many  diverse  theories  from  the  "  Worship  of  Humanity  '^ 
(Comte),  and  a  mere  "Appreciation  of  the  Cosmos"  (Ward), 
to  a  "  Living  Faith  in  a  Self- Conscious,  Personal,  World- 
Ground"  (Bowne,  Baldwin),  while  others  say  that  there  is  no 
one  true  religion  but  that  like  everything  else  religion  is  relative 
to  the  stage  of  social  development  and  environmental  conditions 
of  a  group.  The  philosophy  of  social-personalism  lends  itself 
easily  to  the  belief  that  the  ultimate  religion  will  be  along  lines 
suggested  by  Bowne  and  Baldwin,  with  emphasis,  however,  on 
its  social  aspects  and  its  pragmatic  warrant.  In  any  case  a 
pragmatic  test  is  provided  in  the  way  that  the  religion  of  a  group 
influences  its  associational  life,  and  in  the  survival  and  spread  of 
the  religion  either  by  the  success  of  the  group  thus  inspired  in 
possessing  the  earth  or  the  success  of  the  associational  achieve- 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  329 

merits  of  the  group  in  being  reflectively  imitated.  Professor 
Carver  asserts  that  the  only  way  the  Kingdom  of  God  can  come 
throughout  the  earth  is  by  the  possession  of  the  earth  by  the 
group  that  accepts  the  "  gospel  of  the  productive  Ufe,"  and  that 
the  religion  of  this  group  will  thus  be  demonstrated  to  be  the 
true  religion.  In  contrast  we  beheve  that  the  Kingdom  of  God 
will  come  by  the  spread,  through  reflective  imitation,  of  the 
achievements  of  the  groups  setting  the  best  example  of  social 
organization  and  collective  welfare,  and  that  the  "gospel  of  social- 
personalism  "  working  by  purposeful  idealization ,  innovation y 
imitation  and  exempli/action  will  demonstrate  its  superiority  over 
any  form  of  deterministic  monism  or  the  gospel  of  the  productive 
Kfe  as  interpreted  by  Professor  Carver. 

This  test  of  the  truth  of  social  philosophy,  however,  is  so  indefi- 
nite and  far  distant  as  to  seem  of  little  present  value,  but  a  con- 
sistent social  philosophy  thus  tested,  while  desirable,  is  not 
indispensable.  Most  important  is  a  working  program  of  social 
ameHoration  that  commends  itself  to  the  enlightened  judgment  of 
the  sociological  elite  ^  and  this  is  provided  in  the  four-fold  doc- 
trine of  adaptation  as  worked  out  in  this  study,  the  apparent 
truth  of  this  social  theory  and  of  the  social  philosophy  growing 
out  of  it  being  revealed  in  its  manifest  utility  as  a  key  to  the 
understanding  and  solution  of  practical  life  problems.  As 
applied  to  social  problems  and  conditions,  the  theory  of  adapta- 
tion and  the  philosophy  of  social-personalism  would  seem  to  call 
for  emphasis  on  the  following  factors  in  associational  hfe:  — 

I.  Production  of  material  goods  as  the  basis  of  life,  growth 
and  cultural  development; 

II.  The  elimination  of  waste  land,  waste  labor  and  the  waste 
of  natural  resources; 

1  A  group  of  persons  with  deep  interest  in  a  social  problem  and  such  training; 
and  experience  as  fits  them  for  judgment,  after  mature  deliberation  frequently 
attain  an  "  insight "  into  an  apparent  solution  of  the  problem  that  is  akin  to 
intuition,  indeed  such  collective  insight  might  well  be  termed  "  social  intuition."' 
It  is  nothing  supernatural  or  mystical  or  innate,  but  a  short-circuited  "  insight " 
based  on  experience  and  discussion,  and  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  satisfaction. 
This  is  the  tribunal  of  final  authority  with  reference  to  an  action  worthy  of  imita- 
tion, —  though  it  may  err. 


330  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

III.  Efficient  consumption,  —  interpreted  in  terms  of  produc- 
tion (Carver),  of  surplus  energy  (Patten)  or  of  social  well-being; 

rV.  Education  for  social  efficiency  which  will  include 

(a)  recognition  of  the  family  as  the  educational  as  well  as 
sociological  unit; 

(b)  the  acquirement  of  such  knowledge,  skill  and  training  on 
the  part  of  each  individual  as  will  fit  him  best  for  the  place  he  can 
best  fill  in  the  industrial  system  or  in  the  supply  of  human  needs, 
with  such  direction  and  encouragement  as  will  tend  to  relative 
equaHty  of  income  because  of  relative  equality  in  social  service 
rendered; 

(c)  the  acquirement  of  such  knowledge  and  training  as  will 
result  in  social  adaptation  and  co-operation; 

(d)  the  development  of  personality  and  individuality  with 
self-control,  self-direction  and  prophetic  vision  to  see  the  line  of 
action  that  will  make  for  individual  and  social  well-being; 

(e)  the  attainment  of  that  religious  insight  and  experience 
which  will  link  the  human  life  with  the  Eternal  Source  of  life, 
thus  making  for  increased  energy  and  social  unity; 

(/)  the  above  elements  unified  and  energized  with  the  educa- 
tional ideals  of  adaptation  and  social  exemplifaction. 

V.  Social  Control 

(a)  to  secure  efficient  race-stock  and  to  regulate  population; 

(b)  to  deal  with  the  anti-social  and  the  social  laggards; 

(c)  to  prevent  that  competition  which  experience  shows  to  be 
uneconomic  or  detrimental  to  well-being; 

(d)  to  encourage  such  co-operation  as  promises  to  be  socially 
advantageous,  and 

(e)  to  secure  a  more  just  distribution  of  wealth.^ 

The  individual  who  would  succeed  in  life  must  adapt  himself  to 
his  environment,  physical  and  spiritual;  but  most  to  be  envied 
is  the  one  who  can  exert  the  greatest  influence  on  his  fellow-men 
in  the  line  of  the  increased  well-being  of  all  humanity,  —  himself 
included. 

*  Cf .  the  program  for  a  constructive  democracy  formulated  by  Professor  Carver, 

Essays  in  Social  Justice,  pp.  264,  265. 


SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  33 1 

The  club,  the  religious  sect,  the  political  party,  the  social 
institution  of  every  sort  which  would  succeed  must  likewise  adapt 
itself  to  its  environment,  —  so,  too,  the  sovereign  group.  But 
mere  survival  should  not  be  the  goal,  but  this,  modified  by  the 
ideal  of  functioning  in  a  more  inclusive  unity;  and  while  these  are 
most  frequently  in  harmony  they  are  not  always  so.  The  welfare 
of  the  group  at  times  calls  for  the  sacrifice  of  the  individual;  it 
may  call  for  the  sacrifice  of  a  club,  a  sect,  a  party,  an  institution. 
The  welfare  of  humanity  may  call  for  the  sacrifice  of  a  sovereign 
group.  All  these  unities  and  all  forms  of  associational  life  are 
means  to  the  attainment  of  the  one  supreme  goal,  —  the  well- 
being  of  the  greatest  number  of  rational  individuals  including  not 
only  the  present  but  future  generations. 

Professor  Bowne  holds  with  good  reason  that  well-being  has  two 
constituent  factors,  outward  fortune  and  inner  worth  and  peace.^ 
Emphasis  on  material  progress  may  produce  the  outward  fortune 
but  destroy  the  sense  of  worth  and  peace  which  alone  makes  Hfe 
worth  Hving  for  the  individual.  Emphasis  on  the  subjective  side 
may  lead  to  such  neglect  of  material  welfare  as  to  result  in  in- 
dividual and  social  stagnation  and  decay.  Both  elements  must 
have  place  in  a  social  philosophy  that  shall  satisfy  life  conditions 
and  inspire  to  that  individual  and  social  activity  that  shall  attain 
ultimately  the  coveted  goal. 

No  words  are  better  fitted  to  conclude  this  discussion  than  those 
which  bring  to  a  close  Professor  Giddings'  Principles  of  Sociology: 
"  A  social  being,  the  normally  organized  man  returns  to  society 
with  usury  the  gifts  wherewith  he  has  been  by  society  endowed; 
and  this  truth  will  be  the  starting  point  of  the  ethical  teaching  of 
coming  years.  Personality  cannot  live  within  itself  to  perish 
with  the  individual  life.  It  goes  forth  into  the  everlasting  Hfe  of 
man.  And  so,  little  by  little,  age  by  age,  society,  which  has 
created  man,  is  by  man  transformed.  Of  supreme  importance  in 
this  work  is  the  influence  of  those  few  transcendent  minds  whose 
genius  pierces  the  unknown;  of  those  pioneers  of  thought  and 
conduct  who  dare  to  stand  alone  in  untrodden  ways;  of  those 
devoted  lovers  of  their  kind  who,  often  in  obloquy  and  pain, 

1  Principles  of  Ethics,  p.  304. 


332  ADAPTATION  AND  PROGRESS 

reveal  the  possibilities  of  a  spiritual  life.  It  is  chiefly  through 
these  that  the  mass  of  humanity  is  lifted  in  some  small  degree 
above  the  plane  of  physical  necessity  into  the  freer  air  of  liberty 
and  light.  This  is  the  way  of  life  that  Browning  has  so  truth- 
fully described:  — 

* .  .  .  Already  you  include 
The  multitude;  then  let  the  multitude 
Include  yourself;  and  the  result  were  new. 
Themselves  before,  the  multitude  turn  to  you. 
This  were  to  live  and  move  and  have,  in  them, 
Your  being,  and  secure  a  diadem 
You  should  transmit  (because  no  cycle  yearns 
Beyond  itself,  but  on  itself  returns) 
When,  the  full  sphere  in  wane,  the  world  is  o'erlaid 
Long  since  with  you,  shall  have  in  turn  obeyed 
Some  orb  still  prouder,  some  displayer,  still 
More  potent  than  the  last,  of  human  will, 
And  some  new  kind  depose  the  old.' " 


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335 


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INDEX 


INDEX 


Ability,  22,  25,  26,  no,  155,  180;  nat- 
ural, 22,  93,  143, 144,  15s,  296;  organ- 
izing, 284.    See  also  Capacity. 

Abnormal,  38,  143. 

Abortion,  154. 

Absolute,  175,  311. 

Absorption,  268. 

Abstraction,  19,  22,  131,  209,  260. 

Acclimation,  Acclimatization,  55,  62, 
114-119. 

Accommodation,  202. 

Achievement,  27,  28,  47,  127,  155,  197- 
199,  221-236,  329. 

Acquisition,  250. 

Activity,  34,  282, 305, 323,  331;  creative, 
236,  325;  mental,  25,  289;  political, 
21,  26,  39,  74,  119- 

Adaptability,  68,  94-97. 

Adaptation,  analysis  of,  8-1 1;  for  active 
and  passive  physical,  and  active  and 
passive  spiritual  (including  social), 
see   dose   of   the   discussion   of   each 

.  author;  intellectual,  217,  270;  moral, 
37,  133,  144,  159,  217,  298;  religious, 
259,  298,  311,  312;  mal-adaptation, 
27,  43,  48,  50,  124,  173,  247,  254,  306, 
327.    See  also  Adjustment. 

Adjustment,  15,  23,  7,^,  37-39,  74,  119, 
188,  217,  241;  mal-adjustment,  310. 
See  also  Adaptation. 

Adolescence,  17,  216. 

Aesthetic,  125,  223,  232,  241,  292,  300, 
302. 

Agent,  225,  233,  234,  251. 

Agriculture,  175. 

Alcohol,  95,  263. 

Alliance,  268,  269,  273,  281. 

Altruism,  27,  29,  30,  200,  248,  302,  348. 

Ambition,  25. 

Amelioration,  5,  6,  20,  329. 

America,  114,  1350.,  156,  158. 


Analogy,  Analogical,  30,  46-49>  9i>  94, 
123,  126,  164,  320. 

Anarchy,  14,  17,  90. 

Anthropo-geography,  111-120. 

Anthropological,  Anthropology,  45,  142, 
150-161,  163. 

Anti-social,  34,  230,  325,  330. 

Appetite,  194,  202,  204,  244. 

Appreciation,  202,  327. 

Aristocracy,  loi,  no,  133,  176,  250,  286. 

Art,  Artistic,  Artists,  33,  47,  113,  127, 
232,  23s,  249,  252,  274,  276,  299,  328. 
See  also  Idealization. 

Artificial,  299.  See  also  Selection,  artifi- 
cial. 

Asceticism,  303. 

Assimilation,  136, 138, 171,  204,  229,  230, 
264,  269,  273,  277,  310. 

Association,  139,  146,  182,  189,  238,  244, 
277,  279,  318;  based  on  consciousness 
of  kind,  204,  207;  based  on  sympathy, 
182;  process  of,  182;  psychological 
analysis  of,  207. 

Atheism,  215. 

Attention,  63,  157,  160,  171. 

Attraction,  268,  325. 

Authority,  13,  15,  24,  25,  81,  285,  329. 

Automatic,  207. 

Bagehot,  W.,  3,  177-180,  185. 

Baldwin,  J.Mark,  192-199, 304-312,328. 

Barbarism,  223. 

Barth,  Paul,  13,  16,  50,  123,  202. 

Beauty,  Beautiful,  132,  222,  327. 

Beliefs,  6,  90,  136,  139,  187,  191,  205, 
214,  243,  293,  294,  309,  328. 

Bergson,  H.,  4,  38,  311. 

Biological,  Biology,  9,  16,  42,  73,  82,  91, 
113,  123,  133,  168,  199,  223,  237,  246, 
269,314.  See  o/^oJE volution,  biological. 

Boas,  Franz,  151,  ISS-IS9' 


345 


346 


INDEX 


Body,  social,  45,  124-128. 

Bowne,  B.  P.,  38,  213  n.,  228  n.,  233,  328, 

331. 
Bradley,  J.,  22811.,  298,  311. 
Brain,  64,  137,  156,  209,  215,  217,  275. 

See  also  Intellect,  Intelligence,  Mental, 

Mind. 
Breeding,  61. 
Buckle,  H.  T.,  105-111,  159. 

Cannibalism,  154,  271,  278. 

Capacity,  45,  64,  87,  115,  116,  144,  156, 

164,  175,  209,  325.    See  also  Ability. 
Capital,  Capitalism,  Capitalist,  26,  48, 

104,  176,  241,  248. 
Carlyle,  T.,  3,  283-286. 
Carver,  T.  N.,  8,  36,  85,  iii,  151,  245- 

263,  326,  329. 
Cause,  Causation,  17,  18,  30,  46,  no, 

151,  155,  162,   307,   311;    final,   17, 

233  n.,  310,  327. 
Celibacy,  93. 

Cell,  32,  74,  172,  188,  237,  267. 
Ceremony,  152. 
Change,  291. 
Character,  45, 92, 115, 116, 118, 134, 186, 

212,  243,  326;  acquired,  67,  73,  76,  94, 

134,  193,  237;    group,  92,  134,  154; 

Mendelian,  70-75,  88,  94,  116,  310. 

See  also  Ability. 
Characterization,  202. 
Charity,  270. 
Chastity,  65. 
Choice,  66,  79,  154,  159,  211-214,  240. 

See  also  Will,  free. 
Christian,  Christianity,  82-86,  311,  324. 
Church,  15,  144,  189,  324. 
Citizenship,  97. 
City,  118,  189. 
Civilization,  17,  21,  100,  106,  109,  127, 

134,  13s,  136,  142,  166,  215,  223,  227, 

250,  293. 
Class,  81,  93, 103, 104, 132, 152, 164, 167, 

168,  176,  295. 
Classification,  17,  18,  38,  41,  46,  49-51, 

151-152,  159,  160,  234. 
Climate,  21,  56,  66,  106,  115,  118,  156, 

241,  Zoz, 


Code,  80,  159. 

Coercion,  Coercive,  205,  272,  277. 

Cohesion,  202,  236. 

Colonization,  Colonize,  Colony,  113, 119, 
224. 

Communism,  103,  133. 

Community,  137,  140. 

Companions,  298. 

Comparative,  Comparison,  43,  46,  210. 

Competition,  Competitive,  39,  66,  96, 
132,  192,  195,  223,  247,  251,  257,  275, 
279>  293,  296,  315,  330.  See  also  Con- 
flict, Rivalry. 

Complexity,  34,  49,  158,  163,  216,  234. 

Compromise,  29. 

Comte,  A.,  4, 11-28,  29, 41, 106, 123, 140, 

162,  181,  199,  222,  299-301,  313. 
Conation,  231.    See  also  Will. 
Conduct,  37,  38,  88,  109,  136,  254,  306. 
Conflict,  105,  126,  198,  202,  226,  263, 

268-281, 296, 298 n.,  306, 310;  of  ideals, 
310;  of  interests,  11,  172-176,  247, 
261,  296,  327;  inter-group,  33,  117, 
132, 162-170,  260,  262.  See  also  Com- 
petition, Rivalry,  Struggle. 

Conscience,  social,  326. 

Consciousness,  39,  57,  170,  204,  225,  237, 
269,  274,  327;  individual,  139,  141, 
274,  324;  of  kind,  138-141,  148,  155, 

163,  182  n.,  198,  201,  207;  of  supple- 
mentary difference,  138-140, 148,  201; 
national,  263;  religious,  198,  307; 
self-  63,  79,  171,  197,  308;  social  or 
group,  48,  138-141,  146,  23s,  263,  274, 
308. 

Conservatism,  118,  178. 

Constraint,  140,  148,  201,  276,  306,  318. 

See  also  Pressure. 
Consumption,  167,  234,  241,  243,  250- 

255,  260,  330. 
Contagion,  136. 
Contractual,  49-50. 
Control,  9,  24,  33,  39,  40,  160,  217,  226; 

self-    134,  202,  242,  255,  310,  330; 

social,  91,  132,  242,  243,  248,  250,  257, 

263,  291-297,  324;    criteria  of,  297; 

limits  of,  297;  system  of,  295. 
Conviction,  194,  286, 


INDEX 


347 


Ccx)ley,  C.  H.,  191  n.,  192,  201. 
Cooperation,  20,  33, 65, 87, 126, 138, 142, 

194,  204,  231,  257,  261,  279,  280,  308, 

311,  326,  327.^ 
Correlation,  96,^116,  185,  278,  316. 
Country,  118, 
Courage,  25,  65,  87,  290. 
Create,    Creative,    Creation,    Creators, 

18,  30,  147,  148,  170,  224,  243,  270, 

283,  304,  320,  321.    See  also  Activity, 

creative. 
Crime,  Criminal,  45,  118,  140,  141,  241, 

254; 

Criticism,  154. 

Cross-breeding,  135,  157,  169,  188,  229. 

Cross-fertilization  of  cultures,  164,  226, 

293-294. 
Crowd,  138. 
Culture,  Cultural,  20,  112, 115, 117, 118, 

132,  15s,  166,  242,  260,  268,  271,  273, 

293;  primitive,  175,  209. 
Custom,  27,  160,  178,  182-185,  293,  297. 
Cycle,  65,  124,  166,  23s,  256. 

Darwin,  C,  Darwinism,  28,  58-79,  106, 

125,   189,  222,  288.     See  also  Neo- 

Darwinian. 
Davenport,  C.  B.,  42,  74,  98,  310. 
Davis,  M.  M.,  147,  191. 
Decision,  287. 

Deductive,  42,  46,  120,  233,  237. 
Defect,  Defective,  93-102,  262,  310  n. 
Degeneration,  74,  86,  87,  96,  98,  99,  135, 

223,  234,  241,  292. 
De  Greef,  G.,  49-51,  151. 
Delinquent,  95  n. 
Democracy,  206,  286,  330  n. 
Denationalization,  272,  275. 
Dependence,  49,  173,  307. 
Design,  307. 
Desires,  21,  27,  165,  187,  191,  198,  204, 

231,  235,  238,  241.    See  also  Interests, 

Needs. 
Despot,  Despotism,  178,  250. 
Determinism,  166,  168,   190,  211,  213, 

233;  economic,  103-106. 
Development,   124,  126,  162,  170-180, 

191,  221,  223,  272,  329;  cultural,  158; 


industrial,  9,  155,  262;  moral,  159; 
innate  tendency  to,  21,  27,  39,  73,  77, 
125,  128,  170-180,  222-227;  see  sepa- 
rate modifying  words,  as  above,  also 
Evolution,  Progress. 

De  Vries,  H.,  70-71. 

Dialectic,  106,  192,  308,  327. 

Differentiation,  20,  36,  128,  134,  165, 
186,  192,  327. 

Discipline,  154,  205. 

Discussion,  177,  178,  205,  329. 

Disease,  48,  66,  119. 

Distribution,  33,  34,  330. 

Divine,  311. 

Division  of  labor,  5^,  34,  62,  126,  128, 
134,  140-145,  241,  276. 

Divorce,  118,  258. 

Dogma,  Dogmatic,  S6,  no,  158,  200. 

Domestication,  59,  63,  157. 

Drummond,  H.,  199-201. 

Durkheim,  E.,  123,  138-145,  185,  201. 

Duty,  33,  87,  109,  183,  261,  303. 

Dynamic,  19,  31,  85,  90,  146,  202,  208, 
230-234. 

Economic,  Economics,  Economists,  Econ- 
omy, 13,  32,  36,  39,  49,  100,  113,  118, 
142,  153,  155,  167,  183,  186,  222,  242, 
243,  247,  256,  296. 

Education,  3,  5, 9,  23,  24,  25,  27, 38n.,87, 
96,  100,  107,  134,  136,  154,  232,  249, 
257,  261,  294,  300,  330. 

Efficiency,  81,  87,  88,  94,  128,  206,  226, 
242,  250,  251,  252,  257,  289,  291,  296, 
316,  325. 

Egoism,  Egoistic,  29,  83,  167,  174,  182, 
298  n. 

Elimination,  268. 

filite,  128,  134,  136,  137,  154,  295,  329. 

Ellwood,  C.  A.,  79  n.,  145  n.,  147,  261. 

Emigration,  113,  114,  135. 

Emotions,  Emotionalism,  27,  57  n.,  63, 
109,  206,  298. 

Endurance,  290. 

Energy,  39,  47,  87,  134,  208,  213,  239, 
330;  conservation  of,  179;  human, 
241,  244,  252,  258,  286-291. 

Energies  of  men,  286-291. 


348 


INDEX 


Enlightenment,  294. 

Enthusiasm,  300. 

Environment,  physical  or  material,  8-1 1, 
13,  21,  28,  32,  36,  38,  41,  55,  74,  78, 
90,  93,  103-120,  135,  136,  155,  156, 
170,  177,  186,  209,  227,  238,  287; 
spiritual  (including  social),  8-1 1,  13, 
32,  38,  100,  138,  155,  160,  167,  175, 
186,  289,  323. 

Equality,  87,  no,  206. 

Equilibrium,  31,  39,  226,  243,  253,  274, 
m,  289,  325. 

Equipment,  279. 

Esteem,  252,  301,  302. 

Ethical,  Ethics,  27,  36,  37,  83,  113,  198, 
25s,  293,  302,  305,  306. 

Ethnic,  Ethnology,  118,  124,  164,  175, 

177,  293,  307- 

Ethos,  154,  303. 

Eugenics,  58,  92-102,  257,  316. 

Evaluation,  190,  249,  327. 

Evil,  247,  253. 

Evolution,  7,  30;  biological  or  organic, 
28,  32,  57, 107, 125, 171,  201,  237,  238; 
cosmic,  31-40,  201,  215,  222-224,  229, 
233  n.,  235,  268,  325,  328;  social,  15, 
22, 31,  86, 105, 126, 136, 154, 155,  224- 
226,  238-240,  245,  280.  See  also  De- 
velopment, Progress. 

Example,  274  n.,  282,  287,  324  n.,  325. 

Excitement,  290. 

Exemplif action,  324-330. 

Expansion,  263,  267. 

Experience,  17,  23,  65, 139, 149,  i54,  i73, 
193,  212,  216,  233,  261,  286,  303,  309, 
310. 

Experiment,  42,  73. 

Exploitation,  134,  295,  311. 

Extermination,  66. 

Factors,  31, 33, 39, 49,  "8, 167,  210,  230, 
256.    See  also  modifying  word. 

Faculties,  20,  106,  157,  289. 

Faith,  91,  207,  290,  304,  308. 

Family,  23,  32,  36,  118,  124,  133,  138, 
140,  159,  161,  167,  172,  178,  189,  216, 
243,  248,  251,  257,  322,  324,  330. 

Fashion,  182. 


Fatalism,  213. 

Fatigue,  247,  289. 

Fear,  153,  206,  240,  250. 

Fecimdity,  172  n. 

Federation,  34,  36,  268. 

Feeling,  32,  87,  109,  131,  148,  173,  186, 
213,  224,  232,  234,  238,  243,  271,  276, 
299,  300,  306,  327;  fellow-,  182;  self-, 

309- 
Feudalism,  103. 
Fiction,  25,  27,  301. 
Filiation,  23,  43. 

Fiske,  John,  50 n.,  182,  214-217,  259, 310. 
Flint,  R.,  7,  12  n.,  16  n. 
Fluctuation,  70. 
Folkways,  152-155. 
Food,  56,  57,  59,  60,  106,  no,  156,  175, 

249. 
Force,  Forces,  282;  cosmic,  162, 170,  212, 

222,  224,  225;  physical,  22,  24,  31,  47, 

112,   118,   127,   153,   256,   295,  328; 

social,  42,  112,  141,  165,  166,  173, 187, 

225,  233,  239-241,  245,  272,  283. 
Foresight,  221. 
Fouill6e,  A.,  144,  146. 
Fraternity,  133,  144,  206. 
Fraud,  295. 
Freedom,  4,  30,  45,  47,  57, 106,  129,  132, 

168,  177,  206,  211,  290. 
Friendship,  138. 
Function,  Functional,  37,  45. 

Galton,  Sir  Francis,  36,  58,  92-99,  loi, 

143,  157,  288  n. 
Genesis,  Genetic,  41,  42,  79, 83, 160, 192, 

194,  227,  293. 
Genius,  22,  112,  137,  153,  185,  189,  229, 

231,  235,  283,  284,  288,  291,  295,  300. 

See  also  Innovation,  Invention,  Varia- 
tion, social. 
Geography,  Geographical,  111-116.    See 

also  Environment,  physical. 
Germ  plasm,  69,  75,  99,  176;    social, 

232. 
Germany,  85,  167,  262,  263,  273. 
Giddings,  F.  H.,  17,  146,  201-207,  331. 
Goal,  36,  127-133,  280,  311,  315,  323, 

324,331. 


INDEX 


349 


God,  II,  37,  80,  200,  217,  23311.,  245, 
256,  259,  307,  311,  312,  327,  329. 

Good,  Goodness,  37-39,  83,  132,  154, 
245,  253,  25s,  325. 

Gospel,  262,  319,  329. 

Government,  20,  25,  33,  40,  no,  128, 
145,  253,  257,  280,  281.  See  also  Con- 
trol, social;  Politics. 

Gravitation,  16,  225. 

Gregarious,  193,  216. 

Group,  4,  5,  8,  31,  41,  57,  125,  153,  156, 
164,  246,  253,  330;  associational,  269, 
327;  group  efficiency,  87;  see  Effi- 
ciency, social;  group  interests,  165, 
168;  see  Interests;  territorial,  262, 
272;  see  Nation,  State. 

Growth,  55,  192,  196,  238,  273,  308,  310. 

Gumplowicz,  L.,  23,  146,  156,  163-169, 
175. 

Habit,  57,  79,  188,  306. 

Haeckel,  E.,  8,  48,  126,  209,  215. 

Happiness,  22,  109,  132,  184,  259,  277. 

Harmony,  5,  21,  64,  188,  247,  248. 

Hatred,  163,  169,  279. 

Head-form,  116,  156. 

Health,  96,  180,  244,  252. 

Heart,  21,  27. 

Hedonic,  Hedonism,  182,  198,  216,  235, 

272, 
Hegel,  Hegelianism,  103,  128. 
Herding,  83,  175. 
Heredity,  12,  38,  56,  67,  74,  84,  93,  94, 

104,  107,  154,  163,  171,  186,  193,  288; 

social,  27,  94,  133,  164,  193,  229. 
Hero,  167. 

Heterogeneity,  Heterogeneous,  32, 37,39. 
Hierarchy,    17,    26,   49,    146,    222;     of 

struggles,  277-282. 
History,  Historical,  39,  43,  105, 109,  114, 

137,  150,  162-180,  283. 
Hobbes,  T.,  16,  45. 
Hobhouse,  L.  T.,  6,  159. 
Homogeneity,  Homogeneous,  32, 39, 115, 

137,  204,  254,  272,  280. 
Horde,  32,  163,  205,  223. 
Humanism,  96,  103. 
Humanity,  16,  19,  22,  26,  114,  115,  127, 


162,  189,  200,  215,  222,  262,  269,  276, 

299,  300,  326,  327. 
Hume,  D.,  13,  17. 
Huxley,  T.  H.,  67. 
Hypothesis,  18,  58,  66,  86,  91. 

Ideal,  4,  40,  85,  no,  133,  136,  143,  207, 
240,  260,  311,  320,  324;  formation  of, 
103,  304-306;  personal,  4,  11,  184, 
257,  294,  298,301-305;  social,  II,  125, 
"^Zh  144,  190,  224,  230,  240,  241,  309, 
323;  educational,  2.5,  329.  See  also 
Goal. 

Idealism,  Idealistic,  Idealization,  128, 
235,  240,  242,  251,  296,  298-313,  328, 

329- 
Ideas,  81,  83,  112,  115,  125  n.,  127,  136, 

202,  204,  209,  272,  276,  280,  290. 
Identity,  130. 
Illusion,  25,  168,  170,  190,  213,  294,  297, 

3oi,'303- 
Imagination,  6,  17,  63,  91,  179,  183,  298, 

299,  304. 
Imitation,  reflective,  192,  261,  276,  323, 

324  n.,  325,  326,  328;    social,  37,  136, 

177,  178,  185-192,  195,  202,  274,  275, 

295;  spontaneous,  164,  207,  270,  305; 

provoke  imitation,  272-282. 
Immigration,  100,  114,   135,  137,  156, 

158,  281. 
Immortality,  119,  229;  of  achievement, 

228-229,  316,  324  n.;   social,  91,  167, 

224,  256. 
Improvidence,  157. 
Impulse,  27,  80,  126  n.,  134,  172,  194, 

195,  198,  221,  241. 
In-breeding,  157. 
Income,  153. 
Independence,  154. 
Individual,  34,  123,  131,  149,  167,  238, 

289,  324,  325. 
Individualism,  Individuality,  31,  33,  34, 

63,  96,  118,  173,  190,  276,  281,  330. 
Individuation,  171. 
Induction,  Inductive,  31,  42,  46,  in, 

120,  158. 
Industrial,  Industrialism,  Industry,  9, 

i4n.,  33,  34,  48,  91,  ii4,  132,  136,  i53, 


3SO 


INDEX 


155,  165,  167,  189,  221,  241,  247,  248, 

252;  -revolution,  103. 
Inequality,  26,  104,  143,  163,  206,  296. 
Infancy,  prolongation  of,  214,  309. 
Infanticide,  64,  154. 
Ingenuity,  179. 
Inheritance,  ZZ,  57,  67,  69, 154, 178,  245. 

See  also  Use-inheritance. 
Initiative,  287. 
Injustice,  144. 
Innovation,  Innovator,   136,   178,   229, 

235,  257,  274,  295,  325,  328. 
Insects,  63-65. 
Instinct,  Instinctive,  9,  25,  57,  63,  65, 

77,  78,  81,  83,  87,  159,  163,  194,  216, 

231,  238,  244,  257,  308,  321. 
Institutions,  33,  36,  83,  100,  103,  105, 

116,  125,  126,  127,  135,  152,  153,  161, 

174,  175,  191,  197,  206,  226,  240,  272, 

274,  308,  327,  330,  331. 
Integration,  20,  32,  35,  36, 128, 186,  322, 

327. 
Integrity,  87. 
Intellect,  Intellectual,  15,  21,  25,  27,  39, 

64,  65,  79, 105, 113, 115, 134, 177,  209, 

217,  222. 
Intelligence,  23,  39,  82,  94,  100,  124, 

131  n.,  169,  179,  194,  200,  210,  211, 

224,  270,  274,  275,  276,  282,  311,  312. 
Intemperance,  119. 
Interests,  10,  11,  21,  31,  113,  126,  132, 

136,  142,  170-178,  248,  310,  311,  321, 

326,  327;  self-,  90,  91,  174,  182,  183, 

241,  261,  277,  280.    See  also  Conflict 

of  interests. 
Interference,  297. 
Intuition,    Intuitional,    Intuitionalism, 

105,  108,  173,  254,  303,  329  n. 
Invention,  161,  187,  197,  221-267,  311. 

See  also  Innovation. 
Isolation,  59,  61,  68,  73,  77, 112, 118, 157, 

169. 

James,  W.,  146,  287-291. 
Judgment,  154,  183,  194,  306,  325. 
Justice,  129, 154,  163, 168,  246,  274,  279, 
294. 


Keller,  A.  G.,  316,  317  n. 
Kingdom  of  God,  256,  329. 
Knowing,  Knowledge,  3,  20,  109,  131, 
154,  164,  169,  239,  277,  330. 

Labor,  Laborers,  104,  120, 156, 186,  247- 
249,  258.    See  also  Division  of  labor. 

Laissez  faire,  40,  85,  152,  183,  281. 

Lamarck,  J.  B.,  21,  30,  56-58,  70,  314. 

Language,  33,  63  n.,  114,  116,  117,  137, 
151,  158,  163,  228,  272. 

Lapouge,  V.,  99-102. 

Law,  43,  47,  91,  136,  142;  definition  of, 
17,  no;  biological  or  organic,  57,  76; 
cosmic  or  natural,  15,  17,  22,  23,  24, 
32,  34,  44,  85,  86,  107,  108,  162-165, 
185,  201,  212,  225,  274 n.;  divine,  245, 
259,  312;  economic,  248-250;  Men- 
delian,  72,  73;  mental,  23,  27,  104- 
106,  192-199;  moral,  24;  penal,  254; 
social,  21-26,  106,  140,  164,  167,  170, 
185-192,  277;  statistical,  44;  of  the 
Three  Periods,  16,  17,  20,  26. 

Leader,  Leadership,  128,  177,  268. 

Leisure,  3,  112,  242,  260. 

Liberal,  Liberalism,  30,  206,  278. 

Liberty,  36,  118,  206,  281,  332.  See  also 
Freedom. 

Life,  19,  34,  57,  118,  127,  132,  170,  213, 
234,  245,  277,  287,  308,  324,  328,  332; 
duration  of,  21,  88;  life-force,  125; 
simple,  248;  spiritual,  124. 

Like-mindedness,  203-205.  See  also 
Conciousness  of  kind. 

Lilienfeld,  P.  von,  47-49,  123,  126,  151. 

Literature,  no,  228,  272,  301. 

Loyalty,  235,  274,  279,  290. 

Logic,  Logical,  18,  43,  5°,  105,  159,  190, 
260. 

Love,  12,  25, 153, 172, 181,  200,  201,  242, 
270,  271,  306,  328. 

Luck,  152,  308. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  30,  58. 

Mackenzie,  J.  S.,  123,  128-133,  319  n» 
Mackintosh,  R.,  16,  39. 
Maine,  Sir  Henry,  178. 
Malthus,  T.  R.,  58,  64,  248,  253. 


INDEX 


3SI 


Man,  25,  87,  132,  146,  206,  222;  aver- 
age man,  45,  198,  301;  origin  of,  79, 
208-213;  see  also  Primitive;  Great 
Man  theory,  160,  219,  283-286. 

Marriage,  59,  93,  96,  no,  118,  258. 

Marx,  Kari,  103-105,  181. 

Masses,  87,  132,  134,  136,  137,  153. 

Material,  Materialism,  Materialistic,  13, 
15,  20,  103,  127,  146,  227,  331. 

Maternity,  200. 

Matter,  19,  41,  162,  208,  211,  320. 

McDougall,  Wm.,  146,  201,  211,  308, 
321  n. 

Mechanical,  Mechanism,  Mechanistic, 
38,  124,  138,  168,  170,  190,  208,  230. 

Meliorism,  132,  248. 

Memory,  63,  237. 

Mendel,  Mendelian,  71-73,  88,  116,  314. 

Mental,  93,  124,  148,  155,  228.  See  also 
Capacity;  Laws,  mental. 

Merit,  250. 

Metaphysics,  Metaphysical,  15-20,  246. 

Method,  7,  13,  15,  17,  41-51.  See  also 
modifying  word. 

Methodology,  41-51. 

Might,  84,  153-155- 

Migration,  112,  113,  118,  175,  273. 

Militarism,  Militancy,  Military,  4, 14  n., 
7,^y  100,  128,  135,  262  n.,  292. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  13,  17,  42,  182. 

Mind,  23,  41,  107,  III,  130,  151,  162, 
186,  206,  210,  211,  234  n.,  320,  331; 
general,  23,  26;  social,  17,  133-147, 
206,  318. 

Misery,  91,  250. 

Mob,  194. 

Moderation,  177. 

Modification,  23,  74,  79,  113,  221,  223, 
237.    See  also  Variation. 

Monism,  Monistic,  22,  125,  146,  162, 
208,  210,  212,  213,  214,  233,  309,  310. 

Monogamy,  36,  159. 

Monopoly,  255. 

Montesquieu,  Baron  de,  13,  15,  21. 

Moral,  Morals,  Morality,  15,  20,  22,  34, 
37,  65,  80,  81-85,  95 11-,  100,  106,  109- 
iio,  152,  159,  163,  168,  174,  206,  216, 
242,  247*272,  32611. 


Mores,  140,  231,  254,  310. 

Morgan,  T.  H.,  63,  66  n.,  69. 

Motive,  125  n.,  159,  174,  202,  243,  251, 

254,  260,  272. 
Motor,  239. 
Miinsterberg,  H.,  191. 
Mutation,  63,  70,  209,  288. 
Mutual  aid,  78,  125. 
Mystery,  153,  185,  212,  303,  307,  309. 
Mysticism,  275,  308,  309. 

Nation,  National,  Nationality,  23,  32, 
44,  93-99,  "7,  127,  134,  138,  144,  158, 
175,  179,  189,  224,  234,  241,  246,  255, 
256,  272,  280. 

Nature,  Natural,  Naturalism,  19,  20,  59, 
no,  112,  115,  119,  126  n.,  129,  132, 
222,  304;  "  Natiure  v.  Nurtiu:e,"  92- 
99,  116-119,  232;  niggardliness  of, 
247. 

Needs,  5,  57,  129  n.,  131,  136,  159,  187, 
213,  234,  280,  293,  310,  325.  See  also 
Desires,  Interests. 

Negro,  94,  156  n.,  158. 

Neo-Darwinian,  93,  152,  159,  237,  245, 
281,  294,  315-317. 

Neo-Lamarckian,  207,  222,  237. 

Nietzsche,  F.,  80-85,  91,  loi,  191,  253. 

Nordau,  Max,  94,  288  n. 

Norm,  Normal,  89,  136,  140,  143,  148, 

153. 

Novicow,  J.,  202,  268-282,  319,  320, 
32411. 

Nurture,  116.  See  also  Education,  En- 
vironment, "  Nature  v.  Nurture." 

Nutrition,  116,  199. 

Obedience,  284,  305. 

Observation,  19,  23,  42,  46,  153. 

Occupation,  114,  116,  119. 

Opinion,  22,  205;  public,  261,  294,  296, 

306. 
Opportunism,  21,  24. 
Opportunity,  144,  155-159,  280,  296, 316. 
Opposition,  185,  187,  198. 
Oratory,  301. 
Order,  15,  19,  20,  131  n.,  132,  178,  212, 

294,  299,  302,  328. 


352 


INDEX 


Organic,  i8,  20,  47,  $6,  125,  127,  212; 

super-organic,   32-33;    quasi-organic, 

221.    See  also  Evolution,  organic. 
Organism,  91, 129, 173;  biological,  8,  19, 

23>  55-57,  78,  188;    quasi-biological, 

31;    fictitious,  18;    psychological,  23; 

quasi-psychological,    41;     social,    16, 

23-28,  30-35,  47-49,  87-89,  123-147, 

185. 
Organization,  31,  32,  33,  39,  62,  84,  87, 

91,  132,  144,  155,  175,  215,  255,  270, 

280,  322,  324,  329. 
Origin,  of  man,   78,   79,   150,   162,  see 

Primitive;  of  species,  56-78,  164-170; 

see  Evolution,  biological;  social  origins, 

41,  163. 
Osbom,  H.  P.,  7,  61. 

Pain,  79  n.,  128,  130,  153, 183,  184,  216, 

227,  240,  272,  274,  279. 
Pangenesis,  67. 
Palmer,  G.  H.,  280. 
Parallelism,  211  n.,  212,  239. 
Parasite,  295. 
Parties,  126,  331. 
Pascal,  16,  127. 
Passion,  302. 
Paternalism,  no. 
Pathological,  Pathology,  42,   8  120, 123, 

128. 
Patriotism,  235,  252. 
Patten,  Simon  N.,  236-244. 
Peace,  267,  331. 
Pearson,  Karl,  92-99,  326. 
Perfect,  Perfection,  37,  126,  130,  215, 

226,  238,  280,  292,  301,  319  n. 
Person,  Personal,  195-199,  274,  294,  306, 

307,  331. 

Personalism,  233,  321;  social,  320-331. 

Personality,  15,  16,  48,  143,  145,  148, 
149,  175,  189,  195,  205,  284,  307-310, 
327;  quasi-personality,  45,  48,  196, 
198,  311,  326,  328,  331;  cosmic,  225; 
divine,  307;  social,  48,  145,  148,  149, 
196-198,  320-325. 

Personification,  307-309. 

Persuasion,  277,  325. 

Phenomenal,  16,  171. 


Philosophy,  Philosophical,  25,  82,  124, 
211;  social,  3-10,  14,  181,  192,  211- 
213,  228,  234,  235,  271,  299,  325,  326. 

Pigmentation,  55,  114,  118. 

Play,  195,  206. 

Pleasure,  79  n.,  128,  130,  153,  183,  184, 
231,  234,  238-244,  255,  256,  272,  274, 
277,315,32411. 

Pluralism,  146,  189,  287. 

Poets,  Poetry,  276,  300. 

Political,  Politics,  14  n.,  21,  22,  23,  24, 
33,  48-49,  113,  179,  206,  247,  296,  331; 
factors,  47,  49;  institutions,  100;  op- 
portunism, 21;  parties,  100, 113;  prog- 
ress, 35;  power,  272,  280. 

Pomp,  295. 

Poor,  Poverty,  91,  112,  296. 

Population,  20,  21,  33,  58,  64,  116,  118, 
132,  163,  167,  175,  179,  248,  250,  330. 

Positive,  Positivism,  12-20,  128. 

Posterity,  126. 

Power,  20,  64,  88, 154, 159,  241,  327,  328. 

Pragmatic,  Pragmatism,  26,  169,  170, 
233,  287,  328. 

Prayer,  290,  312. 

Pressure,  social,  38,  167,  177,  306. 

Prevision,  269. 

Primitive,  6,  17,  32,  84,  87,  90,  107,  114, 
134,  151,  152,  155,  162,  178,  209,  255, 
307,  311,  315. 

Principle,  20,  179,  181. 

Process,  the  cosmic,  208,  215,  245;  the 
social,  32, 126, 127;  see  also  Evolution, 
Progress;  society  as  a,  145. 

Production,  Productivity,  2,2,,  113,  138, 
153,  167,  176,  213,  221-263,  269-271, 
278,  280,  329,  330. 

Profit,  295. 

Progress,  3-1 1,  13,  19-25,  32,  34,  65,  82, 
86,  106,  109,  118,  128,  132,  136,  153, 
155-159,  165,  183,  190,  229,  240,  243, 
291-295,  298,  299;  tests  of,  20-25,  34, 
36,  214,  234,  245-255,  275,  297,  323- 
331.  See  also  Development,  Evolu- 
tion. 

Promiscuity,  36.    See  also  Family. 

Propaganda,  270,  278. 

Property,  176,  250-251, 


INDEX 


353 


Prophecy,  Prophet,  27,  324,  330. 

Proportionality,  law  of,  248,  307. 

Prosperity,  167,  176,  183. 

Providence,  188. 

Psychic,  Psychical,  Psychological,  Psy- 
chology, 9,  20,  22,  33,  38,  41,  74,  105, 
108,  114,  123,  125,  127,  133,  167,  192, 
210,  215,  234,  236,  256,  261,  269,  327. 

Punishment,  141,  142. 

Purpose,  Purposeful,  9,  37,  79,  loi,  124, 
125,  128,  144,  145,  171,  194,  204,  221, 
260,  269,  319,  327. 

Qu^telet,  L.  A.  J.,  43-46,  106. 

Race,  21,  22,  106,  115-120,  133-137, 
164,  17s,  178,  180,  194,  209,  223,  224, 
240,  244,  260,  281,  315,  318;  definition 
of,  99,  116,  133;  degeneration  or  ex- 
tinction of,  95,  96,  98,  99,  135,  166, 
224,  259;  improvement  of,  81,  93, 10 1, 
103,  118,  224-226,  261,  330;  survival 
of,  36;  variability  of,  94;  race-cross- 
ing, 119,  158.    See  also  Cross-breeding. 

Rational,  28,  29,  129,  154,  159,  202,  206. 
See  also  Reflective. 

Ratzel,  F.,  111-115. 

Ratzenhofer,  Gustav,  21,  146,  170-178, 
187,  234. 

Real,  Reality,  Realism,  27,  38,  50,  138, 
146,  149,  299,  301;  social  realism,  22, 

23,  47,  138,  144,  327- 
Reason,  24,  48,  59,  63,  90,  91,  131,  132, 

174.    See  also  Intellect. 
Recapitulation,  23,  48,  126,  197. 
Recognition,  204. 
Reconstruction,  5,  16,  23,  207. 
Reflection,  Reflective,  153, 193,  204,  207, 

302,  320,  323,  326,  329. 
Reflex,  78,  134. 
Reformer,  9,  257. 

Regeneration,  social,  6,  92-102,  224. 
Regress,  292. 
Relativism,  Relativity,  3,  12,  20,  21,  27, 

37,  38,  85,  104,  no,  288,  301. 
Religion,  Religious,  20,  25,  34,  37,  63,  81, 

90-93,  96,  100,  no,  125,  136,  137, 141, 

163,  169,  180,  198,  200,  209,  215,  217, 


235,  242,  245,  252,  272,  286,  299-313, 
325;  social,  294,  303,  308. 

Rent,  249. 

Reorganization,  14,  189.  See  also  Re- 
construction. 

Repentance,  260. 

Reproduction,  171,  199. 

Resignation,  169. 

Responsibility,  213,  250,  326. 

Responsiveness,  203. 

Restraint,  144.    See  also  Constraint. 

Retrogression,  36.  See  also  Degenera- 
tion. 

Reverence,  308,  309. 

Revolution,  industrial,  103,  104. 

Rhythm,  39, 242, 2  70, 2  79.  See  also  Cycle. 

Ricardo,  D.,  249. 

Rich,  Riches,  254,  259,  272,  274,  280. 
See  also  Wealth. 

Right,  Rights,  84,  126  n.,  138,  140-143, 
152,  153,  163,  168,  198,  257,  271,  273. 

Ripley,  W.  Z.,  1 15-120. 

Rite,  152. 

Rivaby,  87,  241,  255,  263,  268,  278,  280, 
282.  See  also  Conflict,  Competition, 
Struggle. 

Ross,  E.  A.,  4,  27, 155,  291-297, 301-304. 

Rousseau,  J.  J.,  13,  15. 

Royce,  J.,  30,  213  n. 

Sacrifice,  85,  88,  90,  91,  92,  302,  311,  322, 

331.  ^ 

Saint-Simon,  13,  14  n.,  16. 

Sanctions,  85,  92;  biblical,  262;  per- 
sonal, 198;  religious,  256;  social,  198; 
super-rational,  27,  90,  92. 

Satisfaction,  131,  329. 

Savage,  Savagery,  151,  216,  223.  See 
also  Primitive. 

Scarcity,  economic,  245-260. 

Schaffle,  A.,  47,  123-128,  133,  138,  146. 

School,  140,  154,  189,  217. 

Schopenhauer,  A.,  82,  229. 

Science,  Scientific,  16,  17,  18,  85,  125, 
158,  200,  211,  228,  234,  268,  272,  276, 
304;  Christian,  290;  hierarchy  of,  17, 
49;  historical,  28,  105;  natural,  162; 
social,  4,  8,  49>  128,  x86,  248. 


354 


INDEX 


Security,  278. 

Segregation,  117,  296. 

Selection,  242,  258,  297;  artificial,  71, 
loi,  117,  120,  258;  conscious,  157; 
germinal,  69;  natural,  33,  39,  50,  59- 
68,  73-79,  82,  87,  118,  I2S,  169,  185, 
193,  211,  225,  237;  organic,  75,  193; 
sexual,  59,  66,  118;  social,  92-101, 
115,  118,  153,  154,  164,  241,  255,  316- 
318;  urban,  118. 

Self,  Selves,  iii,  130,  146,  280,  304,  305, 

324,  327- 

Self-consciousness,  see  Consciousness. 

Self-denial,  85. 

Self -development,  170,  324-326. 

Self-esteem,  301. 

Selfish,  Selfishness,  200,  214,  321. 

Self-preservation,  126  n.,  324. 

Self-realization,  133,  170,  319  n. 

Self-satisfaction,  311,  325. 

Semple,  Ellen  C,  111-115. 

Sensation,  Sensory,  187,  237,  239. 

Sentiment,  21,  82,  134,  136,  140,  175, 
183,  191,  222,  236,  273,  306;  self- 
regarding,  91,  147,  149,  221,  261,  326; 
of  safety,  232. 

Service,  242,  259,  274,  301,  324. 

Sex,  Sexual,  142,  154,  178,  200,  223,  244. 
See  also  Selection,  sexual. 

Skill,  330. 

Slavery,  Slaves,  no,  113,  154,  176,  178, 

250,  271,  295. 

Small,  A.  W.,  21,  son.,  124. 

Smith,  A.,  13,  182-184. 

Social  {see  in  Index  the  particular  word 

modified  by  this  adjective). 
Socialism,  Socialistic,  90,  96,  133,  244, 

251,  308. 
Sociality,  216,  294. 
Socialization,  187. 

Society,  Societies,  16,  19,  31,  45,  47,  48, 
82,  120,  123,  127,  139,  145,  168,  196- 
198,  201,  274,  296,  323,  326,  331. 

Sociological,  Sociology,  3-11,  17,  31,  42, 
87,  120,  139,  163,  167,  186,  222,  227, 
233,  245.  See  also  Philosophy,  social, 
Science,  social. 

Sodtis,  150,  206,  327, 


Solidarity,    138-143,    193,     276,     279, 

303. 

Solitude,  298. 

Soul,  133,  136,  185,  215,  216,  222. 

Specialization,  223,  322.  See  also  Indi- 
viduality. .  -^ 

Species,  9,  19,  31,  44,  56,  62,  69,  89,  215; 
modification  of,  78,  86;  origin  of,  56- 
78,  164,  170,  189,  215;  unit  in  selec- 
tion, 63,  69,  77,  90. 

Speech,  209. 

Spencer,  H.,  6,  17,  23,  29-40,  41,  49,  50, 
63,  106,  123,  124,  128,  152,  157,  162, 
217,  253,  275  n.,  287,  313. 

Spirit,  Spiritual,  Spiritualistic,  15,  24, 
124,  127,  148,  212,  227;  see  under 
Adaptation,  Environment,  Life. 

Spontaneous,  193. 

Sport,  230,  235,  288. 

Standard,  5,  38,  62,  109,  144,  152,  153, 

260,  302;  of  living,  241,  250,  263.  See 
also  Test. 

State,  134,  140,  144,  178,  236,  278,  281, 

295,  322.    See  also  Nation. 
Static,  3,  19,  31,  89,  146-147. 
Statistics,  43-46,  105,  143,  186. 
Stature,  114,  116. 
Status,  178. 
Stratification,  117,  134. 
Structure,  26,  32,  62,  123,  127,  142,  145, 

157,  170,  194,  223,  226. 
Struggle,  168, 171, 174-176, 226, 243, 246- 

261,  268-282;  class,  103-105, 164-165; 
economic,  255-256,  270;  for  achieve- 
ment, 199;  for  development,  171;  for 
excellence,  267-279, 320;  for  existence, 
3,  Z2„  59-70,  76  n.,  78,  79,  82,  86,  132, 
171,  238,  243,  246,  279;  for  the  life  of 
others,  199;  hierarchy  of,  267-279; 
inter-group,  36,  87,  96,  163,  263.  See 
also  Competition,  Conflict,  Mal-adap- 
tation.  Rivalry. 

Subsistence,  64,  89,  175,  177,  248. 
Success,  87,  213,  23s,  250,  275,  308,  316, 

325,  328. 
Suggestion,  186,  198,  230,  294,  305,  306. 

See  also  Imitation. 
Sumner,  W.  G.,  49,  I53-I5S.  388  n. 


INDEX 


355 


Super-group,  85,  245-263. 

Super-man,  80-85,  10 !• 

Supernatural,  Supematuralism,  239, 304. 

Super-organic,  33,  38,  123. 

Super-rational,  85-91. 

Superstition,  226,  295. 

Surplus,  47,  104,  231,  237-244,  250-254, 

Survival,  36,  152,  188,  239,  281,  292-294. 
See  also  Struggle,  Selection. 

Symbols,  39,  302. 

Sympathy,  3,  65,  182,  200-217,  271,  291, 
294,  302,  327. 

Synergy,  225,  226,  229. 

Synthesis,  19,  30,  137,  148,  201;  crea- 
tive, 224. 

Tarde,  G.,  137,  185-192. 

Taste,  154. 

Teacher,  9,  186,  249. 

Telic,  Teleological,  Teleology,  Telesis,  9, 
27j  38,  50,  125,  143,  160,  167,  188,  192, 
222,  227,  231,  234,  295.  See  also 
Purpose,  Purposeful. 

Temperament,  114,  144,  303. 

Temperance,  65. 

Tests,  of  good  and  true,  255,  287,  329; 
of  religion,  26,  329;  of  social  philo- 
sophy, 214,  329;  of  social  progress, 
see  Progress. 

Theism,  309. 

Theological,  Theology,  15,  17,  "20,  25, 
129. 

Thomas,  W.  L,  152  n.,  160. 

Thomson,  Sir  A.,  39,  70. 

Thomdike,  E.  L.,  151,  201. 

Thought,  136,  206,  233,  243,  269,  287, 

299,  305,  327. 
Tune,  113,  155,  271,  279,  282. 
Tolerance,  179. 
Tools,  33,  63,  228,  270. 
Trade,  free,  280. 
Tradition,  21,  27,  133,  205. 
Training,  23,  96,  144,  194,  255,  289,  316, 

330- 
Traits,  94,  155-158. 
Transcendental,  173-174,  309. 
Tropism,  78. 


Truth,  5,  25,  189,  214,  279,  287,  327, 
329- 

Type,  19,  44,  45,  46,  89,  94,  99,  115,  124, 
135,  139,  156,  180,  205,  206,  209,  276, 
301. 

Union,  Unity,  5,  6,  8, 15, 16,  30, 114, 127, 
131,  248,  287,  309;  kinds  of,  129-131; 
social,  23,  123,  126,  128,  133,  136,  137, 
142,  144,  147,  180,  198,  235,  323-330- 
See  also  Alliance,  Cooperation,  Federa- 
tion. 

Unit,  sociological,  23,  32,  123,  125,  153, 
189,  206,  236,  246,  249,  260,  272. 

Unlikeness,  205. 

Unselj&sh,  200. 

Urbanization,  100. 

Use-inheritance,  39,  56,  59,  64,  67,  75, 
95,  178,  222,  237. 

Utilitarian,  Utilitarianism,  5,  159,  254. 

Utility,  Utilization,  36,  63,  84,  88,  141, 
142,  152,  183,  202,  207,  222,  236,  241, 
257,  291,  295,  301,  325,  329. 

Utopias,  5,  loi,  299,  300. 

Value,  Valuation,  85,  104,  109,  125,  153, 
159,  212,  249,  303,  327. 

Vanity,  184. 

Variation,  Variability,  84,  107,  292,  325; 
biological,  45,  55,  60,  61,  70,  89,  94, 
107, 116, 164,  209,  288;  psychical,  215; 
social,  45,  113,  136,  157,  178,  185,  187, 
189,  229,  231,  235,  288,  325.  See  also 
Innovation,  Invention,  Genius. 

Variety,  63. 

Vice,  50,  66,  107,  118,  254.    ^ 

Vigor,  87,  93,  96. 

Volition,  145,  187,  204,  298. 

Wages,  104,  242,  248,  258. 
Wallace,  A.  R.,  59,  64,  67. 
War,  Warfare,  113,  134,  176,  247,  250, 

262,  263,  277,  302.    See  also  Conflict, 

Struggle. 
Ward,  Lester  F.,  4,  17,  21,  27,  31,  50, 

151,  213-215,  221-236,  311. 
Waste,  176,  241,  253,  258,  263,  329. 
Wealth,  3,  26,  104,  112,  138,  176,  213, 

228,  243,  251,  256,  274,  330. 


3S6 


INDEX 


Weismann,  A.,  56,  6411.,  67,  68-70,  86, 

88,  93,  96. 
Well-being,  Welfare,  25,  34,  no,  128, 

130,  131,  132,  143,  153,  184,  213,  229, 

240,  241,  256,  258,  260,  263,  297,  302, 

325,  326,  329-331- 
Wesley,  J.,  298. 
Westermarck,  E.,  159. 
Will,  82,  168,   17s,  186,  207;   free,  45, 

58,  106,  211,  213,  227,  233,  235,  286; 

see  Choice;  of  God,  ^t,  215,  245,  259, 


311;    to  live,  82-88,  106;    to  power, 
80-85,  17s;  social,  48,  17s,  207. 

Willing,  108,  131. 

Wisdom,  304. 

Woman,  275,  300,  301  n.;  suffrage,  257. 

Work,  231,  278. 

World,  34,  36,  129,  131,  133,  200. 

Worship,  301. 

Worth,  126,  285,  295,  325,  331. 

Wundt,  W.,  138. 


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